The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CEDRIC OTKINS, JR. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 21-1275
SERGEANT JACK GILBOY, ET AL. SECTION: D (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Order filed by
the Plaintiff, Cedric Otkins.1 The Defendant, Jack Gilboy, and Greg Champagne, in
his official capacity as Sheriff of St. Charles Parish, oppose the Motion.2 After careful
consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the
Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s Order is not “clearly erroneous or contrary to
law” and therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court has previously discussed the general factual background of this case
at length in its Order and Reasons granting the Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and incorporates that background discussion here.3 Summarized briefly,
Plaintiff Cedric Otkins (“Otkins”) filed this civil rights action alleging that he was
unconstitutionally stopped and arrested in violation of his Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. On July 1, 2020, at around 10:40
p.m., Otkins was sitting alone in his parked car at the East Bank Bridge Park in St.
Charles Parish, Louisiana when he was approached by Officer Jack Gilboy (“Gilboy”)
1 R. Doc. 138.
2 R. Doc. 149.
3 See R. Doc. 58 at pp. 1–7.
of the St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office. Officer Gilboy claimed that he smelled
marijuana emanating from Otkins’ vehicle after Otkins exited his vehicle. Officer
Gilboy then called for backup, including a K-9 unit. The drug-sniffing dog alerted for
the presence of drugs in Otkins’ car and a subsequent search by officers with the St.
Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”) revealed twenty grams of
marijuana, including a brown hand rolled marijuana cigar, a firearm, and drug
paraphernalia including a glass smoking pipe, a grinder, and a digital scale with
green vegetable-like matter. Otkins was arrested and charged with violations of La.
R.S. 14:95 (“Illegal Carrying of a Weapon in the Presence of a Controlled Dangerous
Substance”), La. R.S. 40:1023 (“Possession or Distribution of Drug Paraphernalia”),
and La. R.S. 40:966 (“Possession with the Intent to Distribute”). Plaintiff participated
in a Pretrial Intervention Program with the District Attorney’s Office to resolve his
criminal charges.4 Plaintiff subsequently filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against
several individuals, including Officer Gilboy.
This Court granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in Support
of Qualified Immunity, finding that the Defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity on the basis that no violation of Otkins’ Fourth Amendment rights had
taken place.5 On October 31, 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit vacated this Court’s Order granting summary judgment to Defendant Jack
Gilboy, finding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on
4 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 38.
5 Id.
qualified immunity as to Gilboy.6 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the granting of summary
judgment as to all other Defendants.7
Since this case returned to the Court’s docket, the parties have had numerous
disputes regarding the proper scope of discovery.8 In the instant Motion9, Otkins
again seeks review of the Magistrate Judge’s discovery Order in this action.
Specifically, Otkins appeals the Magistrate Judge’s January 11, 2024 Order granting
in part and denying in part the Sheriff’s Office’s Motion to Quash and/or Motion for
Protective Order regarding Subpoena Duces Tecum and 30(b)(6) Deposition Notice.10
Relevant here, in that Order the Magistrate Judge found that the Sheriff’s Office did
not need to respond to Otkins’ Request No. 2 seeking additional sections of St. Charles
Parish Sheriff’s Office Policy and Guidelines Manual (the “Sherriff’s Office Manual”)
because those additional sections are not relevant to Otkins’ claims.11 Further, the
Magistrate Judge quashed Otkins’ Request No. 3 seeking the training officer daily
observation reports or any other report by Officer Roth regarding Officer Pearse’s
performance during the incident on the ground that the request was moot because
the Sheriff’s Office has confirmed that no such reports exist.12 Finally, the Magistrate
Judge quashed Topics No. 8 and 9 of the Sheriff’s Office’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition
6 R. Doc. 71.
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., R. Docs. 72, 82, 93, 100, 105, 107, 109, 114, 120, 129.
