The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PRESTON LEWIS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER: 22-4007
JONATHAN FRIEDMAN, ET AL. SECTION: “P” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are various motions referred to the undersigned by the District
Court Judge for an order or orders. (Rec. doc. 102). A short background of the underlying
facts of this lawsuit will aid in the understanding of the resolution of these mportoi osnes.
This litigation arises from law enforcement’s alleged arrest of Plaintiff
Preston Lewis (“Plaintiff”) and the seizure of $11,020.00 inin ctears ha olian Plaintiff’s person (the
“Cash”). (Rec. doc. 39). Plaintiff brings claims against, , Defendants Jonathan
Friedman (“Friedman”), a Commissioner at Orleans Criminal District Court; and Troy
Pichon (“Pichon”), Steve Lynn (“Lynn”), and Trent Cuccia (“Cuccia”), all three of whom are
Louisiana State Troopers.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on October 2, 2019, while boarding
an Amtrak train in New Orleans, Louisiana, he was approached by Defendants, Raymond
Del Valle and Pichon, who told him they were looking for an individual named Brandon
Lewis. (Rec. doc. 39 at 6). After Plaintiff told them that he was not Brandon Lewis and
presented his identification card, Plaintiff allIedg.es that he was detained and taken to a room
where he “was searched against his will.” ( ). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Del Valle
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and Pichon waited for Lynn to arrive with his K-9, at which time the officers “spIrde.ad
[Plaintiff’s] bags over the room” and allowed the dog to perform an “open air sniff.” ( at
6-7). Plaintiff contends that he was wearing a heart monitor, sat for a long period of timIde,.
complained of chest pains, “and was told to shut up” as the officers searched his bags. (
at 7). Plaintiff alleges that the officers found the cash in one of his bags and proceeded to
confiscate it and his Amtrak ticket even though PlainItdif.f asserted his Fifth Amendment
rights and told them that he had a receipt for the cash. ( ).
Plaintiff further alleges that, after he was released, he “was presented a notice of
pending forfeiture,” andI dh.e filed “a claim with the Orleans Parish District Court” for the
return of his property. ( at 10). Plaintiff avers that he called the District Attorney’s Office
and spoke with Defendant, Blaise D’Antoni, “an attorney of the said property forfeiture,”
who told Plaintiff “the case was over and that the court sent certified mail to the addreIsds.
[Plaintiff] had on file and that [Plaintiff had] lost [his] property for failure to respond.” (
at 11).
Plaintiff hired an attorney and attempted to retrieve the ash, all to no avail and –
according to Plaintiff’s alIlde.g ations – due to the fault of his attorney and the Orleans
Criminal District Court. ( at 11-13). On October 18, 2022, Plaintiff sued Defendants in
this Court for negligence, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his civil rights in
violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
(collectively, the “Section 1983 Claims”), and claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
AIcdt. of 1973 (the “Rehabilitation Act Claim”). Plaintiff also seeks $50 million in damages.
( at 16).
On December 8, 2022, Friedman filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
Failure to State a Claim, and for Insufficient Service of Process (“Friedman’s First Motion to
Dismiss”). (Rec. doc. 9). On January 5, 2023, Pichon, Lynn, and Cuccia ( the “State
Troopers”) filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Failure to State a Claim, and
for Insufficient Service of Process (“State Troopers’ First Motion to Dismiss”). (Rec. doc.
20). On January 13, 2023, this Court allowed Plaintiff to amend his complaint, and
Friedman and the State Troopers updated their motions to dismiss. (Rec. docs. 25, 40, 47).
On May 9, 2023, the District Court, Chief Judge Brown, to whom this lawsuit was
originally allotted, held:
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for damages
against Movants in their official capacities and dismisses those claims
without prejudice. Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Movants are
prescribed and so the Court dismisses those claims with prejudice.
Therefore, the Court need not reach the other grounds for dismissal raised by
Movants. While the Court understands Plaintiff’s difficult predicament, the
facts alleged establish that his claims are prescribed as a matter of law.
(Rec. doc. 57 at 23). (footnote omittedI)d. . The Court thus granted Friedman’s and the State
Troopers’ second motions to dismiss. ( at 23-24).
Since the District Court’s ruling, Plaintiff has littered the docket with motions
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directed at the dismissed Defendants. The first motion before the Court is Plaintiff’s
Motion to Modify and to Strike. (Rec. doc. 74). The motion is opposed, (rec. doc. 78), and
Plaintiff filed a reply. (Rec. doc. 80). On June 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed this motion, which is
technically his third attempt to set aside Chief Judge Brown’s May 9, 2023 order in which
she dismissed the claims against Friedman the State Troopers. (Rec. doc. 57). Plaintiff now
moves to strike Chief Judge Brown’s Order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
However, as previously noted by Chief Judge Brown, under Rule 12(f), a judBguer’ns eotrtd ve. rA iRsC nCoAt
aIn pcl.eading that can be stricken from the record. (Rec. doc. 67 at 2) (citing
, No. 15-1214, 2016 WL 828151, at *4 (W.D. La. Feb. 25, 2016) (denying motion to
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strike a motion to dismiss because “[m]otions to strike under Rule 12(f) are not authorized
to be filed against other motions, only pleadinpglesa”)d)i.n g
A judge’s order is not consideSreecd. &a Exch. Com umn'dne vr. FRauulelk n7e(ra), which a document
must be to strike it under Rule 12(f). , No. 3:16-CV-1735-D,
2019 WL 2515000, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2019) (“Rule 7(a) provides a list of permitted
‘pleadings’ that determines what constitutes a pleading that is subject to being stricken
under Rule 12(f).”). The only pleadings permitted by the Federal Rules are a complaint, an
answer to a complaint, an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim, an
answer to a cross claim, a third party complaint, an answer to a third party complaint, and,
if the court orders one, a reply to an answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). Because a judge’s order is
not a pleading, Rule 12(f)D isE NnoIEt Dapplicable here. Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify and to Strike
(rec. doc. 74) is therefore .
The second motion is Plaintiff’s Motion to Submit Evidence. (Rec. doc. 75). The
motion is unopposed. Having reviewed the motion and finding that the
evidence/documents GthRaAt NPTlaEiDntiff seeks to submit are public records and known to all
parties, the motion is .
The next motion is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave of Court to File Supplemental
Pleading. (Rec. doc. 76). Friedman opposes the motion. (Rec. doc. 79). Plaintiff’s motion
must be denied for several reasons. First, on May 30, 2023, Chief Judge Brown notified
Plaintiff that he was required to file any future contested motions with a memorandum in
support and a notice of submission, (rec. doc. 67), yet he failed to comply with those
instructions with regard to this motion, which has neither a memorandum in support nor a
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notice of submission. Indeed, Plaintiff even failed to contact any Defendant to determine
whether he opposed the motion. And because Plaintiff failed to file a memorandum in
support, he does not address the factors under Rule 15 that control whether he may be
allowed to file a supplemental (or amended) complaint.
The Court notes that when Plaintiff earlier sought to amend his pleadings, Chief
Judge Brown specifically found that any potential amendment against Friedman would be
futile and any attempt to amend the pleadings would be judicially inefficient. (Rec. doc. 57
at 23 n.147). She held that any official-capacity claim against Commissioner Friedman
would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and any individual-capacity claim would be
barred by absolute judicial immunity, as all claims against Friedman sItde.m from his actions
as a judicial officer for the Criminal District Court for Orleans Parish. ( at n.147, 148).
Moreover, Plaintiff failed to attach any proposed pleading/amendment to his motion
which would allow this Court and Friedman to verify if he veritably seeks to add
supplemental claimsD thEaNtI hEaDv e arisen since the filing of his original complaint. The motion
(rec. doc. 76) is thus as futile.
Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Strike Defendants’ Attorney and all Pleadings on
File from Attorneys of Defendant Jonathan Friedman. (Rec. doc. 81). Friedman opposes
the motion, (rec. doc. 82), and Plaintiff filed a reply. (Rec. doc. 86). The basis for Plaintiff’s
motion appears to be that “it is illegal for a corporation to act as a pro se in a case.” (Rec.
Doc. 81 at 2). Plaintiff further argues that “the law provides that no corporation can act as a
See also
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E.D. La. Loc. R. 7.4 (“All contested motions must be accompanied by separate memoranda which
must contain a concise statement of reasons supporting the motion and citations of authorities. If the motion
pro se litigant in a case that they are [a part] of and therefore must be represented by [a]
license[d] attorney who is not [a part] of the company or corporation.” (Rec. doc. 81 at 2).
This motion is beyonprdo f rsievolous. It is axiomatic that Friedman is not a corporation,
and he does not proceed in this lawsuit. He is represented by the Office of the
Louisiana Attorney General. Liberally construing Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff appears to
seek to disqualify counsel for Friedman, potentially arguing that the Office of the Attorney
General is a “corporation.” To the extent the motion may be construed as a motion to
disqualify, this Court must carefully consider such a motion because of the potential for
abuse, and because sInu crhe mAomti.o Anisr lminaeys be used as “procedural weapons” to advance purely
tactical purposes. , 972 F.2d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 1992). “Motions to
disqualify are generally disfavored andL erleequuxi-rTeh uab rhoingh v . sItbaenrdiaa rPda ro. fG porvo’tof so as not to
deprive a party of its chosen counsel.” , Civ. A. No. 13-
852, 2015 WL 339617, *4 (W.D. La. Jan. 23, 2015). The Fifth Circuit has held that attorney
disqualification, particularly disqualifying an entire firm (or here, the enFt.Dir.eI. CO. fvfi.c Ue .So.f Ftihree
AIntst.o Cron.ey General) “is a sanction that must not be imposed cavalierly.”
, 50 F.3d 1304, 1316 (5th Cir. 1995).
Under Louisiana law, the Louisiana Attorney General is statutorily obligated to
defend state officials and state employees who are sued for tort damages, such as in this
lawsuit. La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5108.1. While Plaintiff alleges that the representation of
Friedman by the Department of Justice is “illegal” due to its “corporate” status, state law
unequivocally gives the Attorney General the sole responsibility to determine if a state
official or employee meets the legal threshold for defense. La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5108.1(B). A
plaintiff, including Lewis, cannot override the Attorney General’s determination made
Speuer sHuaawnkt itnos hvi.s S satnadtuertosry role, particularly when he is neither a current nor a former client.
, Civ. A. No. 10-13323, 2020 WL 6582263, *4 (M.D. La. Nov. 10, 2020)
(“Because the Attorney General’s Office’s representation of [the State defendants] is
mandated by Louisiana statute, this Court cannot find that the representation creates an
appearance of impropriety or that the public interest is harmed by the representation.
There is no disqualifying conflict arising of [Plaintiff’s] theory that the Attorney General’s
Office cannot represent a state official or employee alleged to have violated Louisiana
cDrEimNiInEaDl law.”). Plaintiff’s vacuous arguments fail here. The motion (rec. doc. 81) is
.
Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Summons and
Complaint. (Rec. doc. 83). The motion is unopposed. From the convoluted docket sheet in
this case, it is entirely unclear what “summons and complaint” Plaintiff seeks an extension
of time to serve. Plaintiff has moved numerous times for similar extensions, the majority of
which have been denied. Defendants are well aware of the allegations in this lawsuit,
having filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims and ultimately prevailing on those
motions. Affidavits of service (rec. docs. 93-96) have now been filed into the record since
the filing of this motion,D aInSdM iItS tShEuDs aApSp MeaOrOs Tthat this motion is now moot. Accordingly, the
motion (rec. doc. 83) is .
Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions. (Rec. doc. I8d4. ). Plaintiff
seeks sanctions against Friedman and his counsel under Rule 11(c)(2). ( at 1). Yet
Plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 11, which provide that a
motion for sanctions must be served to an opposing party but “must not be filed or be
presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is
withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(2). This creates a “safe harbor” period during which a party can avoid sanctions by
withdrawinSge eo rM caorrgreetcitsi nv.g F tuhreg cehsoanllenged document or position after receiving a motion for
sanctions. , 666 F. App’x 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff failed to
serve his mDoEtNioInE Dfo r sanctions to DefendaSneet FMraiecdkmeya nv. bAemfo. rMe ufilltiin-Cgi nite wmiat,h I tnhce. Court. The
motion is on this basis alone. , No. CV 20-
1350, 2023 WL 4637076, at *2 (E.D. La. July 20, 2023) (denying Defendant's motion for
sanctions under Rule 11 for failing to comply with Rule 11’s safe harbor requirements).
The Court does not rest here, however. Plaintiff specifically seeks sanctions against
Friedman and his attorneys because they have filed oppositions to his motions addressed
in this Order even though Friedman and his cPoluaninsetilf fh iasv teh eb epeanr ttye rwmhion ahteads, firno mef fetchte,
dlaiwrescutilty. pTrhoims pist efadl ltahceio oupsp aots iittsio bness ftr, ogmiv eFnr itehdamt an and his counsel by filing the motions
against Friedman and his counsel even though they have been dismissed from this
lawsuit
. Plaintiff is thus the offender here and has himself precipitated the filing of the
oppositions, which would not be necessary if Plaintiff respected that Friedman and his
counsel are no longer parties to this lawsuit.
It does not end there, however. Even though Plaintiff seeks more than a $1 million
sanction award under Rule 11, he also mentions 28 U.S.C. §v e1r9b2a7t i(ma separate provision
under which a court may award sanctions). The Court quotes :
Under federal statute section 1927 of title 28 state any attorney or other
person admitted conducting cases in any cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiples the proceedings in any case
as to increase cost unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to personally satisfy such excess cost.
(Rec. doc. 84 at 2). Citation to this paragraph is galling to say the least, given that all of the
motions that this Order addresses have been filed by Plaintiff, who is unreasonably and
vexatiously multiplying these proceedings with his harassing aPnlda ianbtuifsf ivseh omuoldti obne pcraarcetifcuel
awghaaint sht ep parratiyess fworh o have been dismissed from this lawsuit.
as he may soon find himself subject to a pcroom speeting motion for sanctions
for abusing the judicial process in this lawsuit. No party – or otherwise – is allowed
to abuse the judicial process simply because he is unhappy with the outcome.
Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Strike Defendants Troy Pichon, Steve Lynn, and
Trent CuccDiaI SAMttIoSrSnEeDy [AsiSc ] MfrOomOT Record. (Rec. doc. 91). The motion is unopposed. This
motion is given that these three Defendants have already been
dismissed from this lawsuit, (rec. doc. 57), and for the same reasons outlined with regard to
the Motion to Strike Defendants’ Attorney and all Pleadings on File from Attorneys of
Defendant Jonathan Friedman. (Rec. doc. 81).
Plaintiff then moves to strike Defendant Jonathan Friedman’s attorney from the
case. (Rec. doc. 92). This moDtiEoNnI iEsD opposed, (rec. doc. 97), and Plaintiff filed a reply. (Rec.
doc. 100). This motion is given that Friedman has been dismissed from this
lawsuit, (rec. doc. 57), and for the same reasons outlined with regard to the Motion to
Strike Defendants’ Attorney and all Pleadings on File from Attorneys of Defendant Jonathan
Friedman. (Rec. doc. 81).
Lastly, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to See Attorney’s for Defendant Jonathan
Friedman Foreign Registration Statement and Anti Bribery Statement. (Rec. doc. 101). The
motion is unopposed. It is also incomprehensible. Plaintiff provides no reason why he
needs to see this information (if it even exists). Plaintiff recognizes that, if they do exist,
these documents must be matters of public record. (Rec. doc. 101 at 1). This Court does
not compel production of documents to which both parDtiEesN IhEaDve access and that are
matters of public record. The motion 7(rthec. doc. 101) iSs ethputes mber .
New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2023.
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNIT ED ST ATES M AGIST RATE JUDGE