Otkins v. Gilboy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CEDRIC OTKINS, JR. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 21-1275

SERGEANT JACK GILBOY, ET AL. SECTION: D (1)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the

Plaintiff, Cedric Otkins.1 The Defendant, Jack Gilboy, opposes the Motion.2 The

Plaintiff filed a reply in support of his Motion.3 After careful consideration of the

parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s Motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court has previously discussed the general factual background of this case

at length in its Order and Reasons granting the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment and incorporates that background discussion here.4 Summarized briefly,

Plaintiff Cedric Otkins (“Otkins”) filed this civil rights action alleging that he was

unconstitutionally stopped and arrested in violation of his Fourth Amendment right

to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. On July 1, 2020, at around 10:40

p.m., Otkins was sitting alone in his parked car at the East Bank Bridge Park in St.

Charles Parish, Louisiana when he was approached by Officer Jack Gilboy (“Gilboy”)

1 R. Doc. 135.

2 R. Doc. 141.

3 R. Doc. 148.

4 See R. Doc. 58 at pp. 1–7.

of the St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office. Officer Gilboy claimed that he smelled

marijuana emanating from Otkins’ vehicle after Otkins exited his vehicle. Officer

Gilboy then called for backup, including a K-9 unit. The drug-sniffing dog alerted for

the presence of drugs in Otkins’ car and a subsequent search by officers with the St.

Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”) revealed twenty grams of

marijuana, including a brown hand rolled marijuana cigar, a firearm, a glass smoking

pipe, a grinder, and a digital scale with green vegetable-like matter. Otkins was

arrested and charged with violations of La. R.S. 14:95 (“Illegal Carrying of a Weapon

in the Presence of a Controlled Dangerous Substance”), La. R.S. 40:1023 (“Possession

or Distribution of Drug Paraphernalia”), and La. R.S. 40:966 (“Possession with the

Intent to Distribute”). Plaintiff participated in a Pretrial Intervention Program with

the District Attorney’s Office to resolve his criminal charges.5 Plaintiff subsequently

filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against several individuals, including Officer Gilboy.

This Court granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in Support

of Qualified Immunity, finding that the Defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity on the basis that no violation of Otkins’ Fourth Amendment rights had

taken place.6 On October 31, 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit vacated this Court’s Order granting summary judgment to Defendant Jack

Gilboy, finding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on

qualified immunity as to Gilboy.7 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the granting of summary

5 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 38.

6 Id.

7 R. Doc. 71.

judgment as to all other Defendants.8

In the instant Motion, Plaintiff requests that this Court deny the Defendant’s

qualified immunity defense on the grounds that the original text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

does not allow for such defense.9 Plaintiff argues that the original version of Section

1983 enacted by the Reconstruction-era Congress in 1871 contained

language unequivocally rejecting common law immunity doctrines but that that

language was inexplicably omitted from the text of Section 1983 upon the first

compilation of the United States Code in 1874. Plaintiff therefore contends that the

Supreme Court has erred in developing the qualified immunity doctrine as no such

immunity exists under the original statute passed by Congress. Accordingly,

Plaintiff asks the Court to preclude the Defendant from raising a qualified

immunity defense in this case.

The Defendant filed a response in opposition to the Motion, first arguing that

the Plaintiff’s Motion should be barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion as the

Plaintiff never raised such issues prior to the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in this matter,

and then arguing that the Supreme Court has rejected the view that Section 1983

displaces common-law principles such as immunity doctrines. 10 The Defendant

points out that time and again the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the existence of the

qualified immunity doctrine in Section 1983 cases. Accordingly, the Defendant asks

8 Id.

9 R. Doc. 135.

10 R. Doc. 141.

the Court to follow binding Supreme Court precedent and to deny the Plaintiff’s

Motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”11 A dispute is “genuine” if it is

“real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.”12 Further,

a fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law.”13 When assessing whether a genuine dispute regarding any material fact

exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from

making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”14 While all reasonable

inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, a party cannot defeat

summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or “only

a scintilla of evidence.”15 Instead, summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable

jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.16

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden

of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

12 Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilkinson v. Powell,

149 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1945)).

13 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.

14 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citations omitted).

15 Id. (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

16 Id. at 399 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248).

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”17 The

non-moving party can then defeat summary judgment by either submitting evidence

sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact or by

“showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the

reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”18 If, however,

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue,

the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in

the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s claim.19 The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond

the pleadings and, “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’”20

III. ANALYSIS

It is central to our entire federal judicial system that federal district courts

must faithfully apply binding circuit court and Supreme Court precedents. Here,

Plaintiff asks this Court to ignore decades of binding Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court

caselaw and to unilaterally amend 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to include language that

Congress has not seen fit––in nearly 150 years––to add. This Court cannot ignore

the firmly established law of the land in favor of amicus briefs, scholarly articles, and

17 International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264–65 (5th Cir. 1991).

18 Id. at 1265.

19 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

20 Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

concurring and dissenting opinions.?! After all, “[c]omments in a dissenting opinion’

about legal principles and precedents ‘are just that: comments in a dissenting

opinion.”22 The veracity and strength of Plaintiffs historical arguments are of no

import; federal district courts cannot disregard binding decisions of the appellate

courts and of the Supreme Court.22 The Court finds no reason to wade into the

various legal and historical arguments raised by the parties as the law is clear cut.

As Plaintiff recognizes, the qualified immunity doctrine is available as a matter of

law to the Defendant under the currently prevailing interpretation of Section 1983.24

Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Partial Motion for Summary

Judgment is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, March 7, 2024.

WENDY B. five

United States District Judge

21 See, e.g., Villarreal v. City of Laredo, Texas, No. 20-40359, —F.4th—, 2024 WL 244359, at *22-24

(5th Cir. Jan. 23, 2024) (Willett, J., dissenting); Rogers v. Jarrett, 63 F.4th 971, 979-81 (5th Cir. 2028)

(Willett, J., concurring).

22 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 8. Ct. 1498 (2020) (quoting Railroad Retirement Bd. v.

Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177, n. 10 (1980)) (cleaned up).

23 Cf. Consumers’ Rsch. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 91 F.4Ath 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2024) (“As

middle-management circuit judges, we must follow binding precedent, even if that precedent strikes

us as out of step with prevailing Supreme Court sentiment.”).

24 The Fifth Circuit implicitly affirmed the viability of the qualified immunity defense just last week

when it denied rehearing en banc a panel decision affirming a district court’s granting of qualified

immunity to a police officer. See Argueta v. Jaradi, No. 22-40781, —F.4th—, 2024 WL 853318 (5th

Cir. Feb. 29, 2024).

25 R. Doc. 135.