The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TED J. MATHERNE, SR., ET CIVIL ACTION
AL.
VERSUS 22-2656
HUNTINGTON INGALLS SECTION: “J”(2)
INCORPORATED, ET AL.
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding the
Avondale Interests’ Government Contractor Defense filed by Plaintiffs Ted J.
Matherne, Sr., Ted J. Matherne, Jr., Giselle Matherne Ordoyne, and Vanessa
Matherne Richardson against Defendants Huntington Ingalls Incorporated
(“Avondale”), Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, and Sparta Insurance
Company (“the Avondale Interests”); (Rec. Doc. 226). Avondale filed an opposition
(Rec. Doc. 255), and Plaintiffs have replied (Rec. Doc. 290). Having considered the
motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that
the motion for partial summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 226) should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Roseanna Matherne was diagnosed with mesothelioma on or around December
1, 2021 and died on March 10, 2022 as a result of the disease. Mrs. Matherne’s
husband worked at Avondale Shipyard from 1965 to 1983. During his employment,
Mr. Matherne worked on U.S. Coast Guard Cutters and Lykes, States, LASH, and
LNG vessels, all of which were built with asbestos-containing materials for the
United States government. Mrs. Matherne was allegedly exposed to asbestos from
her husband’s work clothes which she laundered in their family home. Plaintiffs
allege that this exposure led to Mrs. Matherne’s mesothelioma diagnosis and her
subsequent death. Plaintiffs filed this suit against numerous Defendants in Orleans
Parish, and the case was later removed to this Court on August 12, 2022.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56); see Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a
dispute as to any material fact exists, a court considers “all of the evidence in the
record but refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th
Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but
a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations or
unsubstantiated assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. A court ultimately must be
satisfied that “a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Delta, 530 F.3d at 399.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden
of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would
‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving
party can then defeat the motion by either countering with sufficient evidence of its
own, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not
persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”
Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing
out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element
of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts
to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out
specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may
not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine
issue for trial. See id. at 325; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs in this matter seek summary judgment to prevent Avondale and the
alleged insurers of its executive officers from utilizing the government contractor
defense to “immunize Avondale’s failure to warn of the health hazards of asbestos
and its failure to implement safety measures that would have prevented the
uncontrolled spread of asbestos dust” that caused Roseanna Matherne’s exposure.
(Rec. Doc. 226, at 1).
The government contractor defenses arise out of the United States Supreme
Court decisions in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) and
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940). The Boyle government
contractor defense provides immunity from state law tort claims for certain
government contractors for product design defects when “(1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in
the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United
States.” Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. Based on the “discretionary function” exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the Boyle defense protects against the financial burden of
liability judgments against government contractors, which would be passed through
to the United States government. See Bailey v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d
794, 798 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511). The Boyle Court explained
that the first two elements “assure that the design feature in question was considered
by a government officer, and not merely by the contractor,” and that the third element
encourages manufacturers to disclose their knowledge of risks. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
The Yearsley defense shields government contractors whose work was (1)
authorized and directed by the Government of the United States and (2) performed
pursuant to an Act of Congress. Taylor Energy Co., L.L.C. v. Luttrell, 3 F.4th 172, 175
(5th Cir. 2021) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The rationale behind
the Yearsley defense is that there is “no ground for holding [the government’s] agent
liable who is simply acting under the authority thus validly conferred;” Yearsley v.
W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940); however, an agent of the government
can be liable for his conduct if he exceeds his authority or if the authority was not
validly conferred; id. at 22.
Plaintiffs argue that their motion is basically identical to other motions on this
subject which this Court and others within the Eastern District of Louisiana have
granted. (Rec. Doc. 226, at 3) See Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc., No. 21-1443, 2022
WL 7540115 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2022); Adams v. Eagle, Inc., No. 21-694, 2022 WL
4016749 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 2022); Broussard v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., No. 20-836,
2021 WL 5448795 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2021); Crossland v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 635
F.Supp. 3d. 491 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2022). Defendants assert that this case is different
because “unlike the claims asserted by the plaintiffs in the Adams, Falgout, and
Crossland cases, . . . Plaintiffs’ claims against Avondale arising out of the use,
handling, and disposal of asbestos clearly seek to impose liability on the part of the
contractor for executing the government’s will.” (Rec. Doc. 255, at 2) (internal
quotation omitted). In other words, Defendants argue that in the instant matter
Plaintiffs make claims of general negligence and strict liability in addition to claims
for failure to warn and failure to enact safety measures. However, in their reply,
Plaintiffs assert that they have not moved for summary judgment on the government
contractor defense as to the Avondale Interests’ claims for strict liability or general
negligence. Rather, Plaintiffs state that they are only entitled to summary judgment
for the failure to warn and failure to enact safety measures claims on which this Court
and others have repeatedly ruled. Beyond addressing claims for which Plaintiffs have
not sought summary judgment, the Avondale Interests’ opposition does not present
any compelling new reasons to deny summary judgment which were not already
addressed and dismissed in this Court’s order in Falgout. 2022 WL 540115.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 2022
WL 7540115 (E.D. La. Oct. 138, 2022),
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for partial summary judgment
(Rec. Doc. 226) is GRANTED. The Avondale Interests may not use the government
contractor defense only for those claims listed in Plaintiffs’ motion.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 19th day of January, 2024.
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Wk fake
CARL J. BARBI By Y
UNITED STATHS DISTRICT JUDGE