9 R. Doc. 138.
10 R. Doc. 129.
11 Id. at pp. 5–6.
12 Id. at p. 6.
regarding the Sheriff’s Office’s policies and procedures and updates thereto as
irrelevant.13
Otkins timely filed the present Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Order
on January 25, 2024, arguing that the Magistrate Judge clearly erred in quashing
the production of several different chapters of the Sheriff’s Office Manual, in
quashing the production of daily observation reports or other contemporaneous
reports of the incident that may exist, and in quashing the 30(b)(6) deposition of the
Sheriff’s Office with respect to Topics No. 8 and 9 regarding testimony on the Sheriff’s
Office’s policies and procedure.14 Otkins argues that the additional sections of the
Sherriff’s Office Manual are relevant to his claims and that the Magistrate Judge
erred in not requiring the Sheriff’s Office to turn over such materials. Otkins further
argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in not requiring the Sheriff’s Office to turn
over documents produced by Corporal Roth regarding the performance of Officer
Pearse on July 1, 2020 and asks that the Court order the Sheriff’s Office to clarify
whether “whether documentation pertaining to Officer Pearse’s performance,
authored by Corporal Roth, as the field training officer of Officer Pearse on July 1,
2020, exists.”15 Lastly, Otkins contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in not
allowing for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition regarding updates to the Sheriff’s Office’s
policies and procedures.
13 Id. at p. 10.
14 R. Doc. 138.
15 Id. at p. 15.
The Defendant, Jack Gilboy, and Greg Champagne, in his official capacity as
Sheriff of St. Charles Parish, filed a response in opposition to the Motion, arguing
that the sections of the Sheriff’s Office Manual sought by Otkins are not relevant to
Otkins’ claims and that the caselaw cited in support by Otkins pertains only to
excessive force claims, not to all search and seizure claims.16 As to Corporal Roth’s
reports regarding Officer Pearse, Gilboy and Champagne argue that any such reports
from July 1, 2020 are not relevant to Otkins’ claims because they were not present on
scene at the time that Gilboy purportedly smelled marijuana and that “there are no
reports, observations reports, or otherwise by Deputy Roth regarding Deputy Pearse’s
performance during the incident.”17 Finally, Gilboy and Champagne argue that the
Magistrate Judge did not err in quashing the 30(b)(6) testimony regarding updates
to the Sheriff’s Office procedures because any update after July 1, 2020 would be
irrelevant as to what Gilboy knew on that date.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“[A] judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any
pretrial matter pending before the court” with the exception of certain matters not
relevant here.18 Any party dissatisfied with a magistrate judge’s order on a non-
dispositive matter “may serve and file objections to the order within 14 days after
being served with a copy.”19 Local Rule 72.2 provides that objections to a magistrate
judge’s order must be made via filing a “motion to review a magistrate judge’s
16 R. Doc. 149.
17 Id. at p. 7.
18 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
order.”20 “A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter . . . where it has
been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to
law.”21
III. ANALYSIS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, a person may move to quash or
modify a subpoena if it subjects a person to an undue burden.22 The Fifth Circuit has
directed courts to consider six factors to determine whether a subpoena presents an
undue burden: “(1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party
for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period
covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the
requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.”23 “Whether a burdensome
subpoena is reasonable ‘must be determined according to the facts of the case,’ such
as the party’s need for the documents and the nature and importance of the
litigation.”24 “Further, if the person to whom the document request is made is a non-
party, the court may also consider the expense and inconvenience to the non-party.”25
Otkins’ first assignment of error concerns his request that certain sections of
the Sheriff’s Office Manual be turned over for him to review. The Magistrate Judge
reviewed the titles of the sections of the Manual sought by Otkins and concluded that
20 Local Rule 72.2.
21 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“The district judge in the case must consider
timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary
to law.”).
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv).
23 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Williams v. City of
Dallas, 178 F.R.D. 103, 109 (N.D. Tex. 1998)).
24 Id. (quoting Linder v. Dep’t of Defense, 133 F.3d 17, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1998))
25 Id. (citing Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 109).
they were irrelevant to Otkins’ claims, thereby denying Otkins’ request. The Court
finds no error in the Magistrate Judge’s Order. The Magistrate Judge correctly
identified the relevant issues in this case, whether Gilboy believed he smelled
marijuana thereby furnishing probable cause to search Otkins’ vehicle, and
appropriately concluded that the highlighted portions of the Manual did not bear on
the issues. The Court has independently reviewed the titles of the various sections
sought by Otkins, and provided by Otkins in his briefing, and agrees that they have
no relevance to the claims in this case.26
Although Otkins relies on the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Darden v. City of Fort
Worth, Texas27 for his contention that violation of police department policies is
relevant to the determination of the reasonableness an officer’s actions, the Court
notes that that case involved a claim for excessive force, not for unlawful search or
unlawful prolonging of a traffic stop.28 Depending on the facts of a case, violation of
a department policy may be relevant to whether an officer’s level of force was
excessive in light of the circumstances but does not in itself have any relevance to
whether an officer has probable cause to effect an arrest. Probable cause is an
objective standard; an officer’s subjective intent does not invalidate otherwise lawful
conduct.29 Whether or not Gilboy complied with the policies and procedures
contained in the Sheriff’s Office Manual has no bearing on whether he had probable
cause to arrest Otkins and search his vehicle. Here, whether Gilboy smelled
26 See R. Doc. 138 at p. 12 (listing the titles of the sections sought by Otkins).
27 880 F.3d 722 (5th Cir. 2018).
28 Id. at 732 n.8.
29 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
marijuana emanating from Otkins’ car does not depend on or have any relation to
any policy or procedure possibly contained in the Sheriff’s Office Manual. It was not
clearly erroneous or contrary to law to quash the subpoena request for the additional
sections of the Sheriff’s Office Manual.
Next, the Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the
Sheriff’s Office need not respond to Otkins’ request for any reports by Officer Roth
regarding Officer Pearse’s performance on July 1, 2020. The Magistrate Judge based
her finding on the Sheriff’s Office’s representation that no such reports exist and that
Otkins is in possession of all reports regarding the arrest.30 Otkins argues that the
Magistrate Judge made a factual error in concluding that the Sheriff’s Office
confirmed that no records responsive to Otkins’ request exist. The Court can discern
no error here where the Sheriff’s Office affirmed that no such daily observation
reports exist and that Otkins “is in possession of all reports regarding the arrest.”31
Contrary to Otkins’ contention, there is nothing inconsistent or “perplexing” about
these two statements. Otkins can be in possession of all relevant records from his
arrest and there can exist no reports regarding Officer Pearse’s performance.
Further, in their response in opposition to the Motion, Gilboy and Champagne state
that “there are no reports, observation reports, or otherwise by Deputy Roth
regarding Deputy Pearse’s performance during the incident.”32 To the extent that
30 R. Doc. 129 at p. 6.
31 R. Doc. 121 at p. 6.
32 R. Doc. 149 at p. 7.
Otkins seeks clarification of the Sheriffs Office’s prior representations, that request
is now moot.
Finally, the Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge’s quashing of the Rule
30(b)(6) deposition regarding the policies and procedures and any updates thereto of
the Sheriffs Office. As the Court explained above, such topics are not relevant to the
claims asserted in this matter. Moreover, whether the policies and procedures have
been updated since July 1, 2020 has no bearing on whether Gilboy violated Otkins’
Fourth Amendment rights on July 1, 2020. The Court concludes that the Magistrate
Judge’s ruling on this issue was not clearly erroneous or contrary to the law.
Finding no error, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion for Review.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Review of
Magistrate Judge’s Order?? is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, March 8, 2024.
WENDY B. (tn
United States District Judge
33 R. Doc. 138.