Lotief v. Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MICHAEL P. LOTIEF

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 18-991-JWD-EWD

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FOR

THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA

SYSTEM D/B/A/ UNIVERSITY OF

LOUISIANA AT LAFAYETTE, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Transfer Venue filed by Defendants Board of

Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System, E. Joseph Savoie, Jessica Clarke Leger, and

Bryan Maggard (collectively, “the defendants”). (Doc. 7). Plaintiff Michael P. Lotief opposes the

motion. (Doc. 12). The defendants have filed a reply brief in support of their motion. (Doc. 14).

Oral argument is not necessary. After careful consideration of the parties’ arguments, the facts

alleged, and the applicable law, and for the following reasons, the Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc.

7) is granted and this matter is transferred to the United States District Court for the Western

District of Louisiana.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following is a recitation of the facts alleged in Plaintiff Michael Lotief’s state-court

petition. Lotief resides in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, and was head coach of the women’s softball

team at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette from 2003 until he was terminated on November

1, 2017. (Doc. 1-1 at 8–13). On September 20, 2018, he brought suit in the 19th Judicial District

Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge against the Board of Supervisors for the University of

Louisiana System (“Board”) doing business as the University of Louisiana at Lafayette (“ULL”),

ULL President E. Joseph Savoie, ULL Athletics Director Bryan Maggard, and ULL Deputy

Athletics Director Jessica Clarke Leger. (Id. at 1). ULL itself is located in Lafayette Parish, while

the Board is domiciled in East Baton Rouge Parish. (Id.). Savoie, Maggard, and Leger are all

residents of Lafayette Parish. (Id.).

During Lotief’s tenure as head coach, he “became aware of the inequities and

discrimination between female and male athletics at ULL” and voiced his concerns to Leger,

Maggard, and Savoie. (Doc. 1-1 at 17). Despite raising his concerns, “the inequities and gender

based discrimination continued.” (Id.). Additionally, Lotief documented in writing various

instances of discrimination against female athletes and provided these writings to Leger, Maggard,

and Savoie. (Id.). The alleged discrimination included inequities with respect to medical care,

playing facilities, office space, training, pay for coaches and staff, and funding, among other

things. (Id. at 17–19).

ULL ultimately terminated Lotief in November 2017 purportedly for three incidents:

“using vulgar and offensive language” on the team bus after a game in College Station, Texas, in

April 2017, a similar incident involving language after a game at Louisiana State University in

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in June 2017, and allegedly “poking” a strength coach in the weight room

at ULL in October 2017. (Doc. 1-1 at 19–20). Lotief alleges that comparable instances involving

men’s athletic teams at ULL did not result in the termination of any coaches. (Id.). He claims that

Leger “manipulated” a former student-athlete into filing a complaint against Lotief on August 2,

2017. (Id. at 21–22). Leger allegedly directed the former athlete to contact three players to

corroborate her complaint and “undermine Lotief and the student-athletes Leger was supposed to

be serving.” (Id. at 22–23). Lotief alleges that if the allegations against him had merit, Leger

would have been required to start an investigation; however, she failed to do so and on August 22,

2017, recommended approval of a $21,000 bonus for Lotief. (Id. at 23). Maggard and Savoie also

approved the bonus and “expressed vocally their support for Lotief” at a dinner for the team on

August 21. (Id. at 24).

On October 29, 2017, the softball team signed a statement stating that the investigation into

Lotief’s conduct was “unjust,” and that ULL administration was “intimidating players [and] lying

about the ongoing investigation.” (Doc. 1-1 at 28). The statement provided that the complaints of

a hostile environment were “untrue” and that “there was instead a competitive environment

holding the team to championship standards.” (Id.). Finally, the statement affirmed “the team’s

belief that Lotief was being targeted and retaliated against for standing up for female athletes, and

indicated the team’s belief that they were being treated unequally because of their gender.” (Id.).

Additionally, when Sara Corbello1 presented Savoie with statements from the team in favor of

Lotief and “evidence exonerating” him, Savoie “immediately ordered that Corbello be fired.” (Id.).

Savoie, Maggard, and Leger ignored the “exculpatory statements, documents, and

evidence,” while Savoie “ordered the false, incomplete HR [investigative] report to be released to

the public.” (Doc. 1-1 at 29–30). In October 2017, Lotief spoke with Deputy Athletics Director

Nico Yantko “about the severely disparate treatment of female athletics as compared to men’s

athletics.” (Id. at 33). In response, Yantko became “defensive” and “attempted to intimidate Lotief

into submission by hitting Lotief in his chest with the back of his hand, and moving in closer and

closer towards Lotief as the conversation continued.” (Id.).

When ULL terminated Lotief, it published a press release stating, “Lotief violated ULL

and [University of Louisiana] System policies by subjecting student-athletes and coworkers to

violent, vulgar language and verbal and physical assault, creating a hostile learning and working

1 The petition does not state Corbello’s position at ULL.

environment.” (Doc. 1-1 at 37). Lotief alleges that “[t]his press release was false, defamatory, and

slanderous and known to be so by the Defendants.” (Id.). The fact that ULL released this

information to the public without including information favorable to Lotief “is further evidence of

ULL’s malicious intent.” (Id.). So too was Savoie’s decision to fire Lotief yet retain coaches of

various men’s teams for what Lotief alleges are similar incidents of alleged misconduct. (Id.).

Lotief alleges that ULL’s stated reason for terminating him was pretextual. (Doc. 1-1 at

38). Instead, he maintains that ULL terminated him for “reporting numerous forms of gender

discrimination as well as the unequal treatment of female athletes as compared to male athletes.”

(Id.). “After Lotief’s engagement in this protected activity [under Title IX of the Education

Amendments of 1972] increased, ULL began its attempt to silence and ultimately terminate him

by accumulating false and misleading evidence to support their [sic] ultimate decision.” (Id.).

Lotief additionally alleges that ULL defamed him by “actively propagate[ing] false, misleading,

and damaging information through various local news sources following Lotief’s termination in

an attempt to publically [sic] discredit and humiliate him.” (Id. at 40–41). “ULL falsely accused

Lotief of being verbally, physically, and emotionally abusive to softball players as well as

employees of ULL.” (Id. at 41). Lotief also alleges that ULL’s conduct violated his rights under

the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Id. at

43–47).

Additionally, Lotief brings state-law claims for wrongful conversion of property and

breach of contract. (Doc. 1-1 at 47–49). In support of his conversion claim, Lotief alleges that

while he was on administrative leave on October 6, 2017, he was locked out of ULL’s softball

facilities without access to his personal property. (Doc. 1-1 at 47). Lotief asserts that ULL still

possesses and refuses to return his “family pictures, memorabilia, his notary seal, his prescription

sunglasses, his most valuable autographed photo of Mother Theresa and Father Brennan, multiple

pictures of [his] deceased dad with family members, and family heirlooms.” (Id.). Lotief also

claims that he spent over $120,000 in equipment for the ULL softball team, which has not been

returned. (Id. at 47–48). Despite attempting to recover the property, ULL has not returned all of

it, and instead “engages in multiple piecemeal deliveries to the Lotief’s [sic] storage unit[.]” (Id.

at 48). “[T]o this day,” the university is still in possession of “numerous pieces of equipment,

personal items, and documents which belong to Lotief.” (Id.). ULL is also in possession of

“roughly” $20,000 worth of softball equipment used by Lotief for a summer camp program. (Id.).

Lotief’s breach-of-contract claim arises out of a “contract which . . . may be evidenced in

writing but is otherwise at least oral and which guaranteed a minimum term of employment.” (Doc.

1-1 at 48). He alleges that he had five years remaining on his employment contract after winning

a regional tournament. (Id. at 49). ULL’s decision to terminate his employment constitutes a

breach of the employment contract. (Id.).

II. DISCUSSION

The Court notes at the outset of this discussion that venue is proper in the Middle District

of Louisiana. In federal court, venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides,

if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).2

Here, the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System is the managing body of

ULL and is domiciled in East Baton Rouge Parish, which is located in the Middle District of

2 Additionally, Lotief’s ADA claim is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which provides that venue for an ADA

claim is proper in any district in the state “in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been

committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and

administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful

employment practice[.]” Accordingly, based on Lotief’s allegations, venue for Lotief’s ADA claim is proper in the

Middle District of Louisiana.

Louisiana. As all of the individual defendants are residents of Louisiana according to Lotief’s

allegations, venue is proper in this district.

This, of course, does not end the Court’s inquiry. The federal venue transfer statute

provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district

court may transfer any civil action to any other district where it might have been brought[.]” 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a). Because all of the individual defendants reside in Lafayette Parish, which is

located in the Western District of Louisiana, and “a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise” to Lotief’s suit occurred there, venue in the Western District is also proper.3 Under

§ 1404(a), a motion to transfer venue should be granted if “the movant demonstrates that the

transferee venue is clearly more convenient.” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315

(5th Cir. 2008) (“Volkswagen II”). While deference is given to the plaintiff’s choice of venue, a

movant need only show “good cause” to prevail on a motion to transfer. Id. That is, the movant

must “satisfy the statutory requirements and clearly demonstrate that a transfer” meets the § 1404

threshold of convenience and serves the interest of justice. Id.

In the Fifth Circuit, courts apply a host of public and private interest factors established by

the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), to determine “whether

a § 1404(a) venue transfer is for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of

justice.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. The private interest factors include: “(1) the relative ease

of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance

of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems

that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201,

203 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Volkswagen I”). The public interest factors are: “(1) the administrative

3 All of the requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) are satisfied by venue the Western District of Louisiana;

thus, venue in the Western District for Lotief’s ADA claim is also proper.

difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests

decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4)

the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or] the application of foreign law.” Id.

While they illuminate the convenience inquiry, these factors “are not necessarily exhaustive or

exclusive,” and “none can be said to be of dispositive weight.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315

(internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Private Interest Factors

When applied to Lotief’s factual allegations, the Gilbert factors point inexorably to the

Western District of Louisiana as the more convenient forum for this lawsuit. Beginning with the

private interest factors, the Court disagrees with Lotief’s arguments and concludes that three of the

four factors weigh strongly in favor of transfer.

1. Ease of Access to Sources of Proof

While access to certain sources of proof as a factor may not have the import it used to, the

Fifth Circuit has reminded courts that it remains a “meaningful factor” in the § 1404(a) analysis.

Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316. The defendants point out that because Lotief’s suit arises out of

his employment at ULL, all of his employment files as well as the investigatory materials cited to

in the petition are located at ULL’s offices in Lafayette. (Doc. 7-1 at 5). The defendants also assert

that the “physical evidence,” like the facilities Lotief alleges are inadequate and the property he

asserts was converted, are also located at ULL. (Id.). In response, Lotief argues that “copies of

relevant documents are housed at the Board’s offices in Baton Rouge” and evidence related to

ULL facilities “would be introduced in the exact same manner whether or not trial went forward

in the Middle or Western District.” (Doc. 12 at 4).

This factor weighs plainly in favor of transfer. Based on the allegations in Lotief’s

petition, his sources of proof at trial––witnesses, documents, and physical evidence––are either

predominantly or exclusively located in Lafayette. See, e.g., Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316

(finding this factor weighed in favor of transfer to a different division where “[a]ll of the documents

and physical evidence” related to the accident at issue were located in the transferee division).

And while Lotief makes much of the Board’s domicile in East Baton Rouge Parish, claiming that

copies of relevant documents are located at its offices there, he has failed to point to any specific

document existing in only in Baton Rouge that is crucial––or even relevant––to his case. The

Court cannot simply presume that copies of all relevant documents exist at the Board’s offices in

Baton Rouge merely because the Board is domiciled there. Without any such showing, the Court

concludes that the access-to-proof factor weighs decisively in favor of a transfer to the Western

District––where most or all of Lotief’s proof is currently located.

2. Securing Attendance of Witnesses

As the parties admitted in briefing, this factor is neutral because of the Western District

and Middle District’s coextensive subpoena power over witnesses located either in Baton Rouge

or Lafayette. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(A) (“A subpoena may command a person to attend a

trial, hearing or deposition . . . within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or

regularly transacts business in person[.]”).

3. Witnesses’ Cost of Attendance

The defendants point out that “[a]ll known fact witnesses are current or former [ULL]

employees or softball players,” at least the majority of whom reside or work in the Lafayette area,

and argue that it “would be inconvenient and burdensome for them to travel to Baton Rouge for

trial.” (Doc. 7-1 at 6). The defendants also note that they are unaware of any witnesses residing

or working in Baton Rouge with the exception of a few individuals who may have been witness to

an incident between Lotief and the Louisiana State University grounds grew––one of several stated

justifications for Lotief’s termination according to his allegations. (Id.).

Citing to Volkswagen I, Lotief counters that “the less than sixty mile drive from Lafayette

to Baton Rouge is not a distance that will cause the type of inconvenience warranting a transfer as

contemplated by § 1404” given Volkswagen I’s emphasis on the inconvenience to witnesses

imposed by a distance of greater than 100 miles. (Doc. 12 at 5); see also Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d

at 204–05. Lotief also asserts that Savoie and other ULL administrators regularly travel to Baton

Rouge in the course of their employment, and that he plans to “depose and/or call as witnesses”

members of the Board “who are all located in Baton Rouge or routinely travel to Baton Rouge.”

(Id.). Lotief also asserts that “all depositions could take place in Lafayette,” many of the softball

players who could serve as witnesses have filed their own lawsuit in the Middle District, “clearly

demonstrat[ing] that a large number of witnesses have no problem participating in a lawsuit in

Baton Rouge.” (Id. at 5). Moreover, Lotief argues, “flying into Baton Rouge is much easier than

flying into Lafayette” for out-of-state witnesses. (Id. at 6).

Lotief’s argument misses the mark for several reasons. The essence of his argument is that

because Lafayette and Baton Rouge are not a significant distance from each other, it makes little

difference whether his case is tried in the Western District or Middle District. Such an argument

minimizes the importance and purpose of geographical boundaries for federal district courts as

well as one of the public interest factors––“the local interest in having localized controversies

decided at home.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 571

U.S. 49, 63 n.6 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, importantly, the Fifth Circuit has

clarified that it never implied that “transfer within 100 miles does not impose costs on witnesses

or that such costs should not be factored into the venue-transfer analysis[.]” In re Radmax, 720

F.3d 295, 289 (5th Cir. 2013). Moreover, that certain witnesses may occasionally travel to Baton

Rouge for work or have filed a related lawsuit in the Middle District does not inform the question

of whether it is more convenient for these witnesses to attend court proceedings at the Western

District courthouse in Lafayette. And Lotief offers no citation or further elaboration for his

statement that it would be “easier” for out-of-state witnesses to fly into Baton Rouge than

Lafayette. Thus, the Court cannot consider this broad and sweeping statement in its analysis of

the most convenient forum for Lotief’s suit.

Indeed, as the defendants point out, the difference for the vast majority of the potential

witnesses who reside in the Lafayette area between attending proceedings in the Western District

and Middle District could be substantial. (See Doc. 14 at 3). ULL, where many potential witnesses

are either enrolled as students or employed, is located approximately one mile (a five-minute drive)

from the Western District courthouse in Lafayette. See Driving Directions from University of

Louisiana at Lafayette to U.S. District Court, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps

(follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search “University of Louisiana at Lafayette” to “U.S.

District Court, Lafayette, LA”). Conversely, it is located 57 miles from the Middle District

Courthouse––a one-hour drive without significant traffic. (See Driving Directions from

“University of Louisiana at Lafayette” to “U.S. District Court, Baton Rouge, LA”). And the Court

would be remiss not to note the perils imposed by frequent traffic jams, vehicle accidents, and road

construction on Interstate 10, all of which can make the otherwise one-hour drive a significantly

lengthier and more complicated journey.

“Additional distance means additional travel time; additional travel time increases the

probability for meal and lodging expenses; and additional travel time with overnight stays

increases the time which these fact witnesses must be away from their regular employment.”

Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d at 205. While Lafayette and Baton Rouge are admittedly within relatively

close proximity, they sit in different federal districts for a reason, and Lotief has failed to direct

the Court to any key witnesses for whom travel to Lafayette instead of Baton Rouge would be less

convenient. Accordingly, the Court finds the cost-to-witnesses factor to weigh in favor of transfer

to the Western District of Louisiana. See, e.g., Frederick v. Advanced Fin. Sols., Inc., 558 F. Supp.

2d 699, 704 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (“When nearly all of the nonparty witnesses that will testify

concerning disputed issues reside elsewhere, this factor weighs in favor of transferring the case.”).

4. Other Practical Considerations

The final private interest factor asks for an examination into “all other practical problems

that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d at 203.

Without citation, Lotief asserts that trial of his lawsuit in the Western District would not be “any

more easy, expeditious, and/or inexpensive” than trial in the Middle District. (Doc. 12 at 6). He

additionally argues that trial in the Western District could be complicated by the extensive media

coverage of the case in Lafayette. (Id.). The Court finds this argument to be logically inconsistent

with Lotief’s general contention that trial in the Middle District would not be inconvenient because

of its relatively close proximity to the Western District. Lotief cannot on one hand argue that

Baton Rouge and Lafayette are close enough to mitigate any significant inconvenience, while on

the other maintain that a Western District jury would likely be tainted by the extensive media

coverage while a Middle District jury would be oblivious to the issues underlying his suit.

Nevertheless, any concern over jury bias would be mitigated by voir dire questions

concerning any potential juror’s connection to ULL or exposure to relevant media coverage, as

well as cautionary instructions prohibiting jurors from conducting any outside research into the

case. As Lotief’s allegations center on conduct that occurred in the Western District, the majority

of potential witnesses reside in the Western District, and the majority of potential evidence is

located there, it is clear that a trial in the Western District would be easier, more expeditious, and

less expensive than a trial in the Middle District.

B. Public Interest Factors

1. Court Congestion

In an effort to keep his suit in the Middle District, Lotief references the Western District’s

period of judicial emergency status based on a previous shortage of District Judges. (Doc. 12 at 7).

He asserts that while new District Judges in the Western District are “diligently working to clear

up congestion” there, “it would be far less burdensome to proceed with trial in the Middle District

where similar congestion issues are not present.” (Id.). The Court disagrees.

The Middle District enjoys a high case load and a heavily congested docket. In fact, earlier

this year, it was named the fourth busiest district in the United States based on “weighted filings.”

Middle District of Louisiana is Nation’s 3rd Most Productive U.S. District Court, UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT, MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA, https://www.lamd.uscourts.gov/news/middle-

district-louisiana-3rd-most-productive-us-district-court-feb2019 (last visited July 29, 2019). At

the end of 2008, the Middle District had a total of 2,096 pending civil cases for a Court of three

District Judges. Id. Accordingly, and contrary to Lotief’s contentions, the Court finds that trying

Lotief’s suit in the Middle District would be more burdensome than trying the case in the Western

District. Thus, this factor favors transfer.

2. Local Interests

The defendants assert that a Western District jury has a local interest in deciding this case

because the suit arises out of Lotief’s employment at ULL, and a “Lafayette jury” has an interest

in deciding a case centered on its local university. (Doc. 7-1 at 7–8). Lotief counters that a Middle

District jury has a localized interest in deciding a suit against the Board because it is domiciled in

East Baton Rouge Parish. (Doc. 12 at 8). He also asserts that the Middle District and Western

District are “adjacent to each other” and have “shared localized interests in seeing Louisiana

Universities being held accountable for Title IX violations,” as each public university in the

University of Louisiana System is ultimately accountable to the “Board and System President.”

(Id.). Finally, Lotief cites to Wallace v. Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana

System for the proposition that “it is possible for multiple districts to have a localized interest in a

single cause of action, particularly when the districts are geographically adjacent and the

communities regularly travel between them.” Civil Action No.14-657-SDD-RLB, 2015 WL

1970514, at *7 (M.D. La. Apr. 30, 2015).

Despite Lotief’s contention, the fact that the districts were adjacent was not the Wallace

court’s only consideration, and the facts in that case are easily distinguishable from those here.

Wallace centered on allegations against Southeastern Louisiana University, which is located in the

Eastern District of Louisiana. Wallace, 2015 WL 1970514, at *1. However, the Wallace court was

careful to point out that Southeastern Louisiana University is located 60 miles from the Eastern

District courthouse in New Orleans and just 48 miles from the Middle District courthouse in Baton

Rouge. Id. at *6. Thus, it was actually closer for several witnesses in that case to travel to the

Middle District courthouse than to the Eastern District courthouse. Id. Moreover, because the

university was located in a parish directly adjacent to the Middle District, “its influence [was] felt

in both the Eastern and Middle Districts, considering students and employees hale[d] from both

districts and [were] equally affected by the enforcement of non-discriminatory policies.” Id. at *8.

Further, the university in Wallace operated satellite campuses in the Middle District. Id. Thus,

“residents of both districts [had] a localized interest in the resolution of [the] dispute.” Id.

Conversely, Lafayette Parish is not directly adjacent to the Middle District, and Lotief has

made no showing that ULL’s influence is equally felt in both districts. ULL has no satellite

campuses in the Middle District and it is clear that, for at least a substantial majority of fact

witnesses, the Western District courthouse is significantly closer and more convenient than the

Middle District courthouse. Lotief has pointed to no significant ULL student or employee

population in the Middle District such that jurors in this district would have a localized interest in

resolving this dispute. And Lotief’s argument that a Middle District jury would have a localized

interest in resolving claims against the Board is unavailing. Such an argument would, brought to

its logical conclusion, imply that a Middle District jury has a localized interest in adjudicating a

lawsuit against any school in the University of Louisiana System––including those hundreds of

miles and several hours away from the Middle District. “Jury duty is a burden that ought not to

be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.” Gilbert, 330

U.S. at 508–09. As most of the parties and witnesses reside in the Western District, and the conduct

giving rise to suit occurred at ULL, “the local interest in having localized interests decided at home

weighs heavily in favor” of transfer to the Western District of Louisiana. Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d

at 206 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

3. Governing Law

As both the Western District and Middle District sit within the state of Louisiana and

regularly apply Louisiana law in the adjudication of their cases, both districts are equally familiar

with Lotief’s state-law theories of liability. And both forums are certainly on equal footing with

respect to the federal law governing Lotief’s suit. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.

4. Conflict of Laws

Based on Lotief’s theories of liability, there are no conflict-of-laws issues, and this case

will not require the application of foreign law. Thus, this factor is also neutral.

III. CONCLUSION

This lawsuit arises out of Lotief’s employment with ULL in the Western District, includes

allegations of conduct that took place almost exclusively in the Western District, will require

production of documents and witnesses that are located primarily in the Western District, and is

asserted against one of the largest employers in Lafayette. Lafayette Parish Economic Profile, ONE

ACADIANA, https://www.oneacadiana.org/lafayette-parish (last visited July 30, 2019).

Accordingly, it is both more convenient for the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice

that this case be transferred to the Western District of Louisiana.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 7)

is GRANTED, and this matter is transferred to the United States District Court for the Western

District of Louisiana.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 31, 2019.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA