Summers v. State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KENDALL SUMMERS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 20-21-JWD-SDJ

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT

OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS, ET AL.

CONSOLIDATED WITH

STORM ERIE, ET AL CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 20-289-JWD-SDJ

STATE OF LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

AND HOSPITALS, ET AL.

CONSOLIDATED WITH

IVORY AMOS, ET AL CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 20-386-JWD-SDJ

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

AND HOSPITALS, ET AL.

CONSOLIDATED WITH

CHRISTOPHER CAMPBELL, ET AL CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 20-580-JWD-SDJ

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH, ET AL.

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Compel (R. Doc. 41) filed by Plaintiff Kendall Summers

on January 26, 2021. Plaintiff’s Motion seeks an order compelling Defendants “to provide

substantive responses” to three Requests for Production previously propounded on Defendants.1

Defendants oppose this Motion, filing their Opposition on February 19, 2021 (R. Doc. 45), with

Plaintiff subsequently filing his Reply, with leave of Court, on February 22, 2021 (R. Doc. 47).

As discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because the question of whether the requested information is relevant to this case, a brief

background of the litigation is helpful here. Plaintiff filed suit against the State of Louisiana,

through the Department of Health and Hospitals (“LDH”) as well as the Secretary of the LDH on

January 10, 2020.2 Plaintiff is a psychiatric patient residing at East Louisiana Mental Health

System (“ELMHS”), a state psychiatric hospital.3 Through inpatient treatment at ELMHS,

Plaintiff was able to overcome his psychiatric impairment, but remains detained at ELMHS.4

Three other similar cases have been filed in this Court by patients residing at ELMHS.5 Plaintiff

asserts that all four patients who filed suit against the LDH, including himself, are qualified

individuals with a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the

Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).6 As alleged by Plaintiff, LDH

has failed to develop sufficient community-based treatment options for ELMHS residents, as

1 R. Doc. 41 at 1.

2 R. Doc. 1 at 1.

3 R. Doc. 41-1 at 3.

4 Id. at 3-4.

5 The three other cases are 3:20-cv-00386-JWD-SDJ, 3:20-cv-00289-JWD-SDJ, and 3:20-cv-00580-JWD-SDJ, and

all four have been consolidated for all purposes except trial. (R. Doc. 53).

6 Id. at 3-4

mandated by Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540

(1999) and required under the ADA.7

Plaintiff’s counsel, on September 23, 2019, sent a reasonable accommodation request letter

to LDH on behalf of Plaintiff.8 This request, along with others made by said counsel on behalf of

the plaintiffs involved in the consolidated suits, “requested accommodations includ[ing] adequate

funding of LDH, the development of an outpatient treatment program, training of LDH staff on

accommodating patients with disabilities, the ongoing assessment of Plaintiffs’ needs as

individuals with disabilities, and the release of Plaintiffs while a comprehensive outpatient system

was being developed.”9 While LDH provided a response to some of the requests for

accommodation/modification, it did not respond to Plaintiff’s request.10 Plaintiff resubmitted his

request on October 2, 2019, which request also did not receive a response.11

Plaintiff then filed the instant litigation on January 10, 2020, alleging violations of Title II

of the ADA, Section 504 of the RA, and Section 1557 of the ACA.12 Suits by the other patients

referenced above followed shortly thereafter.13

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may

obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense

and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the

7 Id. 4-5.

8 Id. at 5.

9 Id. at 6. While Plaintiff uses the plural term “Plaintiffs” in his briefing, presumably including the plaintiffs from the

other cases that have been consolidated with this one, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel states that only Plaintiff Summers

is bringing the Motion before the Court. (R. Doc. 41 at 1). As such, the Court will continue to refer to Plaintiff in the

singular.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 R. Doc. 1 at 1.

13 R. Doc. 41-1 at 6-7.

action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’

resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or

expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of

discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “For

purposes of discovery, relevancy is construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or

that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue related to the claim or

defense of any party.” Tingle v. Hebert, No. 15-626, 2016 WL 7230499, at *2 (M.D. La. Dec. 14,

2016) (quoting Fraiche v. Sonitrol of Baton Rouge, No. 08-392, 2010 WL 4809328, at *1 (M.D.

La. Nov. 19, 2010)) (internal quotations omitted).

The court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines that: “(i) the

discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other

source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery

has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed

discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the discovery of documents

and tangible items. A party seeking discovery must serve a request for production on the party

believed to be in possession, custody, or control of the documents or other evidence. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 34(a)(1). The request is to be in writing and must set forth, among other things, the desired

items with “reasonable particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A).

A party must respond or object to requests for production. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2). If

a party fails to respond fully to discovery requests in the time allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the party seeking discovery may move to compel responses and for appropriate

sanctions under Rule 37. An “evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be

treated as a failure to disclose, answer or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). “In sum, a party

served with written discovery must fully answer each interrogatory or document request to the full

extent that it is not objectionable and affirmatively explain what portion of an interrogatory or

document request is objectionable and why, affirmatively explain what portion of the interrogatory

or document request is not objectionable and the subject of the answer or response, and

affirmatively explain whether any responsive information or documents have been withheld.”

Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 580 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (internal quotations and citation

omitted).

The party filing the motion to compel “bears the burden of showing that the materials and

information sought are relevant to the action or will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

Tingle, 2016 WL 7230499, at *2 (quoting Mirror Worlds Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 13-419,

2016 WL 4265758, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2016)). “Once the moving party establishes that the

materials requested are within the scope of permissible discovery, the burden shifts to the party

resisting discovery to show why the discovery is irrelevant, overly broad or unduly burdensome

or oppressive, and thus should not be permitted.” Id. (quoting Mirror Worlds, 2016 WL 4265758,

at *1). See also Wymore v. Nail, No. 14-3493, 2016 WL 1452437, at *1 (W.D. La. Apr. 13, 2016)

(“Once a party moving to compel discovery establishes that the materials and information it seeks

are relevant or will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the burden rests upon the party

resisting discovery to substantiate its objections.”). Further, “[a] trial court enjoys wide discretion

in determining the scope and effect of discovery.” Sanders v. Shell Oil Co., 678 F.2d 614, 618

(5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).

III. PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

Plaintiff has moved to compel substantive responses to three Requests for Production,

which seek the personnel file of a purported “bad actor” as well as documents relating to a

settlement agreement previously entered into by LDH in a separate litigation. Each of these

requests is addressed, in turn, below.14

A. Request for Production No. 19

Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 19 makes the following request:

Please produce a full copy of Mr. Hampton P.S. Lea, CEO’s employee file. You

may redact personal identification information (e.g., his social security number,

DOB) and remove materials that relate solely to his rate of pay, retirement benefits,

or tax forms.15

Hampton Lea (“Lea”), a non-party, is the CEO of ELMHS.16 Defendants objected to this request

on the basis of relevance and argue that “Mr. Lea’s right to privacy in his employment records

should not be violated absent a showing … of the relevance of this request.”17

The Court turns first to the issue of relevance. “To obtain non-party personnel records, the

requesting party must demonstrate the particular relevance of the personnel records to the issue.”

Clemons v. Dollar General Corp., No. 09-64, 2010 WL 1994809, at *5 (N.D. Miss. May 18, 2020)

(citations omitted). The Court is mindful that “[d]iscovery should be allowed unless the party

opposing discovery establishes that the information sought ‘can have no possible bearing on the

claim or defense of the party seeking discovery.’” Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 20-

334, 2021 WL 4060975, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2021) (quoting Dotson v. Edmonson, No. 16-

14 The Court notes that, in their Opposition to the instant Motion to Compel, Defendants reference four motions to

dismiss they previously had filed that were then pending before the Court, arguing “that the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court must be established before the Plaintiff can move to compel the production of documents.” R. Doc.

45 at 5. However, all four motions were dismissed without prejudice on August 19, 2021 (R. Doc. 55), with one being

refiled on September 23, 2021 (R. Doc. 57). However, as a motion to stay discovery has not been filed, and case law

is clear that discovery may continue while a motion to dismiss is pending, particularly in a case like this in which

substantial discovery has already been completed, the Court rejects this argument by Defendants and will not further

address it herein. See Valenzuela v. Crest-Mex Corp., No. 16-1129, 2017 WL 2778104, at *5 (June 26, 2017) (noting

that a stay of discovery is not automatically granted when a motion to dismiss is pending and that “had the Federal

Rules contemplated that a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) would stay discovery, the Rules would

contain a provision to that effect”).

15 R. Doc. 41-1 at 8.

16 Id. at 9-10.

17 Id. at 8. The Court also notes the insufficiency of this and the other objections made by Defendants as they fail to

explain whether responsive documents are being withheld. See Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 580.

15371, 2017 WL 11535244, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2017)). More importantly, “[i]f relevance is

in doubt, the court should be permissive in allowing discovery.” Id. (citations omitted); see also

U.S. v. La., No. 11-470, 2012 WL 3726754, at *7 (M.D. La. Aug. 27, 2012) (recognizing “the

broad scope of relevance”); Smith v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., No. 09-1039, 2011 WL 938359, at

*2 (M.D. La. Mar. 16, 2011) (“[t]he ordinary presumption in discovery is in favor of broad

disclosure”).

As asserted in his Motion to Compel, “[i]n this case, Mr. Summers and other plaintiffs

allege that they have been improperly warehoused and segregated at a decrepit psychiatric facility

in rural Louisiana, in violation of the non-segregation requirements of the ADA and the Supreme

Court’s mandates in Olmstead.”18 To that end, Plaintiff argues that the information in Lea’s

personnel file is relevant because, given the allegedly decrepit and discriminatory conditions at

ELMHS, “Plaintiffs are entitled to investigate what notice—if any—Mr. Lea had of the conditions

at the facility he was stewarding” and “to know if Mr. Lea has been warned, disciplined, or

sanctioned about conditions at ELMHS.”19 Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Lea’s file is relevant

based on his “direct role in reviewing and failing to respond to Plaintiffs’ requests for reasonable

accommodation,” which were addressed to him.20 Per Plaintiff, he is “entitled to know whether

Mr. Lea received any training or education under the [ADA] that would equip him to (1) review

Plaintiffs’ requests for reasonable accommodation, (2) comply with the requirements of Olmstead,

or (3) comply with the requirements of the ADA/RA at the ELMHS.”21

The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments compelling and agrees that at least portions of Lea’s

personnel file are relevant here, particularly in light of the fact that courts consistently have

18 R. Doc. 41-1 at 2.

19 Id. at 10.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 10-11.

permitted disclosure of at least parts of personnel files in certain situations. For example, in Title

VII litigation, where plaintiffs are required to demonstrate pretext and the status of the alleged

harasser, courts frequently have allowed discovery of personnel files. See, e.g., Braud v. Geo Heat

Exchangers, L.L.C., 314 F.R.D. 386, 389-90 (M.D. La. 2016) (granting discovery of personnel

files in Title VII litigation where information in personnel file was relevant to pretext); Coughlin

v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991) (“In Title VII litigation, in which plaintiffs are similarly

required to demonstrate pretext, courts have customarily allowed a wide discovery of personnel

files.”). Along those same lines, here, Plaintiff has alleged violation of Title II of the ADA,

necessarily including discrimination on the basis of disability, in his Amended Complaint.22 As

argued by Plaintiff, recovery under Title II requires notice of a violation. See Miraglia v. Bd. of

Supervisors of La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 574-75 (5th Cir. 2018) (to recover under the ADA,

plaintiff must show the discrimination was intentional, and intent requires the defendant have

actual notice of a violation). The Court, therefore, finds Lea’s personnel file generally discoverable

in this situation.

However, the Court is mindful of Defendants’ argument that “Plaintiff has not genuinely

articulated any relevance in the entire personnel file of Steve Lea.”23 See Estate of Saylor v. Regal

Cinemas, Inc., No. 13-3089, 2015 WL 13841379, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 24, 2015) (“While it is true

that the scope of discovery in a federal civil rights action is especially broad, and that Plaintiffs’

ADA claims add another layer of potentially relevant information to this case, the Court finds it

improper to compel disclosure of everything contained in the Defendant deputies’ personnel files

without knowing exactly what the files contain.”). While the Court finds that the identified

information is relevant to the instant litigation, it is not aware of all of the information in Lea’s

22 See, e.g., R. Doc. 56 at 4, 22.

23 R. Doc. 45 at 7.

personnel file,24 much of which may not be relevant. As such, the Court will order production of

any documents in Lea’s personnel file related to his notice or awareness of conditions at ELMHS

and/or ADA violations as well as any training or education Lea has had under the ADA, with the

limitations detailed below.

Finding the specified information purported to be in Lea’s personnel file relevant to the

instant litigation, the Court now turns to the issue of Lea’s privacy. “Personal privacy and the

confidentiality of personnel files are important public policy concerns.” James v. Peter Pan

Transit Mgmt., Inc., No. 97-747, 1999 WL 735173, at *11 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 1999) (citing

Raddatz v. Standard Register Co., 177 F.R.D. 446, 447 (D.Minn.1997); Whittingham v. Amherst

College, 164 F.R.D. 124, 127 (D.Mass.1995)). “However, when a public policy interest weighs

against disclosure, disclosure may nevertheless be required where: (1) material is clearly relevant;

and (2) the need for disclosure is compelling because the information sought is not otherwise

readily available.” Id. (citing Blount v. Wake Elec. Membership Corp., 162 F.R.D. 102, 105-06

(E.D.N.C. 1993)).25

While recognizing Lea’s privacy rights, Plaintiff claims both that Lea’s personal

information is not being requested and that any remaining privacy concerns “are outweighed by

the importance of the requested information and the gravity of these cases.”26 To help protect

Lea’s privacy, Plaintiff seeks Lea’s personnel file “with the most sensitive and private information

redacted.”27 In his Reply, Plaintiff further explains that he does not seek health insurance, FMLA

24 Neither Party has identified all of the types of documents held in Lea’s personnel file.

25 In his Motion to Compel, Plaintiff applies a list of ten factors outlined in Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339,

344 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a § 1983 concerning a police shooting. However, the court in that case specified that when

executive privilege is asserted, the factors were to be considered in balancing the public interest in the confidentiality

of governmental information against the needs of a litigant to obtain data. Id. at 344. To the Court’s knowledge, no

executive privilege has been asserted here. However, should the Court have applied the Frankenhauser factors, it

would still reach the same conclusion set forth herein.

26 R. Doc. 41-1 at 2.

27 R. Doc. 41-1 at 9.

leave requests, and annual and sick leave documents, which need not be produced.28 Plaintiff also

states that “Defendants need not produce materials related to Mr. Lea’s rate of pay, retirement

benefits, or tax forms.”29 Given the Court’s limitation of the documents to be produced to

documents pertaining to notice of conditions at ELMHS and/or ADA violations as well as ADA

training or education, as set forth above, combined with the agreement of Plaintiff to redact private,

personal information and to not require the production of certain other personal documents

delineated above, the Court finds that Lea’s privacy rights are adequately protected. Further, “[i]n

instances where non-party personnel files are relevant and may lead to admissible evidence, a

protective order can help to mitigate the invasion of the privacy of the non-party.” Clemons, 2010

WL 1994809, at *5 (citation omitted). Here, the Court has entered a Protective Order at the joint

request of the Parties, “govern[ing] the production, use, and retention of confidential medical

records or records which include Personally Identifiable Information of the Plaintiff or individuals

who are not parties to this litigation” and requiring that such documents “be maintained in a secure

manner.”30 As such, the Court finds Lea’s privacy rights adequately protected here.

However, another set of privacy rights are potentially implicated by this document request.

If prior reasonable accommodation requests are included in Lea’s personnel file, such requests by

non-parties likely will include personally identifying information and/or confidential medical

information or records of those individuals. The Court reminds the Parties of the Protective Order

governing documents produced in this case and instructs the Parties to comply with that Protective

Order, redact any personally identifying information or confidential medical information for any

non-party, and/or file such documents under seal, as needed.

28 R. Doc. 47 at 6-7.

29 Id. at 6.

30 R. Doc. 20 at 2.

B. Request for Production No. 22

Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 22 is as follows:

Please produce a copy of any and all emails exchanged by Your attorneys with

counsel for Plaintiffs in the case of Cooper, et al. v. Rebekah Gee, U.S.D.C. for the

M.D. La., No. 3:14-00507-SDD-RLB, provided that said emails relate or pertain to

Paragraphs 12 or 13 of the document attached hereto as Exhibit “B.”31

In this request, as in Request for Production (“RFP”) No. 24, discussed below, Plaintiff seeks

documents related to a settlement agreement reached in a separate litigation, Cooper v. Phillips,

No. 14-cv-507-SDD-RLB (M.D. La.), in which a settlement agreement was reached on or about

September 1, 2016.32 Specifically, Plaintiff seeks e-mail communications between counsel related

to Paragraphs 12 or 13 of the Settlement Agreement, which provide as follows:

12. Within one hundred and eighty (180) days of this Order, Defendants shall

confer and meet to develop a plan for providing less restrictive placement options

in which NGRI and Incompetent Individuals can, with the appropriate permission

of the criminal court, receive clinically appropriate competency restoration or

mental treatment placement options. The parties will discuss potential legislative

proposals to address needs or issues brought forth in this meeting. The

implementation of any such plan shall be subject to concurrence of LDH executive

management and budgetary appropriation by the legislature.

13. In developing the plan described in paragraph 12, Defendants shall

coordinate a meeting of Defendants, Plaintiffs’ counsel, Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Joel

Dvoskin, and any stakeholders Defendants deem necessary to discuss (a) needed

research and analysis beyond that identified in the preceding paragraph, and (b)

necessary elements of the strategic plan. Defendants shall consider, in addition to

the funding of new placements identified in paragraph 18, opportunities to divert

NGRI and Incompetency Individuals from the criminal justice system and to

improve efficiencies in existing operations. To facilitate that meeting, Defendants,

in addition to the information contained in paragraph 4 of this agreement, will

provide to Plaintiffs’ counsel relevant data in Defendants’ possession regarding

patient wait times and recidivism rates for persons placed on conditional release or

returned to jail to stand trial after a determination that his or her competency has

been restored.33

31 R. Doc. 41-1 at 8.

32 A copy of the Settlement Agreement is at R. Doc. 41-3.

33 R. Doc. 41-3 at 9-10.

Defendants once again object to this request on the bases of privilege and relevance, arguing that

communications related to settlement are privileged and that the Cooper case “has no apparent

relevance to this case, except that the Defendant is the same.”34 In his Motion to Compel, though,

Plaintiff clarifies that “the two requests for production at issue do not seek documents related to

the negotiation or crafting of the Cooper settlement agreement,” instead “seek[ing] documents that

‘relate or pertain’ to the DOH’s substantive obligations set forth in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the

Cooper agreement.”35 In their briefing, both Parties address this RFP in conjunction with RFP

No. 24, discussed below. However, because they are separate requests, the Court addresses them

separately here.

Plaintiff argues that the requested communications in RFP No. 22 are relevant to this

litigation because “[t]he steps that the DOH took (or did not take) to develop alternative placement

for individuals with disabilities—outside of simply warehousing them at ELMHS—is central to

this case.”36 The Court agrees. However, as written, RFP No. 22 is overly broad in that it seeks

e-mail communications between opposing counsel without any temporal limitations on those

communications. Therefore, as written, this request can include email communications between

counsel occurring before execution of the Settlement Agreement in the Cooper case and

conceivably creating an ongoing obligation of production by Defendants if said communications

are still continuing.37 The Court is not willing to impose such a requirement at this time absent a

show of its necessity. The Court notes that in his Reply, Plaintiff claims that he is “merely

34 R. Doc. 45 at 10.

35 R. Doc. 41-1 at 17. The Court takes a moment to note that Plaintiff is correct that there is no “settlement privilege.”

See, e.g., Washington-St. Tammany Elec. Coop., Inc. v La. Generating, L.L.C., No. 17-405, 2019 WL 1950394, at *6

(M.D. La. May 1, 2019) (declining to find an implied settlement privilege prohibited discovery of settlement

negotiations). Further, as Plaintiff has specified that he is not seeking documents pertaining to negotiations of the

Cooper Settlement Agreement, the Court will not further discuss the issue of privilege, as it is not applicable here.

36 Id. at 15.

37 This is supported by Defendants’ allegation in their Opposition that “Chief Judge Dick continues to maintain

jurisdiction over the Cooper case and continues to monitor LDH’s compliance with the agreement.” R. Doc. 45 at 11.

seek[ing] documents that were created following the Cooper agreement.”38 However, this request

does not contain this limitation. As such, the Court will deny this request as written.

C. Request for Production No. 24

Finally, Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 24 makes the following request:

Please produce a copy of all research and analysis of less restrictive placement

options that You conducted as required by the paragraph 12 of the settlement

agreement in Cooper, et al. v. Rebekah Gee, U.S.D.C. for the M.D. La., No. 3:14-

00507-SDD-RLB.39

And once again, Defendants object on the bases of relevance and privilege.40 As stated above,

Plaintiff argues this evidence is relevant because it pertains to the steps LDH did or did not take to

develop alternative placement for individuals with disabilities like Plaintiff.41 Plaintiff further

argues that “[t]hese documents will likely show that Defendants could have provided additional

community housing,” and they also will “aid in the determination of the issue of notice and

intentional discrimination.”42 Despite Defendants’ objections, the Court finds the requested

documents relevant.

In their Opposition, Defendants also allege that this RFP, in conjunction with RFP. No. 22,

“appear[s] to be an effort by the Plaintiffs to circumvent the settlement agreement or to argue, in

this case, that the Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary relief for Defendants’ failure to comply with

the terms of the Cooper settlement agreement,” which, per Defendants, is inappropriate.43

Defendants elaborate, stating:

The Plaintiff clarified in his Motion to Compel that he is, in fact, gathering evidence

of LDH’s alleged compliance or non-compliance with the on-going settlement of a

class action lawsuit, in which the Plaintiff is a class member. Plaintiff’s argument

38 R. Doc. 47 at 7.

39 R. Doc. 41-1 at 8.

40 Id.

41 Id. at 15.

42 R. Doc. 47 at 7.

43 R. Doc. 45 at 10.

raises the possibility that this entire lawsuit, and the consolidated lawsuits, are

raising claims and demands that are required to be brought in Cooper.44

As this issue is not currently before this Court, and as Defendants have provided no evidence of

this assertion, the Court will not unnecessarily limit discovery that appears relevant to the current

litigation. As Plaintiff seeks documents pertaining to LDH’s efforts to provide less restrictive

placement options, failure of which is the crux of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court grants this

request by Plaintiff.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Compel filed by Plaintiff Kendall Summers (R. Doc.

41) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Within 21 days of the date of this Order,

Defendants are ordered to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production

Nos. 19 and 24, as instructed in this Order.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on September 24, 2021.

S

SCOTT D. JOHNSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

44 Id. at 11.