Clark v. Wallace

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TORRIANA CLARK CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 23-6293

LANCE WALLACE ET AL. SECTION I

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a motion1 for summary judgment filed by defendants

Sergeant Lance Wallace (“Wallace”), Warden Travis Day, and the State of Louisiana

though the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (collectively, “defendants”).

Plaintiff Torriana Clark (“Clark”)2 opposes the motion.3 Defendants filed a reply.4 For

the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment in

part and denies it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Procedural History

Clark is a Louisiana state prisoner presently incarcerated at the Rayburn

Correctional Center (“RCC”) in Washington Parish, Louisiana.5 Clark initially filed

the instant lawsuit in state court on September 5, 2023.6 Clark’s petition asserts a

federal § 1983 claim and various state-law tort claims against defendants arising

1 R. Doc. No. 18.

2 The Court notes that Clark’s first name is spelled “Torriana” on the complaint, but

“Torriano” on subsequent filings, including certain exhibits and portions of Clark’s

opposition.

3 R. Doc. No. 20.

4 R. Doc. No. 21.

5 R. Doc. No. 2-1 (state-court petition), ¶ 3.

6 See generally id.

from a July 29, 2021 incident at RCC.7 On October 18, 2023, defendants removed the

action to this Court, invoking federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).8

During a telephone status conference held on January 23, 2024, counsel for

defendants indicated that he believed Clark’s claims were barred pursuant to Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).9 The Court ordered Clark’s counsel to advise the

Court whether she agreed that Clark’s claims were Heck-barred after reviewing

information related to Clark’s prison disciplinary hearing and consulting with

Clark.10 Clark subsequently filed a motion for a briefing schedule and a stay during

adjudication.11 In that motion, Clark requested a briefing schedule on the

applicability of Heck and also suggested that any forthcoming motion from

defendants on relevant qualified immunity issues “should be heard as a preliminary

matter.”12 The Court held a second telephone conference, this time on the issues

raised in Clark’s motion.13 During the conference, the Court granted Clark’s motion

to the extent it sought a briefing schedule on the applicability of Heck, but denied the

motion in all other respects.14

7 Id. ¶¶ 30–38; 4–5.

8 R. Doc. No. 2, ¶¶ 2–3.

9 See R. Doc. No. 15.

10 Id. at 1.

11 R. Doc. No. 16.

12 Id. at 1.

13 R. Doc. No. 17.

14 Id. at 1. In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Clark objects to “the

lack of immediate briefing on the issue of qualified immunity[.]” R. Doc. No. 20, at 2.

Clark also suggests that, on page 9 of defendants’ motion, “[d]efendants agree that

[Heck] is not jurisdictional and infer [sic] that this Court erred in failing to order

b. Clark’s Petition

Clark’s petition alleges that Clark was “working in the Sleet Yard when he

began to feel very badly and became weak and reported . . . that he needed to see a

briefing on qualified immunity.” Id. at 1 n.1. The Court finds nothing in defendants’

memorandum suggesting that defendants believe the Court erred in declining to

order briefing on qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation. The cases Clark

relies on to support his position that this Court erred in declining to order immediate

briefing on qualified immunity are inapposite. See id. at 22. In Ramirez v.

Guadarrama, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained the well-

settled principle that “a denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable and

that a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity should be determined at the

earliest possible stage of the litigation.” 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021). However,

Ramirez does not mandate that qualified immunity issues be considered before Heck

issues; indeed, it does not even mention Heck. See generally id. In Armstrong v.

Ashley, the Fifth Circuit again explained that “[a] decision on qualified immunity can

be an appealable final decision.” 918 F.3d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2019). However, the

Armstrong court ultimately dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction

because the district court’s denial of defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based

on qualified immunity was made on procedural grounds rather than legal grounds

and “nothing in the district court’s order bar[red] [the defendants] from asserting

qualified immunity by appropriate, timely procedural vehicle in the future.” Id. at

423. In the instant case, as in Armstrong, nothing in the record prevents defendants

from asserting qualified immunity by an appropriate, timely procedural vehicle in

the future. In Autin v. Goings, the Fifth Circuit explained that the district court had

declined to rule on qualified immunity when it was obligated to do so because the

district court had denied a motion for summary judgment based on Heck and refused

to consider qualified immunity as an alternative bar. No. 21-30678, 2023 WL

3004142, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 19, 2023). The Fifth Circuit held that the district court

had abused its discretion by holding that Autin’s claims were not Heck-barred, but

stated: “because Heck plainly requires dismissal of Autin’s claims, we need not reach

the question of qualified immunity.” Id. at *4. This case actually supports the Court’s

view that, if it finds Clark’s claims to be Heck-barred, it need not reach the issue of

qualified immunity. See also, e.g., Connors v. Graves, 538 F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2008)

(affirming district court’s dismissal, which was based on qualified immunity, but

determining that Heck barred the complaint such that the court did not need to

address the issue of qualified immunity); McNeal v. LeBlanc, 90 F.4th 425, 430–31

