Plaquemines Parish Ventures LLC v. Plaquemines Parish Council

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PLAQUEMINES PARISH VENTURES, * CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-7337

LLC *

* SECTION: “A”(1)

VERSUS *

* JUDGE JAY C. ZAINEY

PLAQUEMINES PARISH COUNCIL ET *

AL. * MAGISTRATE JUDGE JANIS VAN

* MEERVELD

*

ORDER AND REASONS

The following motions are before the Court: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

(Rec. Doc. 7) filed by Plaintiff, Plaquemines Parish Ventures, LLC (“PPV”), and Motion to

Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Rec. Doc. 8), filed by Defendants, Carlton LaFrance, Sr.,

and the Plaquemines Parish Council (“the Council”). Both motions are opposed. The motions,

submitted for consideration on March 27, 2024, are before the Court on the briefs without oral

argument.1 For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is

DENIED.

I. Background

This suit arises out of PPV’s efforts to construct and operate a recreational vehicle park in

Plaquemines Parish to provide temporary housing for workers of a nearby natural gas plant.

(Complaint, ¶ 7). In May of 2022, LaFrance introduced an ordinance declaring the need for

additional RV parks to provide such housing. (Id. ¶ 8). In June of 2023, PPV filed zoning

applications to construct RV parks on two separate plots of land. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11). It alleges that it

1 PPV requested oral argument regarding both its Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Because the Court is not persuaded that oral argument would be helpful, it has decided the motions on the briefs.

complied with the Parish’s zoning application process, including seeking and receiving approval

from the development board, paying all necessary fees, and meeting with the members of the

Council. (Id. ¶ 12). However, PPV claims that LaFrance proved difficult to meet with and, upon

meeting with PPV, stated that he would ensure the applications never received a vote from the

Council. (Id. ¶ 13-17).

Since then, the Council has deferred PPV’s applications several times, each time without

explanation, and PPV’s requests for a vote have been unsuccessful. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19, 22-24).

Further, LaFrance has suggested that he has received letters of objection to the proposal. (Id. ¶¶

18-19). In response, PPV submitted a public records request for all letters of objection; no letters

were produced. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22). Additionally, PPV contends that LaFrance has a personal interest

in other RV sites and, for that reason, is blocking its applications. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27). Consequently,

PPV brought this suit asserting that LaFrance and the Council are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violating its procedural due process rights. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30). It claims that each of (1)

LaFrance’s deferrals of the vote and (2) the Council’s rule enabling a single councilmember to

defer a matter in perpetuity violates its constitutional right to due process in the consideration of

its applications, and precludes a hearing guaranteed under the Parish ordinances. (Id. ¶ 33).

PPV moved for summary judgment after the Council and LaFrance failed to timely

answer.2 In response, the Council and LaFrance moved to dismiss for (1) lack of personal

jurisdiction; (2) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (3) failure to state a claim. Because this

2 Counsel for Defendants experienced delays in their approval to practice in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Because

of these delays, Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment was not timely filed under the

local rules, nor did they file an answer or Rule 12 motion within twenty-one days of service. The Court also notes that

Defendants’ opposition memorandum was considered deficient by the Clerk because it lacked a statement of material

facts. Despite these deficiencies, the Court has considered the opposition memorandum and all filings from

Defendants.

Court finds that PPV has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the motion for summary

judgment is denied. The Court discusses these issues below.

II. Legal Standard

A motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) raises the defense of lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1); Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.

2001). Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be founded on any one of three bases: (1) the

complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or

(3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.

Id. (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)). In examining

a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the district court is empowered to consider matters of fact which may be

in dispute. Id. (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). Ultimately, such

a motion to dismiss should be granted only if it appears that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of

facts in support of its claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. (citing Home Builders Ass’n

of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)).

The central issue in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether, in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief. Gentilello v. Rege, 627

F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)).

To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court does

not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”

Id. (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Legal conclusions must

be supported by factual allegations. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

In the context of a motion to dismiss, the district court must accept all factual allegations

in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Lormand v.

US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &

Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Lovick v.

Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, the foregoing tenet is inapplicable

to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thread-bare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Any ambiguities in the current controlling substantive law

must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2001)

(citing Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1995)).

III. Discussion

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, this Court cannot conduct a 12(b)(6) analysis without first

determining whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. PPV’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

triggers jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The defendants do not contest subject-matter

jurisdiction on these grounds. Rather, they assert that this Court lacks jurisdiction because they

are protected by legislative immunity. However, whether legislative immunity precludes a cause

of action is an affirmative defense that is properly raised as a 12(b)(6) challenge; it is not a

complete bar to the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, “jurisdiction . . . is not

defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which

petitioners could actually recover.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89

(1998) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). Jurisdiction exists in such a federal

question case “unless the claim ‘clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose

of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Id.

(quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83). This Court can dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

due to the inadequacy of a federal claim only when it is completely implausible or foreclosed by

other precedent. Id.

Here, PPV has not stated a claim that is so devoid of merit or implausible that it may be

dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The claim that its procedural due process rights

were infringed upon—while strained, as discussed below—turns on a question of law as to

whether it possessed a constitutionally protected property interest, the resolution of which will

determine whether PPV can state a claim under section 1983. It cannot be said that this claim

was solely alleged to manufacture subject-matter jurisdiction. On this basis, this Court finds that

it has subject-matter jurisdiction due to the existence of a viable, well-pleaded federal question,

and will therefore consider whether PPV has sufficiently stated a claim.3

B. Failure to State a Claim

1. Absence of a Constitutionally Protected Right

PPV brings its cause of action regarding LaFrance’s and the Council’s constitutional

violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

3 The defendants also assert that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them due to legislative immunity.

Legislative immunity does not preclude a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over individuals or entities that

are citizens of the state in which it sits. This argument borders on frivolous, and the motion to dismiss on this basis is

denied.

PPV argues that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause demands that it receive a

hearing as to its zoning applications pending before the Council. It asserts that LaFrance has

violated its right to due process by continually deferring the vote on the applications, and that the

Council has violated its rights because its customs or rules enable LaFrance’s activity.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. The Due

Process Clause grants both substantive and procedural rights; PPV argues only that its procedural

rights were violated because it has been denied a hearing in the deferral of its applications. For a

plaintiff’s procedural due process rights to be violated, the defendant must have infringed upon a

constitutionally protected interest. Price v. City of Junction, Tex., 711 F.2d 582, 589 (5th Cir.

1983) (“It is necessary that property or liberty interests within the meaning of the due process

clause be involved before the notice and hearing rights are created.”). Whether an individual or

entity possesses a property interest protected by due process is a question of state law. Bd. of

Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). In Louisiana, a vested property right is

a present interest in which its owner has “the right to enjoyment, present or prospective.” Sawicki

v. K/S Stavanger Prince, 802 So. 2d 598, 604 (La. 12/7/01) (quoting Tennant v. Russell, 39 So.

2d 726 (La. 1949)). Further, “[t]he right must be absolute, complete, and unconditional,

independent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of future benefit . . . does not constitute a

vested right.” Id. (quoting Tennant v. Russell, 39 So. 2d 726 (La. 1949)) (emphasis added).

PPV points this Court to Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, Mississippi to show that licenses

and permits are essential in the pursuit of livelihood and, therefore, confer a property interest.

PPV states that because its plan has been approved by the development board and the Council

has unreasonably deferred the vote, the activity is effectively a denial of rights without a hearing.

However, Bowlby expressed that “once issued, a license or permit ‘may become essential in the

pursuit of a livelihood.’” Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, Miss., 681 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)) (emphasis added); see also Cleveland Bd. of

Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (providing that an individual may not be deprived

of property interests “once conferred”). PPV expands too much on Bowlby’s focus; there, the

Fifth Circuit found a protected property interest where the Zoning Board sought to revoke

previously issued permits allowing the plaintiff to operate her business in a specific location.

Bowlby, 681 F.3d at 219-20. Bowlby is distinguishable from the issue presented here. Absent

conferral of a permit, the mere fact that PPV’s application has been deferred is not a violation of

due process rights.4 PPV has no permit. Its right to use the land as an RV park is a mere

expectancy, far from what is required under Louisiana law, see Sawicki, 802 So. 2d at 604, and

does not meet the basic threshold present in cases from the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court in

which a permit had already been issued. That is, these deferrals do not deprive PPV of its current

rights to the land; rather, they are mere refusals to potentially grant rights.

PPV also asserts that Plaquemines Parish’s ordinances governing the Council create a

custom or method of operating that makes it liable under section 1983. However, such a method

of imputing liability to the Council—assuming that the Parish Council is an entity capable of

being sued—first requires a constitutional violation. See James v. Harris County, 577 F.3d 612,

617 (5th Cir. 2009) (determining that municipalities are not liable under section 1983 for the

misconduct of an employee unless, “in addition to a constitutional violation, . . . an official

policy promulgated by the municipality’s policymaker was the moving force behind, or actual

4 The fact that PPV has acquired this land and expended funds in developing a business venture for the land does not

create a constitutionally protected interest giving rise to due process rights in this context. While the land certainly is

constitutionally protected from certain infringements, PPV’s ownership does not compel the Council to vote on

applications for a potential permit.

cause of, the constitutional injury” (emphasis added)). PPV asserts that the Council’s governing

ordinances and customs permit councilmembers to perpetually defer zoning applications such

that they never receive a vote or opportunity for public comment, despite one ordinance’s

provision granting a hearing for such votes.5 However, under this ordinance, such a hearing is

not prescribed unless the proposal reaches a vote. Additionally, for such a claim to succeed, there

must be a constitutionally protected interest; absent such an interest, no violation exists under

section 1983. As described above, because PPV has no interest granting procedural protection in

this instance, there is no constitutional violation, and therefore a claim cannot be sustained under

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2. No Procedural Due Process Right in Legislative Activity

Even assuming arguendo that PPV has a protected property interest, legislative activity

does not give rise to procedural due process rights. Jackson Ct. Condos., Inc. v. City of New

Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is well-established law that once an action is

characterized as legislative, procedural due process requirements do not apply.”). This raises the

question: are a parish’s zoning determinations legislative? Both the Supreme Court and the Fifth

Circuit have suggested as much. See, e.g., Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 478

(5th Cir. 1986) (“[Z]oning decisions [are] legislative in nature and governed only by limitations

on legislative procedure . . . .”); Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish, 937 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.

1991) (labeling spot zoning as legislative activity and stating that the Fifth Circuit has “always

viewed zoning as a legislative function”); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429

U.S. 252 (1977) (evaluating denial of request for rezoning of a specific parcel of property as

5 The Code of Ordinances for the Plaquemines Parish Council, Chapter 2, Article II – Section 2-18, Rule 18(a) states:

“Any person shall be entitled to a reasonable hearing on any proposed ordinance or resolution. Public Comment shall

take place after the preamble of each piece of legislation is read and before the floor is open to the Board members to

take action.”

legislative); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975) (“[Z]oning laws and their provisions,

long considered essential to effective urban planning, are peculiarly within the province of state

and local legislative authorities.”).6 Certainly, some actions by a municipal body are

adjudicative, such as when “an appointed group, such as a zoning board, makes a specific

decision regarding a specific piece of property.” Cnty. Line Joint Venture v. City of Grand

Prairie, Tex., 839 F.2d 1142, 1144 (5th Cir. 1988). However, County Line distinguished this type

of decision-making from legislative activity, such as when elected groups, including city

councils, make general zoning decisions. Id. The issue here is not an adjudicative determination

of whether PPV has been compliant with an existing permit, nor is it a question of whether PPV

received proper due process in the revocation of an already-secured permit. Rather, the Parish

Council has merely refused to vote on a particular zoning application.

6 Shelton attempted to do away with the notion that zoning activity can be either quasi-legislative or legislative in the

context of substantive due process. 780 F.2d at 479 (“Such a suggestion of uncertainty [of whether zoning is quasi-

legislative or legislative] is not warranted. We have plainly and consistently held that zoning decisions are to be

reviewed by federal courts by the same constitutional standards we employ to review statutes enacted by the state

legislatures.”). While this case handles procedural due process rights, this Court is comfortable considering the

substantive due process principles as analogous to the procedural due process principles.

Despite the Fifth Circuit’s clear directive that zoning is a legislative activity, PPV contends that this activity

was adjudicative. PPV highlights the difference between legislative and adjudicative acts as described in Hughes v.

Tarrant County Texas. 948 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1991). Hughes provides two tests for determining whether an action is

legislative or adjudicative. The first turns on whether the underlying facts are legislative and the second on the

“particularity of the impact of the state action.” Id. at 920-21 (quoting Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir.

1984)).

As to the first test, the Fifth Circuit “has always viewed zoning as a legislative function.” Calhoun, 937 F.2d

at 174. Even a denial of a request for a variance is “a legislative judgment, an evaluation of legislative facts, even

though the legislative decision was not the initial enactment of a zoning code.” Id. (citing Shelton, 780 F.2d 475). The

second test focuses on the particularity of the act. In Hughes, the court considered a state district court clerk’s claim

for attorney’s fees from a contempt hearing. 948 F.2d at 919-20. The Fifth Circuit stated that the issue was “not based

on general facts regarding any policy, but instead, it was based on specific facts of an individual situation related to

the district court clerk.” Id. at 921. While any zoning determination necessarily implicates questions of specific facts,

the issue in Hughes was clearly one that resembled an adversarial proceeding such as a lawsuit rather than conforming

with a comprehensive legislative plan. Additionally, the case law from other jurisdictions cited by Defendants related

to individualized issues, such as an individual’s ban from attending meetings or a grant of a government contract to a

bidder, which take the form of administrative actions. Zoning questions, on the other hand, are applications of wider

legislative plans to individuals. Such decisions are uniquely legislative, both precedentially and under the framework

set out by Hughes.

Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523

U.S. 44, 54 (1998). The Supreme Court considers the “introduction of a budget and signing into

law an ordinance . . . [to be] formally legislative” acts. Id. at 55. This determination is not

directly on point—after all, PPV takes issue with the Council’s inaction, not any affirmative

action. However, this Court considers this form of inaction to qualify as legislative activity.7

Bogan considered the “introduction of a budget” to be legislative activity because it is an

“integral step[] in the legislative process.” Id. Implicit in the introduction of such a budget is the

decision of whether to introduce that budget. Therefore, the premise that introducing a proposal

is legislative assumes that the underlying decision to introduce it is also legislative. If such a

decision is legislative when the result is to bring the proposal to a vote, then by extension a

negative result must also be legislative. It is not this Court’s place to compel a legislator to

introduce legislation—such an act is squarely within the ambit of the legislator’s discretion.

While the Fifth Circuit has not yet determined whether legislative inaction qualifies as

legislative activity, others have. See, e.g., NRP Holdings LLC v. City of Buffalo, 916 F.3d 177,

192-93 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding that failure to introduce legislation was legislative in form and in

substance); Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp. Inc., 956 F.2d 1056, 1063-64 (11th Cir. 1992)

(“When individuals can sue members of a legislative body to ensure that a certain piece of

legislation is brought before that body for a vote, the process is no longer democratic. Thus, we

hold that the decision . . . not to introduce a piece of legislation . . . is legislative activity

protected by the doctrine of legislative immunity.”). This Court is satisfied that the decision not

to introduce legislation to the Council is legislative activity. Such an act is a necessary

7 PPV points this Court to Hughes to argue that inaction does not constitute a legislative act, instead claiming that the

action is adjudicative. Having found the act to be legislative, the Court must analyze whether inaction can be protected

legislative activity.

determination and therefore an “integral step[] in the legislative process.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55.

Therefore, procedural due process rights do not attach. See Jackson Ct. Condos., 874 F.2d at

1074.

3. Failure of Bias Claim

Finally, PPV has alleged that LaFrance is personally biased against PPV because he has a

financial stake in surrounding RV parks. Because this is a 12(b)(6) analysis, this Court will

assume that LaFrance has such a stake in surrounding RV parks and that he has a personal bias

against PPV.8 Nevertheless, PPV’s argument still fails. The Fifth Circuit has previously refused

to extend procedural due process rights to zoning. Cf. S. Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5,

7 n.1 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (refusing to extend Hornsby v. Allen’s dictate that exercises of

legislative power in adjudicative settings require concepts of minimal due process to zoning

cases).

Beyond the inapplicability of due process in this setting under Pruitt, an official’s bias

only constitutes a violation of procedural due process when an individual possesses due process

rights. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 n.2

(1976) (explaining that there was a property interest at Wisconsin law as a prerequisite to

determining whether bias potentially denied the plaintiff due process). As described at length

above, PPV has no due process rights as to these applications. Additionally, the Court has held

that it is “not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of

legislators,” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951), a protection that is distinguishable

8 The Court notes that PPV is also concerned about LaFrance’s proposal to enact a moratorium on RV developments

on its specific plots of land. There has not yet been a vote. Whether such an action is adjudicative or legislative is

undecided by this Order, as the matter is not ripe until the proposal is acted upon. Further, allegations regarding the

potential moratorium were not included in the Complaint. Therefore, because this claim was not alleged in this lawsuit,

and it is not ripe regardless, this Order issues no opinion on the viability of a constitutional claim regarding the

moratorium, nor shall it be interpreted as issuing such a decision.

from adjudicative contexts.9 In fact, the Supreme Court drew a bright line regarding legislators’

motives, stating:

In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed

to legislative conduct and as readily believed. Courts are not the place for such

controversies. Self discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for

discouraging or correcting such abuses.

Id. at 378. Clearly, it is not this Court’s place to determine whether LaFrance or the Council has

any bias against PPV, considering their inaction falls within the scope of their legislative

discretion. Additionally, it is not this Court’s prerogative to require LaFrance to propose a piece

of legislation with which he disagrees—regardless of his motive for disagreement. Therefore, the

bias claim as to the zoning applications must fail.

IV. Conclusion

Having reviewed the pleadings, this Court does not believe that PPV has a

constitutionally protected property interest, and it therefore cannot claim due process rights. In

the alternative, the defendants’ legislative activity does not give rise to procedural due process

rights for PPV. While the Court sympathizes with PPV’s frustration regarding this matter, as it

currently stands, there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment nor is there a valid civil

rights claim under section 1983. Therefore, PPV cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and, on that basis, that claim is DISMISSED.

Having dismissed the sole basis of subject-matter jurisdiction, only state law claims

remain. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), this Court declines to exercise supplemental

9 The question of whether an act is adjudicative or legislative can have a significant impact on a due process claim

premised on bias. As discussed above, this Order makes no determinations regarding the moratorium’s nature as

legislative or adjudicative, and it therefore makes no determination regarding the viability of a bias claim premised on

the moratorium proposal.

jurisdiction over the remaining claims. They are therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

In light of the above, PPV’s Motion for Summary Judgment, in which it requests

judgment as a matter of law as to section 1983 liability and state law claims, is DENIED WITH

PREJUDICE as to the 1983 claim and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the state law

claims.

Accordingly;

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 8) filed by Defendants,

Carlton LaFrance, Sr., and the Plaquemines Parish Council, is GRANTED as to the 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claim for failure to state a claim. The motion is DENIED as to the state-law claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaquemines Parish Ventures, LLC’s remaining state

law claims arising from this series of events ace DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaquemines Parish Ventures, LLC’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 7) is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE as to the 1983

liability claims and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the remaining state law claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (Rec. Doc.

22) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

April 3, 2024 C |

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