Garcia v. LeBlanc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOSE GARCIA (#633342) CIVIL ACTION NO.

VERSUS 20-785-JWD-EWD

JAMES M. LeBLANC, ET AL.

OPINION

This matter comes before the Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation, which, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, recommended Plaintiff’s

claims against James LeBlanc, as well as all claims arising from alleged violations of equal

protection, due process related to the original disciplinary proceedings, claims for injunctive relief

against Darryl Vannoy, Michael Jack, and Tammy Hendrickson in their individual capacities, and

state law claims arising under the Louisiana Constitution Article I, §§ 1, 3, and 20 be dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claims regarding the conditions of his confinement be dismissed without

prejudice subject to his right to file an amended complaint that cures, if and where possible, the

deficiencies of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims.1 The Report and Recommendation

recognized that, if Plaintiff was given an opportunity to amend, he may be able to state a claim

regarding the conditions to which he is subjected in “Control Cell Restriction,” (“CCR”) where he

is housed.2

1 R. Doc. 7.

2 R. Doc. 7, pp. 5-7.

After the issuance of the Report and Recommendation, in addition to filing an objection,3

Plaintiff filed Motions to Supplement and Amend,4 which attempt to cure the deficiencies of the

conditions of confinement claims, as noted in the Report and Recommendation.5 The Motions to

Amend will be granted in part. To the extent amendment is not allowed for conditions claims,

those claims will be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation will

be adopted in part and rejected to the extent it recommended dismissal without prejudice of the

conditions claims, as, due to the amendments, a determination regarding the viability of those

claims for screening purposes is now possible.

I. Standard of Review for Amendment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides the standard by which the Court must

evaluate a motion to amend pleadings. In determining whether to grant leave, a court may consider

several factors, including, “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of the amendment….”6 As

discussed below, amendment of the majority of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile, so Plaintiff will

not be permitted to amend the suit to add those futile claims.7

3 R. Doc. 10.

4 In actuality, both proposed pleadings are proposed amended, not supplemental, complaints because the conditions

existed prior to the filing of the original complaint and did not arise after the filing of the initial complaint. Dean v.

Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 302 (5th Cir. 1989) quoting 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice &

Procedure, § 1504 at 540 (1971) (“[a]mended and supplemental pleadings differ in two respects. The former relate

to matters that occurred prior to the filing of the original pleading and entirely replace the earlier pleading; the latter

deal with events subsequent to the pleading to be altered and merely represent additions to or continuations of the

earlier pleading.”).

5 R. Docs. 11 & 12.

6 Rhodes v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist., 654 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182

(1962)).

7 Though generally “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course,” to allow amendment for the claims

discussed herein that do not state a claim would be futile because those claims would then merely be subject to

dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.

II. Original Claims

With respect to the conditions of confinement claims, Plaintiff previously provided

relatively conclusory statements of sleep deprivation, living in fear, being deprived in general, and

regarding the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic.8 Plaintiff has expounded on the conditions

to which he is subject in his proposed amended complaints; each condition will be discussed in

turn.

III. Proposed Amended Claims

Plaintiff complains regarding the following conditions in his proposed amended

complaints: 23 hour per day cell confinement, limited outdoor recreation, lack of direct library and

law library access, limited contact visits, denial of religious services and gatherings, denial of

educational and therapy programs, inability to work to earn incentive wages, forced to have meals

alone, denial of normal contact with other inmates, Plaintiff is forced to share a cell block with

mentally ill prisoners who sometimes scream at night preventing Plaintiff from sleeping, he also

has occasional trouble sleeping due to a fear that he will have hot water or human waste thrown

on him, and the cell block is “extremely hot.”

Although some of these claims are true conditions of confinement claims, others invoke

other provisions of the Constitution and federal law., and others do not rise to the level of a

colorable federal claim at all Relative to the true conditions claims, the conditions under which a

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.9 An inmate must establish two elements—one

objective, one subjective—to prevail on a conditions of confinement claim.10 First, he must show

8 R. Doc. 1, p. 6. Some other conditions were noted in attachments to the Complaint, but the conditions that may rise

to the level of a constitutional violation were not sufficiently detailed. See R. Docs. 1-1, 1-2.

9 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).

