The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KATHRAN RANDOLPH CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 15-654-SDD-EWD
EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH
SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on Remand from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.1 The Court previously granted2 the Motion for Summary Judgment3
filed by Defendant East Baton Rouge Parish School Board (“the School Board”) and
entered Judgment4 against Plaintiff Kathran Randolph (“Plaintiff”). The Fifth Circuit
affirmed this Court’s Ruling in all other respects but held that the Court inadvertently failed
to address Plaintiff’s Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”)5 claim
on the merits. The Court now considers this claim as argued by the School Board in its
Motion for Summary Judgment,6 the opposition argument contained in Plaintiff’s stricken
Cross- Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,7 and the School Board’s Reply.8 For the
following reasons, the Court finds that genuinely disputed material facts exist regarding
1 Rec. Doc. No. 172.
2 Rec. Doc. No. 164.
3 Rec. Doc. No. 108.
4 Rec. Doc. No. 165.
5 26 U.S.C. § 4980b(F).
6 Rec. Doc. No. 108.
7 Rec. Doc. No. 115-2.
8 Rec. Doc. No. 128.
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this claim such that summary judgment is not proper on Plaintiff’s COBRA claim.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case was discussed extensively by the Court in its
previous Ruling and is hereby adopted by reference.9 Relevant to this decision, Plaintiff
claims the School Board failed to timely and properly give notice of her continuance of
insurance coverage rights pursuant to COBRA.10 The School Board argues that there is
no record evidence that the School Board failed to provide Plaintiff with adequate notice
of her health benefits, and more importantly, Plaintiff admitted that she elected not to avail
herself of COBRA coverage; thus, even if Plaintiff could demonstrate untimeliness in
notice, she cannot demonstrate that she was damaged as a result of any purported delay.
Plaintiff maintains that she was unaware of any lapse in her health insurance
coverage until she went to a doctor’s appointment in September 2016 and was advised
that her health insurance had been cancelled. Plaintiff relies solely on her deposition
testimony that she did not receive timely notice of her COBRA rights and argues that the
School Board has presented no admissible summary judgment evidence to prove
otherwise.
II. LAW AND ANLYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”11 “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all
9 Rec. Doc. No. 164.
10 R. Doc. No. 47, ¶ 115.
11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”12 A party moving for summary judgment “must ‘demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant’s
case.”13 If the moving party satisfies its burden, “the non-moving party must show that
summary judgment is inappropriate by setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence
of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.’”14 However, the
non-moving party’s burden “is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a
scintilla of evidence.”15
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”16 All reasonable factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.17 However, “[t]he Court has no
duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the summary
judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate precisely
how this evidence supports his claim.”18 “Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific
facts … will not prevent the award of summary judgment; ‘the plaintiff [can]not rest on his
allegations … to get to a jury without any “significant probative evidence tending to
12 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).
13 Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, 246 F.Supp.2d 488, 494 (M.D. La. 2003)(quoting Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2552)).
14 Rivera v. Houston Independent School Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Morris v. Covan
World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
15 Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995)(quoting Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
16 Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
17 Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
18 RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
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support the complaint.”’”19
The parties have sought a bench trial in the present case.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “a district court has somewhat greater
discretion to consider what weight it will accord the evidence [presented on
a motion for summary judgment] in a bench trial than in a jury trial.”20 If a
“[bench] trial on the merits will not enhance the court’s ability to draw
inferences and conclusions, then a district court properly should ‘draw his
inferences without resort to the expense of trial.’”21 However, the Fifth
Circuit has cautioned that “a district court must be aware that assessments
of credibility come into sharper focus” at the time of trial, therefore, “even at
the summary judgment stage a judge in a bench trial has the limited
discretion to decide that the same evidence, presented to him or her
as trier of fact in a plenary trial, could not possibly lead to a different
result.”22
Accordingly, the summary judgment motions before the Court are analyzed in
accordance with this standard, and the Court will apply broader discretion in weighing the
evidence presented.
B. COBRA
COBRA amended ERISA, a federal scheme for regulating employee benefit plans.
The Supreme Court noted in Geissal v. Moore Medical Group,23 that COBRA amended
ERISA “to permit a beneficiary of an employer's group health plan to elect continuing
coverage when [s]he might otherwise lose that benefit because of a ‘qualifying event,’
such as the termination of employment.” 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4(b) details the content
19 Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir.
1994)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
20 Turner v. Pleasant, 10-cv-7823, 2013 WL 823426 at*7 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2013)(quoting In re Placid Oil
Co., 932 F.2d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 1991)).
21 Id. (quoting Placid Oil Co., at 398 (quoting Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir.
1978)).
22 Id. (emphasis added).
23 524 U.S. 74 (1998).
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of the required notice to a former employee of her right to continuation health coverage
under COBRA.
The School Board moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s COBRA claim,
arguing that there is no evidence other than Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations that the
School Board failed to provide Plaintiff adequate notice regarding her health benefits. The
School Board maintains that, upon termination, resignation, and/or retirement, benefit
notifications, including COBRA notifications, are automatically generated and mailed to
an employee.24 Jordan Clements (“Clements”), Supervisor of Payroll and Benefits for the
School Board, declared under oath that “there is no reason to believe that the ordinary
process would not have been completed with respect to Randolph.”25
Moreover, the School Board argues that Plaintiff admits that she received notice,
at the latest, in October of 2016.26 Further, Plaintiff herself admitted that she elected not
to avail herself of continued coverage under COBRA because she could not afford the
increased premiums.27 Thus, the School Board argues, even if Plaintiff could
demonstrate untimely notice, which is denied, she cannot demonstrate that she was
damaged as a result of any purported delay. According to Clements, Plaintiff’s last
payment of insurance premiums occurred in August of 2015.28 The School Board argues
that, by Plaintiff’s own acknowledgement, the School Board offered continuation of
coverage, and, as of October of 2016, Plaintiff remained eligible to continue her health
24 Rec. Doc. No. 108-4 (Declaration of Jordan Clements).
25 Id. at ¶ 4.
26 See R. Doc. No. 47, ¶ 102.
27 Id.
28 Rec. Doc. No. 108-4, ¶ 5 (Declaration of Jordan Clements). Plaintiff moved to strike the Declaration of
Jordan Clements, but the Court denied this request as meritless and unsupported by the law. Rec. Doc.
No. 132.
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insurance coverage which, if elected, would have been retroactive to August of 2015,
resulting in continuous coverage with no lapse in benefits.29 The School Board maintains
that Plaintiff’s own conclusory statement that she failed to receive notice is not evidence
sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
Plaintiff testified in her deposition that the School Board never provided her any
notice of her right to continued coverage under COBRA.30 Plaintiff testified that she first
became aware that her health insurance lapsed in September of 2016 when she was
advised so at a doctor’s appointment. Plaintiff contends on that same day, she contacted
“Anita” with the School Board, who informed her that the School Board had been paying
her premiums and that Plaintiff would have to repay $2,900.00 and a premium of $680.00
per month to have her insurance “reinstated.”31 Plaintiff contends she requested to make
the repayment in installments, but “Anita” refused.32
In Hager v. DBG Partner, Incorporated,33 the Fifth Circuit addressed a similar
argument regarding COBRA notice. In Hager, the plaintiffs claimed they received no
notice of their COBRA rights. The employer presented only an unsigned letter, addressed
to Hager’s former address, informing him that the employer was terminating its health
plan, and the employer argued in the district court that this demonstrated fulfillment of its
notice obligations.34 The Fifth Circuit rejected this as settling the matter, noting:
In Degruise v. Sprint Corp., we noted that the Secretary of Labor had not
promulgated regulations describing the notice requirements for COBRA and
concluded that employers were “‘required to operate in good faith
29 Id. at ¶ 6.
30 Rec. Doc. No. 108-3, p. 27 (Deposition of Kathran Randolph, p. 106).
31 Rec. Doc. No. 115-2, p. 2.
32 Rec. Doc. No. 108-3, p. 27 (Deposition of Kathran Randolph, pp. 104-106).
33 903 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2018).
34 Id. at 467.
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compliance with a reasonable interpretation’ of what adequate notice
entails.” Two years later, the Secretary of Labor did promulgate such
regulations, viz., § 2590.606-4(d), discussed above. It is unclear whether
Degruise’s statement that a good faith attempt to satisfy the notice
requirement is sufficient is still good law.
Even if DBG only needed to show good faith compliance, whether it did so
here is a question of fact more appropriate for summary judgment or trial
and does not implicate a failure to state a claim. In fact, we are skeptical
that DBG’s evidence would even be sufficient to obtain summary judgment.
This court has typically required evidence that a letter was actually
mailed to meet the good faith standard. But DBG has produced no such
evidence; it produced only the letter itself. Hager also points to evidence
suggesting that DBG did not act in good faith: (1) DBG sent Hager’s
employment termination notice, which was hand-delivered earlier than the
health plan termination notice, to the correct address; (2) Hager exchanged
text messages with Rowan about health insurance, during which Rowan
failed to mention the plan’s discontinuation; and (3) DBG deposited Hager’s
premiums when it received them, and refused to refund them for almost two
years. We conclude that, alone, DBG’s letter is insufficient to support
dismissal of Hager’s claim.35
In the present case, the only evidence the School Board has presented that it
timely fulfilled its COBRA notice obligations is the Declaration of Clements. Based on the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis and reasoning in Hager, Clements’ Declaration is insufficient to
demonstrate on summary judgment that the School Board met its notice obligations. The
School Board does not submit a copy of the letter that was allegedly mailed to Plaintiff
upon her termination, or any documentary support for the statements in Clements’
Declaration, and the Court is unable to evaluate whether this purported mailing meets the
requirements set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4(b).
Also, the School Board refers to Plaintiff’s sworn deposition testimony as a
“conclusory statement” “insufficient to withstand a Motion for Summary Judgment.”36 To
35 Id. at 167-68 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added).
36 Rec. Doc. No. 128, p. 2.
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the extent this characterization is correct, the Court finds it no more conclusory than the
following sworn statements of Clements:
2. Upon termination, resignation, and/or retirement, benefit
notifications, including COBRA notifications, are automatically
generated and mailed.
4. There is no reason to believe that the ordinary process would not
have been completed with respect to Kathran Randolph.37
The Clements Declaration is the only evidence submitted by the School Board on
Plaintiff’s COBRA claim, and Clements’ sworn statements and Plaintiff’s sworn testimony
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding notice. In Custer v.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., a case wherein the plaintiffs presented sworn deposition testimony
that they never received notice,38 the court ultimately held that a genuine dispute of
material fact remained on the issue of mailing, despite testimony that the defendant
business typically used first-class mailing procedures.39
Further, the Court finds disingenuous the School Board’s argument that any
purported delay did not cause any damage or prejudice to Plaintiff. It is disputed exactly
when Plaintiff received notice, but she acknowledges she received notice, at the latest,
by September of 2016 when she went to the doctor, more than year after her termination.
As set forth above, Plaintiff testified that she was unable to continue coverage because
she could not make the lump sum payment requested by the School Board. Clements
stated that: “It is the ordinary practice to allow employees who owe back premiums to
make installment payments for same and there is no reason to believe the ordinary
37 Rec. Doc. No. 108-4, ¶ 2, 4 (Declaration of Jordan Clements).
38 503 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2007).
39 Id. at 421.
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practice would not have been permitted with respect to Kathran Randolph.” However,
this is a conclusory statement and not evidence that Plaintiff was offered an installment
plan. Plaintiff’s sworn testimony is that she was declined such a plan. Again, the Court
finds that whether any purported delayed notice caused prejudice to Plaintiff is a disputed
fact issue, and the School Board has failed to carry its summary judgment burden.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Summary Judgment40 by
Defendant East Baton Rouge Parish School Board is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s
COBRA claim. This matter will be set for a bench trial by separate notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on November 22, 2019.
S
CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
40 Rec. Doc. No. 108.
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