allowing narrowly tailored discovery “if further factual development is necessary to ascertain the availability of that defense”
How later courts described this case
- allowing narrowly tailored discovery “if further factual development is necessary to ascertain the availability of that defense”
- holding that on review of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, “[a]ll inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor” unless “blatantly contradicted and utterly discredited by video recordings” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
- first articulating this limited-discovery exception
- expressing concerns that “delaying trial would increase the danger of prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of witnesses to recall specific facts”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DAVID ERWIN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 23-1005
DON MURRAY, ET AL. SECTION “R” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants’ motion to stay discovery.1 Plaintiff
opposes the motion.2 For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and
denies in part the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff David Erwin filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Don Murray, in his individual capacity, and Gregory Champagne, in
his official capacity as Sheriff of St. Charles Parish.3 As to Murray, a St.
Charles Parish Sheriff’s Deputy, plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure as well as state law
claims for false arrest, assault, battery, and negligence.4 Plaintiff asserts only
1 R. Doc. 16.
2 R. Doc. 17.
3 R. Doc. 3.
4 Id.
state law claims against Champagne for vicarious liability and negligence in
hiring, training, disciplining, and failing to terminate Murray.5
A. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges the following facts.6
Plaintiff and his wife were asleep at their home on the night of April 13,
2022, when he began to experience seizures followed by a postictal state of
confusion and impaired awareness.7 His wife called 911 at about 12:14 a.m.,
and first responders, including Murray, arrived at plaintiff’s home shortly
thereafter.8 Murray and other first responders entered plaintiff’s bedroom,
at which time emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”) initiated treatment
on plaintiff.9 Murray and at least two other deputies observed plaintiff’s
initial state of lethargy and unresponsiveness.10 Murray allegedly was also
present while plaintiff’s wife advised EMTs of his medical history, including
that he has a pacemaker, a heart murmur, and high blood pressure.11
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. ¶ 7.
8 Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
9 Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
10 Id.
11 Id. ¶ 10.
Although plaintiff contends that he had taken no opioids, EMTs
initially administered Narcan, after which plaintiff became more alert but
remained confused, afraid, and disoriented.12 Plaintiff began babbling,
fidgeting, and rolling around on his bed for about twenty minutes before first
responders attempted to place him on a gurney for transport to the
emergency room.13 Without warning, an EMT injected plaintiff with
Ketamine, triggering plaintiff to reach behind his body and grab the syringe
from the EMT’s hand.14 Twelve seconds later, plaintiff jumped off the gurney
and ran through the house before exiting out of the front door in his t-shirt
and boxer underwear, all while still holding the syringe.15 Plaintiff contends
that he was confused and disoriented, but did not threaten, assault, or
otherwise injure anyone as he fled.16
Murray followed plaintiff outside and ordered him to “get on the
ground.”17 According to plaintiff, Murray’s body camera footage shows a
disoriented plaintiff turn to face Murray before slowly stepping backwards
onto the grass in his front yard.18 Murray, now with his taser pointed at
12 Id.
13 Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
14 Id. ¶ 11.
15 Id. ¶ 12-14.
16 Id. ¶ 14.
17 Id. ¶ 15.
18 Id.
plaintiff, quickly ordered plaintiff to get on the ground three more times,
after which he shouted “Taser, Taser, Taser” and discharged his taser,
shocking plaintiff for five seconds.19 Just before the first tasing, plaintiff
allegedly said, “Oh, please don’t.”20 Plaintiff alleges that the first tasing
occurred twenty-three seconds after plaintiff jumped off the gurney and
eleven seconds after Murray first ordered plaintiff to get on the ground.21
Plaintiff contends that this was an insufficient amount of time for him to
comprehend the situation and to appropriately respond before the tasing.22
At the time of the first tasing, plaintiff was surrounded by at least three
other deputies, several firemen, and one or two relatives.23 Plaintiff asserts
that at no time before being tased was he physically or verbally threatening
anyone with the syringe, and neither Murray nor the other deputies ordered
him to drop the syringe.24 Plaintiff further contends that Murray, who
observed plaintiff for at least twenty minutes before plaintiff grabbed the
syringe and exited his home, should have known that plaintiff’s mental state
was altered and that he was not a threat to anyone present.25
19 Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
20 Id. ¶ 16.
21 Id. ¶ 17.
22 Id. ¶ 16.
23 Id. ¶ 19.
24 Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 20.
25 Id. ¶ 21.
Plaintiff also asserts that, as a result of the first tasing, his body became
rigid and he fell to the ground, sustaining injuries to his head and back.26 At
this time, plaintiff can allegedly be seen on body camera footage floundering
on the ground.27 Shortly thereafter, and before plaintiff allegedly could react
to Murray’s commands, Murray tased plaintiff for a second time.28 Plaintiff
contends that the second tasing exacerbated the situation and caused him
further injury.29
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint,
plaintiff alleges that the first tasing constitutes an illegal seizure and
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and false arrest and
assault and battery under state law.30 According to plaintiff, Murray’s first
tasing was unreasonable given his knowledge of plaintiff’s mental state and
the absence of an immediate threat.31 Plaintiff further asserts that the second
tasing was excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and assault
26 Id. ¶ 23.
27 Id. ¶ 25.
28 Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
29 Id. ¶¶ 25, 30.
30 Id. ¶ 27.
31 Id. ¶ 22.
and battery under state law.32 Defendants filed an answer on May 20, 2023,
in which they raise the defense of qualified immunity as to Murray.33
Defendants moved the Court to order plaintiff to submit a Rule 7(a)
reply to Murray’s assertion of a qualified immunity defense.34 On August 7,
2023, the Court denied the motion, finding plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently
detailed to allow the Court to rule on any subsequent dispositive motion on
qualified immunity.35 Defendants now move to stay all discovery in the
matter pending the Court’s resolution of the qualified immunity issue.36
Although defendants initially requested that discovery be stayed or,
alternatively, that discovery be limited to the issue of qualified immunity,
defendants now contend in their reply brief that only a stay would be
appropriate under recent Fifth Circuit precedent.37 Defendants further
contend that they are in possession of body camera video footage
“depict[ing] actions worthy of qualified immunity.”38 Defendants
acknowledge that presenting such extraneous evidence would be
32 Id. ¶ 28.
33 R. Doc. 6.
34 R. Doc. 8.
35 R. Doc. 14.
36 R. Docs. 16 & 20.
37 R. Doc. 20.
38 R. Doc. 16-1 at 2.
inappropriate at the motion-to-dismiss stage.39 Therefore, defendants want
to present this evidence in a summary judgment motion and seek a stay of
discovery pending resolution of the issue of qualified immunity.40 In
opposition, plaintiff asserts that defendants’ motion to stay discovery is
premature because there is no pending dispositive motion on the issue of
qualified immunity.41
The Court considers the parties’ arguments below.
II. DISCUSSION
It is well established that qualified immunity shields public officials
from suit and liability under § 1983, “so long as their conduct ‘does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11
(2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)); Crane v.
City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 463 (5th Cir. 2022). Qualified immunity is
not only a defense to liability, but also “a limited entitlement not to stand
trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” including “the burdens of
discovery.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009) (citation and internal
39 Id. at 3.
40 Id. at 5; R. Doc. 20 at 3.
41 R. Doc. 17.
quotation marks omitted); see also Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th
Cir. 2022) (“One of the most important benefits of the qualified immunity
defense is ‘protection from pretrial discovery, which is costly, time-
consuming, and intrusive.’” (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648
(5th Cir. 2012))). Courts must therefore endeavor to resolve immunity
questions “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Ramirez v.
Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (first citing
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985); and then citing Pearson,
555 U.S. at 231).
Murray first asserted the defense of qualified immunity in his answer
to plaintiff’s complaint.42 He now alleges that he intends to file a motion for
summary judgment on his entitlement to the immunity defense.43
Defendants also contend that, pursuant to Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307
(5th Cir. 2022), a complete stay of discovery is required pending this Court’s
resolution of the presently unfiled motion for summary judgment.44 In this
context, the Court does not read Carswell so broadly.
The Fifth Circuit in Carswell clarified that all discovery involving a
defendant who has raised the defense must be stayed until resolution of the
42 R. Doc. 6.
43 R. Doc. 16-1 at 3, 5.
44 R. Doc. 20.
qualified immunity question in a motion to dismiss. Id. at 311-12
(recognizing that Supreme Court precedent “has now made clear that a
plaintiff asserting constitutional claims against an officer claiming [qualified
immunity] must survive the motion to dismiss without any discovery.”
(emphasis in original)). But Carswell does not mean that there can never be
discovery until the qualified immunity issue is resolved. Rather, it held that
a plaintiff “must survive the motion to dismiss without any discovery.” Id. at
311; see also id. at 312 (limiting application of its holding to the motion-to-
dismiss stage and recognizing that the holding does not mean “that the QI
determination must be made once-and-for-all at the motion-to-dismiss
stage”). Indeed, Carswell itself recognizes that if a court denies a defendant’s
motion to dismiss on qualified immunity, the defendant may then, “à la Lion
Boulos and its progeny[,] . . . move the district court for discovery limited to
the factual disputes relevant to whether [qualified immunity] applies, then
reassert [the immunity defense] in a summary judgment motion.” Id. at 312
(citing Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2021)); see also
Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1987) (first
articulating this limited-discovery exception). Such discovery must be
“narrowly tailored” to the issue of qualified immunity and necessary “to
uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim.” Carswell,
54 F.4th at 311 (quoting Wicks v. Miss. State Emp’t Servs., Inc., 41 F.3d 991,
994 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Zapata v.
Melson, 750 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that, in ordering narrowly
tailored discovery, a district court must “identify any questions of fact it
needed to resolve before it would be able to determine whether the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity”).
Here, defendants have foregone filing a motion to dismiss on qualified
immunity. Instead, defendants intend to file a motion for summary
judgment on the immunity issue so that they can rely on Murray’s body
camera footage.45 This essentially places defendants in a similar position to
a defendant described in Carswell who reasserts the immunity defense at
summary judgment after he has lost a motion to dismiss. See Carswell, 54
F.4th at 312; see also Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2019)
(holding that on review of a motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, “[a]ll inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor” unless
“blatantly contradicted and utterly discredited by video recordings”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). In this situation, the Fifth
Circuit clearly contemplates the use of narrowly tailored discovery before
ruling on the motion for summary judgment, if such discovery is necessary
45 Id. at 5.
to resolve any questions of fact relating to qualified immunity. See Carswell,
54 F.4th at 311-12. Defendants are thus not entitled to a complete stay of
discovery at the summary-judgment stage, if the Court finds limited
discovery necessary to its determination of Murray’s entitlement to qualified
immunity.
Nevertheless, without a summary judgment motion on the issue of
qualified immunity before the Court, the Court cannot determine what fact
issues, if any, must be resolved before deciding the immunity question. The
Court will therefore determine whether plaintiff is entitled to limited
discovery after it receives defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Murray is ordered to file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of
qualified immunity by December 6, 2023. All discovery in this matter is
stayed pending a ruling on the motion for summary judgment or an order of
the Court permitting limited discovery.46 See id. at 311; Wicks, 41 F.3d at
46 While “[t]he protection of government officials who are entitled to
immunity does not ipso facto disable a plaintiff from conducting
discovery against all non-immune defendants in his case,” Martin v.
Dallas Cnty., 822 F.2d 553, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1987), the Court
nevertheless finds good cause to impose the stay as to all defendants.
This is because allowing discovery to proceed solely on plaintiff’s
claims against Champagne would potentially require Murray, and their
counsel, “to participate in the [discovery] process to ensure the case
does not develop in a misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice
to their position,” thereby inappropriately subjecting them to the
burdens of discovery. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685; see also Alexander v.
994-95; Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 481; Backe, 691 F.3d at 648; Lion Boulos,
834 F.2d at 507; Webb v. Livingston, 618 F. App’x 201, 206 (5th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam).
After Murray files his motion for summary judgment, and upon proper
motion by the plaintiff, the Court may authorize the parties to conduct
discovery that is narrowly tailored to facts that must be resolved before the
Court rules on the qualified-immunity defense. See Carswell, 54 F.4th at
311-12; Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 481; see also Backe, 691 F.3d at 648 (allowing
narrowly tailored discovery “if further factual development is necessary to
ascertain the availability of that defense”). Plaintiff must file any motion for
limited discovery no later than fourteen days from service of Murray’s
motion for summary judgment. Any motion for leave must identify: (1) the
Hall, No. 20-21, 2022 WL 879496, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 23, 2022)
(“[T]his Court has previously found it proper to stay all discovery . . . ,
even when an immunity motion is asserted on behalf of fewer than all
defendants in a multi-defendant case.”); but see Davis v. City of Fort
Worth, No. 14-491, 2014 WL 12940677, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2014)
(holding that Iqbal did not place “a categorical ban on discovery as to
all defendants when less than all of them assert the defense of qualified
immunity”). Moreover, the Court does not find that the imposition of
a stay of all discovery against all defendants would unduly prejudice
plaintiff or delay the proceedings given the limited duration of the stay
imposed herein. Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707-08 (1997)
(expressing concerns that “delaying trial would increase the danger of
prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of
witnesses to recall specific facts”).
specific discovery plaintiff seeks, including a list of specific documents or
specific categories of documents that plaintiff wants to obtain;47 and (2) an
explanation of why this discovery is necessary to enable plaintiff to respond
to the specific qualified-immunity issues raised in Murray’s motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiff must narrowly tailor the requested discovery
to those facts necessary for the Court to rule on qualified immunity. The
Court will permit discovery only if Murray’s immunity defense turns at least
partially on a factual question, and the Court is unable to rule on the
immunity defense without further clarification of the facts. Defendants have
seven days to respond to plaintiff’s motion for leave.
If limited discovery is granted, the Court will issue an order identifying
the discovery permitted and the deadlines for completing it. The Court will
also set the deadline for plaintiff’s response to the motion for summary
judgment. If discovery is denied, plaintiff will have twenty-one days to
respond to the motion for summary judgment, and defendants will have
seven days to reply.
47 Should plaintiff wish to send interrogatories to Murray, plaintiff must
include in his motion for leave a list of the specific interrogatories.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES
IN PART defendants’ motion. The Court ORDERS defendant Murray to file
a motion for summary judgment with supporting evidence on the issue of
qualified immunity no later than December 6, 2023. The Court GRANTS
defendants’ request to stay all discovery in the matter pending a ruling on
the anticipated motion for summary judgment or an order permitting limited
discovery. The Court DENIES defendants’ request to stay discovery insofar
as they seek to foreclose the Court’s authority to permit narrowly tailored
discovery pursuant to Lion Boulos and its progeny. Further, the Court
ORDERS plaintiff to file any motion for leave to conduct limited discovery
no later than fourteen (14) days from service of Murray’s motion for
summary judgment. Defendants have seven (7) days to respond to any
such motion.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of October, 2023.
Aorwk Var40_
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14