10 Arenas v. Calhoun, 922 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 2019).

that the relevant official denied him “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and

exposed him “to a substantial risk of serious harm.”11 The “alleged deprivation” must be

“objectively serious.”12 Second, the prisoner must show “that the official possessed a subjectively

culpable state of mind in that he exhibited deliberate indifference” to the risk of harm.13 “Deliberate

indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.”14 “A prison official displays deliberate

indifference only if he (1) knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm and

(2) disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”15 This inquiry is “subject

to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.”16 A

“factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that

the risk was obvious.”17

The Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit

inhumane ones.”18 At a minimum, prison officials “must provide humane conditions of

confinement” and “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical

care.”19 They cannot deprive prisoners of the “basic elements of hygiene” or the “minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.”20 Prison conditions cannot inflict “wanton and

unnecessary” pain.21

To be clear, with respect to the below conditions, the only question before the Court now

is whether these conditions violate the Eighth Amendment, as the Magistrate Judge recommended

11 Id. (quotation marks omitted).

12 Id.

13 Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

14 Id., quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756.

15 Id. (quotation marks omitted).

16 Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004).

17 Id.

18 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).

19 Id.

20 Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352-53 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).

21 Id. at 351.

dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claims without prejudice subject to the Plaintiff’s right to

amend.22 The undersigned agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s assessment that the conditions in

CCR coupled with the length of time Plaintiff has been in CCR have given rise to a liberty interest

so as to invoke the protections of the due process clause,23 but the existence or absence of a liberty

interest for purposes of a due process analysis is not synonymous with finding allegations

sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.24

a. 23 Hours Per Day Cell Confinement and Restricted Outdoor Recreation

Plaintiff complains that he is confined to a cell 23 hours per day and only allowed three

hours of outdoor recreation per week.25 Confinement to a cell for 23 hours per day does not rise

to the level of a constitutional violation.26 Thus, because allowing Plaintiff amend his complaint

to bring this claim would be futile, Plaintiff will not be permitted to amend his complaint in this

regard.

22 R. Doc. 7.

23 R. Doc. 7, pp. 9-11.

24 In other words, deprivations may be sufficiently serious to warrant due process protections but insufficient to

constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and deprivations may be of such a nature to constitute a violation of

the Eighth Amendment but not of the nature to warrant due process protections. See Nichols v. Best, No. 15-2946,

2017 WL 3872488, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2017) (exposure to cold may implicate the Eighth Amendment but was

not sufficiently atypical to give rise to constitutional due process concerns); Hopkins v. Klindworth, 556 Fed.Appx.

497, 499 (7th Cir. 2014) (allegations of cold air seeping through a window stated an Eighth Amendment conditions

of confinement claim but not a due process claim). This is because the pertinent inquiry for a due process violation is

distinct from the necessary inquiry for an Eighth Amendment claim. With respect to whether a violation of due

process has occurred in a heightened confinement case, the first inquiry, simply put, is whether the confinement

imposes atypical and significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). If so, the second step is to determine whether the procedures attendant upon

the deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 409 U.S. 454, 460

(1989). Regarding violations of the Eighth Amendment due to the conditions in which an inmate is housed, the first

pertinent inquiry is whether the conditions are so deficient that they deprive the inmate of the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities so as to expose the inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm. Arenas v. Calhoun, 922

F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 2019). The second inquiry requires an inmate to show that the defendant possessed a

subjectively culpable state of mind. Id.

25 R. Docs. 11, p. 1; 12, p. 2.

26 Hill v. Pugh, 75 Fed.Appx. 715, 721 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that confinement for 23 hours per day five days a

week and 24 hours per day on the remaining two days is not unconstitutional because it shows neither an unquestioned

and serious deprivation of basic human needs nor intolerable or shocking conditions)).

Further, Plaintiff has not stated a claim regarding the amount of outdoor recreation he

receives. The Fifth Circuit has evaluated claims regrading deprivation of exercise on a case-by-

case basis using the following criteria: (1) the size of the inmate’s cell; (2) the amount of time the

inmate spends locked in his cell each day; and (3) the overall duration of the inmate’s

confinement.27 “[P]risoners have no absolute constitutional right to outdoor recreation, so long as

some form of exercise is permitted, or, the conditions of confinement, when viewed as a whole,

are not violative of the Eighth Amendment…. Even severe restrictions on or complete denials of

outdoor recreation are not prohibited by the Constitution.”28 Plaintiff is provided with outdoor

exercise three days per week and has failed to provide any facts indicating that the limit on the

amount of outdoor exercise he receives has had any detrimental effects to his health.29 Moreover,

the Fifth Circuit has found that one hour of outdoor exercise three days per week is constitutionally

sufficient.30 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of constitutional dimension with respect

to his complaints of being in a cell 23 hours per day and enjoying three days of outdoor recreation

per week for one hour per day, he will not be permitted to amend to add these claims.

b. Isolated Nature of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges that he is forced to eat alone and is denied all “normal” human contact

with other prisoners.31 Though in some instances, the harm caused by lack of human contact may

27 Hewitt v. Henderson, 271 Fed. App’x. 426, 428 (5th Cir. 2008).

28 Wingo v. Johnson, No. 12-14, 2012 WL 1390684, at *6 (W.D. La. March 21, 2012) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

29 See, Young v. Gusman, No. 12-2877, 2013 WL 4648478, at *12 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2013) (dismissing a claim

regarding limited outdoor exercise because the plaintiff had not sufficiently shown that the limited outdoor exercise

had caused any serious health hazard or deleterious effect to his health).

30 See McBride v. Bremer, 990 F.2d 1253, *2 (5th Cir. 1993) (“providing one hour of outdoor exercise three days a

week and permit[ting] inmates to move to the dayroom or stay in the cell for the majority of the day” is constitutionally

sufficient).

31 R. Doc. 11, p. 2.

violate the Eighth Amendment,32 the “isolation” described in this case does not rise to the level of

isolation sufficient for an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff is housed in a cell with “open

bars” surrounded by other inmates in close enough proximity to throw objects and communicate,33

and Plaintiff is allowed some contact visits with visitors outside of the prison.34 Further, Plaintiff

does not indicate he has suffered any harm from the “isolation.” The “isolation” described by

Plaintiff coupled with the fact that he has not suffered any articulable harm resulting from the

“isolation” leads the Court to conclude that Plaintiff cannot state a claim in this regard.35 Thus, he

will not be permitted to add this claim.

c. Sleep Deprivation

Plaintiff avers that he occasionally cannot sleep due to noise caused by other inmates and

out of fear that something will be thrown on him while he sleeps.36 Though sleep is a necessity,

Plaintiff’s sleep deprivation, as he describes it, stems from the inconvenience of prison life.37

Further, Plaintiff has failed to point to any injury stemming from the noises or from any sleep

deprivation, and courts have found that periodic loud noises that merely annoy, rather than injure,

32 See Irby v. Litscher, 2003 WL 23120126, *5 (W.D. Wisc. Sept. 23, 2003) (“harm caused by lack of human contact

and sensory stimulation may violate ‘contemporary standards of decency’ in some instances.”); Quintanilla v. Bryson,

730 Fed.Appx. 738, 747 (11th Cir. 2018) (allegation of lack of human contact stated claim for deprivation of basic

human needs under the Eighth Amendment); Harvard v. Inch, 411 F.Supp. 1220, 1239 (N.D. Fl. Oct 24, 2019).

33 R. Doc. 12, p. 3.

34 R. Doc. 12, p. 2.

35 Cases wherein the isolation experienced by an inmate was sufficient to constitute a violation of the Eighth

Amendment include circumstances such as solid cell doors, including only a small window to see through, no prisoners

in adjacent cells, eliminating the possibility of any communication between prisoners, absolutely no interaction with

other inmates, no contact with visitors, resulting in essentially no contact with any person except for incidental contact

with corrections officers. See, e.g., Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2019); Johnston v. Wetzel, 431

F.Supp.3d 666, 678-79 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2019). That is simply not the environment in CCR at LSP.

36 R. Doc. 11, p. 3.

37 Covarrubias v. Foxworth, No. 17-191, 2018 WL 817322, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2018) (“The Court does not

dispute the fact that sleep is a necessity; however, the effects of Covarrubias's sleep deprivation, as he describes them,

do not demonstrate the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Rather, Covarrubias's symptoms stemming from

his lack of sleep—depression, tiredness, poor concentration, headaches, high blood pressure, and restlessness—

illustrate the “inconvenience” of the prison's 24-hour schedule.”).

do not state a claim of constitutional dimension.38 Accordingly, Plaintiff will not be allowed to

amend the complaint with respect to this claim.

d. Extreme Heat

Plaintiff’s claim that his housing area is “extremely hot with little ventilation” also fails to

rise to the level of a constitutional violation.39 Although exposure to extreme heat is actionable

under certain circumstances, Plaintiff’s allegations in this case fall short of what is required to

establish a constitutional violation, as Plaintiff has only provided the Court with the conclusory

allegation of extreme heat. Purely conclusory allegations of excessive heat and inadequate

ventilation, without more, fail to implicate a federal constitutional right.40 Further, Plaintiff has

not indicated that he has suffered from any heat related injuries as a result of the “extremely hot”

temperatures.41 Thus, Plaintiff’s conclusory claim of extreme heat will not be added through

amendment.

e. Lack of Religious Services

Plaintiff asserts that he has been denied all religious services and gatherings for over six

years.42 It is well-established that prisoners must be accorded “reasonable opportunities” to

38 Lacy v. Collins, 66 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir.1994) (a few

hours of periodic loud noises that merely annoy, rather than injure, the prisoner does not state a constitutional claim);

Gallegos v. McCubbins, No. CV 18-4925, 2018 WL 7050581, at *10 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2018), report and

recommendation adopted, No. CV 18-4925, 2019 WL 220202 (E.D. La. Jan. 16, 2019) (dismissing as frivolous claims

of sleep deprivation caused by loud noises because the plaintiff failed to allege how the noise posed a substantial risk

of serious harm to his health or safety or to allege facts to demonstrate that the existence of noise was intentionally

designed to deprive him of sleep).

39 R. Doc. 12, p. 3.

40 See Johnson v. Thaler, CA No. 99-20222, 1999 WL 1131941, *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 12, 1999) (concluding that the

inmate plaintiffs’ conclusory “allegations of inadequate ventilation and excessive heat do not entitle them to relief

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Parker v. Smith, No. 93-5542, 1994 WL 198944, *2 (5th Cir. May 6, 1994) (upholding the

frivolous dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim that “the ventilation system in the Smith County jail [was] inadequate”).

41 Johnson v. Texas Board of Criminal Justice, 281 Fed.Appx. 319 (5th Cir. 2008) (wherein the United States Court

of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit upheld a dismissal, as frivolous, of an inmate plaintiff’s claims, finding that his

allegations regarding extreme heat were “not sufficient to state a constitutional claim” because although he alleged

that temperatures were “sometimes uncomfortably hot, he did not allege that he suffered from any heat-related injuries

despite being subjected to these conditions numerous times.”).

42 R. Doc. 11, p. 2.

exercise their religious freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment.43 However, conflicts have

arisen between prisoners’ exercise of this right and genuine concerns of day-to-day prison

administration. “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the

regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”44 The factors

examined to determine the reasonableness of prison regulations are as follows: (1) whether there

is a rational relationship between the regulation and the legitimate government interest asserted;

(2) whether the inmates have alternative means to exercise the right; (3) courts must consider the

impact on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources that would result from

accommodating the asserted right; (4) whether ready alternatives exist which accommodate the

right and satisfy the governmental interest.45 Courts must balance the inmates’ right to free

exercise of religion with the interest of prison officials charged with complex duties arising from

administration of the penal system. Prison officials are afforded great deference in carrying out

their complex duties.46

The Turner factors are not weighed equally.47 The first factor is controlling, and the other

factors merely help a court determine if the connection is logical.48 The Fifth Circuit has held that

“[s]ignificant restrictions on [attendance of religious services] must have some relation to

legitimate penological interests.”49 Based upon Plaintiff’s allegations, read in the light most

favorable to him, he has stated a claim with respect to being prevented from attending any religious

43 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).

44 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

45 Id., at 89-91.

46 O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). In O’Lone, the Supreme Court faced a situation in which policies

adopted by prison officials prevented Muslim prisoners from attending Jum’ah services, and the Court held that it

would not substitute its judgment on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration for the judgment of

those charged with the formidable task of running a prison. Id. at 353.

47 Mayfield v. Texas Dep’t. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 607 (5th Cir. 2008).

48 Scott v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1982).

49 Rose v. Woods, 95 F.3d 53, *1 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1992).

services.50 Though Plaintiff has not targeted any specific Defendant with respect to this claim, it

is reasonable at this juncture to allow the claim to proceed against Vannoy, Jack, and Hendrickson

for further development. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims arising from the First Amendment and

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act51 (“RLUIPA”) should survive.52

However, to the extent Plaintiff has attempted to allege RLUIPA claims against these

Defendants in their individual capacities, he cannot do so. RLUIPA does not permit a claim against

individual defendants in their individual capacities.53 The statute expressly states that RLUIPA’s

scope is limited to a “program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance.”54 In this case,

the recipient of federal funds is the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, not

any individual defendant. Thus, because no individual defendant receives federal financial

assistance as that term is used in the statute, Plaintiff cannot maintain a RLUIPA claim against a

defendant in his or her individual capacity.55 Plaintiff also cannot obtain monetary damages

against any Defendant under RLUIPA.56 Accordingly, though Plaintiff will be permitted to state

claims for violations of the First Amendment and RLUIPA due to the lack of religious services,

he will not be permitted to allege claims under RLUIPA against Defendants in their individual

50 Plaintiff has stated this claim under the First Amendment and under RLUIPA, as RLUIPA places a heavier burden

than the First Amendment on prison officials to justify a substantial burden on an inmate’s religious exercise. See

Stevens v. Cain, No. 14-204, 2017 WL 2389978, at *4 (M.D. La. May 23, 2017) (“RLUIPA imposes a higher burden

than does the First Amendment.”); Legate v. Stephens, No. 13-148, 2014 WL 3587981, at *17 (S.D. Tex. June 6,

2014) citing Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2008) (“RLUIPA imposes a more stringent

standard than that of the First Amendment.”). Though a separate analysis regarding RLUIPA may be required in the

future, it is unnecessary for screening purposes.

51 The RLUIPA states that “no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person

residing in or confined to an institution…unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that

person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering

that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).

52 See Young v. Ericksen, 758 F.Supp. 777, 784-85 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 20, 2010) (on summary judgment, material issues

of fact existed precluding summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim under RLUIPA that he was not allowed to attend

religious services, despite fact that the plaintiff was in segregation for his own safety).

53 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.

54 Id. § 2000cc-(b)(1).

55 See Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 2012).

56 Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 330-331 (5th Cir. 2009) (an award of damages under

RLUIPA is barred by state’s sovereign immunity).

capacities or under the First Amendment and RLUIPA for monetary damages against Defendants

in their official capacities. Plaintiff’s claims regarding religious services are limited to claims for

injunctive relief under RLUIPA and the First Amendment against Defendants in their official

capacities and claim for monetary relief under the First Amendment against Defendants in their

individual capacities.

f. Plaintiff’s Claims Regarding Lack of Direct Library and Law Library

Access, Educational Programs, Opportunities to Earn Wages, and

Visitation are Not Conditions Claims

Plaintiff alleges that he does not have direct access to the library and law library like general

population inmates.57 He also complains of limited contact visitation and that he does not have

access to educational58 and rehabilitation programs and the ability to work to earn incentive wages.

These complaints do not relate to life’s necessities, such as food, medical care, or sanitation and,

accordingly, do not implicate the Eighth Amendment.59 It is also well-settled that a prisoner has

no constitutional right to participate in an educational or rehabilitative program60 and regarding

visitation, incarcerated prisoners do not retain any absolute rights of physical association—the

57 R. Docs. 11, p. 1, 12, p. 2.

58 Plaintiff specifically complains of his inability to attend English classes, but this does not state a claim under the

Eighth Amendment for the same reason that access to general education does not state a claim. To the extent Plaintiff

has complained that he does not receive a Spanish interpreter for review boards, that will be considered in connection

with the due process inquiry.

59 Hambrick v. Collins, 95 F.3d 49, 49 (5th Cir. 1996) (“conditions” complained of by the plaintiff, including denial

of access to a law library did not involve deprivations of essentials, so there was no Eighth Amendment violation);

Rivera v. Long, No. , 2021 WL 326945, at *12 (D. Co. Jan. 31, 2021) (citing Smith v. Romer, 107 F.3d 21, 119 WL

57093, at *2 (10th Cir. 1997) (inmate’s complaints regarding lack of access to education, recreation, and vocational

programs do not relate to life’s necessities and fail to satisfy the objective prong of the conditions of confinement test).

To the extent Plaintiff meant to bring a claim regarding access to the courts arising from the lack of access to the law

library, he has not successfully pled such a claim because there is nothing to suggest he suffered any legal prejudice

or detriment. See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996) (to prevail on a claim of interference with

access to the courts, an inmate claimant must be able to show that he has suffered some cognizable legal prejudice or

detriment as a result of the defendant’s actions).

60 See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976). The Court notes that Plaintiff does not allege he requires any

type of rehabilitation or therapy for medical or mental health reasons; rather, his allegations indicate rehabilitation

may be required for parole purposes, not any medical need. See R. Docs. 11, p. 2; 12, p. 3.

Fifth Circuit has held “that for convicted prisoners ‘[v]isitation privileges are a matter subject to

the discretion of prison officials.’”61 Further, reduced contact visitation does not deprive Plaintiff

of anything essential to life, as further detailed above in relation to the isolated nature of Plaintiff’s

confinement. Finally, though Plaintiff alleges that La. R.S. 15:828 requires that he have access to

the library, education, and rehabilitation,62 this statute does not in any way guarantee inmates direct

access to any library or programs and neither does the Constitution or any other federal law.63

Therefore, Plaintiff will not be permitted to amend to attempt to state claims regarding these

“conditions.”

e. Relief Sought

Plaintiff, in his original Complaint, only sought injunctive relief.64 In the amended

Complaint, Plaintiff also seeks damages.65 Plaintiff will be allowed to amend his complaint to

seek monetary relief against the Defendants, with the following exceptions. Because 42 U.S.C. §

1983 does not provide a federal forum for a litigant who seeks monetary damages against either a

state or its officials acting in their official capacities,16 Plaintiff will not be permitted to amend to

seek monetary damages against the Defendants in their official capacities.66 Accordingly, any §

61 Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1273 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1376-77 (5th Cir.

1981).

62 R. Docs. 11, p. 1, 12, p. 2.

63 The statute specifically states that these programs are subject to “physical custody, and appropriate classification

criteria.” La. R.S. 15:828.

64 R. Doc. 1, p. 6.

65 R. Doc. 12, pp. 7-8. In the relief section of this proposed amended Complaint, plaintiff also purports to ask for

relief against additional individuals including, Hooper, LaMartinaire, and Delaney, without alleging any specific facts

against them. R. Doc. 12, pp. 6-8. Plaintiff also notes in the objection that these other individuals were meant to be

Defendants but fails to allege any specific facts against these individuals; rather, they appear to be named solely as a

result of their supervisory roles. Because these individuals have not been listed as Defendants and have not had any

specific facts alleged against them, they will not be added to this suit at this time. If Plaintiff would like to add these

individuals as Defendants, Plaintiff should file a proposed amended complaint clearly stating how each Defendant is

personally responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivations that remain in this suit.

66 In addition, in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed the distinction between

official capacity and individual capacity lawsuits and made clear that an official capacity suit against a state official

for monetary damages is treated as a suit against the state and is, therefore, barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id.

At 25.

1983 claims asserted by Plaintiff against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary

damages are subject to dismissal.67 Further, Plaintiff’s claims for relief arising from lack of

religious services are limited as discussed above in relation to that claim.

Thus, after independently reviewing the entire record in this case and for the reasons set

forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation dated November 23, 2021 and the

reasons set forth herein,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend and Supplement68 are GRANTED

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART—the Motions are denied to the extent they seek to add any

claim except for the following: (1) claims arising under the First Amendment and RLUIPA for

injunctive relief against Darryl Vannoy, Michael Jack, and Tammy Hendrickson in their official

capacities for the lack of religious services in CCR and (2) claims for monetary relief against

Darryl Vannoy, Michael Jack, and Tammy Hendrickson in their individual capacities for due

process violations arising from Plaintiff’s continued confinement in CCR brought pursuant to the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitutional and Article I, § 2 of the Louisiana

Constitution and for violations of the First Amendment arising from the lack or religious services

in CCR. The Clerk of Court is directed to file the amended complaints into the record.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against James LeBlanc, as well as

all claims arising from alleged violations of equal protection, due process related to the original

disciplinary proceedings, claims for injunctive relief against Darryl Vannoy, Michael Jack, and

Tammy Hendrickson in their individual capacities, and state law claims arising under the

67 See Landry v. Lollis, No. 19-520, 2019 WL 5777755, at *2 (M.D. La. Oct. 8, 2019), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 19-520, 2019 WL 5777388 (M.D. La. Nov. 5, 2019).

68 R. Docs. 11 & 12.

Louisiana Constitution Article I, §§ 1, 3, and 20 be DISIMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims regarding the conditions of Plaintiff’s

confinement arising under the Eighth Amendment and related claims regarding education,

rehabilitation, and visitation are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is referred back to the Magistrate Judge for

further proceedings on Plaintiff’s remaining claims (i.e., Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages

against Darryl Vannoy, Michael Jack, and Tammy Hendrickson in their individual capacities for

due process violations arising from Plaintiff’s continued confinement in CCR brought pursuant to

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitutional and Article I, § 2 of the Louisiana

Constitution and for violations of the First Amendment arising from the lack or religious services

in CCR, and Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against Darryl Vannoy, Michael Jack, and

Tammy Hendrickson in their official capacities for the same violations, as well as for violations of

RLUIPA arising from the lack of religious services in CCR).

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 18, 2022.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA