The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MYRA BROUSSARD CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF NO: 19-00527-BAJ-RLB
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
AND A&M COLLEGE, ET AL.
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 11). Plaintiff filed an opposition. For reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion
is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendants who began her career as a teacher
in 1988. (Doc. 1-2 at p. 5). Plaintiff alleges that she attained tenure with Iberville
Parish Schools in 1993. (Doc. 17-1 at p. 1). In 2000, she began employment in Baton
Rouge with Louisiana State University Laboratory School, currently known as
University Laboratory School (“ULS”). Plaintiff claims that she excelled as an
educator and in 2005, she became Associate Principal at ULS. Plaintiff claims that
in 2008, she became the Elementary School Principal at ULS and served in that role
until her demotion to Special Assistant to the Interim Superintendent in May 2019.
(Id. at p. 9). Plaintiff alleges that she was later demoted once more to an instructor
role before Defendants notified her on August 19, 2019 that she would be terminated
effective May 22, 2020 (Id.).
Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of East Baton Rouge on July 18, 2019. Plaintiff alleges claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and state law for Defendants’ violation of her due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and for retaliatory termination. Plaintiff further claims that
she was terminated in violation of La R.S. 17:441, et seq., Louisiana’s Tenured
Teacher Law, because she was tenured at the time of her termination. (Doc. 1-2 at p.
10). On August 14, 2019, Defendants removed this matter to federal court. Shortly
after removal, Defendants filed the instant motion as to the issue of tenure, arguing
that Plaintiff was not tenured during her employment at ULS because she was not
an eligible teacher as defined in 17:441(A)(1)(a). Plaintiff opposes the motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56, “[t]he [C]ourt shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining
whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the Court views the facts in
the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all reasonable inferences in
the non-movant's favor. Coleman v. Houston Independent School Dist, 113 F.3d 528,
533 (5th Cir. 1997).
After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must
set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). At this stage, the Court does not evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes. Int'l
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1059 (1992). However, if the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable
jury, drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, could arrive at a verdict
in that party's favor, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Int'l
Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1263.
On the other hand, the non-movant's burden is not satisfied by some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, or by conclusory allegations,
unsubstantiated assertions, or a mere scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-
movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). In
other words, summary judgment will be appropriate only “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sherman v. Hallbauer,
455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that she is tenured because she is a teacher within the
meaning of the tenure laws. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that she is a teacher because
she is an employee of a local public school board as defined in La. R.S.17:441(A)(1)(a).
Plaintiff further argues that she attained tenure while working at ULS. Plaintiff
argues, in the alternative, that if she didn’t attain tenure at ULS, she maintained the
tenure that she previously attained as a teacher for the Iberville Parish School Board
throughout her employment with ULS. Plaintiff also argues that because ULS is
funded with public money, she is an employee of a local public school board. (Doc. 17
at p. 6).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not an employee of a local public school
board because ULS is not affiliated with or under the authority of the East Baton
Rouge School Board and operates under the authority and administration of
Louisiana State University; thus, Plaintiff is an employee of Louisiana State
University. (Doc. 11-3 at p. 2). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s employment contract
specifically states that she would not attain tenure. Defendants further argue that
regardless of Plaintiff’s attainment of tenure prior to her employment with ULS, she
did not maintain her previous tenure or attain a new tenure during her employment
with ULS. Defendants assert that although it receives public funding for ULS, ULS
is still not a school within the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; thus, Plaintiff
is not employed by the local public school board.
Louisiana Revised Statute 17:441, et seq “defines the status of Louisiana’s
public school teachers and outlines the procedures a school board must follow to
discharge them.” Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish School Bd., 633 So.2d 1235, 1241
(La. 1994) “Teacher tenure law gives to public school system teachers tenure in office
and arms those permanent teachers with a shield protecting them against discharge,
suspension, or demotion for causes other than those provided by statute.” Id. Under
§ 441(A)(1)(a), a teacher is “any employee of a local public school board, state special
school, or a program administered by the special school district who holds a teacher’s
certificate and whose legal employment requires such teacher’s certificate.” 1 More
specifically, “a teacher is an employee of a parish school board, including principals,
or superintendents.” Id. at 1242.
Defendants attached a copy of Plaintiff’s employment contract and
appointment letters from her initial employment in 2000 and promotion in 2006 as
proof that Plaintiff was not on a tenure track. (Doc. 11, Exhibits A-1 and A-2). The
appointment letter provides that positions such as hers “are renewable on an annual
basis and do not lead to tenure.” (Id., Exhibit A-2). The letter signifying Plaintiff’s
promotion to Assistant Principal in 2006 provides that “all positions in the College
Education and Laboratory School are renewable on an annual basis and do not lead
to tenure.” (Id., Exhibit A-3). Defendants also submitted a job description template
for Plaintiff’s position as principal. (Id., Exhibit A-4). On the job description template,
next to the term “faculty status,” is the notation that Plaintiff is on a “non-tenure
track.”
Finally, Defendants submitted a copy of a Louisiana Attorney General Opinion
which provides that when a teacher who has attained tenure in one parish but who
then leaves that parish to begin employment in another parish or a state educational
institution located in another parish, loses the tenure previously acquired. (Doc. 18,
Exhibit B).
1 The parties agree that Plaintiff was not employed by a state special school or a program
administered by the special school district.
Plaintiff did not submit any specific evidence to prove that she reached tenure
status while employed with Defendants. Plaintiff merely attached a letter from the
Iberville Parish School Board that reflects her years of service and that she reached
tenure status in Iberville Parish in 1993. (Doc. 18, Exhibit A). Plaintiff also attached
a copy of the Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors’ regulations and her
termination letter, but neither serve as evidence that she achieved tenure status
while employed at ULS. (See Id. Exhibits B, C).
The Court finds that Defendants have submitted sufficient evidence to show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s tenure status. The
uncontroverted evidence shows that Defendants made it clear to Plaintiff, when she
was initially employed and when she was promoted, that she was never a tenured
employee for ULS. During her employment with ULS, Plaintiff was not a teacher
within the meaning of 17:441(A)(1)(a), as Plaintiff was not an employee of a local
parish school board. Rousselle, 633 So.2d at 1242. Plaintiff’s appointment and
promotion letters bear “Louisiana State University” in the letterhead and her
employment contract provides that she is an employee of the University. Moreover,
ULS is not a school within the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; it is operated
under the authority of the Louisiana State University. Thus, since Plaintiff was not
an employee of a local parish school board, she cannot avail herself of the protections
of Louisiana’s tenure laws. The fact that ULS receives public funding does not make
Plaintiff an employee of the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board.
The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s tenure status from the Iberville Parish
School System was not maintained during her employment with ULS. The Attorney
General Opinion, cited by Defendants, provides that “it is the opinion of this
department that where a teacher who has tenured in a parish voluntarily leaves the
employ of the parish school system to accept employment in another parish school
system, or in an educational institution located in another parish, the such action
constitutes an abandonment of the tenure… so he would lose any tenure which he
may have previously acquired.” Opp.Atty.Gen.,1940-42, p. 3720. Thus, when Plaintiff
left Iberville Parish in 2000, she abandoned her tenure when she accepted
employment with ULS, an educational institution in another parish.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 11) is GRANTED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 27th day of July, 2020
_____________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA