The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IMMACULATA N. ANYANWU CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA NO.: 18-00778-BAJ-SDJ
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26) filed by Defendant State
of Louisiana through the Louisiana Department of Health (“LDH”), seeking the
dismissal of all Plaintiff’s remaining claims. For the following reasons, Defendant’s
Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
This dispute arises from an action for the alleged discrimination against
Plaintiff due to her disability and national origin. Plaintiff is a former employee of
LDH, who worked for the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System as a registered
nurse. (Doc. 24 at p. 2). Plaintiff alleges that in September 2012, she was on leave
under the Family Medical Leave Act because of a medical procedure. (Id.) She later
returned to work in October 2012 with the following physician-ordered restrictions:
no lifting more than ten pounds, no bending, no squatting, no stooping, no climbing
stairs, and no prolonged activities. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew of her
health issues and her restrictions throughout her employment. Plaintiff also alleges
that throughout her employment, she was harassed and discriminated against not
only on the basis of her restrictions, but also on the basis of her national origin. (Id.
at p. 5). Plaintiff alleges that although she was born in Nigeria, she is a naturalized
citizen. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to intimidation, mockery and
harassment because of her accent. (Id.). On October 26, 2012, Plaintiff alleges she
received a termination letter effective November 2012. (Id. at p. 4).
On August 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed her Complaint. (Doc. 1). Defendant
responded with a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 9). On July 24,
2019, the Court partially granted this motion, dismissing Plaintiff’s claim under
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The remaining claims are
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II of the ADA, and the Family
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The Court allowed these claims to proceed, so long as
Plaintiff amended her complaint to provide more facts. The Court granted Plaintiff
ten days to comply with the Order and advised that failure to timely amend may
result in dismissal. (Doc. 15). Plaintiff failed to comply with the Order, prompting
Defendant to file another Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41.
The Court denied this motion, granting Plaintiff another opportunity to amend her
complaint. (Doc. 23).
On September 11, 2019, Plaintiff eventually filed her Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 24). Plaintiff supplemented her claims under FMLA and Title VII; however,
Plaintiff did not provide supplemental information for her ADA claim. Instead,
Plaintiff added a claim alleging a questionable application of Louisiana Civil Service
Rule 12.6(a)(1). Defendant then filed the instant motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), alleging that Plaintiff’s claims arising under the FMLA and
Louisiana Civil Service Rule 12.6(a)(1) are barred by sovereign immunity, pursuant
to the Eleventh Amendment, and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, at issue is the trial court’s jurisdiction—
its very power to hear the case. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,413 (5th Cir.
1981). This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Because Plaintiff invokes that jurisdiction,
she bears the burden of proving it. See Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir.
2018). In determining its jurisdiction, the Court may consider “(1) the complaint
alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record,
or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the [C]ourt’s resolution
of disputed facts.” Carroll v. Abide, 788 F.3d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 2015).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint against
the legal standard set forth in Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). Hence, a complaint need not set out “detailed factual allegations,”
but something “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action” is required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. DISCUSSION
A. FMLA Retaliation Claim
Defendant argues for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim not
only because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, but also because it is a “well settled
point of law that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suits for money
damages brought under the self-care provisions of the FMLA.” (Doc. 26-1 at p. 6).
Defendant points to Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 566 U.S. 30 (2012) for
support. Defendant argues that in Coleman, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that states’ sovereign immunity was not abrogated by Congress to allow suits
for money damages under FMLA’s self-care provision. Under the self-care provision
of the FMLA, eligible employees may take leave because of “a serious health condition
that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such
employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
Plaintiff claims that she was discharged from her employment in retaliation
for availing herself of FMLA leave to undergo a medical procedure. Plaintiff asserts
that the discharge was unfounded because she worked with the same restrictions
before she left; therefore, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated provisions of
the FMLA. Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive monetary damages for
the alleged retaliatory discharge.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is barred due to sovereign immunity. In
Coleman, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign
immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to allow suits for
damages under the self-care provision. See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 43-44. Plaintiff was
an employee who took leave under the self-care provision of FMLA and now seeks
monetary damages for an alleged violation of the self-care provision; thus, Defendant
is immune from liability for this claim.
B. Title VII Claim
Plaintiff asserts that she was discriminated against because of her national
origin. She alleges that she is a naturalized citizen that was born in Nigeria and that
she was treated differently regarding scheduling, assignment, and performance
review. (Doc. 24 at p. 5). Plaintiff further alleges that she was harassed and
intimidated by her immediate supervisor and mocked because of her Nigerian accent.
Plaintiff claims that other employees, who were natural-born citizens of the
United States and had similar medical limitations, were allowed to continue their
employment with Defendant. Plaintiff did not provide specific details in her pleadings
in support of this allegation, leaving Defendant uncertain as to what her exact claims
are under Title VII. Defendant argues that it seems that Plaintiff may be attempting
to bring claims for hostile work environment, discriminatory discharge, and
retaliation under Title VII. (Doc. 26-1 at p. 7). Defendant argues that regardless of
the claims Plaintiff intended to bring, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Title
VII.
1. Hostile Work Environment
To state a claim for hostile work environment under Title VII, Plaintiff must
show that: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (4) the
harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) her
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt
remedial action. See E.E.O.C. v. WC&M Enterprises, Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir.
2007). Although Plaintiff alleges that she belongs to the group of persons protected
by her national origin, she was subjected to unwelcome harassment, and that the
harassment was based on her national origin, Plaintiff has failed to allege whether
the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment and
whether Defendant knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to
take prompt remedial action. Plaintiff failed to plead enough details to put Defendant
on notice that her claims include a hostile work environment claim; thus, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for hostile work environment.
2. Discriminatory Discharge
Defendant argues that because Plaintiff alleged that other employees, who
were natural-born citizens and have similar limitations, were allowed to continue
their employment, Plaintiff seems to be pleading a discriminatory discharge action.
(Doc. 26-1 at p. 9). Defendant further argues that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently
allege that she was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees
not in her protected class, under nearly identical circumstances. (Id.).
To state a claim for discriminatory discharge, Plaintiff must establish that she:
(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was subjected to an adverse employment
action; (3) was qualified for her position; and (4) was replaced by someone outside of
the protected class. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 345
(5th Cir. 2007). Once again, Plaintiff has pleaded that she is a member of the
protected class based on national origin and that she was subject to an adverse
employment action; however, Plaintiff has failed to plead with sufficiency information
regarding whether she was qualified to continue working in her position and was
replaced by someone outside of her national origin of Nigeria. Plaintiff pleaded that
employees that were natural-born citizens were permitted to continue their
employment. Without more details, the Court must conclude that the assertion is
nothing more than a conclusory allegation. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed
to plead sufficient details to establish a claim for discriminatory discharge.
3. Retaliation
Defendant argues that Plaintiff seems to be abandoning her original Title VII
retaliation claim in the Amended Complaint and that Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff failed to allege any facts that suggest
that she engaged in an activity that is protected by Title VII and that no causal link
exists between the protected activity and her termination. (Doc. 26-1 at p. 11).
To state a claim for Title VII retaliation, Plaintiff must show that (1) she
engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) that she was subjected to an adverse
employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557
(5th Cir. 2007). An employee has engaged in a protected activity under Title VII if
she either (1) opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title
VII, or (2) made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding or hearing under Title VII. McCoy, 55 F.Supp.3d at 561 n.8.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a
claim for retaliation under Title VII. Although Plaintiff has alleged an adverse
employment action, she has failed to allege sufficient details regarding her
engagement in a protected activity and a causal link between the protected activity
and her termination from employment. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
that sufficiently state a claim under Title VII for hostile work environment,
discriminatory discharge, retaliation, or any other cognizable action, the Court must
dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.
C. Misapplication of Louisiana CSR 12.6(a)(1) Claim
Defendant also contends that Plaintiff’s claim for the violation of Louisiana
State Civil Service Rule 12.6(a)(1) is also barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff
argues that Rule 12.6(a)(1), as applied to Defendant, violates the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and ADA Title I by failing to accommodate persons
with disabilities. (Doc. 24 at p. 6). Defendant argues that this claim may actually be
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, although Plaintiff does not describe it as such.
(Doc. 26-1 at p. 7).
Rule 12.6(a)(1) permits an employer to non-disciplinarily remove an employee
if, on the day the employee is considered to have been given notice, she (1) has less
than eight hours of sick leave and (2) is unable to perform the essential functions of
her job due to illness or medical disability. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated
this rule because she had 88 hours of leave remaining before her removal. (Doc. 24 at
p. 6). Plaintiff further alleges that she was able to perform the essential functions of
her job, post-medical procedure, despite her illness. Plaintiff contends that she
returned to work with the same restrictions that Defendant previously
accommodated before her medical procedure. (Id. at p. 4).
Plaintiff argues that the Defendant’s application of Rule 12.6(a)(1) to terminate
her employment violated her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
and her right to be accommodated under FMLA and ADA Title I. (Id. at p. 6).
Although Plaintiff does not specifically assert a § 1983 claim, the Court agrees with
Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff is alleging the elements of a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under § 1983, any person who, under color of any statute, violates
the federal rights of a person within the United States shall be liable to the party
injured. Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant has violated her federal rights under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, FMLA, and the ADA while
acting under color of state statute, Rule 12.6(a)(1).
Defendant argues that if Plaintiff’s claim is a § 1983 claim, then it is barred by
sovereign immunity. Defendant further argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars
§1983 suits against state governments in federal court, and that states are not
“persons” within the meaning of the statute. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct.
1139 (1979); See also Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109
S.Ct. 2304 (1989). Defendant argues that it has not waived its sovereign immunity
for § 1983 claims in federal court. (Id. at p.7).
To the extent that Plaintiff’s claim is intended to be a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff
was required to allege (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. West v Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Although
Plaintiff alleged the denial of constitutional and statutory rights, she did not allege
that a state official acted under color of the law regarding her termination. Therefore,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983.
The most fatal characteristic of Plaintiff’s claim is not that she failed to allege
sufficient detail, but that she chose to sue only the State of Louisiana. A state is not
a person under § 1983; thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars claims against a state
brought under this section. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); See also Will
v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). Thus, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant for the alleged misapplication of
Rule 12.6(a)(1) is barred.
D. Title II of the ADA Claim
As previously noted, the Court ordered Plaintiff to amend her Complaint to
supplement her claim under Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”). (Doc. 15). Plaintiff made no mention of this claim in her Amended
Complaint. Thus, due to Plaintiff’s failure to provide supplemental information, the
Court must dismiss this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion (Doc. 26) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s remaining claims are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 31st day of July, 2020
_____________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA