The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DARVIN CASTRO SANTOS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
CRAIG WHITE, ET AL. NO.: 16-00598-BAJ-EWD
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Craig White, John Wells, Allen Verret, and
Ashley Martell’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70). For the reasons that
follow, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Prison Altercation
This matter arises from allegations of excessive force at a correctional facility.
Plaintiff is a prisoner currently incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary but
was incarcerated at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center in St. Gabriel, Louisiana at the
time of the event on which this suit is based. On January 28, 2016, around 4:30 p.m.,
Plaintiff alleges that he was walking into his dorm when he witnessed six correctional
officers beating an inmate named Charlie Morris. (Doc. 1 at p. 4). Plaintiff alleges
that he pleaded with officers to stop hitting Morris. Plaintiff alleges that the officers
told him, “shut up, this is not your business.” Plaintiff alleges that these same officers
then jumped on him and began to hit and kick him, knocking Plaintiff to the ground.
Plaintiff claims that he was forcefully and tightly handcuffed and thrown on an empty
metal bed. (Id.).
Plaintiff further claims that Colonel Allen Verret (“Col. Verret”) then grabbed
him by the throat and choked him while Captain Billy Verret (‘Capt. Verret”),
Lieutenant Jarrod Verret (Lt. Verret”), Major Craig White (“Major White”), and
Captain John Weils (Capt. Wells”) struck his face and body with their fists and
radios. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that the officers dragged him from his dorm to another
unit while continuously beating him and causing his head to hit the poles in the
walkway. (d.). Upon arrival to the unit, the officers allegedly threw Plaintiff to the
ground and continued to beat him.
Plaintiff alleges that was he was placed in a shower cell alone for an extended
period of time. Plaintiff claims he sustained cuts from the beating and that his hands
were swollen from the tightness of the handcuffs (Id. at p. 5). Plaintiff alleges that
Capt. Wells eventually came to the cell with Sergeant Justin Washington and ordered
him to approach the bars of the cell door to remove his handcuffs. Plaintiff claims
that when he approached the bars of the cell door, Capt. Wells sprayed him in the
face with a chemical agent and made racially charged statements. ([d.). Soon
thereafter, Plaintiffs handcuffs were removed, and Plaintiff claims he was ordered to
remove his clothing. Plaintiff alleges that Capt. Wells then sprayed the chemical
agent on his genitals and anus. (Id. at p. 6). When Plaintiff turned on the shower to
wash away the chemical agent, he claims he was ordered by Capt. Wells to turn off
the shower and put on a jumpsuit. Capt. Wells then allegedly escorted him from the
shower cell to another area where Capt. Wells retrieved a folded knife, which Plaintiff
alleges was about 5 inches long. (Id. at p. 7). Plaintiff claims that Capt. Wells cut him
and threatened to kill him with the knife.
B. Plaintiff's Alleged Injuries from the Incident
Plaintiff was later transported to a diagnostic center where he was cleaned up.
Plamtiff alleges that the Emergency Medical Technicians refused to stitch his hand
and face to conceal the fact that he was beaten. (Id. at p. 8). Plaintiff asserts that the
medical technicians refused to give him medicine for his pain. Plaintiff farther asserts
that he was kept in isolation for three to four days while his repeated requests for
medical attention for his wounds were ignored. Plaintiff alleges that he was never
allowed to see a doctor during his time at the diagnostic center. (Id.).
Plaintiff further alleges that he suffered acute injury and multiple serious and
prolonged injuries including, but not limited to, his anus, arm, back, chest, face,
genitals, hands, shoulder, and ribs. (Id. at p. 11). Plaintiff further alleges that he
suffered scarring on his legs and arms from the leg irons and handcuffs and has
difficulty with sight since the incident. Plaintiff further claims that he has blood clots
in both eyes, on the back of his legs, on his face, and suffers from discomfort,
humiliation, burning in his respiratory system, mental and emotional injury, medical
expenses, and lost wages. (Id.).
C. Prison Disciplinary Proceeding
As a result of the altercation, Plaintiff was issued several disciplinary reports
for violations such as “aggravated disobedience”, “defiance”, “property destruction”,
“entrance into an unauthorized area.”! On February 1, 2016, the prison disciplinary
board found Plaintiff guilty on nine rule violations. Plaintiff received a combined
sentence of isolation for a period of twenty days and the forfeiture of 180 days of good
time. Plaintiff also received the loss of canteen privileges for a period of eighteen
weeks and thirty weeks loss of phone restrictions.?
DD. Procedural History
On September 10, 2016, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Doc.
1), alleging unreasonable use of excessive force. Plaintiff later amended his
Complaint (Doc. 45) to add Sgt. Washington as a defendant. Defendants responded
with an Answer (Doc. 20), denying all allegations. On August 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed
a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 63) to dismiss Defendants Set. Washington, Lt. Verret, and
Lt. Troy Rogers, which the Court granted. (Doc. 69). Plaintiff filed his Second
Amended Complaint (Doc. 66) on September 17, 2018, adding Lieutenant Ashley
Martell as a defendant. On July 22, 2019, Defendants filed this Motion for Summary
Judgment, asserting that Plaintiff's §1983 action is barred by the Heck doctrine.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56, “[t]he [Clourt shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining
whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the Court views the facts in
the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all reasonable inferences in
“Td.
the non-movant's favor. Coleman v. Houston Independent School Dist, 113 F.3d 528,
533 (6th Cir. 1997).
After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must
set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). At this stage, the Court does not evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes. Int'l
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1059 (1992). However, if the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable
jury, drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, could arrive at a verdict
in that party's favor, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Int‘
Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1263.
On the other hand, the non-movant's burden is not satisfied by some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, or by conclusory allegations,
unsubstantiated assertions, or a mere scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.8d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-
movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). In
other words, summary judgment will be appropriate only “af the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sherman v. Hallbauer,
455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).
Il. DISCUSSION
Federal law provides a cause of action against “every person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State..., subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws....” 42 U.S.C. §1983. To state a
claim under §1983, a plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law. Southwestern Bell Telephone,
EP City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2008). Although §1983 actions are
potent proceedings designed to vindicate deprived rights, they are often vulnerable
to dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), otherwise
known as the “Heck doctrine.”
A. Heck v. Humphrey
Defendants contend that the success of Plaintiffs claims would necessarily
implicate the validity of the prison disciplinary proceedings in which Plaintiff was
found guilty of multiple violations. Under Heck, a §1983 claim must be dismissed if
the adjudication of the claim would imply the invalidity of a plaintiffs prior criminal
convictions or sentence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. In the summary judgment analysis,
the presence of a genuine issue of material fact in the basis for the conviction does
not preclude the application of Heck. The Heck doctrine rests on the “principle that
civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments.” Id. However, the constitutional violation claim will
not be barred “if the factual basis for the conviction is temporally and conceptually
distinct from the excessive force claim.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir.
2008).
The Heck doctrine also applies to prison disciplinary proceedings. A conviction,
for purposes of Heck, includes a ruling in a prison disciplinary proceeding that results
in a change to the prisoner’s sentence, including the loss of good-time credits. Heck,
512 U.S. at 189. “The conviction, in the prison disciplinary sense, is the finding of
guilt on the disciplinary charge, and if success of the plaintiffs §1983 claim
necessarily would imply the invalidity of that finding, then Heck bars the claim until
such time as its requirements are satisfied.” Id. (citing Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 120 F.3d
718, 721 (7th Cir. 1997)). The disciplinary ruling must first be reversed, expunged, or
otherwise declared invalid.
Plaintiff was found guilty on multiple disciplinary reports. These violations
included: (1) refusing direct verbal orders of several corrections officers for Plaintiff
to comply after being restrained; (2) striking Capt. Wells in his eyes, nose, and mouth;
(3) severely damaging Capt. Wells’ dentures; (4) refusing to obey direct verbal orders
to approach the bars to allow Capt. Wells to remove his restraints; (5) threatening to
kill corrections officers; (6) kicking and spitting in Lt. Ashley Martell’s face; (7) failing
to comply with Major White’s orders to exit the tier; and (8) refusing direct verbal
orders which necessitated Capt. Wells’ use of chemical agent to gain Plaintiffs
compliance. (Doc. 70-1 at p. 7).3
8 See Doc. 71, Exhibits 2, and 8, and 4.
After a review of Plaintiff's disciplinary proceeding record, the Court finds that
a favorable verdict on Plaintiffs excessive force claim would undermine his
convictions, The facts of Plaintiffs excessive force allegation are the same as the basis
for his convictions; therefore, the facts do not differ temporally and conceptually in a
manner that permits the claim to proceed. If the Court were to rule in favor of
Plaintiff on these facts, it would directly challenge the validity of his convictions.
Plaintiff must first have his convictions reversed, expunged, or invalidated before
bringing an §1983 action on this set of facts. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has
not provided any evidence that the convictions from his disciplinary proceeding have
been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
claims against Defendants are barred pursuant to the Heck doctrine.
B. Claim for Relief Costs and Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988 and
punitive damages under §1983. Under §1988, the Court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. The Court
declines to exercise its discretion to award attorney’s fees, costs, and punitive
damages to Plaintiff, as he is not the prevailing party in this matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
70) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims against the remaining
Defendants are DISMISSED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this Tsay of January, 2020.
JUDGE ~ a {—
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA