Opinion

Barker v. The City of Plaquemine

Court: District Court, M.D. Louisiana
Filed: Sep 20, 2019
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 22.5%

concluding that plaintiff's failure to defend her “retaliatory abandonment” claim in response to the defendant's motion to dismiss constituted abandonment of the claim

How later courts described this case

concluding that plaintiff's failure to defend her “retaliatory abandonment” claim in response to the defendant's motion to dismiss constituted abandonment of the claim
discussing a Fourteenth Amendment claim of failure to provide medical care
“If officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff's rights were violated, the officer's qualified immunity remains intact.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ARIEL BARKER ON BEHALF OF CIVIL ACTION

HANNAH CLAIRE BARKER AND

AVA ANTHONY BARKER

VERSUS NO. 17-340-SDD-RLB

THE CITY OF PLAQUEMINE, MAYOR

EDWIN M. REEVES, JR., ET AL.

RULING

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Second Supplemental

and Amended Complaint1 by Defendants, City of Plaquemine and Kenny Payne, Chief of

Plaquemine Police (“Chief Payne” or collectively “municipal Defendants”). Chief Payne

has been sued in his individual and official capacities. Plaintiff, Ariel Barker on behalf of

Hannah Claire Barker and Ava Anthony Barker (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Reply in opposition2

to the municipal Defendants’ motion, to which Defendants filed a Reply.3 For the reasons

set forth below, Defendants’ motion shall be granted.

Also before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Second Supplemental and

Amended Complaint4 by Defendants, James Breaux (“Breaux”), Demetre Jackson

(“Jackson”), Victor Hebert (“Hebert”), Travis Roberts (“Roberts”)(or collectively, “the

1 Rec. Doc. No. 39.

2 Rec. Doc. No. 42.

3 Rec. Doc. No. 48.

4 Rec. Doc. No. 40.

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officers”), all of whom have been sued in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff

has filed an Opposition5 to the officers’ motion, to which the officers filed a Reply.6

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND7

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on May 31, 2017 asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and Louisiana law.8 Plaintiff is the biological mother of Hannah Claire Barker and Ava

Anthony Barker, both minor children and surviving descendants of their deceased father,

David Anthony Ourso, Jr. (“Ourso”). Plaintiff’s claims arise from an altercation involving

Ourso and officer Defendants on the night of June 1, 2016.9 Plaintiff claims that the

Defendants violated Ourso’s rights secured by the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. Section

1983, and the rights secured by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution and the laws and Constitution of the State of Louisiana.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Plaquemine Police officers Breaux, Roberts, and

Jackson were dispatched to investigate a called-in complaint on June 1, 2016.10 Plaintiff

further alleges that the officers located the individual described in the call, who was later

identified as Ourso.11 Based on Plaintiff’s observation of the officers’ body camera videos

obtained from the night in question, Plaintiff claims that Ourso complied with the officers’

commands of “don’t move” and “put your hands up,” and Ourso fell to his knees and

raised both hands.12 Further, Plaintiff alleges that Ourso’s behavior was erratic and that

5 Rec. Doc. No. 41.

6 Rec. Doc. No. 48.

7 The facts are drawn from the Second Supplemental and Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 37) and the

Parties’ memoranda.

8 Rec. Doc. No. 1.

9 Rec. Doc. No. 37.

10 Id. at ¶ 19.

11 Id. at ¶ 20.

12 Id. at ¶ 21.

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it was obvious that he was suffering from a mental episode or was under the influence of

drugs and/or alcohol during the incident.13 Plaintiff claims that, without warning or

provocation, Hebert grabbed Ourso and slammed him to the ground.14 Plaintiff alleges

that Ourso was fully cooperating with the officers, the officers had full control of the scene,

and Ourso posed no threat to their safety.15 Despite his cooperation, Plaintiff claims that

Hebert, Roberts, and Jackson all placed their weight on Ourso’s back, Roberts advised

Ourso to stop struggling, Hebert got handcuffs on Ourso’s left wrist, and Roberts pinned

Ourso to the ground.16

Next, Plaintiff alleges that Breaux, Roberts, Jackson, and Hebert utilized the “prone

restraint maneuver” to restrain Ourso, holding him down by his arms and legs, and one

officer stepped on his hand.17 Although Ourso allegedly complained that he could not

breathe, Plaintiff alleges Roberts kept his full body weight pressed onto Ourso, which

Plaintiff contends demonstrated the officers’ deliberate indifference to binding

jurisprudence.18 Plaintiff claims that, although the officers understood the urgency of

Ourso’s medical needs, the officers ignored his pleas and rather “intended him harm in

the form of urging his arm to be broken.”19 Finally, Plaintiff claims that none of the officers

rendered care in response to Ourso’s obvious need for medical care, and, as Ourso

allegedly begged for help to breathe, they told Ourso “you can breathe when you calm

down.”20 Plaintiff contends that Ourso’s body soon “went lifeless,” yet the officers

13 Id.

14 Id. at ¶ 22.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Id. at ¶ 23.

18 Id. (citing Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1990)).

19 Id. at ¶ 24.

20 Id. at ¶ 25.

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continued to bear down on him with their full weight.21

Ourso ultimately died following this encounter, and his death was ruled by the

coroner to be a homicide.22 Plaintiff maintains that the body camera videos worn by the

officers belie their subsequent police reports which contain justifications for their conduct,

i.e., that Ourso was resisting them such that their use of force was necessary.23 Plaintiff

claims that Chief Payne subsequently ratified an approved the police reports written by

these officers, knowing that the reports conflicted with what was revealed on the body

cameras, thus resulting in a “cover up” of the homicide allegedly committed by the

officers.24

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 5, 2017, the City of Plaquemine and Chief Payne filed a Motion to

Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted wherein Chief Payne asserted the defense of qualified immunity.25 On

September 5, 2017, Defendants Breaux, Jackson, Hebert, and Roberts also filed a Motion

to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted wherein they asserted the defense of qualified immunity.26 Plaintiff subsequently

filed a First Supplement and Amended Complaint,27 a Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss,28 and a Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s 12(b)6 Motion for

Failure to State a Claim/ and or alternatively Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave of Court to File

21 Id. at ¶ 26.

22 Id. at ¶ 27.

23 Id.

24 Id. at ¶ 28.

25 Rec. Doc. No. 12.

26 Rec. Doc. No. 13.

27 Rec. Doc. No. 19.

28 Rec. Doc. No. 20.

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Amended Claim.29

In response to Plaintiff’s First Supplement and Amended Complaint, Chief Payne

and the officers filed new Motions to Dismiss essentially seeking the same relief.30 While

these motions were pending, Plaintiff again sought leave to amend her Complaint, which

the Court granted, and Plaintiff’s Second Supplemental and Amended Complaint31 was

filed on August 13, 2018. Because Defendants subsequently filed Motions to Dismiss on

Plaintiff’s most recent amendment, the Court denied as moot all previously pending

Motions to Dismiss.32 The Court now turns to the most recent Motions to Dismiss filed by

the municipal Defendants and the officers.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-

pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”33 The

Court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into

the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”34 “To

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”35 In Twombly, the United States Supreme

Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

29 Rec. Doc. No. 21.

30 Rec. Doc. Nos. 32 & 33.

31 Rec. Doc. No. 37.

32 Rec. Doc. No. 49.

33 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Martin v. Eby Constr.

Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).

34 Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).

35 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area

Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d at 467).

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motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does

not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”36 A complaint is also insufficient if it

merely “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”37 However,

“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.”38 In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than

a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.”39 “Furthermore, while the

court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable

to the plaintiff.’”40 On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”41

B. Federal Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a private right of action for

redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law.42 It

provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

36 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal citations and brackets

omitted)(hereinafter Twombly).

37 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(internal citations

omitted)(hereinafter “Iqbal”).

38 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

39 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

40 Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire

Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).

41 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d

209 (1986)).

42 See Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984); Middlesex County

Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).

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citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to

the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured....43

“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.’”44

To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a person acting

under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States.45 A Section 1983 complainant must support his claim with specific

facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory

allegations.46

C. Chief Payne and the City of Plaquemine

Although Plaintiff asserted Section 1983 official capacity claims against Chief

Payne and the City of Plaquemine for policies of deficient supervision and/or training, in

her Opposition to the municipal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues only her

ratification claim. As Plaintiff failed to address any policy claims other than ratification in

her Opposition, Plaintiff’s supervision and training claims are deemed abandoned and are

dismissed as a matter of law.47

43 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

44 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, (1979));

accord Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,

816 (1985); Jackson v. City of Atlanta, TX, 73 F.3d 60, 63 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 818 (1996);

Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir.1985).

45 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986);

Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 324–25 (5th Cir.1984).

46 See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir.1995); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir.1986); Angel v. City of

Fairfield, 793 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir.1986).

47 See U.S. ex rel. Woods v. SouthernCare, Inc., 2013 WL 1339375 at *7 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2013)(“The

Relators did not adequately brief their opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count Three on

state law claims of fraud, suppression, and deceit. As such, they have abandoned Count Three. See Black

v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding that plaintiff's failure to defend

her “retaliatory abandonment” claim in response to the defendant's motion to dismiss constituted

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The Supreme Court has held that, when an authorized policymaker approves a

subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, such ratification is chargeable to the

government entity.48 The Fifth Circuit, however, has limited the theory of ratification to

“extreme factual situations.”49 “Good faith statements made in defending complaints

against municipal employees do not demonstrate ratification.”50 Accordingly, “a

policymaker who defends conduct that is later shown to be unlawful does not necessarily

incur liability on behalf of the municipality.”51 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[i]t

is nearly impossible to impute lax disciplinary policy to [a governmental entity] without

showing a pattern of abuses that transcends the error made in a single case.”52

Plaintiff alleges the following about ratification:

10. Defendant, KENNY PAYNE, (hereinafter “Payne”) is the Chief of Police

for The City of Plaquemine at the Plaquemine Police Department, the

employer of the defendant officers herein. Payne enjoys ultimate

supervisory, regulatory, and corrective authority over each and every law

enforcement officer herein, and bears ultimate personal and vicarious

liability for the negligent conduct of the same. Further, Defendant, Payne,

has ultimate policy making authority with respect to the conduct and

procedures of the Plaquemine Police Department. Plaintiff sues Payne in

his individual and official capacity concerning the actions leading to David

Anthony Ourso, Jr.’s death and for the initial cover up of those illegal acts.

* * *

abandonment of the claim); Dean v. One Life Am., Inc., No. 4:11–CV–203–CWR–LRA, 2013 WL 870352,

at *2 (S.D.Miss. Mar. 7, 2013) (holding that by failing to address the defendant's argument in her response,

the plaintiff abandoned her claim); Alexander v. Brookhaven Sch. Dist., No. 3:07–CV–640–DPJ–JCS, 2009

WL 224902, at *4 (S.D.Miss. Jan. 28, 2009) (stating that the plaintiff “appears to have abandoned [her

Equal Pay Act] claim having not defended it” in her response to the defendant's motion to dismiss), aff'd,

428 F. App'x 303 (5th Cir. 2011)).

48 See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988).

49 Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d

791, 298 (5th Cir. 1998)).

50 Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 2010).

51 Peterson, 588 F.3d at 848.

52 Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d

567, 582 (5th Cir. 2001) and affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s excessive force claim

against a police department).

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28. Later the officers wrote reports that were in direct conflict to what

actually occurred on the 3 body cameras. These reports were ratified and

approved by CHIEF KENNY PAYNE, in his official capacity as the CHIEF

OF POLICE for the City of Plaquemine. PAYNE deliberately allowed these

officers to submit false police reports to cover up the homicide that they

committed against OURSO.53

1. Chief Payne - Official Capacity Claims

Chief Payne moves to dismiss the Section 1983 claims brought against him in his

official capacity. A suit against a government official in his official capacity is the

equivalent of filing suit against the government agency of which the official is an agent.54

Accordingly, the claims against the Chief in his official capacity are, in effect, claims

against the municipal entity he represents, the City of Plaquemine Police Department.55

A plaintiff asserting a Section 1983 claim against a municipal official in his official capacity

or a Section 1983 claim against a municipality “must show that the municipality has a

policy or custom that caused his injury.”56 To establish an “official policy,” a plaintiff must

allege either of the following:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially

adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by

an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated the policymaking

authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which,

although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is

so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly

represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such

53 Rec. Doc. No. 37 at ¶¶ 10, 28.

54 Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv, of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55 (1978).

55 Graham, 473 U.S. at 165; see also Bellard v. Gautreaux, No. CIV.A. 08-627, 2010 WL 3523051, at *4

(M.D. La. Sept. 3, 2010) amended in part, No. CIV.A. 08-627, 2010 WL 4977480 (M.D. La. Dec. 2, 2010),

affirmed, 675 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2012) and affirmed, 675 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2012).

56 Parm v. Shumate, 513 F.3d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 2007).

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custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or

to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.57

Although “a single decision may create municipal liability if that decision were

made by a final policymaker responsible for that activity,”58 absent an official policy,

actions of officers or employees of a municipality do not render the municipality liable

under Section 1983.59 A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the

tortious behavior of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior.60 “Congress

did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal

policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”61

The municipal Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claims, arguing that

she has failed to identify a single policy or practice of the police department that caused

the alleged injuries, and Plaintiff has not specified what these policies and practices are.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has made only allegations of an isolated incident and has

alleged no facts to demonstrate a pattern of similar violations. The municipal Defendants

maintain that Plaintiff’s ratification claim is based on vague and conclusory allegations

insufficient to rise to the legal definition of “ratification” or “endorsement.”62

Plaintiff opposes the motion by the municipal Defendants, arguing that she has

pled that the police reports do not accurately reflect what occurred on the body cameras

of the officers involved in the incident, and she claims that caselaw supports her claim of

57 Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir.1984).

58 Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 586 (5th Cir.1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis

in original).

59 Id.

60 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

61 Id.

62 Rec. Doc. No. 39-1, p. 13, n. 73.

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ratification. However, for purposes of Monell liability, Plaintiff has failed to plead a policy

or custom of ratification and has failed to argue in her Opposition that a policy or custom

of ratification existed within the Plaquemine Police Department. Plaintiff merely states:

“the only action that Payne took in the instance case was to overlook what the body cam

video shows.”63

In Cambre v. Smith,64 the district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

addressed a case with similar facts wherein the plaintiff suffered injuries after an

altercation with police officers in St. Tammany Parish. Among other claims, the plaintiff

asserted a ratification claim against the sheriff in both his official and individual capacities

for his alleged ratification of his officers’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct.65 The plaintiff

pled that the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office “has a de facto policy of using its internal

affairs division to cover up bad policing practices in lieu of addressing deficiencies within

the organization.”66 The plaintiff argued that “the investigation into the injury-causing

incident was actually ‘a cover-up,’ in part because no ‘struggle’ occurred as part of the

alleged January 2018 incident,” and he also argued that the press release issued by the

department was false.67 The plaintiff maintained that, because the sheriff concluded that

his officers followed proper protocol, the sheriff ratified the subordinate officers' decisions

and the bases for such decisions, which warranted imposing liability on the sheriff in his

official capacity.68

63 Rec. Doc. No. 42, p. 3.

64 No. 18-6509, 2018 WL 6510897 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2018).

65 Id.

66 Id. at *2. Conversely, the Plaintiff herein did not plead any ratification policy on the part of the municipal

Defendants.

67 Id. at *7.

68 Id.

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The court dismissed the plaintiff’s official capacity ratification claim against the

sheriff, stating: “Cambre’s bald accusation that the investigation was a ‘cover-up’ is not

enough. The amended complaint includes no facts suggesting that Smith knew about the

circumstances surrounding the January 2018 incident, as Cambre alleges them, let alone

that he ratified the STPSO officers' conduct on that date and their grounds for engaging

in such conduct.”69 The court also rejected the plaintiff’s ratification claims because the

plaintiff failed to allege a pattern of complaints by other citizens, as required by Fifth Circuit

jurisprudence,70 and stated: “Thus, Cambre’s theory of ratification cannot establish an

official policy or custom, and his claim against Smith in his official capacity must be

dismissed.”71

Here, after three attempts, Plaintiff has made only vague, conclusory assertions

that Chief Payne and the City of Plaquemine engaged in a cover-up, failed to discipline

the officers, and ratified or endorsed the officers’ allegedly unconstitutional behavior.

There is no allegation that a policy or pattern of ratifying or endorsing similar conduct

existed within the department, and there are no facts alleged to support a policy or pattern

of ratification. Accordingly, the Section 1983 ratification claim brought against Chief

Payne in his official capacity is dismissed with prejudice.

69 Id. (citing Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009)(holding that a police chief

was not liable for his subordinate officers' alleged use of excessive force under a theory of ratification

despite the plaintiff’s contention that the police chief investigated the officers' conduct and determined that

it complied with departmental policies).

70 Id. (citing Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston,

237 F.3d 567, 582 (5th Cir. 2001) and affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s excessive force

claim against a police department)).

71 Id.

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2. Chief Payne - Individual Capacity Claims

Based on the same allegations set forth above, Plaintiff also brings a ratification

claim against Chief Payne in his individual capacity. Chief Payne moves to dismiss this

claim, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim against him, and he is

entitled to qualified immunity.

The Fifth Circuit has held that, in a claim asserted under Section 1983, “[a] plaintiff

must establish that the defendant was either personally involved in the deprivation or that

his wrongful actions were causally connected to the deprivation.”72 A governmental

official cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior.73

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Chief Payne personally engaged in a “cover-up,” failed

to discipline the officers, and ratified or endorsed the allegedly false police reports

documenting the incident. The same jurisprudence set forth above demonstrates that

Plaintiff has failed to plead factual support for these conclusory allegations; moreover, it

has been held as a matter of law that the failure to discipline does not rise to the level of

ratification or endorsement. In Hoffpauir v. Columbia Casualty Co., this Court held that

the failure of a sheriff to discipline an officer for allegedly unconstitutional conduct, without

more, does not constitute ratification or endorsement of the officer’s behavior.74 Because

Plaintiff has failed to plead an individual capacity claim against Chief Payne for ratification,

the Court need not address the defense of qualified immunity. Chief Payne’s motion to

72 James v. Texas Collin County, 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson v. Pasadena Indep.

Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir.1999)).

73 Monell v. Dep.t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978).

74 2013 WL 5934699 at *9 (M.D. La. Nov. 5, 2013)(citing Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278–

79 (5th Cir.1992)).

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dismiss the Section 1983 ratification claim against him is GRANTED, and this claim is

dismissed with prejudice.

3. State Law Claims

Plaintiff asserted several Louisiana constitutional and state law claims against

Chief Payne and the City of Plaquemine. Plaintiff utterly failed to mention any of the

state law claims in her Opposition memoranda. Accordingly, the state law claims are

deemed abandoned;75 the municipal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted on all state

law claims; and the state law claims asserted against the municipal Defendants are

dismissed with prejudice.

D. Claims Asserted against the Officers

Plaintiff asserts the following claims pursuant to Section 1983 against the officers:

false arrest, false imprisonment, battery, assault, and kidnapping. Plaintiff asserts the

following state law claims against the officers: assault, negligence, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, false arrest, false imprisonment without consent, kidnapping,

wrongful death, and unspecified “[v]iolation of rights otherwise guaranteed by [sic] under

state and federal law.”76

75 See U.S. ex rel. Woods v. SouthernCare, Inc., 2013 WL 1339375 at *7 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2013)(“The