Clark v. LeBlanc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROBERT CLARK CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL. NO. 19-00512-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs pro se Request for Emergency Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) (Doc. 59) and Request for Emergency TRO

Continued (Doc. 65). Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order (TRO) “enjoining

Defendants, their successors in office, agents, employees, and all other persons acting

in concern [sic] and/or participating with them to provide the Plaintiff with adequate

medically needed medical treatments in the form of (a) a follow up visit with

endocrinologist; [or] (b) allow Plaintiff to dress and groom as a phenotypic female,

until [sic] after a hearing has been held pertaining to this TRO, and then only if this

order has been rescinded.” (Doc. 59, p. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the

Court order the prison to allow Plaintiff to style her hair in “effeminate styles (braids,

plaits, ponytails, perms, relaxers, arched eyebrows and more).” (Doc. 65).

The Court denied Plaintiffs request for a temporary restraining order, yet

ordered Defendants to file their response to the request for a preliminary injunction.

(Doc. 60). Defendants filed an opposition. (Doc. 62). Plaintiff filed a reply. (Doc. 66).

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motions are DENIED.

I BACKGROUND

Plaintiffis a transgender woman incarcerated at Louisiana State Penitentiary

@LSP”). (Doc. 1). On August 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed suit against LSP alleging that

Defendants unconstitutionally “deny inmates with gender dysphoria individualized

medically appropriate treatment.” (Doc. 1, p. 13). Plaintiff has, to date, filed three

main motions for a temporary restraining order. See (Docs. 10, 40, 61). The Court

granted the first motion, finding that, at the time, Plaintiff was “being denied

necessary treatment for gender dysphoria that meets the prevailing standards of

care.” (Doc. 11, p. 5). Specifically, the Court found that LSP offered Plaintiff “no viable

option to relieve the ongoing gender dysphoria.” (/d.). However, Plaintiffs second

motion was denied because Defendants demonstrated that, as of May 21, 2020,

Plaintiff was receiving the recommended medication and treatment for her gender

dysphoria. (Doc. 48, p. 3).

Plaintiff requests that the Court mandate that Defendants provide her with a

follow-up visit with an endocrinologist, permit her to “dress and groom as a female”,

particularly with regard to her hair, and release her to a less restricted custody

status. (Doc. 59, p. 1). Defendants argue that Plaintiff has a follow-up visit scheduled

with an endocrinologist, thus Plaintiffs request is now moot, and that her other

requested relief jeopardizes security at LSP and should be denied. (Doc. 62).

Il. ANALYSIS

A. Standard

Generally, preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders are

designed to preserve the status quo prior to the Court’s consideration of a case on its

merits and are not intended as a substitute for relief on the merits of the case. See

Hederal Savings and Loan ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir. 1987).

“Injunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, and should only be granted

when the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion.” Anderson v. Jackson,

556 F.3d 351, 360 (th Cir. 2009) (quoting, Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy,

777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1974). “The party seeking such relief must satisfy a

cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated before a

temporary restraining order or prelimmary injunction can be granted.” Clark v.

Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987). “Specifically, the movant must show: (1)

a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial

threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3)

that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction

may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not

disserve the public interest.” Holland Am. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d at 997 (quoting, Canal

Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 1974)).

B. Discussion

i. Grooming

As the Court noted in its initial ruling granting Plaintiffs motion for a

temporary restraining order, injunctions are not designed to circumvent the normal

procedures of litigation. (Doc. 35, p. 2). Here, Plaintiff now requests that the Court

order LSP to take positive action and allow Plaintiff to dress and present as a woman,

a request substantially in line with her underlying complaint. See (Doc. 65); (Doc. 1).

Unhke Plaintiffs imitial motion, which requested that the Court enjoin LSP from

cutting Plaintiffs hair, this motion does not “simply maintain[] the status quo

pendente lite.” See Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1248 (5th Cir. 1976). Such

relief “is particularly disfavored, and should not be issued unless the facts and law

clearly favor the moving party.” Id.

Dr. Warren M. Frazer, the physician who examined Plaintiff and diagnosed

her with gender dysphoria, recommended that she “be allowed to dress and groom as

a phenotypic female to the extent that it does not jeprodize [sic] the security policies

of the prison.” (Doc. 38-1, p. 2). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs requested

hairstyles, particularly braids, are in conflict with LSP’s security policies. (Doc. 62,

p. 4). As of September 2, 2015, the LSP “Offender Grooming” Policy states that “Hair

length ... shall only be regulated in order to comply with necessary and reasonable

health (sanitation), safety and security factors. Judgments of what constitutes a

health (sanitation), safety or security problem shall be made by the responsible

official and justified through explanation of the hazard involved.” (Doc. 62-1, p. 1).

Defendants note that buns and braids are prohibited at LSP because they interfere

with search procedures and therefore constitute a security concern. (Doc. 62, p. 4).

Defendants do not address Plaintiffs counterargument that these styles do not

present security concerns at women’s facilities.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants “have manufactured security concerns” to

prevent her from receiving gender-affirming treatment. (Doc. 65, p. 3). However,

Courts have found, particularly in the religious context, that grooming policies in

prisons that limit the length and styling of incarcerated individuals’ hair due to

security concerns are permissible. See, e.g. Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir.

2007) (prison grooming policy requiring short hair did not violate Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act); But see Ware v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrs.,

866 F.8d 263 (5th Cir. 2017) (grooming policy prohibiting prisoners from having

dreadlocks violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act).

Similarly, Plaintiff argues that “Defendants halve] failed to show or explain

why natural born females are allowed long hair and hair styles no matter how violent

their history is but Plaintiff and other transgender prisoners are not.” The Fifth

Circuit has long held that a difference in the application of hair length policies

between prisoners in separate facilities is not an equal protection violation. Hill v.

Estelle, 587 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that other

inmates at LSP are permitted to wear their hair long, outside of those who receive

religious accommodations.

Given the security concerns alleged, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a

substantial likelihood that she will prevail on the merits of her claim. Similarly,

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction

is not granted. Plaintiff is currently receiving hormone treatment, as will be

discussed, and is permitted to wear her hair longer than would otherwise be

permitted as LSP is enjoined from cutting it unless she requests it. As such, her

request for a preliminary injunction is denied as to these claims.

it Endocrinologist

The Kighth Amendment forbids cruel and unusual punishments. The Supreme

Court has construed this prohibition to include “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs of prisoners.” Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.8d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 285). To establish deliberate

indifference, Plaintiff must (1) demonstrate a serious medical need and (2) show that

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need. Id. (citations

omitted). Deliberate indifference cannot be established by showing mere negligence

or inadvertence. Jd.

There does not appear to be a dispute as to whether Plaintiff has established a

serious medical need. She has done so.! Rather, Plaintiff areues that Defendants have

failed to adequately address her medical needs and have thus acted with deliberate

indifference to such needs. In support, Plaintiff alleges that her treatment for gender

dysphoria has been put on hold “for over a year.” (Doc. 65, p. 7). However, Defendants

note that, due to restrictions stemming from the COVID-19 crisis, many

non-emergency appointments were put on hold. (Doc. 62, p. 4). As restrictions have

now been hfted, Plaintiffs treatments have resumed. Indeed, Plaintiff had an

appointment with Dr. Frazer on March 22, 2021. As such, Plaintiff has not

demonstrated that irreparable harm will result if her Motion is denied because this

concern is moot.

Court notes that on April 22, 2021, the United States Department of Justice filed a

Statement of Interest in the case of Diamond v. Ward, 5:20-cv-00453-MTT (Doc. 65). There,

the Department argued that “[p]rison officials are [] deliberately indifferent to transgender

prisoners’ gender dysphoria when they categorically deny certain types of treatment without

consideration of individualized assessments conducted by qualified medical professionals and

widely-accepted standards of care that indicate such treatments are medically necessary.”

(Doc. 65, p. 16).

iii. Custody Status

Defendants note that Plaintiff igs housed in restrictive custody because she

attacked a cellmate in 2018 with a padlock. (Doc. 62). The cell mate died from his

injuries, and Plaintiff was charged with second degree murder. (fd.). While Plaintiff

disputes the characterization of the situation, she does not dispute the fact that she

is in restrictive custody due to this incident. (Doc. 65, p. 1). Plaintiff has not

demonstrated that the public interest favors any modification of her custody status,

and therefore her motion is denied with respect to this claim.

I. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs requests for a temporary restraining order

and preliminary injunction (Docs. 59, 61, 65) are DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is REFERRED to the

Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this se of May, 2021

R Q. x

JUDGE BRIA Ca CKSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA