Opinion

Isom v. Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice

Court
District Court, M.D. Louisiana
Filed
Dec 3, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.5%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

AURLISA ISOM CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

LOUISIANA OFFICE OF JUVENILE NO. 21-00013-BAJ-SDJ

JUSTICE, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Louisiana Department of Public Safety and

Corrections, Office of Juvenile Justice, an agency of the state’s Department of Public

safety and Corrections, and William Sommers who, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6), seek dismissal of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 28, 37). The

Motions are opposed (Docs. 32, 38). For the reasons stated below, Defendants’

Motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Facts

On February 6, 2018, Plaintiff applied for a job at the Bridge City Center for

Youth as a Social Worker II. (Doc. 25, | 8). On March 23, 2018, Plaintiff contends

she received a conditional offer of employment. (Doc. 25, { 9). As a part of the pre-

employment screening process, Plaintiff underwent two pre-employment physicals

and disclosed a prior diagnosis of bone cancer. (Doc. 25, 4] 11-12). On March 26,

2018, upon her arrival at BCCY, Plaintiff alleges that she was told “she could not

have the job of Social Worker II because of her disability.”! (Doc. 25, 9 15, 17).

Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission “on or before January 22, 2019.” (Doc. 25, { 19).

Plaintiff now brings this action for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief

for violation of her rights under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act and

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1978. (Doc. 25 J 1).

B. Procedural History

On January 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed her initial complaint asserting claims under

Title I of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794, et seq. against all named Defendants seeking damages,

injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Sommers

filed their initial Motion to Dismiss on March 3, 2021. (Doc. 9)

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, which was granted.

(Doc, 12). Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint

which was granted and entered into the record as Doc. 25. Thereafter, Defendants

initial Motion to Dismiss was denied as moot. (Doc. 26).

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as defendants the Department

of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice, and William

Sommers, Deputy Secretary of Youth Services, in his official capacity. (Doc. 25). She

Additionally, the Court notes that Defendants have yet to articulate any legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason to counter Plaintiffs clatm that she was refused a position as a

Social Worker II at the Bridge City Center for Youth because of her disability.

asserts claims under Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 121101 and §504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. based on her assertion that she was not

hired at BCCY because of her disability, or because Defendants regarded her as

having a disability. (Doc. 25 J 26 & 28). Plaintiff seeks injunctive, declaratory, and

monetary relief against the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and Office

of Juvenile Justice for back pay, benefits of employment, and compensatory damages

for violations of Section 504 Rehabilitation Act of 1973. (Doc. 25 § VID). She also

prays for a permanent injunction requiring that Sommers provide her with

employment as a Social Worker for Bridge City Center for Youth, or a similar facility.

Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred

by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.

FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286-287 (5th

Cir. 2012) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994)); Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998)). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a

claim is “properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court

lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” the claim. Jd. (quoting

Home Builders Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)).

The court should consider a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any

attack on the merits. fd. (citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161

(Sth Cir, 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 960 (2001)). Considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion

to dismiss first “prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a

case with prejudice.” /d. (citing Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161).

There are two categories of motions under Rule 12(b)(1): facial attacks on

jurisdiction or factual attacks on jurisdiction. See, e.g. Paterson v. Weinberger,

644 F.2d 621, 524 (5th Cir. 1981). A “facial attack” accepts the facts of the complaint

as true and tests the sufficiency of those allegations. Id. However, a “factual attack”

rejects the facts underlying a plaintiffs jurisdictional claim. fd. Where a defendant

makes a “factual attack’ upon the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the

lawsuit...a plaintiff is also required to submit facts through some evidentiary

method and has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the

trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction.” Jd.

HI. ANALYSIS

A. Department of Public Safety and Corrections Lacks the

Procedural Capacity to be Sued

The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States bars a state

from being sued in federal court by its own citizens, citizens of other states, or foreign

nations. U.S. Const. Amend. XI; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996);

Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 307 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Bd. of Trs. Of Univ. of

Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)), Louisiana is immune from suit from Title [ADA

claims and has not waived its immunity or consented to the exercise of federal judicial

power in civil actions against it. La. R.S. § 13:5106(A); La. Const. art. I, § 26;

Harris v. Loutstana Office of Suvenile Justice, 2019 WL 2617175, at *4

La. June 26, 2019) (citation omitted). “When a state agency is named the

defendant, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for both money damages and

injunctive relief unless the state has waived its immunity.”

Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council President Government, 279 F.8d 278, 281

(5th Cir. 2002). Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections is an arm of

the State that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Zoghbi v. Glob. Industries, Inc., No. CV 138-409-SDD-EWD, 2016 WL 4163558, at *2

(M.D. La. June 380, 2016), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.

Zoghbi v. Glob. Indus., Inc. of N.J., No. CV 13-409-SDD-EWD, 2016 WL 4157336

(M.D. La. Aug. 4, 2016) (citing Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office,

188 F.3d 312, 314 (th Cir. 1999)).

Accordingly, the Department of Public Safety and Corrections is immune from

suit in federal court under Title I of the ADA. As such, to the extent if any that

Plaintiff asserts a Title I of the ADA claim for monetary relief against Defendant

Department of Public Safety and Corrections it is dismissed with prejudice.

B. Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice Lacks the Procedural

Capacity to be Sued

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(8) provides that whether a defendant can

be sued is a matter to be determined, “by the law of the state where the court is

located.” In Louisiana, an entity “must qualify as a juridical person” to be capable of

being sued.” Harris, 2019 □□□ 2617175, at *2 (citing Dejoie v. Medley,

945 So.2d 968, 972 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2006)). The Louisiana Civil Code defines a

juridical person as “an entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a

corporation or partnership.” La. Civ. Code art. 24. A unit of local government is a

juridical person when it is “separate and distinct from other government entities,

[and] when the organic law grants it the legal capacity to function independently and

not just as the agency or division of another governmental entity.” Harris,

2019 WL 2617175, at *2 (citing Roberts v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans,

634 So.2d 341, 347 (La. 1994).

The Office of Juvenile Justice is not a juridical person because it is not a

separate and distinct unit of local government. It is merely an administrative office

within the Department of Public Safety and Corrections. See Louisiana Revised

Statute 36:401(C)() ([t}he Department of Public Safety and Corrections shall be

composed of the executive office of the secretary, public safety services, corrections

services, youth services, and such other offices as shall be created by law”) (emphasis

added), Accordingly, to the extent if any that Plaintiff asserts a Title T ADA claim for

monetary relief against Defendant Office of Juvenile Justice it is dismissed with

prejudice,

C. Sovereign Immunity as to William Sommers

The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States bars a state

from being sued in federal court by its own citizens, citizens of other states, or foreign

nations. U.S. Const. Amend. XI; Seminole Tribe v, Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996);

Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 307 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Bd. of Trs. Of Univ. of

Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)). “When a state agency is named the defendant,

the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for both money damages and injunctive relief

unless the state has waived its immunity.” Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council--

President Government, 279 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2002). Louisiana Department of

Public Safety and Corrections is an arm of the State that is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Zoghbi v. Glob. Industrhes, Inc., No. CV 18-409-SDD-EWD,

2016 WL 4163558, at *2 (M.D. La. June 30, 2016), report and recommendation

adopted sub nom. Zoghbi v. Glob. Indus., Inc. of N.J., No. CV 18-409-SDD-EWD, 2016

WL 41573386 (M.D. La. Aug. 4, 2016) (citing Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's

Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999)).

“This rule extends to ‘arms of the state,’ and to a state’s ‘officials acting in their

official capacities.” Parker v. Louisiana Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., No. CV 18-1030-

JWD-EWD, 2020 WL 4353564, at *8 (M.D. La. July 29, 2020) (citing Howlett v. Rose,

496 U.S. 356, 365, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1990); Will v. Michigan Dep't

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2804, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989)) (Obviously,

state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her

official capacity is not a suit against the official, but rather is a suit against the

official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”).

However, under the Hx Parte Young doctrine, “a litigant may sue a state official

in his official capacity if the suit seeks prospective relief to redress an ongoing

violation of federal law.” Williams on Behalf of J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729,735-86

(6th Cir. 2020) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 28 S.Ct 441, 52 L.Ed 719

(1908)). This exception, candidly, “rests on a legal fiction, the premise that a state

official is not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes when a federal court

commands [him or her] to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law.”

id. at 168. (citations omitted). For a suit to proceed under this doctrine, it must be a

suit seeking declaratory or injunctive relief and: “(1) be brought against state officers

who are acting in their official capacities; (2) seek prospective relief to redress ongoing

conduct; and (3) allege a violation of federal, not state, law.” Id. (citing NiGen Biotech,

L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.8d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2015). This is true, even where an

injunction may have “an ancillary effect on the state treasury.” Quern v. Jordan, 440

U.S. 832, 337 (1979).

Plaintiff filed suit against Sommers in his official capacity and seeks a

permanent injunction requiring him to provide Plaintiff with employment as a Social

Worker for Bridge City Center for Youth or similar facility or program. (Doc. 25 {C).

Defendants argue that any claim for money damages asserted against Sommers, a

state officer acting in his official capacity as Deputy Secretary of Youth Service under

DPSC, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Doc. 28-1, p.6) See Fletcher v.

Loutstana Dep't of Transportation & Dev., No. CV 19-00593-BAJ-RLB, 2020 WL

6588593, at *4 (M.D. La. Nov. 10, 2020). While the eventual remedy may include

payment of salary and benefits, nowhere in Plaintiffs second amended complaint

against Sommers does she specifically request the Court to order back payment asa

remedy, Although the harm Plaintiff suffers may be monetary in nature, she

primarily petitions the Court for prospective injunctive relief. (See Doc. 25 {C). As

noted above, Plaintiff asserts claims under Title I of the ADA and §504 of the

Rehabilitation Act based on her assertion that she was not hired at the Bridge City

Center for Youth because of her disability, or because Defendants regarded her as

having a disability. (Doc. 25 {26 & 28). Therefore, Plaintiff's suit for prospective,

imjunctive relief may proceed against Sommers.

D. Timeliness

The parties dispute the time limitations that apply. (Docs. 28-1, 32, 37-1, 38).

Defendants urge the Court to apply the one-year limitation period governing personal

injury actions under Louisiana law. See La. Civ. Code art. 3492. However, Plaintiff

asks the Court to apply a four-year catch all limitations period under federal law.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). This period applies in “civil actions arising under an Act of

Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a).

When Congress has not established a limitations period for a federal claim, courts

“borrow the most analogous period from state law.” Frame v. City of Arlington,

657 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2011). This Court recognizes a narrow exception: a court

may decline to adopt a state limitations period only when another federal statute

clearly provides a closer analogy, and when the federal policies at stake and the

practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate rule

making vehicle. Guy v. LeBlanc, 400 F. Supp. 3d 536, 541 (M.D. La. 2019) (citation

omitted). This period applies in “civil action[s] arising under an Act of Congress

enacted after the date of the enactment of this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Section

1658 was enacted on December 1, 1990. See PUB. L. No. 101-650, 104 STAT. 5089.

A claim arises under an Act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990 if the claim

as “made possible by a post-1990 enactment.” Guy, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 541 (citation

omitted).

Plaintiff must show that her claim was not cognizable under the pre-amendment

version of Section 504 and was, therefore, only made possible by the amendments

contained in the ADAA. Fletcher v. Louisiana Dep't of Transportation & Dev., No. 18-

CV-00860, 2019 WL 3240056, at *4 (M.D. La. July 18, 2019), aff'd, 848 F. App'x 163

(5th Cir. 2021). A claim is considered cognizable before the ADAA amendments if

Plaintiffs allegations fall within the pre-amendment version of the Rehabilitation

Act. fd. Under these amendments, the term “disability’ now includes an impairment

that 1s episodic or in remission if it would substantially limit a major life activity

when active; examples include epilepsy, hypertension, asthma, diabetes, major

depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and cancer.” Lewis v. Cain, No. 3:15-CV-

318, 2021 WL 1219988, at *54 (M.D. La. Mar, 31, 2021) (emphasis added),

Here, Plaintiffs claim would not have been cognizable before the ADAA

amendments. Plaintiffs bone cancer and sporadic back pain that hinder her ability

to walk falls squarely within “an impairment that is episodic . . .[that] would

substantially limit a major life activity when active.” Id. (Doc. 25 J 7). Accordingly,

Plaintiff claims is subject to the four-year catch-all provision.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Louisiana Department of Public Safety and

Corrections’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37) is GRANTED in part.

Defendant Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs claim against it is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Title I ADA claim

against the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Louisiana is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Louisiana Office of Juvenile

Justice’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28) is GRANTED in part.

Defendant Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs

claim against it is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Title I ADA claim against the Louisiana

Office of Juvenile Justice is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

In all other respects, Defendants’ Motions are DENIED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 348 day of December, 2021

2-24

JUDGE BRIAN CCAGRSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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