(5th Cir. 2024) (addressing Heck before qualified immunity).

doctor.”15 An officer told Clark to wait until the officer was “freed up [from] his

duties.”16 Clark tried to eat and drink “but felt even worse as though he was unsteady

on his feet. He tried to approach his bunk to lie down and he developed a sever[e]

headache.”17 Later, when an officer was making rounds, Clark “got out of his bed to

seek help, but fell due to weakness, nausea, and dizziness.”18 He again informed the

officer that he needed to see a doctor.19

According to the petition, Clark then “tried to sit down on a bed and [the]

[o]fficer grabbed him and forced him against the wall.”20 Clark was handcuffed, and

he “tried to explain that he was sick, weak[,] and could not walk.”21 Other officers

then arrived to assist with escorting Clark out of the dormitory.22 One of those officers

allegedly “threw him on a bed.”23 “At that point, [ ] Wallace [ ] started twisting his

ankle. [ ] Wallace began choking [Clark] who was in full restraints, had an injured

ankle[,] and who was unable to defend himself.”24 Clark claims that he “blacked out

15 R. Doc. No. 2-1, ¶ 8. The Court notes that Clark’s Administrative Remedy Procedure

claim states that, while outside, Clark picked up what he thought was a cigarette and

“smoked the rest of it.” R. Doc. No. 18-4, at 14. Clark asserts that this was not the

same cigarette he had been smoking earlier, and he began to feel lightheaded soon

after smoking it. Id.

16 R. Doc. No. 2-1, ¶ 8.

17 Id. ¶ 9.

18 Id. ¶ 10.

19 Id.

20 Id. ¶ 11.

21 Id.

22 Id. ¶ 12.

23 Id.

24 Id.

briefly due to being choked” and was dragged out of the dormitory.25 Wallace allegedly

pushed him, saying, “Walk faster, before I make you walk!”26

The petition asserts that, because Clark was having difficulty walking due to

his illness and ankle pain, Wallace forced him to the ground.27 When Clark regained

consciousness, “there was blood on the ground and he could feel blood running down

his face, which felt numb[.]”28 Clark was “not able to breathe from his nose.”29 Clark

then “started crying and [ ] asking why,” but Wallace grabbed his arm and began

jerking him up while using profanity to instruct Clark to “walk” before Wallace “[did]

it again[.]”30 Clark was taken to the hospital that day.31 He received four to five

stitches in his forehead and it was determined that his ankle and nose were injured.32

The petition alleges that, although Wallace “has a history of using excessive

force on RCC inmates with multiple complaints being filed on him[,] nothing has been

done to discipline him” because “he is protected and not held responsible for his

actions due to family connections.”33 The petition further alleges that “rampant

nepotism and cronyism at RCC prevent any real order and discipline of the officers”

and that the warden and Department of Corrections are “well aware” of this.34 The

25 Id. ¶ 13.

26 Id.

27 Id. ¶¶ 14–15.

28 Id. ¶ 15.

29 Id.

30 Id. ¶ 16.

31 Id. ¶ 18.

32 Id. ¶ 20.

33 Id. ¶¶ 17, 26.

34 Id. ¶ 19.

petition also asserts that “Medical frequently fails to document and/or treat injuries

to inmates caused by guards[.]”35 Additionally, according to the petition, the warden,

Travis Day, “was negligent in his supervision and training of [ ] Wallace and the other

correctional officers and instilled and allowed an atmosphere of violence between

guards and inmates[,]” including by ignoring reports of assaults.36

Based on these allegations, Clark asserts a § 1983 claim and several state-law

tort claims against defendants, including battery, negligence, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress.37

c. Clark’s Disciplinary Hearing and Defendants’ Versions of the July

29, 2021 Incident

Three disciplinary reports arose from this incident.38 The first is a disciplinary

report signed by Wallace.39 Wallace describes the July 29, 2021 incident from his

perspective, including his use of force.40 Wallace asserts that he responded to a beeper

activation and observed Clark “being combative [and] refusing to be restrained.”41

According to Wallace, he “began giving multiple orders to stop resisting.”42 Clark was

then “directed to a [nearby] bed due to his resistance and combative behavior.”43 At

35 Id. ¶ 22.

36 Id. ¶ 24.

37 Id. ¶¶ 30–37.

38 The Court notes that it may consider the disciplinary reports because they were

submitted “to demonstrate that the disciplinary board found [Clark] guilty of various

offenses, not to prove the truth of the matter, that is, that he actually had committed

the offenses.” Santos v. White, 18 F.4th 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2021).

39 R. Doc. No. 18-3, at 2–4.

40 Id. at 2.

41 Id.

42 Id.

43 Id.

this point, Wallace states that he “placed [his] right hand on [Clark’s] right shoulder

applying downward pressure while giving multiple orders to stop resisting.”44 While

applying this downward pressure, Wallace “observed [Clark] start kicking his legs.”45

“[T]o prevent [Clark] from harming himself and assaulting staff, [Wallace

states that he] stopped applying downward pressure to [Clark’s] right shoulder and

redirected [his] positioning to [Clark’s] legs while giving multiple orders to stop

resisting and kicking which [Clark] refused.”46 Because Clark was “continuing to

kick,” Wallace “took control of his right ankle[,] applying an ankle lock while giving

orders to stop kicking and resisting.”47 Wallace asserts that Clark then “reluctantly

began to comply with orders to stop resisting” and that “pressure was released on [ ]

Clark’s ankle.”48

According to the report, “Act/Major” Darren Ball (“Ball”) advised the officers

that Clark should be escorted out of the dormitory.49 Wallace “then released [ ] Clark’s

ankle” and “Clark was then assisted to his feet.”50 Once Clark was helped to his feet,

“he began jumping up and down while twisting his body being combative.”51 Wallace

asserts that Clark “was given multiple orders to stop resisting[,]” but he refused.52

Wallace states that he “took control of [ ] Clark’s upper torso[,] directing him to a

44 Id.

45 Id.

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 Id.

49 Id.

50 Id.

51 Id.

52 Id.

nearby bed” and that “Clark was then directed to the floor.”53 “Once on the floor, [ ]

Clark continued his combative behavior and resistance.”54 According to Wallace, he

“took control of [ ] Clark’s upper torso applying downward pressure while giving

multiple orders to stop resisting.”55 “Moments later, [ ] Clark reluctantly began to

comply with orders to stop resisting” and “was assisted to his feet.”56

The report states that Wallace and Ball placed Clark in “an off-balance escort

position to escort him out of the dormitory while giving multiple orders to walk to no

avail.”57 Upon entering the television room, Wallace asserts that “Clark was assisted

to the floor to reestablish the escort position.”58 Clark stated that he would walk.59

“Clark was then assisted to his feet and hands on escorted out of the dormitory. Once

out of the dormitory, [ ] Clark stopped walking and began hollering, ‘Time for [y’all]

to feel my pain I go through[.]’”60 According to Wallace, Clark was ordered to walk “to

no avail.”61 Ball and Wallace then “directed Clark to the ground while giving multiple

orders to stop resisting.”62 “Once on the floor, [ ] Clark reluctantly began to comply

with orders” and “stated that he would walk.”63 Wallace states that “Clark was then

53 Id.

54 Id.

55 Id.

56 Id.

57 Id.

58 Id.

59 Id.

60 Id.

61 Id.

62 Id.

63 Id.

assisted to his feet and hands on escorted to the infirmary [without] any further

incident. All use of force ceased.”64

This first disciplinary report does not clearly indicate whether Clark pleaded

guilty to the violations of Rule 3 (defiance) and Rule 5 (aggravated disobedience)

described in the report or whether he was found guilty.65 However, the disciplinary

board sentenced Clark to a 30-day disciplinary transfer for the Rule 3 violation and

a 60-day disciplinary transfer for the Rule 5 violation.66

The second disciplinary report is signed by Lieutenant Brian Nichols

(“Nichols”).67 Like Wallace, Nichols describes the July 29, 2021 incident from his

perspective.68 Specifically, Nichols asserts that he responded to a beeper activation

and observed Clark being combative with Cadet Christopher Kimball (“Kimball”).69

Nichols states that he gave “loud, direct orders to stop resisting . . . to no avail.”70 He

then applied handcuffs to Clark and “attempted to escort [him] out of the dorm when

he continued to resist by [tensing] up his upper torso.”71 Nichols directed Clark to the

bed and “continued to give orders to stop resisting.”72 “Shortly afterwards[,] [ ] Clark

began to comply with orders and [Nichols] released [ ] Clark’s upper torso. At this

64 Id.

65 Id. (showing that numbers 18—“plea by offender”—and 19—“rule/verdict”—were

left blank).

66 Id. at 3.

67 Id. at 5–6.

68 Id. at 5.

69 Id.

70 Id.

71 Id.

72 Id.

point, all use of force ceased.”73 This disciplinary report indicates that Clark pleaded

guilty to violations of Rule 3 (defiance) and Rule 5 (aggravated disobedience).74

Clark’s sentence was a loss of 60 days of good time credit for each violation.75 The

disciplinary board also imposed $24.00 in restitution for exams following the use of

force.76

The third disciplinary report is signed by Ball and it indicates that Clark

pleaded guilty to a violation of Rule 14 (intoxication).77 The parties appear to agree

that this disciplinary report is not relevant to the Heck analysis that follows.78

d. Video Recordings of the July 29, 2021 Incident

Defendants submitted three video recordings in support of their motion for

summary judgment.79 The first video is from a camera in the prison dormitory.80

Kimball enters the room and stops to talk to Clark, the man sitting next to him, or

possibly both of them.81 Kimball then leaves the men and continues walking through

the dormitory.82 As Kimball approaches the camera, Clark stands up, raises his

73 Id.

74 Id.

75 Id.

76 Id.

77 Id. at 7–8.

78 See R. Doc. No. 20, at 4 (stating that the disciplinary report for intoxication “has no

relevance”); see generally R. Doc. No. 18-2 (arguing that Clark’s claims are Heck-

barred based on the Nichols report for which Clark lost good-time credit, not based

on the report concerning Clark’s intoxication).

79 See R. Doc. No. 18-5 (notice of manual attachment); R. Doc. No. 19 (notice that

manual attachment is located in the Clerk’s Office).

80 See generally Manual Attachment No. 1.

81 Id. at 0:08–0:32.

82 Id. at 0:32–1:01.

hands to his head, and walks over toward Kimball while jumping up and down.83

Clark falls to the ground and then stands up again.84 He walks closer to Kimball,

moving his arms.85 When he arrives at the walkway between the rows of beds where

Kimball is standing, he approaches Kimball, then takes a step back, places his hands

behind his back, and speaks to Kimball.86 Clark takes a few steps toward Kimball,

places his back against a bunk bed, and begins jumping up and down again.87

Kimball reaches for Clark’s left arm, but Clark pulls away and falls against

another bunk bed.88 At this point, Kimball physically guides Clark between two bunk

beds and toward the wall.89 Clark appears to be resisting and pulling away from

Kimball.90 Another man who had been sitting on one of the adjacent bunk beds stands

up and moves away.91 A second officer enters the room.92 She rushes over to Clark

and Kimball and helps Kimball push Clark against the wall.93 A third officer, Nichols,

enters and moves quickly toward the two guards and Clark.94 The three officers

83 Id. at 1:00–1:07.

84 Id. at 1:07–1:15.

85 Id. at 1:15–1:20.

86 Id. at 1:20–1:30.

87 Id. at 1:30–1:36.

88 Id. at 1:36–1:42.

89 Id. at 1:42–2:07.

90 Id.

91 Id. at 1:48–1:52.

92 Id. at 2:07.

93 Id. at 2:07–2:14.

94 Id. at 2:13–2:21.

attempt to handcuff Clark, and there appears to be a struggle.95 A fourth and fifth

officer arrive.96 The fifth officer, Wallace, helps the other officers handcuff Clark.97

Once Clark is handcuffed, the officers move him away from the space between

the two bunk beds and force him onto a different bed.98 Nichols appears to place his

knee on Clark’s back.99 Wallace is standing on the other side of the bed, near Clark’s

head.100 Clark kicks his legs.101 Wallace walks around the bed to position himself

closer to Clark’s feet.102 Wallace grabs Clark’s foot and lifts it up.103 The man

previously lying on the adjacent bed stands up and moves away.104 Nichols still seems

to be kneeling on Clark’s back, and another officer standing to the left of Nichols and

Wallace is pressing down on Clark.105

Wallace twists Clark’s leg and presses it down toward the ground.106 Wallace

then sits on the adjacent bed, still holding one of Clark’s legs.107 The video also shows

Kimball holding Clark’s other foot.108 Another officer enters and appears to say

95 Id. at 2:21–2:38.

96 Id. at 2:24–2:42.

97 Id. at 2:40–2:52.

98 Id. at 2:50–2:57.

99 Id. at 2:59–3:58.

100 Id.

101 Id. at 2:57–3:10.

102 Id. at 3:10–3:14.

103 Id. at 3:12–3:16.

104 Id. at 3:13–3:26.

105 Id. at 3:12–3:23.

106 Id. at 3:13–3:34.

107 Id. at 3:34–3:47.

108 Id. at 3:25–4:05.

something to the group.109 The video shows Wallace leaning forward.110 Since his

back is to the camera, it is not entirely clear what he is doing when he leans forward,

but he may be applying additional pressure to Clark’s leg.111 The guard who most

recently entered walks around the bed toward Clark’s head.112 Shortly after this

guard arrives, Nichols stops applying pressure and stands.113 A few seconds later,

Wallace drops Clark’s leg and Wallace stands.114 Several officers help Clark stand.115

As soon as he is standing, Clark jumps, which seems to cause him and several officers

to fall backward onto the adjacent bed.116 When they fall onto the bed, the video shows

Wallace’s arm around Clark’s neck, with Clark on top of Wallace kicking his legs.117

The other officers rush toward the bed and pull Clark off the bed and onto the floor.118

A group of officers huddles around Clark, with some officers kneeling and others

standing.119 Wallace appears to be on top of Clark and near his head applying

pressure.120 Two other officers arrive with leg shackles.121 Once the leg shackles are

109 Id. at 3:40–3:49.

110 Id. at 3:38–4:03.

111 See id.

112 Id. at 3:45–3:57.

113 Id. at 3:58.

114 Id. at 4:01–4:03.

115 Id. at 4:03–4:05.

116 Id. at 4:04–4:09.

117 Id. at 4:06–4:10.

118 Id. at 4:07–4:21.

119 Id. at 4:21–5:07.

120 Id. at 4:18–5:05.

121 Id. at 5:06–5:13.

applied, the officers again attempt to bring Clark to his feet.122 The officers pull Clark

out of the dormitory with his feet dragging on the ground.123

The second video shows the television room outside the dormitory area.124 The

officers and Clark enter the room and stop near the entrance.125 The officers are still

dragging Clark.126 The officers then appear to place Clark on the floor and reposition

themselves.127 Several of the men sitting in the television room stand and watch.128

The officers and Clark then walk across the room toward the exit, with Clark walking

rather than being dragged by the officers.129

The third video shows officers escorting Clark to the infirmary.130 Clark is still

walking in this video.131

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the materials in the

record, a court determines that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[A] party

seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record]

122 Id. at 5:13–6:26.

123 Id. at 6:26–6:40.

124 See generally Manual Attachment No. 2.

125 Id. at 0:43–1:02.

126 Id. at 0:43–0:47.

127 Id. at 0:47–1:02.

128 Id. at 0:57.

129 Id. at 1:02–1:18.

130 Manual Attachment No. 3, at 0:21–0:36.

131 Id.

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment need

not produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact; it need only point out

the absence of evidence supporting the other party’s case. Id.; see also Fontenot v.

Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195–96 (5th Cir. 1986) (“There is no sound reason why

conclusory allegations should suffice to require a trial when there is no evidence to

support them even if the movant lacks contrary evidence.”).

Once the party seeking summary judgment carries that burden, the

nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a

genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine issue is not satisfied by

creating “‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory

allegations,’ by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Little

v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Rather, a

genuine issue of material fact exists when the “evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

If the movant’s story is “blatantly contradicted by the record”—including a

videotape—such that “no reasonable jury could believe it,” the court should “view[]

the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–

81 (2007). If the nonmovant fails to meet its burden of showing a genuine issue for

trial that could support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment

must be granted. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075–76.

The party responding to the motion for summary judgment may not rest upon

the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party’s evidence, however, “is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmoving party’s]

favor.” Id. at 255.

III. ANALYSIS

As noted, defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment

because Clark’s federal § 1983 claim and his state-law claims are Heck-barred. Clark

disagrees. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Clark’s § 1983 claim

is Heck-barred. The Court also declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Clark’s state-law claims.

a. The Heck Standard

In Heck, a state prisoner convicted of voluntary manslaughter filed a federal

civil lawsuit against prosecutors and a police investigator pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. 512 U.S. at 478–79. The complaint alleged that the defendants had engaged

in an unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation leading to the plaintiff’s

arrest, knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence, and caused an illegal voice

identification procedure to be used at the plaintiff’s trial. Id. at 479. Citing the

“principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the

validity of outstanding criminal judgments[,]” the U.S. Supreme Court held that,

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Id. at 486–87.

The Supreme Court further explained that “when a state prisoner seeks

damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence[.]” Id. at 487. If so, “the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff

can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id.

Heck also prohibits § 1983 lawsuits if success on the § 1983 claim would necessarily

imply that a prior disciplinary proceeding resulting in a change to the prisoner’s

sentence—including the loss of good time credits—is invalid. Aucoin v. Cupil, 958

F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2020).

The Heck doctrine is motivated by the principle that courts “do not allow the

use of § 1983 to collaterally attack a prior criminal proceeding [or disciplinary

proceeding resulting in the loss of good time credits], out of concern for finality and

consistency.” Id. at 380–81. Specifically, “courts are wary of duplicative litigation and

the potential for conflicting judgments.” Id. at 382. “[I]f an individual objects to the

results of a prior proceeding, the proper avenue for relief is an authorized appeal in

that proceeding—not an end-run through § 1983.” Id.

Accordingly, a prisoner “cannot bring a § 1983 claim for excessive use of force

by a prison guard, if the inmate has already been found guilty for misconduct that

justified that use of force.” Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 381. “But Heck does not bar a § 1983

claim for a prison guard’s excessive use of force after the inmate has submitted and

ceased engaging in the alleged misconduct.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Determining “whether an individual claim is barred by Heck is . . . ‘analytical

and fact-intensive.’” Gray v. White, 18 F.4th 463, 468 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Bush v.

Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008)). “A court may bar only those claims whose

success ‘require[] negation of an element of the criminal offense or proof of a fact that

is inherently inconsistent with one underlying the criminal conviction.’” Id. (quoting

Bush, 513 F.3d at 497). One hallmark of a non-Heck-barred claim is “if the factual

basis for the conviction is temporally and conceptually distinct” from the civil claim.

Bush, 513 F.3d at 498.

But the Heck bar extends further: even where the plaintiff’s “factual

allegations supporting the claim are necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the

conviction,” Heck still bars the claim. Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 383 (citing Bush, 513 F.3d

at 497; DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656–57 (5th Cir. 2007)). That

is true regardless of a civil claim’s “theoretical compatibility” with the conviction.

Daigre v. City of Waveland, 549 F. App’x 283, 286 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bush, 513

F.3d at 498 n.14); see also Thomas v. Pohlmann, 681 F. App’x 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2017)

(citing with approval Daigre and DeLeon).

To lift a Heck bar, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the proceedings

terminated in his favor. See Hoog-Watson v. Guadalupe Cnty., 591 F.3d 431, 435 (5th

Cir. 2009). Absent such a showing, a Heck-barred claim should be “dismissed with

prejudice to [its] being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.” DeLeon, 488

F.3d at 657 (quoting Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996)).

b. Federal Claims

Defendants argue that Clark’s § 1983 claim is Heck-barred because that claim

requires Clark to assert facts contrary to those underlying his convictions for the Rule

5 and Rule 14 violations.132 Defendants note that Clark’s claim “is not that the officers

used excessive force after he stopped resisting or to stop his resistance; instead his

claim is based on assertions that he was ill and was only trying to seek help from the

officer on duty, while several other officers, including [ ] Wallace, suddenly began

using excessive force without provocation.”133 Defendants further contend that the

Nichols report “squarely supports [Clark’s] conviction[s] [for defiance and aggravated

disobedience] in that [Clark] disobeyed direct orders and offered resistance to officers

attempting to gain compliance.”134 Additionally, defendants argue that “the video

footage plainly shows that [Clark’s] claims arise out of one continuous incident. There

are no allegations in [Clark’s] civil claim that are temporally and/or conceptually

distinct from the factual basis upon which his convictions were based.”135

Clark responds that the Nichols report and Wallace reports must be considered

separately.136 Since Clark only lost good time credit for the conduct described in the

Nichols report, he asserts that Heck does not apply to conduct not covered by that

132 R. Doc. No. 18-2, at 10–15.

133 Id. at 10.

134 Id. at 12.

135 Id.

136 R. Doc. No. 20, at 2.

report, conduct that occurred after the conduct for which Clark lost good time, and

conduct that occurred while Clark was no longer resisting.137 According to Clark, the

Nichols report ends when Nichols released Clark and Clark was no longer

resisting.138 Clark therefore argues that “the conduct for which Clark lost good time

is limited to the struggle at the wall during hand-cuffing, a short struggle on the bed”

because “there are no disciplinary charges by Nichols for any conduct that took place

after Nichols released Clark, which is clearly visible on the video, or conduct by

Wallace in nearly breaking Clark’s leg.”139

Clark correctly asserts that the fact that these two reports are “intertwined” is

insufficient to support a holding that conduct not described by the Nichols report is

Heck-barred.140 See Gray, 18 F.4th at 468 (explaining that the Heck inquiry is not

simply whether claims of excessive force are “intertwined” with the findings of the

disciplinary board revoking his good time credits, but rather whether the plaintiff’s

claims are “strictly incompatible with the findings of the disciplinary board” that

resulted in the loss of good time credits); Santos, 18 F.4th at 476–77 (“It is not

sufficient to deem [the plaintiff’s] claims to be ‘intertwined’ with his loss of good-time

credits. Rather, in applying Heck, a court must bar only those claims that are

‘necessarily at odds with’ the disciplinary rulings, and only with those rulings that

resulted in the loss of good time credits.”).

137 Id.

138 Id. at 6.

139 Id.

140 Id. at 2–3.

Additionally, as explained, “there is no Heck bar if the alleged violation occurs

‘after’ the cessation of the plaintiff’s misconduct that gave rise to his prior conviction.”

Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 382. The Nichols report states that “all use of force ceased” when

Clark began to comply with the officers’ instructions and Nichols released Clark’s

upper torso.141 Accordingly, Clark argues that his allegations regarding Wallace’s use

of force through a chokehold and pushing him to the ground are not strictly

inconsistent with the Nichols report for which Clark lost good time credit.142

However, as defendants point out,143 they are not arguing that Clark’s claims

are “intertwined” with his loss of good time credits. As explained, defendants note

that Clark’s claim “is not that the officers used excessive force after he stopped

resisting or to stop his resistance; instead his claim is based on assertions that he

was ill and only trying to seek help from the officer on duty when several other

officers, including [ ] Wallace, suddenly began using excessive force without

provocation.”144 Indeed, Clark’s petition alleges that he “began to feel very badly” and

that he was only asking an officer to see a doctor when that officer “grabbed him and

forced him against the wall.”145 Clark also alleges that other officers arrived to assist

in escorting Clark out of the dormitory, that one of those officers “threw him on a bed”

and that Wallace twisted his ankle, choked him, pushed him, forced him to the ground

141 R. Doc. No. 18-3, at 5.

142 R. Doc. No. 20, at 4–8.

143 R. Doc. No. 21, at 4–5.

144 R. Doc. No. 18-2, at 10.

145 R. Doc. No. 2-1, ¶¶ 8–11.

because Clark was having difficulty walking due to his illness and pain, and grabbed

his arm to jerk him up while using profanity.146

These allegations are inconsistent with the Nichols report, which states that

Clark was being combative with Kimball, disregarded “loud, direct orders to stop

resisting[,]” and continued to resist after he was handcuffed.147 This prompted

Nichols to direct Clark to the bed while giving additional orders to stop resisting.148

The Nichols report also states: “Shortly afterwards, [] Clark began to comply with

orders and [Nichols] released [] Clark’s upper torso. At this point, all use of force

ceased. All [o]fficers were examined by [a nurse] with no injuries to note.”149

As noted, the Nichols report indicates that Clark pleaded guilty to violations

of Rule 3 (defiance) and Rule 5 (aggravated disobedience), for which he lost good time

credit.150 Defiance is “obstruct[ing], resist[ing], distract[ing], or attempt[ing] to elude

staff in the performance of their duties.”151 Aggravated disobedience is failing to “obey

direct verbal orders cooperatively and promptly” and “debat[ing], argu[ing] or

ignor[ing] orders before obeying.”152

Like the plaintiff in Aucoin, Clark “has insisted . . . that he is wholly blameless

for the use of force against him.” Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 383. “If the factual account of

[Clark’s] complaint is taken as true, then he cannot be guilty of defiance [or]

146 Id. ¶¶ 12–16.

147 R. Doc. No. 18-3, at 5.

148 Id.

149 Id.

150 Id.

151 R. Doc. No. 18-6, at 22.

152 Id.

aggravated disobedience.” Id. “[W]hen a plaintiff’s claim ‘is based solely on his

assertions that he . . . did nothing wrong, and was attacked by the [ ] officers for no

reason,’ that suit ‘squarely challenges the factual determination that underlies his

conviction’ and is necessarily at odds with the conviction.” Id. (quoting Walker v.

Munsell, 281 F. App’x 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)); see also McIntosh v.

Goings, No. 21-1719, 2022 WL 1091278, at *6–8 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 2022) (Africk, J.) ,

(granting motion for summary judgment pursuant to Heck where the plaintiff’s

complaint turned on a single narrative inconsistent with the disciplinary board’s

determination that he was attacked without provocation).

The Fifth Circuit has previously explained that, where an excessive force claim

“is presented as a single violent encounter throughout which [a defendant] used

excessive force” and where the plaintiff asserts that he is innocent, contradicting an

element of his previous conviction, the plaintiff’s excessive force claim is Heck-barred.

DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 656–657. This is so even if the plaintiff argues that “his

conviction would not be invalidated by his proving that excessive force was used well

after the need for it had ceased.” Id. As discussed, Clark’s excessive force claim is

presented as a single violent encounter throughout which Wallace used excessive

force. See id.153 The video supports the assertion that the incident was a single violent

153 Clark’s claim is therefore distinguishable from Bourne v. Gunnels and Gray v.

White. Bourne involved a prisoner who had jammed the food-tray slot in his cell with

a sheet and towels and refused to clear it, requiring prison staff to use a chemical

agent to regain control of the door. 921 F.3d 484, 487–88 (5th Cir. 2019). In his civil

case, the prisoner alleged that, once the officers entered his cell and he was

handcuffed and shackled on his cell’s floor, certain officers used excessive force by

physically and sexually assaulting him. Id. at 488. The prisoner was convicted of

encounter that occurred within the span of a few minutes. And the assertions in

Clark’s petition—that he was simply ill and seeking medical assistance when the

officers began using force against him—belie his guilty pleas for defiance and

aggravated disobedience. See id. Those guilty pleas required him to accept

responsibility for resisting staff in the performance of their duties and for failing to

tampering with his cell door and creating a disturbance in connection with the use of

force, resulting in a forfeiture of thirty days’ good-time credit. Id. at 491. The Fifth

Circuit held that the basis of the prisoner’s § 1983 excessive force claims was distinct

from the basis of his disciplinary conviction because it was separate from his jamming

the food-tray slot and requiring the use of force by prison officials. Id. Specifically,

“[a] finding of excessive force [after the officers had successfully entered the prisoner’s

cell and the prisoner was handcuffed and on the ground] would not negate the prison’s

finding that the prisoner violated its policies [by jamming the food-tray slot] and was

subject to disciplinary action as a result.” Id. By contrast, Clark’s petition asserts that

he was simply sick and seeking medical care when officers used force against him. As

explained, that assertion is inconsistent with the guilty pleas for defiance and

aggravated disobedience. In Gray, a prisoner alleged that certain officers attacked

him in his cell, then took him to a shower and sprayed him in the face with a chemical

agent despite his compliance with all orders. 18 F.4th at 466. The officers instead

claimed that they approached the prisoner’s cell for a targeted search because the

prisoner was evidently intoxicated, and that they moved him to the shower area,

where he refused direct verbal orders and assaulted them, forcing them to use the

chemical agent to gain compliance. Id. The disciplinary board found the prisoner

guilty of one count of intoxication, two counts of defiance, four counts of aggravated

disobedience, and one count of property destruction. Id. The board issued multiple

disciplinary sanctions without stating which of its findings were necessary to the

prisoner’s convictions, and the district court had not yet performed a fact-specific

analysis informed by the elements necessary to establish those violations. Id. at 466,

467. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that it could not determine

which of the prisoner’s factual allegations might necessarily contradict his

disciplinary convictions. Id. at 470. Conversely, Clark’s claims arise from a single

encounter captured on video and defendants have provided the Louisiana

Department of Public Safety and Corrections Disciplinary Rules and Procedures for

Adult Offenders, which state the elements of defiance and aggravated disobedience.

See R. Doc. No. 18-6, at 22.

obey direct verbal orders cooperatively and promptly.154 Accordingly, Clark’s § 1983

claim is barred pursuant to Heck.

c. State-Law Claims

Because the Court has concluded that Clark’s § 1983 claim is barred, only his

state-law claims remain. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a state-law claim if “the district court has dismissed all other claims

over which the district court has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). A

district court has “wide discretion” when deciding whether it should retain

jurisdiction over state-law claims once all federal claims have been eliminated.

Guzzino v. Felterman, 191 F.3d 588, 595 (5th Cir. 1999). However, the general rule

in the Fifth Circuit is “to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they

are pendent are dismissed.” Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972

F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992). In addition, the Fifth Circuit has instructed district

courts to consider the common law factors of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

and comity.” Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008). “These interests

are to be considered on a case-by-case basis, and no single factor is dispositive.” Id.

Upon review, the Court concludes that Clark’s state-law claims should be

remanded to state court. The Court has “dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Moreover, allowing Louisiana courts to

rule on Louisiana law “encourages fairness between the parties by ‘procuring for them

a surer-footed reading of applicable law.’” Bitte v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. 07-9273,

154 See R. Doc. No. 18-6, at 22.

2009 WL 1950911, at *2 (E.D. La. July 1, 2009) (Africk, J.) (citations omitted) (quoting

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). “[D]eference in this

case with respect to the state law issue[s] promotes the important interest of comity

to state courts.” Id. The Court therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the remaining state-law claims. Those claims will be remanded to state court.

d. Leave to Amend

Finally, Clark argues that, to the extent the petition “does not closely describe

the conduct of Wallace shown in the video,” the Court should allow Clark an

opportunity to amend his complaint.155 According to Clark, “[i]t is obvious from the

video that while Clark was face down on the bed with Nichols on his back, [Clark]

could not clearly see who was doing what.”156 Clark asserts that the video was

recently produced and that an amendment would “cure any possible overlap between

the disciplinary charges by Nichols and the attempts by Wallace to detach the leg at

either the knee or the hip[.]”157 Specifically, Clark argues that the moment he was

“let up by Nichols is when Nichols says all resistance by Clark ended.”158

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings

“shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Although Rule

15 “evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend,” it is not automatic. Martin’s

Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading U.S.A. Co., 195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th

155 R. Doc. No. 20, at 9.

156 Id.

157 Id.

158 Id.

Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Lin v. Mayfield, 773 F. App’x 789, 790 (5th Cir. 2019)

(quotations omitted). A decision to grant leave to amend is within the discretion of

the trial court. Mayfield, 773 F. App’x at 790.

However, a “district court must possess a ‘substantial reason’ to deny a request

for leave to amend.” Id. (quoting Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir.

2004)). The “futility of the amendment” is one such reason. Id. “[A]n amended

complaint is futile ‘if the complaint as amended would be subject to dismissal.’” Rohi

v. Brewer (In re ABC Dentistry, P.A.), 978 F.3d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Varela v. Gonzales, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014)). Futility is evaluated “under

the same standards as a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Butler v. Denka Performance

Elastomer, L.L.C., 16 F.4th 427, 437 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Villarreal v. Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A., 814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2016)).

As discussed, the problem with Clark’s petition is that he asserts he was

merely seeking medical treatment when Kimball began to use force against him and

that other officers arrived and also used force against him. The same is true of Clark’s

Administrative Remedy Procedure claim, which states that Clark was sick and

simply attempting to communicate his illness to the officers when they used force

against him.159 Pursuant to Aucoin and DeLeon, the fact that Clark maintains he did

nothing wrong indicates that his petition is inconsistent with his guilty pleas for

defiance and aggravated disobedience in connection with the Nichols report.

159 R. Doc. No. 18-4, at 14–17.

Accordingly, the Court finds that permitting Clark to amend his petition to match the

video more closely with respect to the sequence of events would be futile.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED to the

extent it seeks dismissal with prejudice of Clark’s § 1983 claim. The motion is

DENIED to the extent it seeks dismissal with prejudice of Clark’s state-law claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Clark’s federal claims against defendants

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to their being asserted again until the Heck

conditions are met.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Clark’s state-law claims are REMANDED

to the 22nd Judicial District Court in Washington Parish, Louisiana for further

proceedings.

New Orleans, Louisiana, March 8, 2024.

hn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

28