The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROBERT PARKER
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 18-1030-JWD-EWD
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, ET AL.
RULING AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint (Doc.
67) filed by Defendant James LeBlanc (“LeBlanc”). Plaintiff Robert Parker (“Plaintiff”) opposes
the motion. (Doc. 71.) LeBlanc has filed a reply. (Doc. 72.) Oral argument is necessary. The
Court has considered the law, the facts alleged in the Third Amended Complaint for Negligence,
False Imprisonment, and Violation of Constitutional Rights (“Third Amended Complaint”) (Doc.
66), and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following
reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. Relevant Factual Background
This is an over-detention case. In short, Plaintiff was sentenced to two years imprisonment
(with reductions for good time credit and credit for time served), but, due to an error misclassifying
him as a sex offender and the alleged actions of various defendants, Parker was not released as
legally required but was instead held for an additional 337 days beyond the time when he should
have been released. (Third Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 24–27, 35, Doc. 66.) Relevant here, Plaintiff claims
that his over-detention was caused in part by LeBlanc’s implementing a policy of over-detaining
individuals in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”
or the “Department”), of which LeBlanc is Secretary. (Id. ¶¶ 45–50.)
Plaintiff asserts the following counts against all Defendants: (1) false imprisonment under
Louisiana state law; (2) negligence; (3) & (4) a violation of his right to due process under the
federal and state constitutions; (5) “Monell and Failure to Train/Supervise”; (6) failure to train and
supervise; (7) respondeat superior; (8) indemnification; and (9) direct action against the insurance
companies. (Id. ¶¶ 51–81.) Here, LeBlanc moves for dismissal of the following claims against
him: (1) the § 1983 claim, (2) the state law claims of false imprisonment and negligence, and (3)
the respondeat superior and indemnification claims. (Doc. 67 ¶¶ 1–4.)
II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
“Federal pleading rules call for a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); they do not countenance dismissal of a
complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v.
City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346–47 (2014) (citation omitted).
Interpreting Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Fifth Circuit has
explained:
The complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter
(taken as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that
discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.
“Asking for [such] plausible grounds to infer [the element of a
claim] does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal [that the elements of the claim
existed].”
Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)).
Applying the above case law, the Western District of Louisiana has stated:
Therefore, while the court is not to give the “assumption of truth” to
conclusions, factual allegations remain so entitled. Once those
factual allegations are identified, drawing on the court's judicial
experience and common sense, the analysis is whether those facts,
which need not be detailed or specific, allow “the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” [Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009)]; Twombly, 55[0] U.S. at 556. This analysis is not
substantively different from that set forth in Lormand, supra, nor
does this jurisprudence foreclose the option that discovery must be
undertaken in order to raise relevant information to support an
element of the claim. The standard, under the specific language of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), remains that the defendant be given adequate
notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it is based. This
standard is met by the “reasonable inference” the court must make
that, with or without discovery, the facts set forth a plausible claim
for relief under a particular theory of law provided that there is a
“reasonable expectation” that “discovery will reveal relevant
evidence of each element of the claim.” Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257;
Twombly, 55[0] U.S. at 556.
Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Oceanografia, S.A. De C.V., No. 10-00177, 2011 WL 938785, at *3
(W.D. La. Feb. 9, 2011) (citation omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, all well-pleaded facts are taken as true and viewed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Thompson v. City of Waco, Tex., 764 F.3d 500, 502–03
(5th Cir. 2014). The task of the Court is not to decide if the plaintiff will eventually be successful,
but to determine if a “legally cognizable claim” has been asserted.” Id. at 503.
III. Discussion
A. Section 1983 Claim Against LeBlanc Individually
1. The Court’s Prior Ruling
In the Court’s prior ruling on LeBlanc’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Parker v. Louisiana Dep't
of Pub. Safety & Corr., No. 18-1030, 2020 WL 4353564 (M.D. La. July 29, 2020), the Court laid
out in detail the standards for qualified immunity and for liability in over-detention cases, id. at
*10–12, and for supervisors like LeBlanc, id. at *13–15. See also Doc. 65 at 17–22, 24–26. Of
particular importance to this motion was the Court’s discussion of how, in order to establish that
a supervisor was liable for implementing unconstitutional policies, a plaintiff must ordinarily prove
a pattern of similar violations. Parker, 2020 WL 4353564 at *14; Doc. 65 at 25. This Court
specifically stated:
“It is thus clear that a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘a pattern of abuses
that transcends the error made in a single case.’ ” [Peterson v. City
of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 850–51 (5th Cir. 2009)] (quoting
[Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 582 (5th Cir. 2001)]
(citations omitted)). “A pattern requires similarity and specificity;
‘[p]rior indications cannot simply be for any and all “bad” or unwise
acts, but rather must point to the specific violation in question.’ ” Id.
at 851 (quoting Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of North
Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Parker, 2020 WL 4353564 at *14; Doc. 65 at 25. This Court then applied that standard and found:
The Second Amended Complaint lacks adequate detail from which
the Court can plausibly conclude that the other described incidents
are sufficiently similar to what befell Plaintiff or that the same or
sufficiently underlying cause is to blame. Indeed, Plaintiff provides
no detail about these other incidents and essentially says only that
over-detention is ubiquitous. Without more, Plaintiff’s claim must
fail.
Parker, 2020 WL 4353564 at *16; Doc. 65 at 29. This Court also held that “Plaintiff has, at this
point, failed to adequately allege deliberate indifference,” as Plaintiff failed to allege, even on
information and belief, that LeBlanc was aware of public references to the over-detention problem
(including to a Legislative Auditor’s report, an Attorney General op-ed, and testimony in a state
court law suit, all discussed in the complaint). Parker, 2020 WL 4353564 at *16; Doc. 65 at 29.
2. Parties’ Arguments
Here, LeBlanc asserts that “Plaintiff does not lodge any factual allegations regarding
similar incidents beyond what was deficiently alleged in the Second Amended Complaint.” (Doc.
67-1 at 7.) While Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that LeBlanc was aware of the
Auditor’s report, op-ed, and state court case, he fails to show that “those prior instances were
sufficiently similar to the incident in question such that it put the Secretary on notice that a
particular defect in his policies would lead to the constitutional violation at issue in this case.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff disagrees and argues that he has pled facts to “allow this Court to plausibly
conclude that the other described incidents are sufficiently similar to the Plaintiff’s case, and to
establish Defendant LeBlanc’s knowledge and the basis thereof.” (Doc. 71 at 4.) Plaintiff asserts:
Specifically, the Plaintiff pled facts that explain (1) the similar year-
long duration of numerous other incidents of over-detention, (2) the
similar cause of numerous other instances of over-detention related
to incorrect inmate records, and (3) the similar recognition upon
review of records in other instances of over-detention that an inmate
being held was entitled to immediate release. Rec. Doc. 66, p. 8
§(B)(48).
(Id.) Plaintiff then details various allegations of the Third Amended Complaint. (Id. at 5–7.)
Plaintiff further argues:
Overall, the facts pleaded by the Plaintiff explain that there is a
widespread practice of over-detention at the DOC, which has been
recognized by employees, counsel, and independent auditors alike.
Specifically, the frequency of year-long over-detentions, of inmate
release records being done wrong, and the belated recognition that
inmates are entitled to immediate release in other cases was the exact
experience of our Plaintiff as described in his Third Amended
Complaint.
(Id. at 6.) Plaintiff closes by arguing that he has adequately pled LeBlanc’s knowledge of these
problems.
LeBlanc replies by reiterating that Plaintiff has failed to establish the similarity of the prior
incidents:
The Plaintiff fails to plead facts identifying prior violations which,
because of the similarities to this case, should have put the Secretary
on notice that specific training, specific supervision, or a specific
policy was needed to prevent the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights
from being violated in the way the Plaintiff’s rights were allegedly
violated.
(Doc. 72 at 1–2.) LeBlanc then goes through each of the alleged categories of prior incidents to
rebut Plaintiff’s arguments. LeBlanc concludes:
None of the alleged other incidents referenced by the Plaintiff in his
Complaint pertain to an alleged pattern of offenders erroneously
labeled as sex offenders which led to delayed release from custody
to get compliance with the sex offender registration requirements.
Therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of pleading that
Secretary LeBlanc had notice of the particular problem that
supposedly caused Plaintiff’s alleged over-detention.
(Id. at 3.)
3. Analysis
Having carefully considered the matter, and upon further consideration of the Court’s prior
ruling, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled that there were sufficiently similar prior
incidents in sufficient number and of which LeBlanc was aware to overcome qualified immunity
at this stage. As a result, LeBlanc’s motion will be denied.
A brief review of Plaintiff’s allegations is warranted. In the Third Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff claims on information and belief that “there is a significant pattern of over-detention at
the DPSC, such that the pattern is tantamount to official policy.” (Third Amend. Compl. ¶ 45, Doc.
66.) Plaintiff further alleges that LeBlanc “was aware that the Legislative Auditor released a report
finding that the DPSC had a serious problem of not knowing where its inmates were located, or
when their proper release date was.” (Id. ¶ 46.) Moreover, Plaintiff avers on information and
belief, that:
LeBlanc was aware that counsel for the DPSC, Attorney General
Jeff Landry, wrote an op-ed on March 8, 2018, during Plaintiff’s
over-incarceration, conceding that there “is a layer of incompetence
so deep that the Corrections Department doesn’t know where a
prisoner is on any given day of the week or when he should actually
be released from prison.”
(Id. ¶ 47.) Lastly, Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that:
LeBlanc was aware of testimony from DPSC employees in Chowns v.
LeBlanc, La. 37th JDC 26-932 regarding the regular pattern of over-
detention of inmates, specifically:
a. Tracy Dibenetto, a DOC employee, testified that DOC staff have
discovered approximately one case of over-detention per week for the last
nine years. Ms. Dibenetto also testified that inmates are sometimes
incorrectly incarcerated for periods of up to a year.
b. Henry Goines, a DOC employee whose job was to review sentence
computations for the assistant secretary, testified that he typically
discovered “one or two [inmates] a week” who were eligible for immediate
release.
c. Cheryl Schexnayder, a DOC records analyst, testified that in the course
of her job, she had looked at inmates’ sentences and found that they had
been done wrong and the inmate was entitled to immediate release.
d. Sonja Riddick, a DOC employee, responded to the question: “Did you
ever find a time when you looked at an inmate’s records and you say, this
man should be out now?” with the answer: “Oh yes.”
(Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff concludes:
Plaintiff’s allegations, which if taken as true, make it plausible that
Defendant LeBlanc engaged in a policy of unconstitutionally over-detaining
persons and that policy was the driving force behind the violation of
Plaintiff's constitutional rights. As such, Defendant LeBlanc is subject to a
Monell claim based on the pattern of ongoing, widespread and specifically
similar incidents of over-detention
(Id. ¶ 49.)
Considering these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged
sufficiently similar incidents based on (1) the Legislative Auditor’s finding that “DPSC had a
serious problem of not knowing . . . when [inmates’] proper release date was,” (id. ¶ 46); (2) the
op-ed from LeBlanc’s lawyer, the Attorney General, that LeBlanc does not know, because of a
“layer of incompetence,” “when [inmates] should actually be released from prison,” (id. ¶ 47); (3)
Dibenetto’s testimony that inmates are “incorrectly incarcerated for periods of up to a year,” (id. ¶
48(a)); and (4) Schexnayder’s testimony that inmate sentences have been “done wrong” and that
inmates are entitled to immediate release,” (id. ¶ 48(b)). That is, construing these allegations in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court
finds that a reasonable juror could conclude that LeBlanc implemented defective policies that lead
to Plaintiffs’ (and others’) over-detention.
While the Fifth Circuit requires specificity and similarity, the Court declines to draw the
line as finely as LeBlanc advances and limit the types of problems involved solely to those
instances where individuals have been misclassified as sexual offenders. Rather, the problem
alleged is, as the op-ed and Legislative Auditor’s report said, the Department “not knowing when
[inmates’] proper release date was,” (id. ¶¶ 46–47), and, as Schexnayder said, the fact that “inmate
sentences have been ‘done wrong’ and that inmates are entitled to immediate release,” (id. ¶ 48(c)).
As to the other requirements, the Court finds that LeBlanc cannot seriously dispute (1) that
the prior incidents were sufficient in number and (2) that LeBlanc did not have actual knowledge
of them, particularly considering the allegations on information and belief that he knew about the
Legislative Auditor’s report, Attorney General op-ed, and state court testimony. (Id. ¶¶ 46–48.)
For all these reasons, LeBlanc’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s qualified immunity claim will
be denied.
B. False Imprisonment
LeBlanc next moves to dismiss the false imprisonment claim against the “Defendants.”
LeBlanc argues that this state law claim requires that each Defendant either actually or
constructively detain Plaintiff. According to LeBlanc, here, Plaintiff alleges only that he was in
“state law custody.”
Plaintiff responds:
Whether or not Secretary was the person who physically locked the
Plaintiff in a prison cell for 337 days past his release date, the
Plaintiff’s allegations, when taken as true, make it plausible that
LeBlanc engaged in a policy of unconstitutionally over-detaining
persons and that policy was the driving force behind the violation of
Plaintiff's constitutional rights. As such, Defendant LeBlanc is
subject to a claim of false imprisonment and thus personally liable
for the Plaintiff’s injuries.
(Doc. 71 at 10.)
LeBlanc responds first by arguing that Plaintiff engaged in “shotgun pleading.” (Doc. 72
at 4.) LeBlanc then contends, “Plaintiff’s repeated argument that he states a ‘Monell’ claim against
Secretary LeBlanc under §1983 does not respond to the argument that Secretary LeBlanc,
personally, cannot be held liable for Plaintiff’s alleged false imprisonment under Louisiana law.”
(Id.) Further, LeBlanc “note[s], again, the DPSC is still a Defendant in this lawsuit and was
unquestionably a ‘jailer’ of the Plaintiff under Louisiana law even though the Plaintiff was in
parish jails for the duration of his confinement.” (Id. at 5.) LeBlanc then closes by again
hammering the “shotgun pleading” argument. (Id. at 5–6.)
“Under Louisiana law, ‘[f]alse imprisonment is the unlawful and total restraint of the
liberty of the person.’ ” Hernandez v. Theriot, 709 F. App'x 755, 757–58 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Kelly v. W. Cash & Carry Bldg. Materials Store, 745 So. 2d 743, 750 (La. Ct. App. 1999)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Crossett v. Campbell, 122 La. 659, 48 So. 141, 143 (1908))). “It
consists of the following two essential elements: (1) detention of the person; and (2) the
unlawfulness of the detention.” Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669,
690 (La. 2006)).
Having considered the matter, while the Court laments Plaintiff’s lumping together of all
Defendants together in his counts, the Court finds that, at this stage of the proceeding, Plaintiff has
adequately put LeBlanc on notice of the allegations against him and has sufficiently described the
basis for imposing liability for this claim. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that LeBlanc implemented
policies with deliberate indifference that directly led to his over-detention. Under the
circumstances, the Court finds Plaintiff has adequately pled a false imprisonment claim. Cf. Poche
v. Gautreaux, 973 F. Supp. 2d 658, 666, 674–75 (M.D. La. 2013) (finding plaintiff stated a viable
state law false imprisonment claim when plaintiff alleged that “the District Attorney and the Prison
Officials were personally liable under Louisiana law for ‘acts and omissions in the implementation
and non-implementation of policies and customs’ that resulted in her illegal detention.”). At the
very least, the complaint, on its face, contains enough factual matter, when taken as true, to raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each element of the claim.
See Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257. As a result, LeBlanc’s motion on this issue is denied.
C. Negligence
LeBlanc’s negligence argument echoes his false imprisonment one; Plaintiff lumped all
“Defendants” together and fails to “plead facts showing how Secretary LeBlanc, personally,
breached a duty of care he owed to the Plaintiff or how any negligent conduct of Secretary LeBlanc
was the cause-in-fact of Plaintiff’s harm.” (Doc. 67-1 at 9 (citing Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d
1032 (La. 1991)).) According to LeBlanc, “[t]he few facts pleaded show the negligence claim is
directed to the Department, rather than to the Secretary.” (Id. (citing Third Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 59–
65, Doc. 66.)
In response, Plaintiff asserts that he defined “Defendants” to include each one individually
and collectively. (Doc. 71 at 10 (citing Doc. 67 at 9).) Plaintiff then argues:
As the case proceeds, discovery and testimony may further illuminate
the Defendants’ relative fault. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff clearly
plead that Secretary LeBlanc was one of the numerous “Defendants,”
that he was being sued in his personal capacity, and that he was
responsible, at the very least, for perpetuating a policy of over-
detention that caused harm to the Plaintiff. Thus, a claim of the
“Defendants” negligence was a claim against Secretary LeBlanc
individually and personally. Again, the Plaintiff’s allegations against
Secretary LeBlanc when taken as true make it plausible that Secretary
LeBlanc engaged in a policy of unconstitutionally over-detaining
persons and that the policy was the driving force behind the violation
of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
(Doc. 71 at 10–11.)
In reply, LeBlanc addresses both false imprisonment and negligence claims together.
These arguments were summarized above.
For the same reasons given in the false arrest section, the Court will deny LeBlanc’s motion
to dismiss the negligence claim. Construing the allegations of the Third Amended Complaint in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court finds
that the complaint, on its face, contains enough factual matter, when accepted as true, to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence that LeBlanc breached the
duties he owed as Secretary to Plaintiff and other inmates by implementing policies that were a
legal cause of Plaintiff’s over-detention . See Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257; Tredick v. Ekugbere, No.
17-103, 2018 WL 5504157, at *3–4 (M.D. La. Oct. 29, 2018) (deGravelles, J.) (describing
elements of negligence claim). Consequently, LeBlanc’s motion on this issue will be denied.
D. Respondeat Superior and Indemnification
LeBlanc next attacks Plaintiff’s allegation that LeBlanc is the “employer” who is
vicariously liable for torts of the DPSC and that LeBlanc is a “public entity” who is obligated to
pay any judgment against Department employees. (Doc. 67-1 at 9 (citing Third Amended
Complaint ¶¶ 76, 79, Doc. 66).) LeBlanc argues that he is neither an “employer” nor a “public
entity.” Rather, DPSC is. (Id.) LeBlanc then relies on precedent from this Court and the Fifth
Circuit to argue that he is not vicariously liable for and need not indemnify torts committed by
employees of the Department. (Id. (citing Deal v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 16-61, 2018 WL 4935454,
at *3 (M.D. La. Oct. 11, 2018)).)
Plaintiff does not oppose LeBlanc on this issue. (See Doc. 71.) Plaintiff concedes that there
is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983 but argues that “he has sufficiently pled a
pattern or practice to hold Secretary LeBlanc liable under a theory of Monell liability and therefore
the federal and state claims against him should not be dismissed.” (Id. at 11.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff has waived any opposition to dismissal of these claims by
failing to substantively oppose LeBlanc’s motion. See United States ex rel. Byrd v. Acadia
Healthcare Co., Inc., No. CV 18-312, 2021 WL 1081121, at *29 (M.D. La. Mar. 18, 2021)
(deGraveles, J.) (citing numerous authorities on this issue). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against
LeBlanc for respondeat superior and indemnification will be dismissed with prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 67) filed
by Defendant James LeBlanc is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is
GRANTED in that Plaintiff’s claims for respondeat superior and indemnification against LeBlanc
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 30, 2021.
S
JU DGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA