“Our Circuit does not recognize an accountant-client privilege.”
How later courts described this case
- “Our Circuit does not recognize an accountant-client privilege.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHEVRON TCI, INC. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 18-776-BAJ-RLB
CAPITOL HOUSE HOTEL
MANAGER, LLC, ET AL.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel or Authorize Deposition and Production
of Documents. (R. Doc. 46). The exhibits were filed under seal. (R. Doc. 50). The motion is
opposed. (R. Docs. 51, 60).1 Plaintiff filed reply memoranda. (R. Doc. 57, 63).
The Court held oral argument on March 3, 2020. (R. Doc. 77).
I. Background
This is a breach of contract action in which Chevron TCI, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Chevron
TCI” or “CTCI”) alleges that it is entitled to recover approximately $11 million from Capitol
House Hotel Manager, LLC (“Capital House Manager”) and/or the Wilbur Marvin Foundation
(“WMF”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (R. Doc. 1, “Compl.”).
CTCI alleges that in 2005, it invested in Capitol House Hotel Operating Company, LLC
(“Capital House Operator” or “Company”) “which was formed to lease, hold, maintain, and
operate a hotel and commercial space in downtown Baton Rouge, now known as the Hilton
Capital Center.” (Compl. ¶ 7). CTCI represents that the “project was eligible for the federal
1 CTCI argues that the opposition filed by the third-parties KMPG LLP and Shannon Kirkpatrick was not filed
within the 21 days provided by Local Rule 7(f), and should therefore be struck from the record. (See R. Doc. 63 at
3). The Court disagrees. Foremost, it appears that CTCI’s certificate of service represents that the third-parties’
counsel was served with the motion “via the CM/ECF . . . system” on November 1, 2019. (R. Doc. 46 at 2). The
third-parties’ counsel did not make an appearance until filing an opposition on December 12, 2019. (See R. Doc.
60). It is therefore unclear when and how the motion was served on the third parties. At any rate, to the extent
necessary, the Court finds good cause to deem the opposition timely under Local Rule 7(f).
Historic Tax Credit (HTC) program, which encourages private sector investment in the
rehabilitation and re-use of historic buildings.” (R. Doc. 24-1 at 3).
Defendants represent that on December 19, 2005, Capital House Manager, Capital House
Operator, and Capital House Hotel Development Company, LLC (“Capital House Owner”) were
organized as limited liability companies under Louisiana law. (R. Doc. 27-1 at 4). Defendants
assert that Capital House Owner leased the hotel to Capital House Operator and “there was an
historic tax credit pass-through agreement allowing CTCI to receive the income tax credits, even
though the entity in which it invested (Operator) did not own the building that was being
improved.” (R. Doc. 27-1 at 4). CTCI represents that under Capital House Operator’s operating
agreement, Capital House Manager would manage Capital House Operator and CTCI would
receive tax credits for an investment of $11,909,779, payable in two installments, which CTCI
paid. (R. Doc. 24-1 at 3).
On December 29, 2005, CTCI entered into a Purchase Agreement with Capital House
Manager with a six-month “put option period” to elect to sell its membership interest in Capital
House Operator to Capitol House Manager. (Compl. ¶ 8; see R. Doc. 1-1).2 That same day,
CTCI also entered into a Guaranty Agreement with WMF in which WMF guaranteed all
obligations of Capitol House Manager within the Purchase Agreement. (Compl. ¶ 9; see R. Doc.
1-2). The Purchase Agreement has been amended several times, with the seventh and final
amendment providing that the purchase option period ended on December 31, 2015. (Compl. ¶
10-11; see R. Docs. 1-3, 1-4). In addition, each of the Amended and Restated Purchase
Agreements contains an acknowledgement that the Guaranty Agreement remains in full effect
except to the extent the Purchase Agreement is amended. (Compl. ¶ 12; see R. Docs. 1-3, 1-4).
2 Defendants’ Answer asserts that Capital House Manager held a 0.1% interest and CTCI held a 99.9% interest in
Capital House Operator. (R. Doc. 9 at 1).
Capital House Operator was under IRS audits with respect to CTCI’s claimed historic tax
credit for the years 2006-2011. (R. Doc. 27-1 at 6). Defendants assert that during this audit
CTCI took the position that it was a “true partner” with Capital House Operator and,
accordingly, could avail itself of the full historic tax credit, but ultimately settled with the IRS by
receiving two-thirds of the historic tax credit. (R. Doc. 27-1 at 6-7).
Defendants represent that on September 5, 2012, Capital House Owner and Capital
House Operator “terminated the lease between them” and Capital House Owner sold the hotel,
including fixtures and other assets, to a third party. (R. Doc. 27-1 at 5). Defendants assert that
Capital House Operator “was terminated and dissolved” in light of the language of Section
2.5(A)(i) of its Operating Agreement. (R. Doc. 27-1 at 5).3 Defendants further assert that CTCI
consented to the sale and termination of the lease, and CTCI lost its right to a put option payment
in light of the termination of Capital House Operator as an entity. (R. Doc. 27-1 at 6). CTCI
argues that Louisiana law has additional requirements for the termination of a limited liability
company, notwithstanding the language in Capital House Operator’s Operating Agreement. (R.
Doc. 33 at 3).
Capital House Operator was also under an IRS audit with respect to CTCI’s claimed
historic tax credit for the years 2012-2013. (R. Doc. 27-1 at 6-7). Defendants represent that
during this audit CTCI signed a Form 870-PT agreeing with the IRS’ conclusion that Capital
House Operator was terminated as an entity in 2012 given the termination of the lease and sale of
assets. (R. Doc. 27-1 at 7).
3 Section 2.5(A)(i) of its Operating Agreement provides the following: “[Capital House Operator] shall continue in
full force and effect until December 31, 2055, except that [Capital House Operator] shall be dissolved prior to such
date upon the happening of . . . The termination or expiration of the Lease or the sale or other disposition of all or
substantially all the assets of [Capital House Operator] (including, without limitation, the Leasehold Interest).” (R.
Doc. 42-2 at 31).
On November 19, 2015, CTCI demanded Capitol House Manager to purchase its interest
in Capital House Operator for $10,554,519. (Compl. ¶ 13). Neither Capital House Manager nor
WMF paid the amount sought. (Compl. ¶ 14). CTCI is now seeking recovery for breach of the
Purchase Agreement and Guaranty Agreement.
II. The Motion to Compel
The instant discovery motion concerns whether and to what extent Shannon Kirkpatrick
(“Kirkpatrick”), a CPA with KPMG, LLG (“KPMG”), must provide testimony and documents in
response to a Rule 45 subpoena served on her by CTCI. CTCI represents that “[f]rom 2008 to
2013, Kirkpatrick prepared and filed all of the Company’s tax returns, and through 2018, she
continued to service the Company’s and CTCI’s tax needs (as CTCI was 99% owner of the
Company) as it involved the Company.” (R. Doc. 46-1 at 2). There is no dispute that both CTCI
and the defendants, Capital House Manager and WMF, would like to obtain documents and
deposition testimony from Kirkpatrick.
CTCI’s subpoena, which was served on October 10, 2019, sought compliance in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana on October 29, 2019. (R. Doc. 50-1 at 1-2). In response to the subpoena,
Kirkpatrick and KPMG informed CTCI that they objected to the subpoena as it was not issued in
compliance with Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 517, which requires a contradictory hearing
to be held prior to the service of a subpoena on a CPA. (R. Doc. 50 at 81; see R. Doc. 60).
CTCI filed the instant motion to compel compliance with the subpoena and, to the extent
necessary, to comply with the requirements of Article 517. (R. Doc. 46). As a preliminary issue,
CTCI argues that while this is a breach of contract action under Louisiana law, the Court should
apply federal privilege law, which does not recognize an accountant-client privilege, much less
the procedural requirements of Article 517. (R. Doc. 46-1 at 8-10; R. Doc. 63 at 3-6). CTCI
further argues that even if the accountant-client privilege under Louisiana Code of Evidence
article 515 applies, CTCI is entitled to obtain the information sought as the “client” in that
accountant-client relationship. (R. Doc. 46-1 at 11-13). Finally, CTCI argues that the Court
should find any additional procedural requirements under Article 517 to be satisfied. (R. Doc.
46-1 at 13-14).
In partially opposing the motion, Capital House Manager and WMF argue that while they
have an interest to obtain documents and deposition testimony from Kirkpatrick, certain
attorney-client communications after November 19, 2015 and information pertaining to WMF
entities (other than Capital House Operator) fall outside the scope of discovery. (R. Doc. 51). As
discussed further below, the foregoing issues became moot at oral argument when defense
counsel withdrew the position with respect to attorney-client privilege and Plaintiff’s counsel
clarified that the scope of information sought pertained only to Capital House Operator. Capital
House Manager and WMF also seek testimony on specific categories of information identified
on an attachment to their opposition (R. Doc. 51-1). Again, at oral argument, the parties agreed
that the additional information sought by Capital House Manager and WMF, including
documents related to the negotiation and execution by CTCI of a Form 870-PT for the years
2012 and 2013, pertain solely to Capital House Operator.
Kirkpatrick and KPMG oppose the motion on the basis that as a federal court sitting in
diversity, this Court must apply Louisiana privilege law, including the requirements of Article
517. (R. Doc. 60 at 1-6). Kirkpatrick and KPMG argue that the Court must hold a contradictory
hearing in compliance with Article 517 to determine whether and to what extent the information
sought is protected from disclosure by any applicable accountant-client privilege or work product
rule, and that the subpoena meets the four criteria set forth in Article 517. (R. Doc. 60 at 6-12).
Kirkpatrick and KPMG further argue that the court must determine the extent of privilege and
whether the subpoena is validly issued and enforceable so that they can comply with the rules of
professional conduct for CPAs and a criminal provision in the Internal Revenue Code. (R. Doc.
60 at 12-14). At oral argument, Kirkpatrick and KPMG’s counsel clarified that the non-parties
were not taking any position with respect to whether an actual privilege applies to the
information sought.
III. Law and Analysis
A. The scope of the information sought
Rule 45 provides that “[a]t any time, on notice to the commanded person, the serving
party may move the court for the district where compliance is required for an order compelling
production or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i).
Through the subpoena at issue, CTCI seeks documents and testimony on three categories:
(1) “Any and all documents concerning the 2012 Tax Returns for Operator”; (2) “Any and all
documents concerning or related to the Form 1065X – Amended Return or Administrative
Adjustment Request . . . referred to as the 2012 Amended Return for Operator”; and (3) “Any
and all documents evidencing any and all communications or Professional Actions by
[Kirkpatrick] for Operator, which were generated after the filing of the 2012 Tax Returns for
Operator until the Form 1065X . . . was filed.” (R. Doc. 50-1 at 8). At oral argument, Plaintiff’s
counsel clarified that the information sought pursuant to CTCI’s subpoena is limited to
documents and communications concerning Capital House Operator, and that CTCI does not
seek any information related to the numerous related and support entities involved in the
underlying deal or any unrelated WMF entities. Given these representations, any issue with
respect to whether CTCI is seeking information pertaining to entities other than Capital House
Operator (and to which a separate accountant-client privilege with Kirkpatrick and KPMG may
attach) is resolved. The Court finds that the scope of the information sought by CTCI through its
subpoena, to the extent it is limited to Capital House Operator, to be relevant to the claims and
defenses in this action and proportional to the needs of this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
Capital House Manager and WMF also seek to obtain information pertaining to other
categories not explicitly detailed in CTCI’s subpoena: (a) “any and all documents related to IRS
NOPA (Notice of Proposed Adjustment) for the calendar years 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010”; (b)
“any and all documents related to IRS NOPA for calendar years 2007, 2011, 2012, and 2013”;
(c) “any and all documents related to IRS requests to extend the statute of limitations for any of
the years 2006 through 2013 in connection with negotiations of the NOPAs and [Kirkpatrick’s]
communication of those requests to CTCI, its counsel or other representatives and to Manager;
(d) “any and all documents related to the amendments to the Purchase Agreement between CTCI
and Manager”; (e) “any and all documents related to CTCI’s settlement with the IRS for years
2006 through 2011, including, but not limited to, Notices of Final Partnership Administration
Adjustment (‘FPAA’) for years ending December 31, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011”
and (f) “any and all documents related to negotiation and execution by CTCI of a Form 870-PT
for years 2012 and 2013.” (R. Doc. 51-1). At oral argument, defense counsel focused on
obtaining information related to the Form 870-PT.
It appears that many of the foregoing additional documents sought by Capital House
Manager and WMF fall within one of the three categories of information sought in CTCI’s
subpoena. To the extent they do not, the Court finds this information is also relevant to the
claims and defenses in this action and proportional to the needs of this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)(C). The Court will not require Capital House Manager and WMF to issue and serve a
subpoena to obtain this information from Kirkpatrick and KPMG. The information sought,
however, is limited to documents pertaining solely to Capital House Operator. Furthermore, to
the extent required, the Court finds good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) to extend the non-expert
discovery deadline for the sole purpose of allowing Kirkpatrick and KPMG to obtain this
information.
Having determined that the foregoing information sought otherwise falls within the scope
of discovery, the Court will address whether any privileges are applicable.
B. Whether federal or state privilege law applies
As a preliminary issue to the determination of whether any privilege applies, there
appears to be some dispute regarding whether Louisiana law governing the accountant-client
privilege applies to this action. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that “in a
civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies
the rule of decision.” Fed. R. Evid. 501. The advisory committee notes provides that “[t]here
may be diversity cases, however, where a claim or defense is based upon federal law. In such
instances, federal privilege law will apply to evidence relevant to the federal claim or defense.”
Fed. R. Evid. 501 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1974 Enactment.
There is no dispute that this is a diversity action and CTCI’s claims are for breach of
contract under Louisiana law. CTCI argues, however, that federal privilege law applies in this
action because Capital House Manager has raised certain defenses under federal law. (R. Doc.
46-1 at 8-10; R. Doc. 63 at 3-4).4 There is no applicable accountant-client privilege under the
federal common law. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (“[N]o confidential
accountant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no statecreated privilege has been
4 In one brief, however, CTCI argues that “[t]he existence of any privilege would be decided by state law.” (R. Doc.
57 at 4).
recognized in federal cases. . . .”) (citations omitted); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530,
540 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Our Circuit does not recognize an accountant-client privilege.”). In
contrast, Louisiana law has codified an accountant-client privilege. See La. Code Evid. art. 515
et seq.
CTCI has not shown that the information sought through its subpoena pertains more to
Capital House Manager’s defenses than to its own claims, or that Capital House Manager’s
federal defenses are so pervasive that the Court should ignore the fact that CTCI has brought a
breach of contract action under state law. It therefore appears that Louisiana should govern
privilege issues. That said, the Court need not decide whether federal or state law privilege
applies to this action. That is because even if state law applies, the privileges asserted are
inapplicable given the facts of this case.
C. Application of the accountant-client privilege
Louisiana law establishes a privilege between an account and his or her client relative to
confidential communications:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another person from
disclosing, a confidential communication, whether oral, written, or otherwise,
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional accounting
services to the client, as well as the perceptions, observations, and the like, of the
mental, emotional, or physical condition of the client in connection with such a
communication. This privilege includes the protection of other confidential
information or material obtained by the accountant from the client for the purpose
of rendering professional services. This privilege exists when the communication
is:
(1) Between the client or a representative of the client and the client's accountant
or a representative of the accountant.
(2) Between the accountant and a representative of the accountant.
(3) By the client or his accountant or a representative of either, to an accountant or
lawyer, or representative of an accountant or lawyer, who represents another party
concerning a matter of common interest.
(4) Between representatives of the client or between the client and a
representative of the client.
(5) Among accountants and their representatives representing the same client.
(6) Between representatives of the client’s accountant.
La. Code. Evid. art. 515(B) (emphasis added). A “client” is defined as “a person, including a
public officer, corporation, partnership, unincorporated association, or other organization or
entity, public or private, to whom professional services are rendered by an accountant, or who
consults an accountant with a view to obtaining professional services from the accountant.” La.
Code. Evid. art. 515(A)(1).
In addition, the Louisiana Accountancy Act provides, in pertinent part, the following:
A. No licensee or person employed by a licensee shall be required to or shall
voluntarily disclose or divulge the contents of any communication made to him by
any person employing such licensee or person in connection with the rendition of
tax services or to examine, audit, or report on any books, records, or accounts, or
divulge any information derived from such books, records, or accounts in
rendering professional services, except as provided by Code of Evidence Articles
515 through 517.
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection A of this Section, no licensee or
person employed by a licensee shall be required by subpoena or otherwise to
disclose or divulge any of the following internal documents maintained by such
licensee:
(1) Personnel files, except that an individual may subpoena his own personnel
files.
(2) Planning and procedure manuals.
(3) Notes and comments made in the course of evaluating the efforts of any
licensee or employee, partner, shareholder, or member of a licensee in the
performance of an engagement.
La. R.S. 37:86(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
There is no dispute that Capital House Operator, as well as its members, CTCI and
Capital House Manager, are “clients” of Kirkpatrick and KPMG. At oral argument, counsel for
Kirkpatrick and KPMG represented that they were concerned with producing the information
sought by the subpoena because of the apparent breadth of the information sought, which
appeared to concern entities other than Capital House Operator. Given Plaintiff’s counsel’s
clarifications at oral argument, as well as the Court’s limitation of any discoverable information
to that pertaining to Capital House Operator, those concerns are unwarranted. Again, the only
information that must be produced, through both documents and testimony, is information
pertaining to Capital House Operator. Given that both of Capital House Operator’s members are
seeking information regarding Capital House Operator from its accountant, the Court finds that
the information sought is not subject to the accountant-client privilege, or is otherwise waived by
the client, under Article 515. Similarly, the Court finds that Capital House Operator’s own
accounting files are subject to subpoena by its members under Louisiana Revised Statute
37:86(B)(1). In short, the Court finds that even if Louisiana privilege law applies under Rule
501, that does not preclude Capital House Operator from obtaining its own information from its
own accountant.
The sole remaining issue with respect to the accountant-client privilege is Kirkpatrick and
KPMG’s argument that certain requirements under Article 517, including a contradictory
hearing, must be satisfied prior to the issuance of a subpoena or court order with respect to
information sought from an accountant in civil litigation. Article 517 provides the following:
A. General rule. Neither a subpoena nor a court order shall be issued to an
accountant or his representative to appear or testify in any civil or juvenile
proceeding, including pretrial discovery, or in an administrative investigation or
hearing, except proceedings by the State Board of Accountancy as provided in the
Louisiana Accountancy Act, where the purpose of the subpoena or order is to ask
the accountant or his representative to reveal information about a client or former
client obtained in the course of representing the client unless the court determines,
after a contradictory hearing held after service of actual notice to the accountant
and the client at least ten days prior to the contradictory hearing, that the
information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege or
work product rule and all of the following apply:
(1) The information sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing
investigation, is essential to the case of the party seeking the information, and is
not merely peripheral, cumulative, or speculative.
(2) The purpose of seeking the information is not to harass the accountant or his
client.
(3) With respect to a subpoena, the subpoena lists the information sought with
particularity, is reasonably limited as to subject matter and period of time, and
gives timely notice.
(4) There is no practicable alternative means of obtaining the information.
B. Waiver. Failure to object timely to noncompliance with the terms of this
Article constitutes a waiver of the procedural protections of this Article, but does
not constitute a waiver of any privilege.
C. Binding effect of determination; notice to client. The determination that an
accountant-client privilege is not applicable to the testimony shall not bind the
client or former client unless the client or former client was given notice within
the time period set forth in Subsection A of this Section, of the time, place, and
substance of the hearing and had an opportunity fully to participate in that
hearing.
D. Scope. Nothing in this Article is intended to affect the absolute privileges
against disclosure in R.S. 37:86(B) through (E).
La Code. Evid. art. 517 (emphasis added). The highlighted portions of Article 517 make it clear
that the rule does not anticipate the situation where a client seeks its own information from its
own accountant, which would lead to the absurd requirement that the client provide itself notice
of a contradictory hearing.
It appears that Kirkpatrick and KPMG solely argue that Article 517 applies in light of the
potential that the information sought pertains to entities other than Capital House Operator or to
the extent CTCI and Capital House Manager dispute the extent of the scope of the privilege.
Those issues were resolved at oral argument. As stated above, the only information that may be
obtained pursuant to this ruling is information pertaining to Capital House Operator. Because
both CTCI and Capital House Manager are seeking information related solely to Capital House
Operator, and the accountant-client privilege under Article 515 is inapplicable, the additional
requirements of Article 517 appear to also be inapplicable.5
While Article 517 appears to be inapplicable, the Court nevertheless provided the parties
the opportunity to raise any arguments with respect to the requirements of that provision at oral
argument. The Court has also considered the four enumerated factors and find that they have
been met. The sole factor that Kirkpatrick and KPMG argue may not be met is the final one,
which requires a finding that there is no practical alternative means of obtaining the information
sought. (R. Doc. 60 at 9). In short, Kirkpatrick and KPMG argue that CTCI would have access
to any final work product that has been provided to it. While that may be the case, the
information sought and otherwise allowed by this order includes non-final work product and
communications that would not be obtainable from any source other than Kirkpatrick and
KPMG.
D. Application of the attorney-client privilege
In their limited opposition, Capital House Manager and WMF assert the attorney-client
privilege with respect to certain communications between their counsel and KPMG after
November 19, 2015. (R. Doc. 51). At oral argument, defense counsel withdrew this assertion of
5 Furthermore, even if substantive state privilege law applies in this action under Rule 501, the Court is not
convinced that the requirements of Article 517, which appear procedural in nature, apply to a subpoena served under
Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427
(1996) (citing Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). Kirkpatrick and KPMG have not presented a
single federal decision holding that Article 517 constitutes substantive state law applicable in a diversity action. The
Court has found only one federal court decision discussing the possible application of Article 517 in a federal
proceeding, but the parties “waived an evidentiary hearing.” See Hillman Lumber Prod., Inc. v. Webster Mfg., Inc.,
No. 06-1204, 2008 WL 2811835, at *1 (W.D. La. July 8, 2008).
the attorney-client privilege in light of the nature of the few communications discovered.
Accordingly, this issue is moot.
E. Costs and timeframe of third-party discovery
At oral argument, the Court stayed the deadline to file dispositive motions and Daubert
motions in light of the instant discovery dispute, and encouraged the parties to begin efforts to
obtain responsive information and to schedule Kirkpatrick’s deposition. The Court set a
telephone conference with the parties for March 17, 2020, and required the parties to submit a
status report with respect to the discovery at issue the day before the conference. (R. Doc. 77).
The Court will reset the deadline to file dispositive motions and Daubert motions at or soon after
the scheduled telephone conference.
It remains unclear to the Court the extent of information subject to this ruling. At this
time, the Court finds it appropriate for the parties to bear their own costs with respect to the
instant motion and the discovery efforts subject to this ruling. The parties are ordered to consult
and confer with KPMG regarding the cost of production. If unable to reach a resolution amongst
themselves, they may address the issue of costs in the status report.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel or Authorize Deposition and
Production of Documents (R. Doc. 46) is GRANTED. Kirkpatrick and KPMG must produce
the information subject to this ruling, including Kirkpatrick’s deposition testimony, by March
23, 2020 unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties. The parties shall inform the Court of any
agreed upon deadline for completion of this third-party discovery in their status report to be
submitted on March 16, 2020. The parties are to make good faith efforts to resolve any issues
with respect to this Order prior to seeking court intervention.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for Kirkpatrick may object to any attempt to
obtain testimony outside of the scope of information allowed by this Order and, in so objecting,
may instruct Kirkpatrick not to answer such questioning. The parties must address any such
dispute in a written motion filed within 3 days of the objection.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall bear their own costs.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 11, 2020.
S
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE