Marshall v. Webre

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MICHAEL MARSHALL, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff

VERSUS NO. 23-1319

CRAIG WEBRE, ET AL., SECTION: “E” (1)

Defendants

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the second motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint

filed by Defendants Sheriff Craig Webre and the Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office.1

Plaintiff Michael Marshall filed an opposition to the motion.2 For the following reasons,

the motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to defendant Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office and

DENIED as to Sheriff Craig Webre, except as to the claim regarding understaffing, which

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff Michael Marshall was incarcerated at the Lafourche Parish Detention

Center (“LPDC”) at the time of the events in question.4 Mr. Marshall alleges that he did

not receive appropriate medical care at LPDC following complaints of back pain, difficulty

walking, and a subsequent fall that rendered him partially paralyzed and incontinent.5

Prior to his incarceration, Mr. Marshall was diagnosed with metastatic prostate

cancer.6 This diagnosis was known to the employees of CORRECTHEALTH, LLC and

1 R. Doc. 21.

2 R. Doc. 25.

3 The background facts are taken from the allegations in the second amended complaint. R. Doc. 19.

4 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 4.

5 Id. at ¶¶ 5-9.

6 Id. at ¶ 4.

CORRECTHEALTH LAFOURCHE, LLC (collectively, “CH”) at LPDC.7 On or about March

30, 2022, Mr. Marshall alleges he began having back pain, which worsened over the next

several days.8 When Mr. Marshall was seen by a CH nurse on April 1, 2022, he claims that

he indicated his back pain had worsened and he was having trouble walking and moving

his lower extremities.9 The nurse provided ibuprofen.10

On April 2, 2022, Mr. Marshall fell while attempting to urinate, due to the

difficulties with moving his lower extremities.11 Plaintiff alleges that his body became

paralyzed after the fall, and he began experiencing urinary incontinence and the inability

to defecate.12 After informing a CH nurse of his condition, Mr. Marshall alleges he was

instructed to “lay [sic] in bed.”13 Four days after the fall, on April 6, 2022, Plaintiff was

transported to Chabert Medical Center for treatment of the injuries he sustained as a

result of the fall.14 Plaintiff was subsequently taken by helicopter to University Medical

Center, where he underwent emergency surgery.15

Plaintiff sues Craig Webre in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lafourche Parish; the

Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office (“LPSO”); Archie Chaisson III in his official capacity as

Lafourche Parish President; the Parish of Lafourche; and CH for compensatory and

punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth

7 Id.

8 Id. at ¶ 5.

9 Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.

10 Id. at ¶ 6.

11 Id. at ¶ 7.

12 Id.

13 Id. at ¶¶ 7-7(a)

14 Id. at ¶ 8.

15 Id.

Amendment rights to adequate medical care while detained.16 Plaintiff also seeks

attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.17

Plaintiff originally filed a Petition for Damages against Defendants in state court

on March 22, 2023.18 Defendants removed the matter to the United States Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana on April 20, 2023 on the basis of federal question

jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.19 On June 20, 2023, Sheriff Webre and LPSO

filed their first motion to dismiss.20 On July 11, 2023, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to

file a second amended complaint,21 which Plaintiff filed on July 25, 2023.22 The Court

then denied Defendants’ first motion to dismiss without prejudice.23 Sheriff Webre and

LPSO now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against them in the second amended

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.24

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Sheriff Webre and LPSO are set forth below.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may only

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the

plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him

to relief.25 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”26 “A claim

16 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 16-17, 30

17 Id. at ¶ 30.

18 R. Doc. 1-1.

19 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 4.

20 R. Doc. 12.

21 R. Doc. 18.

22 R. Doc. 19.

23 R. Doc. 18.

24 R. Doc. 21.

25 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.

2007).

26 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”27

The Court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory

statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual

conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”28 “[T]hreadbare recitals of

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” or “naked

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient.29

However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, [if] they

[are] supported by factual allegations.”30 “Determining whether a complaint states a

plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”31 Moreover, claims of

municipal liability under § 1983 are not subject to a more heightened pleading standard

that other types of clams.32

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that it is the policy, practice, or custom of Sheriff Webre and LPSO,

among other defendants, to “ignore legitimate and serious complaints of pain by inmates

and to fail to provide necessary and basic medical care to inmates.”33 Moreover, Plaintiff

alleges that Sheriff Webre and LPSO, among other defendants, had no established policies

27 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

28 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing

Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).

29 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 678 (citations omitted).

30 Id. at 679.

31 Id.

32 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167 (1993).

33 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 9.

or rules which provided that inmates at LPDC were entitled to receive prompt medical

care for serious medical conditions, such as Plaintiff’s condition following his fall.34

Plaintiff further alleges that Sheriff Webre and LPSO, among other defendants,

were aware of the inadequate staffing, training, and supervision of medical and

correctional staff with regard to medical care and treatment of sick and/or injured

inmates.35 Plaintiff avers that Sheriff Webre and LPSO were ultimately responsible for

hiring, training, supervising, disciplining, and/or retaining all employees at LPDC, and

were responsible for all policies and procedures at LPDC.36 The Court addresses each of

these claims in turn.

I. LPSO is Not a Proper Party to This Action.

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue all claims against LPSO should be

dismissed, since LPSO is not an entity capable of being sued in federal court.37 Plaintiff

concedes that LPSO is an improper party for this reason in his opposition.38 Accordingly,

the claims against Defendant LPSO are dismissed with prejudice.

34 Id. at ¶ 14.

35 Id. at ¶ 10.

36 Id. at ¶ 13.

37 R. Doc. 21-1 at 5. (“The capacity of a non-corporate entity to sue or be sued in federal court is governed

by the law of the state where the district court is located. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(3). “The ‘law’ of the state

includes the ‘whole law,’ that is, both statutes and judicial decisions.” Morice v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. #3, 430

F. Supp. 3d 182, 198 (E.D. La. 2019)(citing Klebanow v. N.Y. Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir.

1965)). Accordingly, federal courts sitting in Louisiana will look to Louisiana law to determine whether

sheriff’s offices, jails, or correctional facilities are entities capable of suing or being sued. To possess such

capacity under Louisiana law, an entity must qualify as a “juridical person,” which is “an entity to which the

law attributes personality, such as a corporation or partnership.” La. Civ. Code art. 24. “The State of

Louisiana … grants no such legal status to any parish sheriff’s office.” Roy v. Orleans Par. Sheriff’s Off., No.

CIV.A. 09-6794, 2009 WL 4730697, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2009). Thus, they can neither sue nor be sued.

See Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Government, 279 F.3d 273, 283 (5th Cir. 2002); also

see Ruggiero v. Litchfield, 700 F.Supp. 863, 865 (M.D.La.1988).”).

38 R. Doc. 25 at 1 n.1.

II. Plaintiff has Stated a Claim Against Sheriff Craig Webre in His Official

Capacity as Sheriff of Lafourche Parish.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint names Sheriff Webre in his official capacity, as

Sheriff of Lafourche Parish.39 “A suit against a government official in his official capacity

is treated as suit against the entity.”40 Thus, a suit against Sheriff Webre in his official

capacity must be treated as a suit against the municipal entity of LPSO.41 Municipal

liability under § 1983, or Monell liability, requires proof of three elements: 1) a

policymaker, 2) an official policy or custom, and 3) a violation of constitutional rights

whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.42

A. Sheriff Webre is the Final Policymaker as to the Provision of Medical

Care in the Lafourche Parish Detention Center.

Defendants argue Sheriff Webre does not administer medical care to inmates at

LPDC.43 Defendants contend since medical care is independently administered by CH, “a

private corporation which holds a contract [with LPSO] to provide medical care to the

inmates,” Sheriff Webre cannot be liable as a policymaker under § 1983.44 However, it is

well-established that the Sheriff is the final policymaker as to the provision of medical

care in parish jails.45

The determination of whether the Sheriff is a final policymaker is a matter of

Louisiana state law.46 The Sheriff’s duty of operating LPDC and ensuring the safety and

39 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 1.

40 Belcher v. Lopinto, 492 F. Supp.3d 636, 658 (E.D. La. 2020) (citing Lee v. Morial, No. CIV. A 99-2952,

2000 WL 725882, at *2.

41 Id.

42 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of NY, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

43 R. Doc. 21-1 at 4.

44 Id. at 4-5.

45 Belcher, 492 F. Supp.3d at 658; see also Quatroy v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff’s Off., 2009 WL 1380196 * 1

(E.D. La. 2009).

46 McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 117 (1997) (citing St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,

123 (1988); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (“‘[W]hether a particular official has final

policymaking authority’ is a question of state law [.]’”).

well-being of the people he detains is derived from the Louisiana Constitution.47 After all,

Sheriffs are the “keeper[s] of the public jail”48 and the managing authority for the

functioning of the jail they run, and, “ha[ve] the obligation to provide medical care for the

prisoners.”49

Defendants appear to assert LPSO’s fulfillment of its duty under La. R.S. 15:703

(by contracting with CH) somehow relieves the Sheriff of his constitutional duty to ensure

the safety and well-being of inmates and pre-trial detainees.50 However, this contention

is not supported by relevant caselaw or Louisiana law. This Court provided a detailed

analysis of this issue in Mixon v. Pohlmann;51 the relevant reasoning from that decision

follows.

In Quatroy v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office, the family of a deceased inmate

brought a § 1983 municipal liability claim against Newell Normand in his official capacity

as the Sheriff of Jefferson Parish.52 The pretrial detainee was a known drug user.53 Despite

this knowledge, the pretrial detainee was not provided sufficient medical care, resulting

in his death.54 On the issue of whether Sheriff Normand was a policymaker, Judge Vance

recognized that “Court[s] [must] look to Louisiana law to ascertain the extent of the

Sheriff’s policy-making authority.”55 Faced with an argument by the defendant that “the

Sheriff was not the official source of policies relating to the healthcare of inmates” because

of the Parish’s responsibility to appoint a jail doctor or contract with a healthcare

47 Jones v. St. Tammany Par. Jail, 4 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613 (E.D. La. 1998) (citing La. Const. art. 5 § 27).

48 La. R.S. 15:704.

49 Jones, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 613.

50 R. Doc. 21 at 4-5.

51 2022 WL 2921733 (E.D. La. July 25, 2022).

52 2009 WL 1380196 *1 (E.D. La. 2009).

53 Id.

54 Id.

55 Id. at *4.

provider,56 the court parsed through the responsibilities of the Sheriff versus the parish

governing authority.

In terms of the Sheriff, under La. R.S. 15:704 and article 5 § 27 of the Louisiana

Constitution, the Sheriff is the keeper of the public jail of his or her parish.57 “Courts have

recognized . . . sheriffs are the final policymakers when it comes to the management of

jails,” the Sheriff is charged with the jail’s administration, and the Sheriff has the power

to “by all lawful means preserve the peace and apprehend all disturbers thereof.”58 The

parish governing authority, on the other hand, is responsible for either appointing a jail

physician or contracting with a healthcare provider to provide medical services for

detainees and inmates.59 Recognizing the shared responsibility for the medical treatment

of detainees and inmates, the Court held “despite the parish’s authority to choose the jail’s

healthcare provider, the Sheriff is the final policymaker when it comes to dealing with

inmates suffering [from] withdrawal within the jail”60 because “Louisiana law makes the

Sheriff the relevant policymaker in this regard.”61

More recently, in Belcher v. Lopinto, the court was faced with, among other issues,

a § 1983 municipal liability claim against Newell Normand and Joseph Lopinto in their

official capacities as current and former Sheriffs of Jefferson Parish following the suicide

death of a pretrial detainee at the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center.62 In Belcher, the

governing authority of Jefferson Parish satisfied its legal duty under La. R.S. 15:703 by

56 Id.

57 Id. at *5.

58 Id.

59 Id. (“The parish authority is generally not liable for the action or inaction of a physician or healthcare

provider. But the parish authority may be liable if it exercises ‘gross negligence of willful misconduct in the

performance of its duties and obligations imposed by [La. R.S. 15:703]’ and that gross negligence of willful

misconduct is a ‘substantial factor’ in causing a prisoner’s injury.”).

60 Id. (emphasis in original).

61 Id. at *6.

62 492 F.Supp.3d 636, 644 (E.D. La. 2020).

contracting CorrectHealth Jefferson, LLC to provide medical and mental care to inmates

and detainees.63 Even though this contractual relationship existed, as to the policymaker

element of a municipal liability claim, the Belcher court concluded “Sheriffs Normand

and Lopinto in their official capacities . . . [were] ‘policymakers’ for purposes of § 1983

liability” because “Sheriffs are the keepers of parish jails and final policymakers with

respect to jail management” under Louisiana law.64

As explained in Mixon, the Court agrees with the analyses in Quatroy and Belcher

and finds Defendant Sheriff Webre is a relevant policymaker regarding Plaintiffs’

municipal liability claims.65 The allegation that a contractual relationship exists between

LPSO and CH does not change this legal reality. This result is consistent with Louisiana

law, Mixon, Quatroy, and Belcher. Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

state a claim against Sheriff Webre in his official capacity as a policymaker for LPDC for

the purposes of § 1983 liability.

B. Plaintiff has Alleged Sufficient Facts to Support a Claim of Official

Policies and/or Customs Attributable to Sheriff Webre.

For purposes of Monell liability, an official policy may be either 1) “policy

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated

by the municipality’s lawmaking officers” or 2) “A persistent, widespread practice […]

which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so

common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal

policy.”66 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges Sheriff Webre has maintained

63 Id.

64 Id. at 658; see La. R.S. 15:704 (“[e]ach sheriff shall be the keeper of the public jail of his parish, and shall

by all lawful means preserve the peace and apprehend all disturbers thereof, and other public offenders.”).

65 2022 WL 2921733 at *8.

66 Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir.).

persistent widespread practices regarding the provision of healthcare and the staffing and

training of LPDC, which amount to de facto municipal policies.67

1. De Facto Policies Regarding Failure to Provide Adequate Medical

Care

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges Sheriff Webre maintained persistent,

widespread practices of 1) failing to provide adequate, necessary, and/or basic medical

attention to inmates at LPDC68 and, relatedly, 2) ignoring legitimate and serious medical

needs and/or complaints of pain by inmates.69 Defendant Webre argues Plaintiff has

failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim that these policies existed because

Plaintiff has failed to identify other inmates who have been denied adequate medical

care.70 Defendant Webre contends that without the identification of these other inmates,

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to support a claim that Sheriff Webre maintained

de facto policies of failing to provide adequate medical care.71

However, the cases cited by Defendant Webre to support his argument were

decided on summary judgment, not at the pleading stage.72 The Court knows of no case

suggesting this level of factual support is required at the pleading stage. Rather, the

relevant pleading standard, as defined by Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009), provides “legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, [if] they [are] supported by factual

allegations.”73

67 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 13-14, 19.

68 Id. at ¶ 9, 21.

69 Id. at ¶ 9, 28.

70 R. Doc. 21-1 at 8.

71 Id.

72 Id. at 9 (citing Arshad ex rel. Arshad v. Congemi, 2009 WL 585633 at *8-9 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished);

Gates v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008)).

73 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Much of Plaintiff’s inartful amended complaint is stated in the language of legal

conclusions. However, Plaintiff includes factual allegations regarding his own experiences

in LPDC which, assuming their veracity, as the Court must, support the claim that Sheriff

Webre maintained de facto policies of “ignoring legitimate and serious medical needs,”

and “failing to provide adequate medical attention to inmates.”74 Plaintiff alleges he

suffered a fall at LPDC, after which his body became paralyzed.75 Plaintiff alleges his

complaints of paralysis were “ignored” by the medical staff at LPDC who merely

instructed him to “lay [sic] in bed.”76 Plaintiff avers it was not until four days after the fall

that he was transported to Chabert Medical Center for treatment of his injuries.77 Plaintiff

was allegedly subsequently taken by helicopter to University Medical Center, where he

underwent emergency surgery.78 In Plaintiff’s own words, “even a lay person would know

that . . . inability to move ones legs is a severe medical issue, . . . requiring immediate

medical treatment.”79 Indeed, common sense would suggest that failure to adequately

treat an inmate who was experiencing paralysis for four days plausibly supports the

conclusion that a de facto policy existed at LPDC of ignoring serious medical needs and/or

failing to provide adequate medical attention. The allegation that Plaintiff immediately

underwent emergency surgery after receiving outside care further supports this

conclusion.

Relatedly, Plaintiff alleges Sheriff Webre failed to establish a policy or rule which

mandated that inmates of the jail were to receive prompt medical attention relative to

74 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 9, 28.

75 Id. at ¶ 7.

76 Id.

77 Id. at ¶ 8.

78 Id.

79 Id. at ¶ 7(b).

their serious medical needs.80 Defendant Webre argued that Plaintiff failed to allege

sufficient facts of “‘a pattern of similar constitutional violations’ due to deficient

policies.”81 Once again, Defendant erroneously relies on a case decided at the summary

judgment stage to argue that specific allegations related to such an alleged pattern is

required to plausibly state a claim of a de facto policy at the pleading stage.82

As discussed above, the alleged inadequate treatment of Plaintiff’s paralysis, along

with Plaintiff’s subsequent emergency surgery support the inference that Plaintiff was in

blatant need of significant medical care, which he allegedly did not receive at LPDC

throughout the four days following his fall. Plaintiff’s allegations about his treatment

plausibly support a claim that Sheriff Webre failed to establish and/or enforce a policy

requiring that inmates receive prompt and adequate medical attention.

Accordingly, the Court “draw[s] on its judicial experience and common sense”83 to

find Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a claim that Sheriff

Webre maintained insufficient policies and/or failed to maintain any policies regarding

the adequate provision of healthcare at LPDC.

2. De Facto Policies Regarding Understaffing and Failure to Train

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff further alleges Sheriff Webre maintained

persistent, widespread practices of 1) failing to train and/or supervise the employees of

LPDC with regard to the medical care and treatment of sick and/or injured inmates84 and,

80 Id. at 19 ¶ 14.

81 R. Doc. 21-1 at 9.

82 Id. at 9 (citing Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 447 (5th Cir. 2011)).

83 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

84 R. Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 10, 28, 28(b).

relatedly, 2) inadequately staffing LPDC.85 The Court addresses each of these alleged

policies in turn.

a. Failure to Train

“[T]he failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for

which the [Defendants are] responsible, and for which [they] may be held liable if it

actually causes injury.”86 Defendant Webre argues Plaintiff has failed to allege with

sufficient specificity how the training program at issue is defective.87 Again, Defendant

erroneously relies on a case decided at the summary judgment stage to support his

contention that detailed allegations of the deficient training program are required to

plausibly state a claim of this de facto policy at the pleading stage.88 Defendant contends

that Plaintiff provided only conclusory allegations without “any facts whatsoever to

support [his] claim.”89

However, as discussed above, Plaintiff includes factual allegations regarding his

own experiences in LPDC which, assuming their veracity, support the claim that Sheriff

Webre maintained de facto policies of failing to train the employees at LPDC. Plaintiff

alleges after his fall, he suffered from paralysis for four days before being provided with

adequate and necessary medical treatment.90 The Court reasonably infers from these

allegations that several staff members at LPDC were aware, or should have been aware,

of Plaintiffs condition over the course of four days. The lack of response from those staff

members plausibly indicates a failure on the part of Sheriff Webre to train and/or

85 Id. at ¶ 9, 28.

86 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).

87 R. Doc. 21-1 at 10.

88 Id. at 10 (citing Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2009)).

89 Id. at 11.

90 R. Doc. 19 ¶¶ 7-8.

supervise the employees of LPDC with regard to the medical care and treatment of sick

and/or injured inmates.

Accordingly, the Court “draw[s] on its judicial experience and common sense”91 to

find Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a claim that Sheriff

Webre maintained a policy of failing to train the employees of LPDC.

b. Understaffing

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Webre was aware of “inadequate staffing” at LPDC and

“knew, must have known, or should have know that the standard of care for those

experiencing health crises could not be met by the . . . staffing at the prison.”92 In his first

motion to dismiss, Defendant Webre argued that Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to

state a claim of understaffing.93 Plaintiff failed to provide any additional facts supporting

these allegations in his amended complaint.94 While the Court may reasonably infer that,

subsequent to Plaintiff’s fall, some employees were on duty who did not adequately

respond to the situation, as discussed above, the Court has no indication of how many

employees were on duty at that time, and whether LPDC could be considered

understaffed. The Court agrees with Defendant Webre that “Plaintiff’s general and

conclusory allegations of understaffing,”95 without more factual support, cannot support

a claim that Sheriff Webre maintained a policy of understaffing LPDC. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff Webre regarding understaffing is dismissed with

prejudice.

91 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

92 R. Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 10-11.

93 R. Doc. 12-1 at 9-10.

94 See generally, R. Doc. 19.

95 R. Doc. 21-1 at 11.

C. Plaintiff has Alleged Sufficient Facts to Support a Claim of Deliberate

Indifference Against Sheriff Webre.

The third element of a Monell claim is proof of a violation of constitutional rights

whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.96 Mr. Marshall alleges violations of both his

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result of the de facto policies of Sheriff

Webre.97

“The Eighth Amendment ensures the safety of convicted prisoners while due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees.”98 In this case, Mr.

Marshall appears to have been a pretrial detainee.99 Nevertheless, “[t]he proper analysis

of each category of claims is the same, as [the Fifth Circuit’s] ‘Fourteenth Amendment

case law concerning pretrial detainees [is based] on the Supreme Court’s Eighth

Amendment precedent concerning prisoners.’”100

A pretrial detainee may prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating either

“an unconstitutional condition of confinement” or an “unconstitutional episodic act or

omission.”101 These two avenues for § 1983 claims come with separate inquiries.102

Plaintiff has clarified in his opposition to the instant motion that he alleges a violation

based on an unconstitutional episodic act or omission.103

96 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

97 R. Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 17-21.

98 Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added) (citing Hare v. City of

Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996)).

99 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 18. The allegations provided in Plaintiff’s amended complaint do not explicitly address

whether Mr. Marshall was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the time of the alleged injury.

However, his amended complaint appears to distinguish his position from “convicted prisoners.” (R. Doc.

19 ¶ 18). As such, the Court assumes Mr. Marshall was a pretrial detainee for the purposes of this ruling.

100 Baughman, 935 F.3d at 306 (third alteration in original) (quoting Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626,

634 (5th Cir. 2019)).

101 Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 727 (5th Cir. 2020).

102 Id.

103 R. Doc. 25 at 5.

In an episodic act or omission case, courts “employ different standards depending

on whether the liability of the individual defendant or the municipal defendant is at

issue.”104 In this case, Sheriff Webre is sued in his official capacity, and, as such, the

liability of the municipal defendant only is at issue.105 “To establish municipal liability in

an episodic-act case, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) that the municipal employee violated [the

pretrial detainee's] clearly established constitutional rights with subjective deliberate

indifference; and (2) that this violation resulted from a municipal policy or custom

adopted and maintained with objective deliberate indifference.’”106

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges Sheriff Webre maintained the de facto

policies regarding the provision of health care and the deficient training of employees at

LPSO, discussed above, with deliberate indifference.107 “To succeed on a deliberate-

indifference claim, plaintiffs must show that (1) the official was ‘aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ and (2) the

official actually drew that inference.”108 “[O]fficial conduct must be ‘wanton,’ which is

defined to mean ‘reckless.’”109 Deliberate indifference “requires that the defendant act

with ‘something more than mere negligence’ but ‘less than acts or omissions for the very

purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.’”110

104 Baughman, 935 F.3d at 307 (quoting Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir.

1999)).

105 See discussion supra Section A.

106 Cadena, 946 F.3d at 728 (alteration in original) (quoting Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 331 (5th

Cir. 2008)).

107 R. Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 10, 13-14, 21, 28; see discussion supra Section I(B).

108 Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 239

F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001)).

109 Baughman, 935 F.3d at 307 (quoting Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420 (5th

Cir. 2017)).

110 Cadena, 946 F.3d at 728 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)).

1. Plaintiff Has Alleged Sheriff’s Policies Regarding Failure to Provide

Adequate Medical Care Were Adopted with Deliberate Indifference.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Webre maintained the inadequate policies regarding

the provision of medical care, discussed above, with deliberate indifference.111 Plaintiff

avers that Defendant’s knowledge that the deficient policies were “inadequate and posed

a danger of serious bodily harm to inmates at LPDC,” and Defendant’s refusal to “take

action to correct these policies,” indicate “deliberate indifference to the serious risks to

inmates.”112 The Court agrees. Defendant Webre devotes the majority of his motion to

dismiss to arguments that the alleged inadequate policies regarding the provision of

healthcare do not exist, and does not contest Plaintiff’s contention that if, as alleged, the

policies exist, they were adopted and maintained with deliberate indifference.113

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that

Sheriff Webre maintained the policies regarding failure to provide adequate medical care

with deliberate indifference.

2. Plaintiff Has Alleged Sheriff’s Policies Regarding Failure to Train

Were Adopted with Deliberate Indifference.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Webre was deliberately indifferent in his failure to train

the employees of LPDC.114 Defendant Webre argues Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient

facts to show deliberate indifference in his failure to train because Plaintiff has not “cited

a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” which would put

the Sheriff on notice that a substantial risk of serious harm existed.115 Defendant supports

111 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 15, 20, 21, 28

112 Id. at ¶ 15.

113 See generally R. Doc. 21-1.

114 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 28, 28(b).

115 R. Doc. 21-1 at 10.

this contention with a citation to an opinion issued on appeal after a jury verdict,"° and

so once again, does not properly assess the level of factual specificity required at the

pleading stage. Assuming the Sheriff failed to properly train the employees of LPDC as to

the provision of necessary medical treatment, as alleged, the Court may properly infer

that the existence of this deficiency in training was reckless, in and of itself, since it

involved such a crucial issue of safety for the jail. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff

has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that Sheriff Webre maintained the policies

regarding failure to train with deliberate indifference.

CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to defendant

Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office and DENIED as to Sheriff Craig Webre, except as to the

claim regarding understaffing, which is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff

Michael Marshall’s claims against Lafourche Parish Sheriffs Office under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of September, 2023.

68 nba

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16 Td, (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)).

18