The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WALTER CARTER CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 19-105-SDD-EWD
SID J. GAUTREAUX, III, ET AL.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss1 filed by Defendant,
CorrectHealth East Baton Rouge, LLC (“CorrectHealth”). Plaintiff Walter Carter
(“Plaintiff”) filed an Opposition,2 to which CorrectHealth filed a Reply.3 For the following
reasons, CorrectHealth’s Motion shall be granted in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff entered the custody of the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (“EBRPP”) on
or about April 2, 2018.4 Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly requested medical attention for
the fourth finger (the ring finger) of his left hand on the date of his entry and over the next
17 days.5 Plaintiff claims that his finger suffered from pain, swelling, tenderness, and
discharge.6 On April 19, 2018, Plaintiff was transported to Our Lady of the Lake Regional
Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with a bone infection; his finger was
subsequently amputated.7
1 Rec. Doc. No. 37-1.
2 Rec. Doc. No. 40.
3 Rec. Doc. No. 43.
4 Rec. Doc. No. 22, p. 3.
5 Rec. Doc. No. 22, p. 3–4.
6 Rec. Doc. No. 22, p. 3.
7 Rec. Doc. No. 22, p. 4–5.
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Although not initially sued, on March 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint adding CorrectHealth as a defendant.8 Plaintiff asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
deliberate indifference claim9 and state law claims.10 Based on the substance of the
parties’ briefs and the lack of specificity in the Amended Complaint, the Court assumes
for the purposes of this motion that CorrectHealth has been sued in its official capacity
only. On June 29, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).11
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-
pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”12 The Court
may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”13 “To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”14
In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary
for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked
by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
8 Rec. Doc. No. 22.
9 Plaintiff styles the pertinent Count “42 USCA § 1983 14th Amendment-Due Process/Deliberate
Indifference” and does not include CorrectHealth as a defendant to his conditions of confinement claim.
Rec. Doc. No. 22, p. 7–9. The Court can thus conclude that the current claim is not a conditions of
confinement claim.
10 Rec. Doc. No. 22, pp. 9, 13.
11 Rec, Doc. No. 37.
12 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Martin v. Eby Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
13 Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).
14 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007)).
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plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.”15 A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid
of ‘further factual enhancement.’”16 However, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”17 In order to satisfy the plausibility
standard, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has
acted unlawfully.”18 “Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true,
it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’”19 On a motion to dismiss,
courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.”20
B. Section 1983 Generally
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a private right of action for
redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law.21 It
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
15 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal citations and brackets
omitted)(hereinafter Twombly).
16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(internal citations omitted)(hereinafter “Iqbal”).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Taha v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (quoting Southland Sec.
Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).
20 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d
209 (1986)).
21 See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984); Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).
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the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured....22
“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’”23
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the
color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.24 A § 1983 complainant must support his claim with specific facts demonstrating
a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations.25 The
Supreme Court has held that municipal policies and practices amounting to deliberate
indifference with respect to training, supervision, and/or hiring may give rise to § 1983
liability.26 Plaintiff contends that CorrectHealth acted in deliberate indifference to his
medical needs.27
C. Private Entity Liability under § 1983
To maintain a claim that a private citizen is liable under § 1983 on the basis of joint
action with state officials, a plaintiff “must allege facts showing an agreement or meeting
of the minds between the state actor and the private actor to engage in a conspiracy to
deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, and that the private actor was a willing
22 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
23 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, (1979));
accord Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
816 (1985); Jackson v. City of Atlanta, TX, 73 F.3d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 818
(1996); Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir. 1985).
24 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986);
Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 324–25 (5th Cir. 1984).
25 See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir.1995); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir.1986); Angel
v. City of Fairfield, 793 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1986).
26 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
410–11 (1997).
27 Rec. Doc. No. 22, p. 9.
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participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.”28 Under the nexus test, a private
party will be considered a state actor “where the government has ‘so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence with the [private actor] that it was a joint participant in
the enterprise,’” and the actions of the private party can be treated as that of the state
itself.29
Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he medical services at EBRPP are operated by
CorrectHealth East Baton Rouge, LLC . . . pursuant to a contract with Sherriff
Gautreaux.”30 CorrectHealth does not dispute that it is a state actor. The Fifth Circuit has
held that “[a] private doctor under contract with a state prison to provide medical care to
prisoners is considered a state actor because his action in providing medical care to
prisoners is fairly attributable to the state.”31 This reasoning applies equally to
CorrectHealth, and the Court concludes that CorrectHealth is a state actor for the
purposes of this Ruling.32 Plaintiff must still allege facts that CorrectHealth acted with
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs and satisfy the municipal liability
standard set forth in Monell.
D. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
To establish liability in connection with a claim for deliberate medical indifference,
a prisoner-plaintiff must be able to show that appropriate medical care has been denied
28 Pikaluk v. Horseshoe Entm't, L.P., 810 F. App'x 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Polacek v. Kemper
County, 739 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 (S.D. Miss. 2010)).
29 Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 242 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982).
30 Rec. Doc. No. 22, p. 3.
31 See Bishop v. Karney, 408 Fed.Appx. 846, 848 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-
50, 54-57 (1988)).
32 As other courts have done. Robichaux v. Lafourche Par. Det. Ctr., No. CV 17-5680, 2017 WL 5495791,
at *8 (E.D. La. Oct. 10, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-5680, 2017 WL 5483780
(E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2017); Zavala v. City of Baton Rouge/Par. of E. Baton Rouge, 2018 WL 4517461 at *12
(M.D.L.A. 2018).
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or delayed and that the denial or delay has constituted “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.”33 “Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.”34 It
requires (1) knowledge that the inmate faces a substantial risk of serious bodily harm,
and (2) failure to take reasonable measures to abate the risk.35 In the context of medical
care, this may be met by showing that the defendant “‘refused to treat [the plaintiff],
ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly,’ or otherwise ‘evince[d] a
wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’”36 Further, the plaintiff must establish
that the defendant possessed a culpable state of mind.37 For a prison official to be held
liable, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”38
“Mere negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice” does not constitute deliberate
indifference.39 Even “gross negligence” does not establish deliberate indifference.40
Rather, “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law” is the appropriate standard
for “deliberate indifference” under the Fourteenth Amendment.41 The mere delay of
medical care can also constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation but only “if there has
been deliberate indifference [that] results in substantial harm.”42
This Court previously granted Defendants Dennis Grimes and Sid J. Gautreaux,
33 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir. 1985).
34 Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001).
35 Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Arenas v. Calhoun, 922 F.3d 616, 620 (5th
Cir. 2019)).
36 Id. at 226 (quoting Arenas v. Calhoun, 922 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 2019)).
37 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
38 Id. at 837.
39 Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107
(5th Cir. 1979)).
40 Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Prot. and Reg. Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 2004).
41 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40; Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Prot. and Reg. Servs., 380 F.3d at 881.
42 Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195
(5th Cir. 1993)); Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Prot. and Reg. Servs., 380 F.3d at 881.
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III’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal law claims based on the insufficiency of Plaintiff’s
Complaint.43 This Court noted:
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff entered prison on April 2, 2018 and
allegedly immediately complained about “pain, swelling, tenderness,
discharge and other symptoms in the fourth (ring) finger of his left hand.”44
Plaintiff alleges that he requested medical care and continued to complain
until he received medical attention on April 19, 2018.45 Throughout the
seventeen days between his entry into prison and his treatment, Plaintiff
alleges that he “experienced severe and excruciating mental and physical
pain and suffering from the date of his incarceration….”46 Given these
factual allegations, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing at the
12(b)(6) stage that the prison officials were made aware of a substantial risk
of harm and that the prison officials unreasonably failed to abate the risk.
While Plaintiff alleges facts regarding the condition of his finger—
particularly swelling and discharge47—that may concern a reasonable
person, these facts are not of such a magnitude as to constitute deliberate
indifference. Plaintiff does allege that he requested medical care and called
the prison officials’ attention to his symptoms,48 but he does not allege the
amount of times he requested medical attention. There are simply not
enough alleged facts to indicate that the prison officials unreasonably failed
to abate the risk.49
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, while substantially similar to the original Complaint,
added CorrectHealth as a defendant and some additional factual allegations relevant to
CorrectHealth. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that: he complained more than once;
CorrectHealth employees ignored his complaints; CorrectHealth employees knew that a
substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff existed because of his complaints; CorrectHealth
employees denied his request to take him to the hospital; and CorrectHealth’s actions
43 Rec. Doc. No. 21.
44 Rec. Doc. No. 1 p. 3.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Rec. Doc. No. 21, pp. 5–6.
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resulted in the amputation of his finger.50 Plaintiff also attaches a study by “The Promise
of Justice Initiative” that examined the deaths of several inmates in EBRPP from 2012–
2016.51
CorrectHealth advances two arguments in support of its Motion to dismiss the
deliberate indifference claim: (1) Plaintiff’s medical records, which CorrectHealth attached
to its Motion, affirmatively disprove Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference; and, (2)
Plaintiff failed to allege any custom, policy, or practice that resulted in a violation of his
constitutional rights.52
As to (1), it is well established that, on a motion to dismiss, courts can consider
only “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint
by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”53 CorrectHealth
implores the Court to consider the medical records under the Collins exception, which
provides that a court may consider “[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to
dismiss [because they] are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the
plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim.”54 The Court exercises its discretion55 to
decline to wade into the muddied waters of the Collins exception.56
50 Rec. Doc. No. 22, p. 4–9.
51 Rec. Doc. No. 22-1.
52 Rec. Doc. No. 37-1, pp. 8-10.
53 Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).
54 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000)(internal citations omitted).
55 “The court may also consider documents attached to either a motion to dismiss or an opposition to that
motion when the documents are referred to in the pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims.” Brand
Coupon Network, L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014).
56 The Collins court explained that this exception to Rule 12(b)(6) is beneficial because, by attaching a
document that meets the above criteria, “the defendant merely assists the plaintiff in establishing the basis
of the suit, and the court in making the elementary determination of whether a claim has been stated.” It is
unclear exactly what documents the Collins court held were properly considered, but it was either a contract
or “fairness opinion” one of the parties had written for a transaction. The Collins exception is best confined
to cases where authenticity is not questioned, as it is here, and the documents introduced are truly the
basis of the claim, such as a contract or lease. The medical records here are not the basis of the claim;
they are evidence refuting the claim. Application of Collins to this case would allow the defendant to use
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The Court harbors doubt as to whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that
CorrectHealth acted with deliberate indifference because Plaintiff’s new “factual”
allegations provide little in the way of specificity. The Amended Complaint is devoid of
names of specific people who may be at fault, so individual liability is off the table. The
Court does not reach the issue of deliberate indifference, however, because the Court
concludes that the Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a custom or policy by CorrectHealth
as Monell requires.
E. Municipal Liability under Monell
To recover under § 1983 against a corporation acting as a state actor, the plaintiff
must show that the deprivation of a constitutional right was pursuant to a custom, policy,
ordinance, regulation or decision of the state actor-corporation.57 “The test to determine
liability for a private prison-management corporation under § 1983 is more or less
identical to the test employed to determine municipal or local government liability.”58
To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify: “(1) an official
policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive
knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or
the exception as a weapon rather than a convenient tool that benefits all parties and the Court. Additionally,
if the Court were to apply Collins as CorrectHealth suggests and consider the medical records, the Court
would be considering documents that in current form are inadmissible hearsay and that CorrectHealth
correctly characterizes as “evidence.” Rec. Doc. No. 37-1, p. 10 (“It is clear from the evidence that at no
point did [CorrectHealth] refuse to treat Plaintiff, ignore his complaints, or intentionally treat him
incorrectly.”).
57 Robichaux v. Lafourche Par. Det. Ctr., No. CV 17-5680, 2017 WL 5495791, at *8 (E.D. La. Oct. 10, 2017),
report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-5680, 2017 WL 5483780 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2017); Zavala
v. City of Baton Rouge/Par. of E. Baton Rouge, 2018 WL 4517461 at *12 (M.D.L.A. 2018).
58 Robichaux v. Lafourche Par. Det. Ctr., No. CV 17-5680, 2017 WL 5495791, at *8 (E.D. La. Oct. 10, 2017),
report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-5680, 2017 WL 5483780 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2017); Alfred
v. Corr. Corp., No. 08-CV-0643, 2009 WL 789649, at *2 (W.D. La. Mar. 24, 2009).
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custom).”59 The definition of “policy” includes:
A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees which,
although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so
common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents
municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be
attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to
whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.60
A policy sufficient to satisfy Monell can be found where there is “systemic
maladministration of the laws.”61 But Monell liability presupposes a “conscious adoption
of a course of action” and requires a practice that is “so persistent and widespread and
so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.”62
“Actual or constructive knowledge of [a] custom must be attributable to the
governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body has delegated
policy-making authority.”63 Elaborating on these requirements, the Fifth Circuit has stated:
Actual knowledge may be shown by such means as discussions at council
meetings or receipt of written information. Constructive knowledge may be
attributed to the governing body on the ground that it would have known of
the violations if it had properly exercised its responsibilities, as, for example,
where the violations were so persistent and widespread that they were the
subject of prolonged public discussion or of a high degree of publicity.64
Finally, “[t]o succeed [in alleging ‘moving force’ causation], ‘a plaintiff must show
that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must
demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of
59 Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237
F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)).
60 Id.
61 O'Quinn v. Manuel, 733 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1985).
62 Cleveland v. Gautreaux, 198 F. Supp. 3d 717, 735 (M.D.L.A. 2016).
63 Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735
F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1984)).
64 Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 860 F.3d 803, 808–09 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bennett v. City of Slidell,
728 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1984)).
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federal rights.’”65 “That is, ‘the plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects
deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory
right will follow the decision.’”66
Plaintiff argues that the following paragraph from his Amended Complaint
sufficiently alleges a custom or policy:
[Plaintiff’s] failure to receive proper medical care was the direct result of the
conditions outlined in the study by The Promise of Justice Initiative – i.e.,
the jail’s medical unit is underfunded and understaffed, and breaches its
constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical care to inmates; the
prison medical services provide substandard care and treatment; the
medical services area of the jail is not properly equipped with the staff,
machines and other basic resources to properly access and treat its large
population; prison officials routinely ignore monitoring policies; and jail
officials have known of the unconstitutional conditions at EBRPP since at
least 2015 and yet have failed to act.67
CorrectHealth argues that “allegations of a single incident are not sufficient to show
the existence of a custom or policy.”68 CorrectHealth further argues that Plaintiff does not
allege any facts “sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or practice of inadequate medical
care that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute an official custom.”69 Plaintiff
responds that he is alleging more than a single incident (the single incident being
Plaintiff’s incident); rather, he is asserting that “his damages were the result of a medical
system at EBRPP that was inadequately funded, chronically understaffed, and marred by
a complete lack of training . . . .”.70 Plaintiff cites Zavala v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of
65 Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).
66 Id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 411).
67 Rec. Doc. No. 40, p. 7.
68 Rec. Doc. No. 37-1, p. 10.
69 Id.
70 Rec. Doc. No. 40, p. 8 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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East Baton Rouge wherein another section of this Court denied in part CorrectHealth’s71
motion to dismiss on similar grounds.72
The Zavala court held that very detailed allegations of a “mental-health system that
was inadequately funded, chronically understaffed, and marred by a complete lack of
training . . . .” sufficed to allege a policy or custom of “systemic deficits in EBRPP’s mental
healthcare treatment” under Monell.73 Assuming for the purposes of this Ruling that
“systemic deficits in treatment” can be considered a policy under Monell, Plaintiff has still
failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a custom or policy.74
Plaintiff’s allegations of CorrectHealth’s policy are insufficient for both temporal
reasons and due to a lack of specificity—particularly as to causation. First, “The Promise
of Justice Initiative” study that Plaintiff relies on almost entirely to establish
CorrectHealth’s policy only examined EBRPP practices from 2012–2016, and Plaintiff
entered EBRPP in July 2018.75 In the paragraph that Plaintiff argues sufficiently alleges
a custom or policy, Plaintiff states, “[Plaintiff’s] failure to receive proper medical care was
the direct result of the conditions outlined in the study by The Promise of Justice Initiative
. . . .” then lists the purported conditions within EBRPP.76 Conditions are not necessarily
policy, and Plaintiff’s description of conditions two years prior to his incarceration is
insufficient to raise his claims for relief above a speculative level. Plaintiff does not
71 CorrectHealth was also a defendant in Zavala.
72 Id. citing Zavala v. City of Baton Rouge/Par. of E. Baton Rouge, No. CV 17-656-JWD-EWD, 2018 WL
4517461, at *23 (M.D. La. Sept. 20, 2018).
73 Zavala, at *18–19.
74 The Zavala plaintiff’s complaint was substantially more thorough. The Zavala plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint included things like names, dates, times, and citations to medical records. Case 3:17-cv-00656-
JWD-EWD, Rec. Doc. No. 23, pp. 1-38. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not as to CorrectHealth. Case
3:19-cv-00105-SDD-EWD, Rec. Doc. No. 22, pp. 1–18.
75 Rec. Doc. No. 22-1, p. 14.
76 Rec. Doc. No. 40, p. 7.
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sufficiently allege that those conditions still existed during his incarceration or that those
conditions were the result of any policy. For that reason alone, Plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claim against CorrectHealth must be dismissed.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations as to the conditions within EBRPP are
insufficient to state a claim because Plaintiff does not show a “direct causal link between
the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.”77 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that:
[T]he jail’s medical unit is underfunded and understaffed, and breaches its
constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical care to inmates; the
prison medical services provide substandard care and treatment; the
medical services area of the jail is not properly equipped with the staff,
machines and other basic resources to properly access and treat its large
population; prison officials routinely ignore monitoring policies; and jail
officials have known of the unconstitutional conditions at EBRPP since at
least 2015 and yet have failed to act.78
Plaintiff fails to connect the causal dots because he fails to allege facts that show
the conditions that he alleges were in existence at EBRPP contributed to his injuries. In
other words, Plaintiff alleges that he was injured while in EBRPP, and that EBRPP had
the above conditions (at some point), but he does not demonstrate how those conditions
caused his injuries with any degree of specificity. As such, even disregarding the temporal
limitations to Plaintiff’s allegations, he has still failed to allege sufficient causation because
he has failed to allege a “direct causal link between [CorrectHealth’s] action and the
deprivation of federal rights.79
77 Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).
78 Rec. Doc. No. 40, p. 7.
79 Valle, 613 F.3d at 542.
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F. State Law Claims
In addition to his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff also brings claims against
CorrectHealth for negligence under state law.80 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to allege facts sufficient to support his federal law claims, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims in the current
procedural posture.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, CorrectHealth’s Motion to Dismiss81 is hereby
GRANTED in part. Plaintiff will have 21 days from the date of this order to cure the
deficiencies in the Amended Complaint, to the extent possible. If Plaintiff does not cure
the deficiencies, this dismissal will convert to a dismissal with prejudice over the federal
claims, and the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state law claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on October 22, 2020.
S
JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
80 Rec. Doc. No. 22, pp. 13–15.
81 Rec. Doc. No. 37.
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