Williams v. Biggs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JEVIN WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 21-333 C/W 21-334

DANIEL BIGGS, ET AL. SECTION: “H”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

103). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

This consolidated case arises out of the shootings of Plaintiffs Jevin

Williams and Glendale Hampton by Orleans Levee District Police Department

(“OLD-PD”) Officer Daniel Biggs.1 On February 16, 2020, Officer Biggs

received a report that cars were doing donuts in a parking lot near Lake

Pontchartrain. During his investigation into the reckless driving report, Biggs

fired four shots into a Camaro occupied by Williams and Hampton, striking

both. Plaintiffs have brought claims against Officer Biggs, the Southeast

1 Williams v. Biggs et al., Case No. 21-333; Hampton v. Biggs et al., Case No. 21-334.

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Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East (“SLFPA-E”), and several other

individual officers.2 They allege § 1983 violations of their Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights and state law tort claims.

In the instant Motion, Officer Biggs moves for a finding of qualified

immunity from Plaintiffs’ § 1983 and state law claims, arguing that his use of

force was objectively reasonable because he believed he was in danger as the

vehicle accelerated towards him. The SLFPA-E, Superintendent Kerry Najolia,

Captain Michael Brenckle, and Officers Donald Juneau, Albert Pellitteri,

Darnell Laurent, Bruno Mason, and Vance Bieniemy also move for dismissal

of the § 1983 failure to train and supervise claims against them.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”3 A genuine issue

of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.”4

In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,

the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws

all reasonable inferences in his favor.5 “If the moving party meets the initial

2 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against the City of New Orleans,

and Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Lakefront Management

Authority.

3 Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).

4 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

5 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1997).

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burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden

shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts

showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”6 Summary judgment is

appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”7 “In response to a

properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must

identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that

evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to

sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the non-

movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”8 “We do not . . . in the absence

of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the

necessary facts.”9 Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual

dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.”10

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Court will consider each of Defendants’ arguments for summary

judgment in turn.

A. Qualified Immunity

First, Defendants argue that Biggs is entitled to qualified immunity from

Plaintiffs’ claims. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

6 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).

7 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

8 John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th

Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

9 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.

Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).

10 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).

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officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.”11 Plaintiffs have the burden of rebutting “the

officers’ qualified-immunity defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to

whether the officers’ allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established

law.”12

In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary

judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry. The first asks

whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a federal

right. . . . The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks

whether the right in question was clearly established at the time

of the violation.13

In cases alleging excessive force, “the second prong of the analysis is better

understood as two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated

constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and,

if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively unreasonable in

light of [the] then clearly established law.”14

To prevail on a claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment,

Plaintiffs must show: “(1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the

use of force that was excessive to the need and that (3) the force used was

objectively unreasonable.”15 “Excessive force claims are necessarily fact-

intensive; whether the force used is ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ depends on

11 Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation omitted).

12 Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 2011).

13 Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655 (2014) (internal quotations and alterations

omitted).

14 Griggs, 841 F.3d at 313 (internal citation omitted).

15 Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004).

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the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”16 In Graham v. Connor,

the Supreme Court set forth factors to consider in determining whether a use

of force was reasonable: (1) the “severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether

the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,”

(3) and “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest

by flight.”17 “While all factors are relevant, the threat-of-harm factor typically

predominates the analysis when deadly force has been deployed. The

reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, and only the facts then knowable to the defendant officers may be

considered.”18 That said, the standard is one of objective reasonableness and is

not subjective, as Biggs suggests.19

Officer Biggs contends that his use of force was reasonable because he

perceived an immediate threat as Hampton’s car accelerated toward him. He

contends that he received a report that cars were doing donuts in a parking lot

near Lake Pontchartrain. It is undisputed that Hampton was in the driver’s

seat and Williams was in the passenger seat of a Camaro parked in the lot.

Upon entering the parking lot, Biggs stopped his vehicle in front of and

partially blocking the parking space occupied by the Camaro. Biggs testified

that he activated his lights, exited his vehicle, and asked the driver to stop. He

16 Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009).

17 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

18 Crane v. City of Arlington, Texas, 50 F.4th 453, 463 (5th Cir. 2022).

19 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case

is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are “objectively reasonable”

in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying

intent or motivation.”).

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alleges that as he was standing in front of the Camaro, it accelerated forward

toward him. He contends that at that point he was in fear for his life, and he

fired four shots at the driver of the vehicle. He testified that as he was shooting,

the vehicle fishtailed to the side, and he was “still in danger of the side and the

back of the vehicle hitting” him.20 He testified that he stopped shooting after

the vehicle was no longer a danger to him.

In support of his version of events, Officer Biggs presents the police

report from the incident, which was prepared by another officer who arrived

on the scene after the shooting. The report includes the account of an

eyewitness who was sitting in another car in the parking lot. The eyewitness

stated that the Camaro attempted to hit the officer. The eyewitness also spoke

with Sgt. Clinton Givens, an investigator with the New Orleans Police

Department’s Force Investigation Team (“FIT”), who prepared the FIT report

associated with the incident. Sgt. Givens concluded in his report that Biggs

was justified in his use of force because of his perception that he was in

imminent danger of being struck by the vehicle driven by Hampton.21

On the other hand, Plaintiffs allege that Hampton did not drive straight

toward Biggs. Instead, they allege that Hampton was attempting to exit the

parking lot and turned his car immediately to the right to drive around the

rear of Biggs’s vehicle, which was partially blocking the space in which the

Camaro was parked. They allege that the front of the Camaro had passed the

rear of the police vehicle before Biggs began shooting, and he therefore could

20 Doc. 103.

21 Significantly, Sgt. Givens did not find that Hampton accelerated toward Biggs, but

rather, that in attempting to flee, he began to spin out and lose control of the vehicle and that

Biggs believed the vehicle was going to strike him.

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not have reasonably feared for his safety. Both Plaintiffs testified that Biggs

never gave them an instruction to stop.

In support of their version of events, Plaintiffs also point to portions of

Sgt. Givens’s FIT report. First, Sgt. Givens points out that the tire tracks from

Hampton’s vehicle “did not indicate that the vehicle ever moved in a straight

direction forward. The tracks immediately curved north and then west as the

vehicle spun out of control.”22 Givens also did not find that Hampton

accelerated toward Biggs, but rather, that Biggs believed the vehicle was going

to strike him as it began to spin out and lose control.23 Next, Plaintiffs point to

the location of the bullet holes in the car and in their bodies as supporting

evidence that Biggs was not in danger. Crime scene photographs reflect that

all of the bullets that Biggs fired hit either the far edge of the driver’s side

windshield or through the driver’s window of the car. Hampton was shot in the

back, upper left arm, and Williams was shot in the left torso. Plaintiffs argue

that this suggests that the car was turning away from Biggs at the time of the

shooting. Next, Plaintiffs provide a video of the incident taken by an

eyewitness from an adjacent parking lot approximately 300 feet away.24 The

22 Doc. 118-4 at 21.

23 Id.

24 Defendants object to the video as not being competent summary judgment evidence.

Under Rule 56, “[a] party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact

cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs will be unable to authenticate the video at trial because the

individual who recorded the video resides outside of the subpoena power of the Court. They

also complain that Plaintiffs have not shown that the video accurately reflects when the audio

of the gun shots occurred relative to the movement of the vehicle on the video. The Fifth

Circuit has explained that “[a]t the summary judgment stage, evidence need not be

authenticated or otherwise presented in an admissible form. . . . [M]aterials cited to support

or dispute a fact need only be capable of being presented in a form that would be admissible

in evidence.” Maurer v. Indep. Town, 870 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2017). “There is nothing to

compel a conclusion” that the video “is not capable of being admitted at an eventual trial.”

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video—although poor quality and from a distance—supports Plaintiffs’

contention that Hampton had turned the vehicle to get around Biggs’s police

vehicle and had cleared the rear of Biggs’s car before Biggs began shooting.

Given the evidence presented by Plaintiffs, there is a clear issue of

material fact regarding whether Plaintiffs’ vehicle accelerated toward Biggs

and whether Biggs reasonably perceived an immediate threat. Plaintiffs have

provided evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find that Biggs’s

perception of an immediate threat was not reasonable.25 “When two

conclusions are plausible, at the summary judgment stage, we must accept as

true that which is most favorable to the nonmovant.”26 Accordingly, taking

together the assumptions that Plaintiffs were attempting to flee the parking

lot to evade arrest, were under suspicion of reckless driving—a relatively minor

crime—and Biggs was not in immediate harm, a jury could reasonably find

that the degree of force used by Biggs was not reasonable.

The second step of the qualified immunity inquiry asks whether the

violated constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the

violation. “It has long been clearly established that, absent any other

justification for the use of force, it is unreasonable for a police officer to use

deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient threat of

Id. Indeed, “authentication is a low burden, requiring only a showing sufficient to support a

finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is and a video’s own distinctive

characteristics might overcome it.” Smith v. Lopez, 519 F. Supp. 3d 395, 405 (W.D. Tex. 2021).

Even so, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient additional evidence to

overcome summary judgment even without the video.

25 See Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2021) (“It is a case in

which [video] evidence the Supreme Court has recognized as especially compelling could be

viewed as contradicting the officer’s testimony.”).

26 Crane, 50 F.4th at 462.

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harm to the officer or others.”27 Accordingly, “because the facts seen in a light

most favorable to [Plaintiffs] indicate a violation of a clearly established right

and material facts are in dispute,” summary judgment on qualified immunity

is denied. 28

B. Failure to Train, Supervise and Discipline

Next, Plaintiffs bring claims against SLFPA-E and Superintendent

Najolia in his official capacity, as well as Najolia and Officers Juneau,

Pellitteri, Laurent, Brenckle, Mason, and Bieniemy in their individual

capacities for failure to train, supervise, and discipline Officer Biggs. This

Court will outline Plaintiffs’ claims and the evidentiary support thereto before

considering whether Plaintiffs’ claims survive summary judgment.

i. Failure to Train

In support of their failure to train claims, Plaintiffs present the following

arguments.29 First, Plaintiffs contend that there was a three-year period of

time in which there was no training coordinator at the OLD-PD. Plaintiffs also

argue that the OLD-PD only hired officers that were already POST certified

and did not offer any additional training to new hires besides emailing the

policy manual and requiring some officers to meet with human resources. They

27 Id. at 466.

28 Id. at 467.

29 Plaintiffs also argue that they cannot completely respond to Defendants’ request for

dismissal of their supervisory liability and Monell claims because Defendants have failed to

produce all discovery. Plaintiffs’ Motion contends that they are awaiting the resolution of a

pending Motion to Compel in order to fully set forth evidence of their claims. The Motion to

Compel, however, was denied as moot after Defendants produced more documents. Despite

this additional production, Plaintiffs have not sought to supplement their response to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which has been pending for more than six

months. Accordingly, this Court assumes that Plaintiffs have presented all relevant evidence

in support of their claims.

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argue that the OLD-PD’s Field Training Officer (FTO) program is flawed

where there is no oversight for recommendations from other officers that a new

hire is ready for solo patrol. Rather, Plaintiffs argue, one officer’s subjective

opinion is sufficient to allow a new hire to begin a solo patrol. Plaintiffs also

maintain that OLD-PD officers were improperly instructed as to when they

may use force. Plaintiffs argue that the lack of training and improper guidance

on the use of force resulted in Officer Bigg’s improper understanding of when

he could use force. Specifically, Plaintiffs note that Officer Biggs testified that

he was instructed that he could use force when he “deemed it necessary.”30

Plaintiffs also contend that Officer Biggs did not receive any training on

firearm decision-making skills. Plaintiffs argue that Officer Biggs’s lack of

training on and understanding of when deadly force is appropriate was a

moving force behind the shooting of Plaintiffs.

The evidence presented by Plaintiffs does not, however, bear out these

allegations. First, Plaintiffs do not present any evidence supporting the

allegation of a three-year period in which there was no training coordinator at

the OLD-PD. Instead, the testimony reveals that Officer Darnell Laurent

began serving as the training coordinator after Officer Sue Egan retired.31

Officer Laurent testified that, as training coordinator, he sent quarterly

reminders to the OLD-PD officers regarding mandatory training hours.

Laurent also testified that the policy manual was given to new hires in both

email and paper forms and that new hires were required to sign and

acknowledge that they had received and understood the policy.

30 Doc. 118-2 at 11.

31 Doc. 103-11 at 8.

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As for the FTO program, Lieutenant Pellitteri, the program coordinator,

testified that he reviewed daily observation reports and weekly reports

prepared by FTOs for each new recruit and met with the FTO to make a

recommendation regarding release to solo patrol. Superintendent Najolia

confirmed that a FTO would make a recommendation regarding a new hire’s

readiness for solo patrol to his sergeant and lieutenant and “if both of those

sign off—because they are monitoring them, reading the reports, and

approving the reports, and watching his behavior and stuff. Then the

lieutenant would sign off and send it to the district commander for approval

for solo patrol. Once the captain approved, then the individual was allowed to

solo patrol.”32 Even Captain Juneau testified that he reviewed the evaluations

of reserve officers going through the FTO program.33 Accordingly, the

testimony does not support Plaintiffs’ contention that recommendations for

solo patrol were based on “one FTO’s subjective opinion.”34

Finally, Plaintiffs mischaracterize Officer Biggs’s testimony regarding

his understanding of use of force. Read in its totality, Officer Biggs explained

that he was instructed to “use the least amount of force possible and move up

the use-of-force ladder” and that deadly force should only be used when the

officer or a member of the public’s life is in immediate danger.35 The testimony

of other officers regarding their training on the use-of-force policy is consistent

with this understanding.36 Officer Biggs also outlined the firearms training he

32 Doc 118-10 at 12.

33 Doc. 103-11 at 5.

34 Doc. 118 at 34.

35 Doc. 118-2 at 12.

36 See Docs. 118-7 at 7 (Testimony of Captain Brenckle); 103-12 at 12 (Testimony of

Superintendent Najolia).

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received, and Lieutenant Laurent described the firearms decision-making

course that he instructed.37 Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence

that supports their claims of lack of training.

ii. Failure to Supervise and Discipline

As to their claims of failure to supervise and discipline, Plaintiffs argue

that, as a reserve officer, it is unclear who was supervising Officer Biggs. While

Officer Biggs testified that his supervisor was Captain Donald Juneau, Juneau

testified that he did not have direct responsibility over any other officer. As a

reserve officer, Biggs was supervised by the shift lieutenant and sergeant for

the shift on which he was working on any given day. But, Plaintiffs argue, the

shift lieutenant on the day of the shooting at issue here testified that he simply

assigned Biggs an area to patrol but did not serve as an immediate supervisor.

Further, Plaintiffs argue that the OLD-PD has no formal use-of-force review

process and therefore no disciplinary process to correct problems with uses of

force.

Here again, Plaintiffs cherry-pick testimony in support of their

arguments. The testimony makes clear that Captain Juneau supervised

Officer Biggs for administrative purposes, but that the lieutenant and sergeant

of the platoon on watch at the time that he volunteered supervised him for that

shift.38 The officers also testified that use-of-force reports are filled out for all

use-of-force incidents and reviewed by the platoon sergeant, the platoon

lieutenant, the captain, the superintendent, and the legal department.39

Captain Brenckle testified that he reviewed the use-of-force reports for the

37 Doc. 118-8 at 9.

38 Docs. 118-11 at 8, 103-9 at 3, 103-12 at 9.

39 Doc. 103-15 at 13–14.

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“legitimacy of the use of force used.”40 There is also evidence that Captain

Brenckle, Superintendent Najolia, and Lieutenant Laurent met with Officer

Biggs to discuss the shooting at issue here and determined that his actions

were consistent with department policy and training.41 Accordingly, here

again, the evidence presented does not support Plaintiffs’ allegations of a

failure to supervise.

iii. Officers in their Individual Capacities

Under § 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of

subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”42 “Rather, a plaintiff must

show either that the supervisor personally was involved in the constitutional

violation or that there is a sufficient causal connection between the

supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.”43 “When, as here, a

plaintiff alleges a failure to train or supervise, the plaintiff must show that: (1)

the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a

causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of

the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to

deliberate indifference.”44 The Fifth Circuit has frequently held that supervisor

liability “requires a showing of the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the

known or obvious fact that such constitutional violations would result and that

generally requires that a plaintiff demonstrate at least a pattern of similar

violations.”45 “For an official to act with deliberate indifference, the official

40 Doc. 103-15 at 13.

41 Docs. 103-15 at 16–17, 118-8 at 12–13.

42 Hobart v. Estrada, 13-20022, 2014 WL 4564878 (5th Cir. 2014).

43 Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006).

44 Est. of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.

2005).

45 Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

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must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”46

“Actions and decisions by officials that are merely inept, erroneous, ineffective,

or negligent do not amount to deliberate indifference and do not divest officials

of qualified immunity.”47

Plaintiffs argue that the OLD-PD training and supervision was so

insufficient that the risk of constitutional rights violations should have been

obvious to Officers Najolia, Juneau, Pellitteri, Laurent, Brenckle, Mason, and

Bieniemy. As outlined above, however, the evidence presented to the Court

does not support this argument. Plaintiffs also do not show specific conduct by

any individual officer that could rise to the level of deliberate indifference.

Plaintiffs do not show that any one officer’s failure to train or supervise Biggs

resulted in the constitutional violation to Plaintiffs, and they do not show that

any of the officers was “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and that he drew that

inference.48 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims for § 1983 liability against Officers

Najolia, Juneau, Pellitteri, Laurent, Brenckle, Mason, and Bieniemy in their

individual capacities are dismissed.

iv. Municipal Liability

Under Monell, a plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a municipality

must show “(1) the existence of an official policy or custom, (2) a policymaker’s

actual or constructive knowledge of the policy or custom, and (3) a

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 Id.

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constitutional violation where the policy or custom is the ‘moving force.’”49 To

assert a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must allege that “1) the [city] failed

to train or supervise the officers involved; 2) there is a causal connection

between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of

the plaintiff's rights; and 3) the failure to train or supervise constituted

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”50 A “pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily required

to show deliberate indifference.”51 However, “even absent proof of pattern,

deliberate indifference can still be inferred if the factfinder determines that

the risk of constitutional violations was or should have been an ‘obvious’ or

‘highly predictable consequence’ of the alleged training inadequacy.” Courts,

however, have found this inference applied in only narrow circumstances. The

Fifth Circuit has advised that such an inference is possible only when the

municipal entity has failed “to train its employees concerning a clear

constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations that a particular

employee is certain to face.”52

Here again, the evidence presented to this Court does not support

Plaintiffs’ claims of municipal liability for failure to train or supervise.

Plaintiffs have not shown a pattern of failures in training or supervising

officers or a training inadequacy that creates an obvious risk of constitutional

violations. To the extent that there are deficiencies in the training and

supervision of the OLD-PD officers, they do not rise to this level, and no

49 Pudas v. St. Tammany Par., No. CV 18-10052, 2019 WL 2410939, at *3 (E.D. La.

June 7, 2019) (quoting Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2010)).

50 Id. at 623.

51 Id.

52 Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 624 (5th Cir. 2018).

15

evidence was presented of deliberate indifference thereto. Plaintiffs’ claims of

municipal liability against the SLFPA-E and Najolia in his official capacity are

dismissed.53

C. Declaratory Judgment

Next, Defendants move to dismiss Williams’s claim for declaratory

judgment against them. In his Complaint, Williams seeks a declaratory

judgment that Defendants have violated his constitutional rights and caused

him injury. To “‘obtain equitable relief for past wrongs, a plaintiff must

demonstrate either continuing harm or a real and immediate threat of

repeated injury in the future.’”54 Defendants argue that Williams he has not

shown a risk of future harm. Williams has not responded to this argument, and

this Court agrees that he has not shown he is in danger of repeated injury.

Accordingly, Williams’s claims for declaratory judgment are dismissed.

53 Having dismissed this claim, the Court need not address the parties’ dispute

regarding whether OLD or SLFPA-E is the proper party. Further, Plaintiffs’ claims for

punitive damages against the SLFPA-E and Najolia in his official capacity likewise fail.

Defendants’ Motion correctly pointed out that punitive damages cannot be recovered from a

municipality or an officer in his official capacity under § 1983. See Broussard v. Lafayette

City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 45 F. Supp. 3d 553, 578–79 (W.D. La. 2014) (“It has been thirty-three

years since the Supreme Court clearly stated: “we hold that a municipality is immune from

punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453

U.S. 247, 271 (1981)). Further, “‘an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name,

to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for

the real party in interest is the entity.’ As such, a plaintiff is barred from recovering punitive

damages against an official acting in his official capacity.” Givs v. City of Eunice, No. 6:05–

CV–0788, 2006 WL 1831528, at *1 (W.D.La. 2006) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 165 (1985)).

54 Kokesh v. Curlee, 422 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1133 (E.D. La. 2019) (quoting Bauer v.

Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2003)).

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D. State Law Claims

In addition to the § 1983 claims discussed above, Plaintiffs bring state

law claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional

distress against Biggs, and vicarious liability for those claims against Najolia,

Brenckle, and SLFPA-E. Defendants move for dismissal of these claims,

arguing only that they should be dismissed for the same reasons as the federal

claims. Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, there is a material issue of

fact regarding whether Biggs is entitled to qualified immunity. Because

Defendants have presented no other argument for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state

law claims, they survive.55

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 and Monell claims against SLFPA-E

and Chief Najolia in his official capacity, as well as Najolia and Officers

Juneau, Pellitteri, Laurent, Brenckle, Mason, and Bieniemy in their individual

capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 and state

law claims against Officer Biggs survive, and summary judgment on qualified

immunity is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Najolia, Brenckle

and SLFPA-E survive.

55 Defendants also suggest that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims after all federal claims are dismissed. Because

this Court did not dismiss all federal claims, this argument too fails.

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New Orleans, Louisiana this 26th day of February, 2024.

g TRICHE LLG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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