Garig v. Travis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TAMMY LEE GARIG

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 20-654-JWD-RLB

JEFFERY TRAVIS, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Attorney General Jeff Landry’s Rule

12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 49) filed by

Defendant Attorney General Jeff Landry (the “Attorney General” or “AG”). Plaintiff Tammy Lee

Garig (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. (Doc. 63.)1 The Attorney General filed a reply. (Doc. 67.)

Oral argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts alleged in

the Amended Supplemental Complaint for Damages (“Amended Complaint”) (Doc. 48), and the

arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, the

motions are granted.

I. Relevant Factual Background

Plaintiff in this civil rights action is Tammy Lee Garig, a former employee of the Village

of Wilson Police Department. (Doc. 48 at 2.) Defendants are (1) Jeffery Travis, Sheriff of East

Feliciana Parish, sued in his individual and official capacity; (2) Greg Phares, former Chief Deputy

of East Feliciana Parish, sued in his individual and official capacity; (3) William “Bill” Cox, an

Investigator with the Louisiana State Police, sued in his individual and official capacity; (4) Susan

L. Guillory, Town Clerk for the Village of Wilson, sued in her official capacity; and (5) Jeff

1 The other Defendants in this matter have also filed motions to dismiss. (See Doc. 51, Motion to Dismiss for Failure

to State a Claim by Susan L. Guillory; Doc. 52, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by William Cox; Doc.

58, Motion to Dismiss by Greg Phares and Jeffery Travis.) Plaintiff filed a consolidated opposition to the Defendants’

pending motions. (Doc. 63.)

Landry, head of the Louisiana Office of the Attorney General, “who has the duty to investigate the

collusion of the public bodies of the State of Louisiana.” (Id.) The Attorney General is sued in his

official capacity. (See id. at 1–2.)

The following factual allegations are taken from the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Doc.

48.) They are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. Thompson v. City of Waco, Tex., 764

F.3d 500, 502–03 (5th Cir. 2014). Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, they

are discussed here only as necessary to explain the Court’s decision.

In short, Plaintiff claims that the Defendants colluded with each other to wrongfully

investigate Plaintiff and maliciously prosecute her for payroll fraud. (Doc. 48 at 3–4, 31.)

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants’ conduct caused her to be wrongfully arrested

and falsely imprisoned, on December 6, 2019, for public payroll fraud, malfeasance in office, and

filing or maintaining false public records. (See id. at 23, 31.)

As a result of the above, Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) civil rights

violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 19862 (id. at 27–30); (2) civil rights violations under

the Louisiana Constitution (id. at 30–31); (3) malicious prosecution and abuse of process (id. at

31); (4) false imprisonment, wrongful arrest, and wrongful detention (id. at 31–32); (5) retaliatory

arrest in violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights under state and federal law (id. at 32); (6)

intentional infliction of emotional distress/mental anguish (id. at 32–33); (7) negligence under state

2 As to her § 1986 claim, Plaintiff alleges:

each Defendant, excluding JEFF LANDRY, had knowledge that the wrongs conspired to be done

by PHARES and their co-conspirators were about to be committed, and had power to prevent or aid

in preventing the commission of the same. Each Defendant, excluding JEFF LANDRY, neglected

and/or refused to do so, failing to prevent the wrongful acts complained of herein from being

committed. Thus each Defendant, excluding JEFF LANDRY, is liable to the Plaintiff for all

damages caused by the wrongful acts complained of herein. Each Defendant, excluding JEFF

LANDRY, intentionally failed to exercise reasonable diligence which would have prevented the

Plaintiff’s damages. Thus Plaintiff brings additional claims against Defendants under 42 USC §

1986.

(Doc. 48 at 29–30.)

tort law (id. at 33); and (8) trespass and invasion of privacy (id. at 33–34).3 The Attorney General

now moves to dismiss all claims asserted against him in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant

to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 49.)

II. Applicable Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard

Concerning the standard for Rule 12(b)(1) motions, the Fifth Circuit has explained:

Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a

party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case.

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1)

the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced

in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s

resolution of disputed facts.

The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that

jurisdiction does in fact exist.

When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions,

the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing

any attack on the merits . . . .

In examining a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the district court is empowered to consider

matters of fact which may be in dispute. Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the

plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

plaintiff to relief.

Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

“Federal pleading rules call for a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); they do not countenance dismissal of a

3 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 48) does not specify whether the following causes of action are brought under

federal law, state law, or both: malicious prosecution and abuse of process; false imprisonment, wrongful arrest, and

wrongful detention; and trespass and invasion of privacy.

complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v.

City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (citation omitted).

Interpreting Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Fifth Circuit has

explained:

The complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true)

(3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant

evidence of each element of a claim. “Asking for [such] plausible grounds to infer

[the element of a claim] does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading

stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal [that the elements of the claim existed].”

Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

Applying the above case law, the Western District of Louisiana has stated:

Therefore, while the court is not to give the “assumption of truth” to conclusions,

factual allegations remain so entitled. Once those factual allegations are identified,

drawing on the court’s judicial experience and common sense, the analysis is

whether those facts, which need not be detailed or specific, allow “the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

[Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)]; Twombly, 55[0] U.S. at 556. This

analysis is not substantively different from that set forth in Lormand, supra, nor

does this jurisprudence foreclose the option that discovery must be undertaken in

order to raise relevant information to support an element of the claim. The standard,

under the specific language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), remains that the defendant

be given adequate notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it is based. The

standard is met by the “reasonable inference” the court must make that, with or

without discovery, the facts set forth a plausible claim for relief under a particular

theory of law provided that there is a “reasonable expectation” that “discovery will

reveal relevant evidence of each element of the claim.” Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257;

Twombly, 55[0] U.S. at 556.

Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Oceanografia, S.A. De C.V., No. 10-00177, 2011 WL 938785, at *3

(W.D. La. Feb. 9, 2011) (citation omitted).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, all well-pleaded facts are taken as true and viewed in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Thompson v. City of Waco, Tex., 764 F.3d 500, 502–03

(5th Cir. 2014). The task of the Court is not to decide if the plaintiff will eventually be successful,

but to determine if a “legally cognizable claim” has been asserted. Id. at 503.

III. Parties’ Arguments

A. Attorney General Landry’s Original Memorandum (Doc. 49-1)

In his motion, the Attorney General seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against him on

three main grounds: (1) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),

and its progeny; (2) Plaintiff’s claims based on federal law, if any, are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment; and (3) all of Plaintiff’s claims are prescribed as a matter of law. (Doc. 49 at 2–3.)

As to the first ground, in his previous motion to dismiss (the “AG Motion”) (Doc. 40), the

Attorney General “incorporated the arguments found in the previous motions to dismiss filed by”

the other Defendants in this case, including their arguments that the Heck doctrine bars all of

Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff failed to plead any viable claims for relief under Rule 8(a).

(Doc. 49-1 at 6–7 (referencing Docs. 8, 12, and 20); see also Doc. 40-1 at 4.) The Attorney General

contends that these arguments remain applicable as to the Amended Complaint, despite “Plaintiff’s

removal and omission that she voluntarily entered into a pre-trial intervention program—a valid

conviction.” (Doc. 49-1 at 7.)4 Consequently, the Heck doctrine applies in this case and Plaintiff’s

claims against the Attorney General should be dismissed with prejudice. (Id.)

Regarding his second ground for dismissal, the Attorney General “asserts his Eleventh

Amendment immunity to any federal claims asserted against him.” (Id.)5 The Attorney General

thus contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any purported federal claims

against him, such that those claims should be dismissed with prejudice. (Id.)

4 The Attorney General notes in his memorandum that he “incorporates as if copied herein in extenso, the arguments

set forth in” Defendants’ previous motions to dismiss. (Doc. 49-1 at 7 (referencing Docs. 8, 12, and 20).)

5 The “Attorney General incorporates as if copied herein in extenso, the arguments set forth in the AG Motion as it

relates to his defense.” (Doc. 49-1 at 7, n.28 (citing Doc. 40-1 at 5–6).)

Third, the Attorney General argues that, even if the Court finds it has subject matter

jurisdiction over the claims asserted against him, “those claims (both federal and state) are still

prescribed as a matter of law because there are no new or different factual allegations asserted

against him in the Amended Complaint to support such claims.” (Id. at 8.)6

Additionally, the Attorney General notes that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to

remedy the pleading deficiencies detailed in numerous motions to dismiss and this Court’s Order.

(Id. at 5–6 (referencing Doc. 45).) As a result, the Attorney General “still does not have notice of

the claims against him and the grounds upon which each claim rests.’” (Id. at 6 (citing Weiland v.

Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015)).)

B. Plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. 63)

In her consolidated opposition, Plaintiff argues that, although Defendants seek dismissal

of her claims based on Heck, the doctrine “is not applicable” in Pre-Trial Intervention cases. (Doc.

63 at 9.) Specifically, Plaintiff urges that Defendants’ motions based on the Heck doctrine should

be denied in light of Thompson v. Clark, a case that is currently pending before the U.S. Supreme

Court:

The United States Supreme Court has granted a Petition for Certiorari on March 8,

2021, in Thompson v. Clark, 20-659, (2021) and heard oral argument on October

12, 20201 [sic] regarding the question of “Adjudicated Innocence” which is a

standard that the Supreme Court should overturn as it improperly attempts to have

an adjudication of innocence in a criminal proceeding injected into a civil

proceeding for constitutional rights violations. Additionally, the proof required

under Heck as espoused by Defendants in this matter improperly overlooks a

presumption of innocence in criminal law.

(Id. at 9–10.) Plaintiff represents that the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Thompson case to

resolve a division in this area of the law that has emerged from lower court opinions:

6 The Attorney General “incorporates as if copied herein in extenso, the arguments set forth in the AG Motion as it

relates to this defense.” (Doc. 49-1 at 8, n.29 (citing Doc. 40-1 at 6–8).)

The Supreme Court should address the [sic] will address Heck v. Humphery [sic]

because a majority of lower courts have wrongly decided that a termination

demonstrating innocence is an element of 1983 violations of constitutional claims.

Specifically, the Supreme Court has been asked to grant certiorari that no such

element (of proof of adjudicated innocence) exists in 1983 claims.

(Id. at 10 (citing Amicus Brief submitted in Thompson v. Clark).) Plaintiff highlights that, because

she entered a pre-trial diversion program, “there was no finding of guilt” and, moreover, “no

concession of guilt.” (Id.) She further argues:

The exception espoused by the Defendants all presume that Ms. Garig’s entering

into PTI attaches some culpability when PTI specifically avoids any finding of guilt

and inferences inapposite of that unfairly place a burden on a civil litigant that she

have a finding of innocence when it is generally impossible in the criminal justice

system and thus, this Court should deny dismissing the claims of Ms. Garig on the

Heck exception at this point in the litigation to at least allow discovery to proceed

to afford the opportunity to show that she was pursued maliciously by Phares, Cox

and Wilson under the direction of the supervision of Sheriff and Attorney General

Landry.

(Id. at 12.)

Regarding the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss based on his immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff first cites to Fifth Circuit case law for the proposition that the Ex

Parte Young doctrine permits a plaintiff to “sue a state official in his official capacity if the suit

seeks prospective relief to redress an ongoing violation of federal law.’” (Id. at 14 (citing Williams

ex rel. J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 735–36 (5th Cir. 2020)).) Plaintiff then asserts that state

actions, such as the actions that form the basis of her claims against the Attorney General, can

properly be subject of § 1983 claims. (Id. at 15 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).)

Finally, in opposing the Attorney General’s prescription argument, Plaintiff restates the

response provided in her opposition to the previous AG Motion. (Compare Doc. 63 at 16, with

Doc. 44 at 3.) In short, the alleged actions of the Attorney General which form the basis of

Plaintiff’s claims did not culminate into a violation of law until her arrest; accordingly, her claims

are timely. (Doc. 63 at 16.)

C. Attorney General Landry’s Reply (Doc. 67)

The Attorney General first reiterates that, despite being afforded another opportunity to

state a legally cognizable claim, the Amended Complaint contains numerous defects that are

incurable or that Plaintiff is unable to amend to avoid dismissal. (Doc. 67 at 1–2.)

Next, the Attorney General maintains that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck. (Id. at 2.)

The Attorney General notes that, while not referenced in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

specifically asserts in her opposition that she entered into a pretrial diversion program in January

2020. (Id. at 2 (citing Doc. 63 at 8).) Thus, the Heck doctrine applies. (Id.)7 The Attorney General

also rejects Plaintiff’s reliance on the arguments raised in the amicus brief filed in Thompson v.

Clark because “[a]s discussed at length by the other Defendants in their respective reply

memoranda, Thompson is factually and legally distinguishable from the case at bar because

Plaintiff’ [sic] underlying criminal case did not terminate in her favor.” (Id. at 2–3 (referencing

Docs. 64, 65, and 66).) The Attorney General urges that Plaintiff’s suit should be dismissed based

on Heck alone. (Id. at 3.)

Third, the Attorney General argues that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for the

additional reason that they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Id.) “Plaintiff does not provide

any substantive arguments as to why immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable,”

according to the Attorney General. (Id.) “Moreover, Plaintiff has not asserted a claim for injunctive

relief in her Amended Complaint, much less a claim for prospective injunctive relief for the Ex

7 The Attorney General “incorporates as if copied herein in extenso the arguments set forth in the reply memoranda

filed by” Defendants Guillory, Cox, Travis, and Phares “regarding application of the Heck doctrine and Thompson v.

Clark to the instant matter.” (Doc. 67 at 2 (referencing Docs. 64, 65, and 66).)

parte Young exception to apply.” (Id.) Finally, the Attorney General notes that the cases cited in

Plaintiff’s opposition “do not provide Plaintiff the legal precedent to overcome” his Eleventh

Amendment immunity. (Id. (referencing Doc. 65 at 5).)

In response to Plaintiff’s prescription argument, the Attorney General notes that Plaintiff

does not cite any law or facts to support the contention that her action against him did not culminate

into a violation of law until her arrest. (Id. at 3–4.) The Attorney General concludes:

Plaintiff cannot overcome Attorney General Landry’s defenses raised in his first or

second motion to dismiss, and she has not met the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

8 and 10 as to how the reformatted factual allegations in the Amended Complaint

support the many confusing causes of action asserted, and how those allegations

support legally cognizable claims as to the Attorney General.

(Id. at 4.) He thus argues that Plaintiff’s claims against him should be dismissed with prejudice.

(Id. at 4–5.)

IV. Discussion

A. Shotgun Pleading

The Court notes at the outset of its analysis that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails

to meet the pleading standards established by Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, as the Attorney General correctly argues in support of his motion. (See Doc. 49-1 at 5–

6.) In its prior ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court laid out in detail the numerous

pleading deficiencies in Plaintiff’s original Complaint. (See Doc. 45.) The Court declines to revisit

those deficiencies in detail again here. Simply put, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, like its

predecessor, is a shotgun pleading that fails to give Defendants notice of the claims against them

and the grounds upon which each claim rests violation of Rules 8 and 10. (See id. at 30–33.) And

while the Amended Complaint could be dismissed on this basis alone, the Court will address the

more substantive issues with the Amended Complaint that justify its dismissal with prejudice under

Rule 12.

B. Heck v. Humphrey bars Plaintiff’s claims

The Attorney General essentially argues that Plaintiff’s claims against him are barred by

Heck’s favorable termination requirement. Again, he contends that Plaintiff’s participation in a

pretrial intervention program equates to a judgment terminating the criminal matter adverse to

Plaintiff. While reference to Plaintiff’s participation in this pretrial intervention program is now

conspicuously absent from the operative complaint, it is referenced in Plaintiff’s opposition.

Specifically, Plaintiff attached the following as exhibits to her opposition: (1) the U.S. Supreme

Court’s Order granting certiorari in Thompson v. Clark (Doc. 63-1); (2) an amicus curiae brief

submitted in Thompson v. Clark (Doc. 63-2); (3) Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Intervention Agreement for

her misdemeanor theft charge (Doc. 63-3); (4) the warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest (Doc. 63-4); and

(5) a letter from the District Attorney informing Plaintiff that her misdemeanor theft charge was

dismissed based on Plaintiff’s completion of her probationary period on the Pre-Trial Intervention

Program (Doc. 63-5). The Attorney General does not object to Plaintiff’s exhibits in his reply brief.

(See Doc. 67.) Thus, the Court will consider these documents, particularly those related to

Plaintiff’s entrance in and completion of the Pre-Trial Intervention Program, in ruling on the

instant motion.8

8 On a motion to dismiss, the court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, ‘documents incorporated into

the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.’” Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd.

P’ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. June 12, 2018) (quoting Wolcott v.

Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011)). The Fifth Circuit has approved district courts’ consideration of

documents attached to a motion to dismiss, when such documents are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are

central to the plaintiff’s claim. See Werner v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 441 F. App’x 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2011); Scanlan

v. Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–

99 (5th Cir. 2000). The Court notes that some of the documents Plaintiff attached as exhibits to her opposition are not

referenced in the Amended Complaint and are not necessary for this Court to decide the present motion. Nevertheless,

the Court will consider Plaintiff’s exhibits as they are public records of which the Court may take judicial notice or

are otherwise central of Plaintiff’s claims against the Attorney General.

The Court’s prior ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss provided a detailed discussion

of the standards for the Heck doctrine and its favorable termination requirement. (See Doc. 45 at

34–38.) This Court specifically stated:

[U]nder Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 . . . (1994), a plaintiff who has

been convicted of a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his

constitutional rights if the alleged violation arose from the same facts attendant to

the charge for which he was convicted, unless he proves “that his conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S.

at 486–87; Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Sappington v.

Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1999). “Heck requires the district court to

consider ‘whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has

already been invalidated.’ ” Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1995)

(citation omitted). This requirement or limitation has become known as the

“favorable termination rule.” Sappington, 195 F.3d at 235.

(Id. at 34–35.) Of particular importance to this motion was the Court’s discussion of pretrial

diversion programs in the context of Heck:

The Fifth Circuit considers voluntary participation in a pretrial diversion program

to be a “conviction” for purposes of Heck. See Elphage v. Gautreaux, 969 F. Supp.

2d 493, 506 (M.D. La. 2013) (“The Fifth Circuit has joined the Third and Second

Circuits in treating pretrial intervention programs as convictions under Heck.”).

Moreover, the dismissal of charges after the completion of a pretrial program does

not constitute a termination of the criminal proceedings in favor of the plaintiff. See

Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The rule in this circuit ... is that

proceedings terminate in favor of the accused only when they affirmatively indicate

that he is not guilty.”), abrogated on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352

F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003).

(Id. at 36.) This Court then applied the foregoing precedent to Plaintiff’s Complaint and found that

Plaintiff’s participation in a Pre-Trial Intervention program constitutes a conviction under Heck.

(Id. at 37–38.) Specifically, this Court held: “Plaintiff’s criminal charge for theft was dismissed

following her completion of a PTI program. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s completion of that program

shows that her criminal charge did not terminate in her favor. Therefore, any claim that questions

the validity of those proceedings is barred by Heck.” (Id. at 37–38 (footnote omitted).) This Court

further found that all of Plaintiff’s claims, state and federal, were barred by Heck. (See id. at 41–

48.)

In opposing the instant motion, Plaintiff urges this Court to reject the Attorney General’s

arguments regarding applicability of the Heck doctrine based on the Thompson v. Clark case that

is currently pending before the Supreme Court. (See Doc. 63 at 9–12.) Plaintiff’s objections

regarding the current showing required to bring a Section 1983 claim and how the Supreme Court

“should” rule in Thompson notwithstanding, this Court is bound to apply controlling precedent.

Under that authority, Plaintiff’s voluntary participation in a Pre-Trial Intervention program is

equivalent to a conviction under Heck. See Elphage, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 506; see also Bates v.

McKenna, 2012 WL 3309381, at *4–5 (W.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012).

Having carefully considered the matter, the Court finds that the claims asserted against the

Attorney General in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are barred by Heck. Importantly, Plaintiff has

not alleged or identified any facts suggesting that her conviction—that is, her participation in the

Pre-Trial Intervention program—was reversed on direct appeal, expunged, declared invalid, or

otherwise called into question in a habeas proceeding. Thus, for the same reasons outlined in the

Court’s prior ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court is compelled to conclude that

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims may not proceed because a judgment in her favor would necessarily

imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction. (See Doc. 45 at 41–47.) Additionally, since Plaintiff’s

state law claims arise from the same facts that resulted in her conviction, and that conviction has

not been reversed or invalidated, Plaintiff’s state law claims against the Attorney General are

similarly barred by Heck. (See id. at 48 (citing Lowell v. Ard, No. 17-187, 2019 WL 4855150, at

*3 (M.D. La. Oct. 1, 2019); Price v. City of Bossier, 841 F. App’x 650, 654 (5th Cir. 2021)).)

C. Sovereign Immunity

1. Applicable Law

“Section 1983 provides a private right of action for damages to individuals who are

deprived of ‘any rights, privileges, or immunities’ protected by the Constitution or federal law by

any ‘person’ acting under the color of state law.” Stotter v. Univ. of Texas at San Antonio, 508

F.3d 812, 821 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “The Supreme Court has ‘held that a

State is not a “person” against whom a § 1983 claim for money damages might be asserted.’” Med.

RX/Sys., P.L.L.C. v. Texas Dep’t of State Health Servs., 633 F. App’x 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2016)

(citing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002)). “This rule

extends to ‘arms of the state,’ and to a state’s ‘officials acting in their official capacities.’” Id.

(citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).

Nevertheless, “[i]n Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court carved out

an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Aguilar v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 160 F.3d

1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). “The [Ex Parte Young] Court held that enforcement of an

unconstitutional law is not an official act because a state can not confer authority on its officers to

violate the Constitution or federal law.” Id. (citing American Bank & Trust Co. of Opelousas v.

Dent, 982 F.2d 917, 920–21 (5th Cir. 1993)). “To meet the Ex Parte Young exception, a plaintiff’s

suit alleging a violation of federal law must be brought against individual persons in their official

capacities as agents of the state, and the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature

and prospective in effect.” Id. (citing Saltz v. Tenn. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 976 F.2d 966, 968 (5th

Cir. 1992)).

2. Analysis

The Attorney General argues that any federal law claims asserted against him in Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint should be dismissed based on his immunity from such claims under the

Eleventh Amendment. (See Doc. 49-1 at 7.) Plaintiff apparently does not dispute that the Attorney

General is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; rather, she attempts to overcome

this immunity by invoking the Ex Parte Young exception. (See Doc. 63 at 14–15.) Yet the

Amended Complaint does not reflect that the relief sought against the Attorney General that is

“declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect.” See Aguilar, 160 F.3d at 1054.

Instead, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint seeks recovery for various categories of monetary

damages against all Defendants. (See Doc. 48 at 34–38.)9 Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations are

insufficient to qualify for the Ex Parte Young exception to the rule of sovereign immunity. The

Court will therefore grant the Attorney General’s motion and dismiss all claims asserted against

him in his official capacity under Section 1983.

Having found that all of Plaintiff’s claims against the Attorney General are barred by the

Heck doctrine, sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, or both, it is not necessary

for the Court to address the Attorney General’s additional arguments for dismissal pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6).

V. Conclusion

Accordingly,

9 While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint concludes with a general prayer for “any and all

general, equitable, revocatory, and declaratory relief to which he [sic] is or may be entitled,” (Doc. 48 at 38), this

broad, non-specific prayer fails to state a valid claim for declaratory relief sufficient to overcome the Attorney

General’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant Attorney General Jeff Landry’s Rule 12(b)(1) and

Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 49) filed by the Attorney

General are GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Plaintiff’s claims against the Attorney General

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 22, 2022.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA