Opinion

Bruce v. BP p.l.c.

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Mar 18, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.4%

“Barna’s failure in the Houston proceeding to present some of the evidence it believed supported its claim does not change the nature of the issue resolved[.]”

How later courts described this case

  • “Barna’s failure in the Houston proceeding to present some of the evidence it believed supported its claim does not change the nature of the issue resolved[.]”
  • taking judicial notice of these facts
  • issue preclusion applies to any allegation that was “available at the time the original complaint was filed”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHANE BRUCE, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff

VERSUS NO. 18-2626

BP P.L.C., et al., SECTION: “E” (4)

Defendants

ORDER AND REASONS

Plaintiff Shane Bruce filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Tennessee

(Knoxville) on July 3, 2017.1 On that same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to

proceed in forma pauperis.2 On August 17, 2017, that court granted the motion.3 Plaintiff

filed an amended complaint in the Eastern District of Tennessee (Knoxville) on October

10, 2017.4

The Plaintiff’s case was transferred to this district by MDL Transfer Order on

February 2, 2018.5 In this court, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, the Plaintiff

filed a Second Amended Complaint,6 and a Fourth Amended Complaint,7 alleging he

suffered personal injury, lost wages, and other financial damages, and seeking punitive

damages, as a result of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.8 Defendants BP p.l.c., BP

Exploration & Production, Inc., and BP America Production Company filed a Motion to

Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint.9 Halliburton Energy Services, Transocean

1 R. Doc. 1-3.

2 Id.

3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 R. Doc. 12. The Court denied Plaintiff’s attempt to file his proposed third amended complaint but allowed

him to try again. R. Doc. 37 at 2. When he refiled the pleading, the Plaintiff mistakenly captioned it as his

fourth, rather than his third, amended complaint.

7 R. Doc. 41.

Drilling, Inc. joined in the Motion to Dismiss.10

BACKGROUND

The Defendants accurately state the background of this action.

The Deepwater Horizon was a mobile offshore drilling unit owned

by Transocean Ltd. that operated in the Gulf of Mexico. BP Exploration &

Production Inc.—the relevant BP entity—hired Transocean to drill the

Macondo Well. On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon suffered a

blowout, causing an oil spill. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP

Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 418-20 (5th Cir. 2013); see also id. at 422-24

(taking judicial notice of these facts). Within days, the federal government—

through the Federal On-Scene Coordinator and Unified Area Command—

instituted a massive response. Id. at 418. The well was “capped on July 15,

2010” and then “killed on September 19, 2010 ….” Id. at 420.

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assigned Judge Carl

Barbier of this District to oversee the ensuing Deepwater Horizon MDL. See

In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on

Apr. 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010). Judge Barbier presided

over a seven-week trial in 2013 to determine the oil spill’s cause. See MDL

2179, Rec. Doc. 13381-1 (Sept. 9, 2014). In advance of that trial, the causes

of and allocation of fault for the blowout were the subject of a massive

amount of discovery. During the trial, moreover, every aspect of the

Deepwater Horizon’s operations regarding the Macondo well was

scrutinized in minute detail by the United States, every State in the Gulf

Coast region, and individual plaintiffs represented by experienced lawyers.

None of these parties—supported by teams of scientists—alleged that

genetically modified microbes caused the Deepwater Horizon explosion.

Instead, they focused on much more conventional potential causes,

including “the fact that the well encountered increasingly fragile

sandstone,” “the presence of a large amount of debris in the well,” and the

nature of the “cementing.” Id. at 17, 20, 25 (¶¶ 57, 71, 93).

Following trial, Judge Barbier concluded that BP Exploration &

Production Inc. and BP America Production Co.—“but not BP p.l.c.”—were

“67%” responsible for the spill, with various Transocean and Halliburton

entities being responsible for the remainder. Id. at 152 (¶ 612). As Judge

Barbier recognized, BP p.l.c. is a “parent corporation” that played no role

regarding the Deepwater Horizon. Id. at 143 (¶¶ 572-73). Judge Barbier also

assessed the United States’ allegations under the Clean Water Act and

concluded that “BP Exploration & Production Inc.”—but, again, not BP

p.l.c.—was liable. Id. at 152 (¶ 611). Judge Barbier did not find that

genetically modified microbes played any role in the explosion or spill.11

Despite Judge Barbier’s findings about the cause of spill, Bruce sued numerous

defendants on July 3, 2017—including BP p.l.c., Sir John Sawers (a member of BP p.l.c.’s

Board of Directors), Great Britain, the American Medical Association, the University of

Tennessee, and many medical professionals—in the Eastern District of Tennessee.12 On

October 10, 2017, Bruce amended his complaint. As described by Judge Harry Mattice,

Bruce claimed that “the Deepwater Horizon incident was a deliberate attack, orchestrated

as part of an international conspiracy” that involved “the highest levels of the American

and British governments, including Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and United States

Secretary of Defense, James ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis.”13 Bruce alleged that the conspirators used

“microbes” to create “genetically modified” bacteria that could “‘mine’ metals” on the

seafloor, thus “casting off many tons of dangerous elemental toxins of heavy metals.”14

Bruce contended that as a result, he suffered from, among other ailments, “4 years of

heavy metal poisonings.” 15

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred Bruce’s claims against

BP p.l.c. to Judge Barbier as part of the Deepwater Horizon MDL. 16 Bruce’s claims

against the other defendants, however, including Sir John, continued in the Eastern

District of Tennessee. Judge Mattice dismissed Bruce’s amended complaint with

prejudice on September 25, 2018 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to

state a claim; Judge Mattice further concluded that leave to amend his complaint would

be “futile.”17 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, explaining, inter alia, that “Bruce listed numerous

12 See Am. Compl., Case No. 3:17-cv-285, Rec. Doc. 46 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2017) (“First Am. Compl.”) (Ex.

A).

13 Order, Case No. 3:17-cv-285, Rec. Doc. 129 at 1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 25, 2018) (Ex. B) (“Dismissal Order”).

14 First Am. Compl. at 2 (¶¶ 2, 4).

15 Id. at 4 (¶ 14).

sufficient facts to make out a viable claim for a violation of any law.”18 Afterwards, Bruce

petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied without calling for a response.

19

Judge Mattice and the Sixth Circuit have already considered and rejected Bruce’s

theory that genetically modified microbes caused the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and

devoured metals on the seafloor, triggering poisonous rain that eventually caused Bruce’s

alleged heavy-metal poisoning. Bruce even sued a member of BP p.l.c.’s board for

supposedly being involved in these alleged actions. The Supreme Court denied

certiorari.20

After a court has resolved an issue against a plaintiff in a final judgment (Bruce’s

petroleum-microbes/poisonous-rain theory), issue preclusion bars that plaintiff from

relitigating the same issue against different defendants. Courts may apply preclusion at

the motion-to-dismiss stage so long, as in this case, the grounds “are apparent on the face

of the pleadings.”21 Furthermore, “IFP complaints may be dismissed as frivolous … when

they seek to relitigate claims which allege substantially the same facts arising from a

common series of events which have already been unsuccessfully litigated by the IFP

plaintiff.”22

Issue preclusion has three elements: “(1) the issue … must be identical to the one

involved in the prior action; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior

18 Bruce v. Great Britain, No. 18-6149, 2020 WL 2065955, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2020).

19 Bruce v. Great Britain, No. 18-6149, 2020 WL 2065955 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.

333 (2020).

20 Id.

21 Dean v. Miss. Bd. of Bar Admissions, 394 F. App’x 172, 175 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Kan. Reinsurance Co.

the judgment in that earlier action.”23 Each element is met in this case.

First, other courts have already resolved the issue before the Court. When Bruce

was before Judge Mattice, the Sixth Circuit, and the Supreme Court, he alleged that he

suffered from heavy-metal poisoning from poisoned rain associated with genetically

modified microbes.24 In fact, Bruce’s allegations involved Sir John, whom Bruce sued as

a member of the “British Petroleum board,” and whose actions he specifically tied to BP

p.l.c.’s.25 Bruce reiterated this theory to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that “Sir John Sawers

[is] on the BP board of ‘Ethics and Environmental Assurance’ [and] surely has knowledge

of those events and the devastating heavy metal rains caused by the explosion ….”26 In

fact, Bruce outright told the Sixth Circuit that some of the defendants before that court

were joint wrongdoers with “BP plc” because of their “perpetuation [of] the same fraud

obstructing knowledge of heavy metal poisonings.”27 He also unsuccessfully invoked the

War of 1812 in that court.28 Accordingly, these other courts evaluated Bruce’s theory that

he was injured by “genetically modified microbe[s]” that could “‘mine’ metals” on the

seafloor, causing his sickness, and that a member of BP p.l.c.’s board was a joint

wrongdoer with BP as part of these terroristic actions.29 Bruce’s issue in this Court thus

overlaps with an issue he advanced previously.30 That Bruce has now elaborated on his

23 Gage, 760 F. App’x at 317 (quotation omitted).

24 See, e.g., First Am. Compl. at 2-4 (¶¶ 2-13).

25 See id at 3-4 (¶¶ 11-12).

26 Reply Br., Bruce v. Great Britain, No. 18-6149, Rec. Doc. 70 at 12 (Mar. 15, 2019) (“Bruce Sixth Circuit

Reply Br.”) (Ex. G).

27 Bruce Sixth Circuit Opening Br. at 33 (emphasis added).

28 See Bruce Sixth Circuit Reply Br. at 9-11, 13.

29 See e.g., First Am. Compl. at 2 (¶¶ 2, 4).

30 See also Am. Opening Br., Bruce v. Great Britain, Case No. 18-6149, Rec. Doc. 39 at 9 (Nov. 29, 2018)

(“Bruce Sixth Circuit Opening Br.”) (Ex. E) (“I thought rainwater safe and didn’t believe it could be heavily

contaminated Heavy Metal.”); Cert. Pet. at 2 (“In 2011 Petitioner Shane Bruce was poisoned by heavy metal

rains caused by the series of actions taken by BP plc.”); id. at 16 (“The suit is based on heavy metals

prevent repetitious litigation of what is essentially the same dispute.’”31 Bruce’s new

allegations thus cannot bar issue preclusion.32 In any event, an in forma pauperis

complaint (like Bruce’s) must be dismissed so long as there is “substantial[]” similarity

with an earlier case.33

Second, for similar reasons, the issue before this Court has actually been litigated

in these other courts. In the Eastern District of Tennessee, Bruce’s claims against Sir John

and Great Britain sprung from Bruce’s petroleum-microbes/poisonous-rain theory.

Judge Mattice dismissed his claims with prejudice. On appeal, Bruce presented the issue

again, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Bruce afterwards presented the issue once again to the

Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Where courts have dismissed a claim on the

merits, the actual-litigation element is satisfied.34

And third, the determination of the overlapping issue was part of the earlier

judgment. As the Sixth Circuit explained, “[t]he district court held that Bruce’s conclusory

allegations, lacking factual enhancement, were insufficient to plead a claim for relief.”35

On appeal, Bruce argued that he adequately alleged that “BP”—which placed “Sir John

Sawyers [sic]” on its board—“use[d] petroleum bacteria” for the “degradation of ores

inhibiting oil pumping into their elemental elements.” Bruce Sixth Circuit Reply Br. at 9,

Great Britain, 141 S. Ct. 333 (2020) (No. 19-8805) (Ex. F) (urging the Justices to review his video “Exposed:

How to make a BioChem WMD from Industrial Tech: Toxic Skies, Arsenic Rain, Virus, Bacteria”).

31 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 157 (2015) (quoting Restatement (Second) of

Judgments § 27 cmt. c, at 252-53); see also Gage, 760 F. App’x at 318 (holding that a case about the “sale

of the banned parts” also bars a “case deal[ing] with [those parts’] installation and billing”).

32 See, e.g., Barna Conshipping, S.L. v. 2,000 Metric Tons, More or Less, of Abandoned Steel, 410 F. App’x

716, 721 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Barna’s failure in the Houston proceeding to present some of the evidence it

believed supported its claim does not change the nature of the issue resolved[.]”); Perry v. Sheahan, 222

F.3d 309, 318 (7th Cir. 2000) (issue preclusion applies to any allegation that was “available at the time the

original complaint was filed”).

33 Wilson, 878 F.2d at 850 (emphasis added).

34 See, e.g., Gage, 760 F. App’x at 317-18 (“A court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss qualifies as actual

litigation because dismissal with prejudice is ‘a final judgment on the merits.’”) (quoting Brooks v.

facts to make out a viable claim for a violation of any law.”36 Because Bruce’s current

complaint rehashes the same theory, issue preclusion applies and the Fourth Amended

Complaint must be dismissed.

Alternatively, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Defendants also based their motion to dismiss on Bruce’s failure to state a cause of

action.37 As explained by the Defendants, who have done a better job than this Court is

able to do, Plaintiff in his Fourth Amended Complaint38 contends the Deepwater Horizon

oil spill was an act of “International Terrorism” apparently intended to “quell[] any

celebration of the 200th anniversary of the War of 1812.”39 Plaintiff further alleges that

someone created genetically modified petroleum microbes and injected them—at some

unknown time and through some unknown means—into a pressured oil well thousands

of feet beneath the Gulf of Mexico.

Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants’ actions caused the explosion of the

Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig and that their “misactions during the cleanup using Corexit

caused heavy metals to rain down on terrestrial habitat since an epoch event of a super-

volcano or giant meteorite collision.”40 Plaintiff alleges that he “in March 2012, unaware

of the danger, along with dozens of others, trapped rainwater while camping in the

Apalachicola National Forest during a three-day storm for drinking water, boiled or not.

Drank it, bathed in it did laundry in the trapping rain as were 90 miles from the nearest

water and is extreme campers custom.”41 The Plaintiff alleges he suffered poisoning from

the “misuse of technology by BP plc and subsequent failure to warn people of the immense

36 Bruce, 2020 WL 2065955, at *2.

37 R. Docs. 51, 54.

38 R. Doc. 41.

39 Id. at 4-5.

terrifying and life-threatening experience on the people of the United States.”42 Plaintiff

alleges he has had heavy metal poisoning and various inflammatory diseases for the last

decade. Plaintiff also alleges that he has obesity and he is afraid to lose weight because

“being obese dilutes the heavy metals by my volume and mass”43 He also alleges that his

hair contains hazardous levels of heavy metal toxins and that if “ingested in substantial

amounts might kill another.”44

Plaintiff requests relief in the form of

[O]ther, further and general relief to which he may show himself entitled as

Plaintiff in this action against the Defendants due to the Defendants

egregious improprieties in negligence, failure to warn, malicious hiding of

toxins and condition resulting from their oil well blowout and subsequent

disaster in illegal use of Corexit and resulting toxins and what could be seen

as a series of misuses of deadly technologies, in attempts to obfuscate the

amount of oil expelled, and to consider the technolory of dispersing the

heavy metal contaminant into the atmosphere, which could be used in

malice against the populations of the United States and other Nations,

either way a harm to Public Health, damaged civilian population in what

has been deemed a crime. The Petitioner asks the Courts to uphold and

maintain his rights and Constitutional Privileges in the wake of such

devastating act; also to order reparations for his loss in compensation for

bodily injury, personal injury, mental and physical suffering, and punitive

monetary findings together with any cost of this action by the Defendants.

BP also called the very "existence of GMO Petroleum Microbes that

are capable of [transformation]" impossible to which evidence citing the

British research project publishing "Genome sequence and functional

genomic analysis of the oil-degrading bacterium Oleispira antarctica"

labeled the "DWH DeepWater Horizon) Oceanospirillales".

BP Defendants have wrapped themselves in so many levels of covert

falsifications that Punitive measures and outside research must be applied,

having to cite open water refinement of metal ores (whether they claimed

those ores or not, same processes which EPA doesn't allow openly) or failing

to report threats from their own illegal actions to Public Health, or disclose

the amount and locations of those toxins from heavy metal tailings. BP

Defendants crossed the lines of actually creating a substantial Public Health

threat with astronomical damages and didn't disclose therefore susceptible

to Civil Litigation to have to pay for what is needed, and I as a Citizen can

42 Id. at paragraph 27.

contaminations.45

In his Fourth Amended Complaint, Bruce cites many federal statutes, apparently

to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, but he fails to allege a cause of action under any

of these statutes.

Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiff's claim for relief contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]”46 The Supreme

Court has explained that a claim for relief must contain sufficient factual allegations to

cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.”47 That is, although the district court

is bound to “accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint,” this is limited

by the rule that “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion

to dismiss.”48 Related to this is the rule that a district court has the inherent power to

dismiss an action that is “so patently lacking in merit as to be frivolous.”49 It is important

to keep frivolity distinct from mere improbability. “[A] well-pleaded complaint may

proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable

[.]”50 However, improbability tips into frivolity where the “allegations ... are sufficiently

fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiff's

recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.”51

The plausibility standard is met only where the facts alleged enable “the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”52

The complaint's allegations must establish “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

45 R. Doc. 41 at 28.

46 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

47 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

48 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

49 Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1983).

50 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

51 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

elements of a cause of action will not do,” and a plaintiff cannot rely on “naked assertions

devoid of further factual enhancement.”54

In this case Plaintiff’s fantastical allegations are far beyond mere improbability.

While there are no little green men or time machines in Plaintiff's complaint, it is fantastic

enough to be “halted at the starting gate by the district court.”55

Alternatively, the complaint is dismissed as frivolous.

The Court resolves de novo whether a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis has

stated a claim and has discretion whether to dismiss such a complaint as frivolous.56 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) provides for the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if the court concludes the action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.57 A complaint is frivolous when it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are “clearly

‘baseless.’”58 A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact.” A complaint that is clearly baseless is one encompassing allegations that describe

“fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” scenarios, or that “rise to the level of the irrational or

wholly incredible.”59

53 Id.

54 Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251

(11th Cir. 2013).

55 Guthrie v. U.S. Government, 618 F. App'x 612, 617 (11th Cir. 2015) (district court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing as frivolous action brought by former prisoner against thirty-five defendants,

alleging that government and others, inter alia, pressured him to plead guilty to copyright infringement,

monitored him through surveillance equipment, put bacteria in his ear causing him to become infected, and

killed his pet parrot) (unpublished but recognized as persuasive authority).

56 See Perry v. Allemand, 687 F. App’x 352, 353 (5th Cir. 2017).

57 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

the most liberal construction, Plaintiff's allegations describe irrational or wholly

incredible claims against Defendants.  Trial courts may dismiss in forma pauperis

complaints as frivolous where complaints have no "realistic chance of ultimate success,"

no arguable merit in terms of arguable substance of claim presented both in law and fact,

or where the court is satisfied "beyond doubt" that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of claim that would entitle him to relief.61 The Court is satisfied there is no

reasonable probability that the Plaintiff will be able to produce any evidence in support

of his outlandish claims. Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint is frivolous within the terms of

the statute.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Withdraw Pauper Status on January 26, 2022.62

Apparently, the Plaintiff filed his Motion to Withdraw Pauper Status as a result of his

difficulties in serving all of the Defendants and his belief these issues could be resolved if

he were not proceeding as a pauper. The Court finds that this action was initiated by

Plaintiff while he was proceeding in forma pauperis and that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

applies.

The Court finds the claims in Plaintiff's allegations rise to the level of being

irrational and wholly incredible and his claims should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

Amendment of the complaint would be futile.

Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint prior

to dismissal, but leave is not required when he has already pleaded his “best case.”63 As

60 See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

61 Green v McKaskle (1986, CA5 Tex) 788 F2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1986); Perry v. Allemand, 687 Fed. App’x 352

(5th Cir. 2017).

discussed above, Bruce has been allowed to amend his original complaint three times.

Based on the most deferential review of his complaints, it is highly unlikely that, given the

opportunity, he could allege cogent and viable legal claims. Thus, the Court concludes that

granting leave to amend under these circumstances would be futile and cause needless

delay.

CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint

filed by Defendants BP p.1.c., BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America Production

Company, Halliburton Energy Services, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., Transocean

Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.°¢ is GRANTED.

Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action and,

alternatively, because it is frivolous.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw Pauper Status

is DENIED as moot.®5

New Orleans, Louisiana, on this 18th day of March, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Docs. 51 and 54.

65 R. Doc. 36.

12

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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