G.K. v. D.M.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

G.K. * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 21-2242

D.M. * SECTION “T” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before me is Intervenors Fishman Haygood, LLP and its attorneys Michael Dodson,

Danielle Teutonico, and Monica Bergeron’s Motion to Compel. ECF No. 286. Plaintiff G.K.

timely filed an Opposition, entitled “Objections.” ECF No. 289. Intervenors filed a Reply. ECF

No. 290. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the court

agrees that oral argument is unnecessary.

Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the

applicable law, the motion to compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the

reasons stated herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally filed suit alleging that Defendant falsely represented his HIV status to

induce Plaintiff to engage in unprotected sexual relations and infected him with HIV after a sexual

encounter on September 1, 2019. ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 5–13, at 8–9. The court entered a default

judgment against Defendant D.M. on May 24, 2023, and entered Judgment on November 21, 2023.

ECF Nos. 236, 273.

Intervenor filed a Complaint in Intervention asserting a statutory lien and privilege on any

recovery on July 26, 2023. ECF No. 249. In Plaintiff’s Answer to the Intervention, he asserted

various defenses including malpractice. ECF No. 265-1 ¶ 4. On November 30, 2023, Intervenors

issued discovery, two topics of which are at issue in this motion: (1) information regarding the

email address spark@gardilaw.com and (2) information and communications between Plaintiff

and California attorney Shiloh Bentacourt. ECF No. 286-1 at 4, 6. Movant contends Plaintiff

responded with boilerplate objections (specifically, “irrelevant, vague, ambiguous, overly broad,

calls for a legal conclusion, calls for speculation, is burdensome and harassing, and subject to

varying interpretations”), that he does not have possession of responsive documents, and attorney-

client privilege. Id. at 4-5. Movant argues relevance and waiver of the privilege. Id. at 5-9.

In Opposition, G.K. argues that he has not waived his attorney-client privilege as to his

communications with any attorneys other than intervenors. ECF No. 289-1 at 1. G.K. further

argues that he has no written or audio communications with Shiloh Bentacourt and that he has

never been associated with the email address about which Intervenor seeks information. Id. at 2.

Plaintiff contends the information sought is irrelevant and is simply harassment, subjecting movant

to penalties. Id. at 2-3.

In Reply, Intervenors assert that G.K. has repeatedly relied on advice from Bentacourt and

they are “entitled to demonstrate both that the basis for their withdrawal was well-founded and

that Plaintiff has long been relying on other attorneys to provide him legal advice.” ECF No. 290.

Intervenors further argue that G.K.’s blanket attorney-client privilege invocation and boilerplate

objections are inappropriate and thus should be stricken. Id. at 1-2, 5-6. Intervenors also cite two

Middle District of Louisiana cases wherein parties were compelled to produce information despite

invocation of the attorney-client privilege in order to establish when those parties learned certain

information. Id. at 3. Intervenors further contend that G.K.’s assertion that the

“spark@gardilaw.com” email was “made up” or a filing error should be tested through proper

discovery responses rather than ipse dixit in an opposition memorandum. Id. at 4.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Scope of Discovery

Under Rule 26, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is

relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the

importance of the issues at stake, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant

information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and

whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information

within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

Rule 26’s advisory committee comments make clear that the parties and the court have a

collective responsibility to ensure that discovery is proportional. The party claiming it would

suffer an undue burden or expense is typically in the best position to explain why, while the party

claiming the information is important to resolve the issues in the case should be able “to explain

the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that party understands them.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendment. “The court’s responsibility,

using all the information provided by the parties, is to consider these and all the other factors in

reaching a case-specific determination of the appropriate scope of discovery.” Id.

B. Duty to Respond to Discovery

A party served with written discovery must fully answer each request to the full extent that

it is not objectionable and affirmatively explain what portion of an interrogatory or document

request is objectionable and why, affirmatively explain what portion of the interrogatory or

document request is not objectionable and the subject of the answer or response, and explain

whether any responsive information or documents have been withheld.1 Likewise, a party must

1 Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 580 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (citation omitted).

provide full and complete responses to requests for production within thirty days after being served

same unless otherwise stipulated or ordered. FED. R. CIV. P.34(b)(2)(A).

A party responding to discovery must produce responsive documents not only that are

within that party’s actual, physical possession, but also documents that are within the party's

constructive possession, custody or control. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii); 34(a)(1). For each

request, the respondent must either state that the inspection or production will be permitted or state

with specificity the grounds for objection, including the reason. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B). If a

party fails to produce documents, respond that inspection will be permitted, or permit inspection,

the party seeking discovery may, on notice to other parties and certification that the parties

participated in a Rule 37 conference in good faith, move for an order compelling an answer,

designation, production, or inspection. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure take a “demanding attitude toward objections,”2 and

courts have long interpreted the rules to prohibit general, boilerplate objections.3 When a party

objects to a request for production, the “objection must state whether any responsive materials are

being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection to part of a request must specify the

part and permit inspection of the rest.”4 Objections interposed without also indicating whether

any document or information is being withheld are improper.5 Responses must also clearly state

whether any responsive materials are being withheld and the specific basis for objecting and not

2 8B CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2173 (3d ed. 2021).

3 See, e.g., Chevron Midstream Pipelines LLC v. Settoon Towing LLC, Nos. 13-2809, 12-3197, 2015 WL 269051, at

*3 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 2015) (noting that an objection is boilerplate and insufficient “when it merely states the legal

grounds for the objection without: (1) specifying how the discovery request is deficient and (2) specifying how the

objecting party would be harmed if it were forced to respond to the request.”) (citation omitted); see also McLeod,

Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485–86 (5th Cir. 1990) (simply objecting to requests as

“overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant,” without showing “specifically how each [request] is not

relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive” is inadequate to “voice a successful

objection.”) (citations omitted).

4 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C); Orchestrate HR, Inc. v. Trombetta, 178 F. Supp. 3d 476, 507 (N.D. Tex. 2016), objs.

overruled sub nom. Orchestratehr, Inc. v. Trombetta, No. 13-2110, 2016 WL 5942223 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2016).

5 See Chevron, 2015 WL 269051 at *4 (holding that objections fall short of party’s burden when party objected based

on privilege but failed to state whether any documents were withheld or the nature of withheld documents).

producing same.6 Further, it is improper for parties responding to discovery to provide responses

with the caveat that they are given “subject to and without waiving” objections. Courts have

repeatedly recognized that such language is improper and inconsistent with the Federal Rules.7

III. ANALYSIS

In response to Intervenors’ discovery requests regarding G.K.’s communications with

attorney Bentacourt and the owner of the spark@gardilaw.com email address, G.K. lodged various

unexplained objections, including relevance, vagueness, ambiguity, overbreadth, speculation, and

undue burden; claimed that he has no responsive information in his possession; and asserted the

attorney-client privilege. ECF No. 286-9. In his Opposition Memorandum, G.K. reiterates his

attorney-client privilege invocations, insists that he has no written or audio communications with

Bentacourt, asserts that he does not know who owns the e-mail address at issue and has never been

associated with same, repeats his boilerplate objections, and seeks sanctions against Intervenors

for filing the motion to compel. ECF No. 289-1.

Intervenors argue that Plaintiff waived the attorney-client privilege by alleging an

affirmative defense of legal malpractice in his Answer to the Complaint in Intervention, “thereby

putting Intervenors’ legal representation of Plaintiff at issue.” ECF No. 286-1 at 1.

Initially, G.K.’s unsubstantiated boilerplate objections are improper and thus overruled.

Any responsive information withheld in reliance on these objections must be produced within

fourteen (14) days. Moreover, Plaintiff attempts to both argue that he never engaged Bentacourt

as counsel and has no association with the legal email address while at the same time arguing that

6 Id. (citation omitted) (“Objections that fail to provide an appropriate basis make it difficult for the parties to even

informally discuss any alleged defects in a discovery request or response in hope of fixing the defects.”).

7 Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 486 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (citations omitted) (“The practice of asserting

objections and then answering ‘subject to’ and/or ‘without waiving’ the objections–like the practice of including a

stand-alone list of general or blanket objections that precede any responses to specific discovery requests–may have

developed as a reflexive habit . . . [but the practice] ‘manifestly confuses (at best) and mislead[s] (at worse), and has

no basis at all in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’”).

any communications with either attorney are subject to the attorney-client privilege. Both cannot

be true. Either G.K. has received legal advice from Bentacourt and/or other counsel and such

communications may potentially be protected by privilege or did not receive legal advice and thus

has no basis to assert attorney-client privilege. Further, G.K. insists that he has no documents

responsive to Intervenors’ requests. Of course, the court cannot compel someone to produce

something that does not exist. But should it become evident that documents do, in fact, exist, then

consideration of sanctions will be appropriate.

A. Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege

Intervenors argue that Plaintiff waived the attorney-client privilege by alleging an

affirmative defense of legal malpractice in his Answer to the Complaint in Intervention, “thereby

putting Intervenors’ legal representation of Plaintiff at issue.” ECF No. 286-1 at 1. Intervenors

contend that communications between G.K. and Bentacourt and/or other counsel obtained during

or after Intervenors’ representation of G.K. are relevant insofar as same could be used to dispute

G.K.’s contention that Intervenors abandoned him in the middle of litigation.

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications.8 The

purpose of the attorney-client privilege is well-established: to encourage candid communications

between client and counsel.9 The applicability of the attorney-client privilege “is a question of

fact, to be determined in the light of the purpose of the privilege and guided by judicial

precedents.”10 Not all communications between a client and its attorney are protected by the

attorney-client privilege.11 While the attorney-client privilege extends to all situations in which

counsel is sought on a legal matter, it protects “only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed

8 Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. U.S. Gov’t, Dep’t of the Treasury, 768 F.2d 719, 720 (5th Cir. 1985).

9 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390–91 (1981).

10 Hodges, 768 F.2d at 721.

11 United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 562–63 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that the attorney-client privilege “is not a

broad rule of law which interposes a blanket ban on the testimony of an attorney.”).

legal advice which might not have been made absent the privilege.”12 The attorney-client privilege

therefore does not attach to every communication between a client and counsel, as the privilege

“does not embrace everything that arises out of the existence of an attorney-client relationship.”13

“What is vital to the privilege is that the communication be made in confidence for the purpose of

obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.”14 The attorney-client privilege “was intended as a shield,

not a sword.”15

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,

govern litigation in federal courts, under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, state law

governs privilege issues in a civil case for which state law supplies the rule of decision. FED. R.

EVID. 501. Thus, Louisiana law governs any objection based on the attorney-client privilege and

requires the proponent of the privilege claim to establish: (1) the holder of the privilege is or sought

to become a client; (2) the communication was made to an attorney or his subordinate in a

professional capacity; (3) the communication was made outside the presence of strangers; (4) the

communication was made to obtain a legal opinion or services; and (5) the privilege has not been

waived.16 While both the client and his lawyer or the lawyer’s representative may claim the

privilege, as the holder of the privilege, only the client may waive it.17 The party asserting the

privilege has the burden of proving its applicability and that a waiver has not occurred.18

12 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (citations omitted).

13 Pipkins, 528 F.2d at 563.

14 United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1982) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also

Hodges, 768 F.2d at 720.

15 Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1989).

16 Cacamo v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 1991-1421 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2001); 798 So. 2d 1210, 1216 (citation omitted);

LA. CODE EVID. ART. 506 (2006); see also United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 974 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations

omitted) (holding that a party invoking the attorney-client privilege bears the burden of demonstrating its applicability

and must show: (1) that he made a confidential communication; (2) to a lawyer or his subordinate; (3) for the primary

purpose of securing either a legal opinion or legal services, or assistance in some legal proceeding).

17 La. Code Evid. art. 506(D).

18 Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley, 513 So.2d 1138, 1143 (La.9/9/87); accord Fremin v. Entergy New Orleans,

Inc., 2006-1700 (La. 10/6/06); 938 So.2d 62, 63; Zydeco’s II, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 18-

604 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/19/19), 2019 WL 692963, at *5 (“The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that waiver of

the attorney-client privilege may occur when a party places privileged communications ‘at issue.’”) (citation omitted).

Despite Intervenors’ relevance arguments, however, a litigant’s pleading of a claim or

defense to which his attorney client communications are relevant does not by such pleading alone

waive his attorney-client privilege.19 Instead, the pleading must “inevitably require the

introduction of a privileged communication at trial to constitute a waiver.”20 “Thus, ‘placing at

issue’ waiver does not depend on the relevance of the privileged communications or on the

adversary's need, no matter how strong, for the privileged matters.”21 Rather, the privilege holder

must have “committed himself to a course of action that will require the disclosure of a privileged

communication.”22 This principle is rooted in fairness—“when the [privilege] holder places the

information at issue to his own benefit, allowing ‘the privilege to protect against disclosure of such

information would be manifestly unfair to the opposing party.’”23 Moreover, a party who makes

a pretrial partial disclosure of his attorney-client communications waives his privilege as to all

such communications on the same subject unless he stipulates that he will not introduce any such

communications at trial.24

To determine whether G.K. has waived any attorney-client privilege concerning his

communications with Bentacourt or another attorney (presumedly at the Gardi Firm), this Court

must consider (1) whether G.K. has already revealed privileged communications; and (2) G.K.’s

use of his protected communications with these attorneys, if any—i.e., whether G.K. has

“committed himself to a course of action that will require the disclosure of a privileged

19 Smith, 513 So.2d at 1141.

20 Id.; accord State v. Jennings, 220-97 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/15/20); 304 So.3d 494, 501 (citing McNeely v. Bd. of River

Port Pilot Comm’rs, 534 So.2d 1255 (La. 1988)).

21 Gibbens v. Quality Rental Tools, Inc., Nos. 13-6401, 14-288, 2014 WL 5432113, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2014)

(citing Stumpf v. Stumpf, 613 So.2d 683, 685 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.1993) (citing Smith, 513 So.2d at 1146)).

22 Id.

23 Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. v. Babcock Law Firm, LLC, No. 11-633, 2014 WL 29451, at *6 (M.D. La Jan.

3, 2014) (quoting Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1989).

24 Smith, 513 So.2d at 1141; see also Ocean Sky Int’l, L.L.C. v. Limu Co., L.L.C., No. 18-00528, 2019 WL 13177256

(W.D. La. Dec. 9, 2019) (applying Louisiana privilege law and requiring production of all communications between

defendant and its former counsel on certain topics absent defendant’s agreement to stipulate that it would not rely on

advice of counsel or its communications with former counsel in its defense).

communication,” not the intervenors’ alleged need for the communications.25

Intervenors have not met this burden here. First, although G.K.’s deposition testimony

reflects the potential existence of an attorney-client relationship between himself and Bentacourt

whereby the attorney “consulted with” G.K. and “gave [him] pointers,” G.K. has not disclosed any

specific communications between himself and Bentacourt or another attorney. Likewise, as to the

second inquiry, there is no evidence at this time that G.K. has committed himself to a course of

conduct that will require the use of any privileged communication at trial in support of his legal

malpractice affirmative defense.

Moreover, Intervenors’ assertion that a finding of waiver is appropriate because G.K. put

his communications with Bentacourt and other attorneys at issue by raising a legal malpractice

affirmative defense falls short. Notably, in making their relevance and “at issue” arguments,

Intervenors cite the incorrect standard. Relying on Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Houston

Helicopters, Inc.,26 Intervenors assert that a party is considered to have waived the attorney-client

privilege where “(1) assertion of the privilege was the result of an affirmative act . . .; (2) through

the affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant

to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would deny the opposing party access to

information necessary to his defense.” The Rowan court cites Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581

(E.D. Wash. 1975) as the source of this test. The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, made clear

in Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley, 513 So.2d 1138, 1143 (La. 9/9/87), that it “[has] not

followed the Hearn v. Rhay test because it improperly undermines the legislatively established

attorney-client privilege by causing courts to reassess the privilege by weighing the individual

privilege-holder's interests against his opponent's need for evidence whenever the privilege is

25 Gibbens, 2014 WL 5432113, at *5.

26 No. 06-10755, 2007 WL 9809155, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2007).

attacked.”27 Accordingly, under Louisiana law, Intervenors’ argument that the privileged

information is relevant and/or necessary to their defense of the malpractice claim does not bear

upon the waiver decision. Instead, the operative question under Louisiana law is whether the

privilege holder has committed himself to a course of action that would require the disclosure of a

privileged communication.28

Intervenors fail altogether to address whether G.K. “will be forced inevitably to draw upon

a privileged communication [with Betancourt or any other attorney] in trial in order to prevail.”

Further, Intervenors’ reliance on Blackmon v. Bracken Construction Co., Inc.29 and Forever

Green Athletic Fields, Inc. v. Babcock Law Firm, LLC30 is inapposite. In Blackmon, a party sought

discovery from plaintiffs’ former counsel regarding when and how plaintiffs learned about certain

insurance policies and their limits. The Court found that plaintiffs waived privilege as to this topic

because the question of when and how plaintiffs learned of the insurance policies was “not only

relevant but crucial to their causes of action for fraudulent omissions, material misrepresentations,

detrimental reliance, and the like,” which claims all required plaintiffs to show reliance on an

omission or misrepresentation of a material fact to his or her own detriment.31 The court further

noted that the plaintiffs, who listed their former attorneys as trial witnesses, could not

simultaneously claim that when and how they learned of the insurance policies was privileged but

then selectively disclose that they were not aware of the policies prior to executing the alleged

settlement agreement.32 In Forever Green, plaintiffs faced a peremption issue and argued that

they were not “put on notice” of defendant’s malpractice until a certain date. The court agreed

27 Smith, 513 So.2d at 1145.

28 Id. at 1146.

29 No. 18-142, 2020 WL 6065520 (M.D. La. Oct. 14, 2020), aff’d, No. 18-142, 2021 WL 2150694 (M.D. La. May 26,

2021).

30 No. 11-633, 2014 WL 29451, at *8-*9 (M.D. La. Jan. 3, 2014).

31 Id. at *9

32 Id.

with defendant that plaintiffs “sufficiently placed the running of the one year peremptive period at

issue by claiming they were not put on notice of [defendant’s] malpractice” until a certain point

and that attorney-client communications would be relied on by the parties and the factfinder to

establish when the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the malpractice claim.

This case involves neither fraudulent misrepresentation claims nor peremption issues. Nor

have Intervenors identified a single specific issue for which the contents of G.K.’s communications

with other attorneys would prove necessary for plaintiff to use. Accordingly, the record does not

reflect a factual basis to find a wholesale waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to any

communications with Bentacourt or other attorneys.

B. The Requirement for a Privilege Log

The party asserting privilege bears the burden of proof sufficient to substantiate its claims33

by proving that each document it has withheld is privileged, rather than relying on a blanket

assertion of privilege.34 G.K.’s blanket assertion of attorney-client privilege is wholly insufficient.

A party withholding information by claiming attorney-client privilege “must (i) expressly

make the claim; and (ii) describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things

not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself

privileged or protected, will enable the other parties to assess the claim.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)

(emphasis added). The use of the word “must” indicates that production of a privilege log,

including the detail specified by Rule 26(b)(5)(A)(i) and (ii), is mandatory.

33 United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th

Cir. 2001)); see Hodges, 768 F.2d 719, 721.

34 Jordan v. Aries Marine Corp., No. 14-377, 2015 WL 151336, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2015) (citing In re Equal

Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 207 F. App'x 426, 431 (5th Cir. 2006); Woodard v. Andrus, No. 2:03–2098, 2008 WL

2540600, at *3 (W.D. La. June 20, 2008) (citing High Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. Panasonic Co., No. 94–1447, 1995 WL

45847, at * 1 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 1995) (citing Hodges, 768 F.2d at 721; In re Shell Oil Ref., 812 F. Supp. 658, 661 (E.D.

La. 1993))).

The “privilege log’s description of each document and its contents must provide sufficient

information to permit courts and other parties to ‘test[ ] the merits of’ the privilege claim.”35 It

“should not only identify the date, the author, and all recipients of each document listed therein,

but should also describe the document's subject matter, the purpose for its production, and a

specific explanation of why the document is immune from discovery.”36 Satisfying Rule

26(b)(5)’s requirements as to each withheld document or communication may also require

affidavits or declarations to establish that the items or categories withheld and the reason for same,

with enough information for the requesting party to assess and the court to determine whether the

withheld documents or information are privileged or are work product.37

Should G.K. have withheld any responsive documents in reliance on attorney-client

privilege, each communication must be identified on a privilege log as detailed herein, which

privilege log must be produced to Intervenors within fourteen (14) days.

IV. CONCLUSION

G.K.’s discovery responses are evasive and insufficient. Although this Court finds that

movants have not established a wholesale waiver of any potentially applicable attorney-client

privilege under Smith, G.K. must properly substantiate his invocation of privilege through a proper

privilege log detailing any communication withheld from production. Further, while the court

must accept the plaintiff’s sworn responses reflecting that he has no responsive communications,

35 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm'n v. BDO USA, L.L.P., 876 F.3d 690, 697 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v.

El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 541 (5th Cir. 1982); N.L.R.B. v. Interbake Foods, LLC, 637 F.3d 492, 502 (4th Cir. 2011)

(“When a party relies on a privilege log to assert these privileges, the log must ‘as to each document . . . set[] forth

specific facts that, if credited, would suffice to establish each element of the privilege or immunity that is claimed.’”)

(quoting Bowne, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1993))).

36 See Peacock v. Merrill, No. 08-01, 2008 WL 687195, at *3 (M.D. La. 2008) (quoting Jones v. Hamilton County

Sheriff’s Dept., 2003 WL 21383332, at *4 (S.D. Ind. 2003) and citing Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Packard Bell Elecs.,

Inc., 163 F.R.D. 329, 338 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).

37 Jolivet v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 340 F.R.D. 7, 21 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (citing Navigant Consulting, Inc. v.

Wilkinson, 220 F.R.D. 467, 473-74 (N.D. Tex. 2004)).

should Intervenors discover any undisclosed evidence, sanctions may be imposed. Accordingly,

for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Intervenor’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 286) is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART. G.K. must provide supplemental responses that do not rely on

his boilerplate objections and must also produce a proper privilege log within fourteen (14) days.

“os -. 20th

New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of March, 2024.

re PHILL ys CURRAULT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

13