The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
OSCAR DANTZLER CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS No. 22-2211
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT SECTION I
OF JUSTICE, ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion1 filed by pro se plaintiff Oscar Dantzler
(“Dantzler”) to “vacate” this Court’s orders2 adopting the reports and
recommendations3 of the U.S. Magistrate Judge and this Court’s judgment4 in favor
of remaining defendants5 Claiborne W. Brown (“Brown”) and Merrick Garland
(“Garland”), individually and in his capacity of U.S. Attorney General. Also before
this Court is a motion6 filed by Dantzler for leave to file an untimely objection to the
U.S. Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation that Dantzler’s claims against
Brown be dismissed without prejudice. For the reasons below, the Court denies the
motions.
1 R. Doc. No. 17.
2 R. Doc. Nos. 12 and 15.
3 R. Doc. Nos. 11 and 14.
4 R. Doc. No. 16.
5 All other defendants to the above-captioned action were previously dismissed. See
R. Doc. Nos. 9 (dismissing with prejudice defendants U.S. Department of Justice, U.S.
District Judge Jay Zainey, and U.S. Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld) and 12
(granting Dantzler’s motion and dismissing without prejudice defendants Cashe
Coudrain & Bass LLP, Andre Coudrain, Ashley Edwards Bass, Indigo K. Diekmann,
and Jamie Polozola Gomez and their unidentified agents one through five).
6 R. Doc. No. 18.
I. BACKGROUND
Though his complaint, styled as a “Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and/or
Petition for a Writ Prohibition,”7 is difficult to parse, it appears that Dantzler seeks,
among other things, to compel the United States Department of Justice and its agents
to investigate and prosecute a criminal complaint that Dantzler filed against Brown,
his former attorney, and opposing counsel in Dantzler v. Tangipahoa Parish School
Board et al., E.D. La. Civil Action No. 20-2960.8 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his
claims against several defendants,9 and the U.S. Magistrate Judge issued reports and
recommendations on September 7, 2022 and January 10, 2023, recommending that
Dantzler’s claims against the remaining two defendants be dismissed without
prejudice.
7 R. Doc. No. 1.
8 Id. at 3 (“[T]he U.S.D.O.J. Office and their agents had a [m]andatory duty to
investigate plaintiff’s criminal complaint and to meet with the plaintiff pertaining to
the alleged fraudulent [sic] of documents and other matters, and the conspiracy
between all of the attorneys of record . . . . Plaintiff have [sic] filed a criminal
complaint with the U.S.D.O.J. Office against the mention [sic] parties, and these
attorneys Claiborne Brown, Andre Coudrain, Ashley E. Bass, Indigo K. Diekman
[sic], and Jamie P. Gomez requesting a thorough criminal investigation under the
R.I.C.O. ACT . . . , but to know [sic] avail all was ignored intentionally, by the
U.S.D.O.J. Office and their agents for some unknown reason and as of this date of
filing the U.S.D.O.J. Office had not responded to plaintiff’s criminal complaint.”).
9 R. Doc. Nos. 8 (Dantzler’s motion for voluntary dismissal of defendants U.S.
Department of Justice, U.S. District Judge Jay Zainey and U.S. Magistrate Janis van
Meerveld), 10 (Dantzler’s motion to dismiss defendants Cashe Coudrain & Bass LLP,
Andre Coudrain (individually and in his capacity as an attorney), Ashley Edwards
Bass (individually and in her capacity as an attorney), Indigo K. Diekmann
(individually and in her capacity as an associate attorney), and Jamie Polozola Gomez
(individually and in her capacity as an associate attorney) and their unidentified
agents one through five), and 19 (Dantzler’s motion for voluntary dismissal of Brown).
The first report and recommendation recommended that Dantzler’s claims
against Garland, individually and in his capacity as U.S. Attorney General, be
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the second
recommended that Dantzler’s claims against Brown be dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(m) and 41(b). The Court adopted both
reports and recommendations10 and, on January 31, 2023, issued an order entering
judgment in favor of the remaining two defendants, Garland and Brown.11
On February 14, 2023, Dantzler filed the instant motions to “vacate the judge’s
[order and] judgments dated January 31, 2023 that were rendered[] against the
plaintiff”12 and for leave to file an untimely objection to the U.S. Magistrate Judge’s
report and recommendation that Dantzler's claims against Brown be dismissed
without prejudice.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a party may file a motion to alter or amend
a judgment no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Rule 59(e) motions
“serve the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact
or to present newly discovered evidence.” Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468,
473 (5th Cir. 1989). “Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary
remedy that should be used sparingly.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473,
479 (5th Cir. 2004). “[S]uch a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence,
10 R. Doc. Nos. 12, 15.
11 R. Doc. No. 16.
12 R. Doc. No. 17.
legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry
of judgment.” Id. (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
“A moving party must satisfy at least one of the following four criteria to
prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion: (1) the movant demonstrates the motion is necessary
to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; (2) the
movant presents new evidence; (3) the motion is necessary in order to prevent
manifest injustice; [or] (4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in the
controlling law.” Jupiter v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 99-0628, 1999 WL 796218,
at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 1999) (Vance, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Dantzler’s motion to vacate does not specify the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
pursuant to which he seeks relief. The Court will therefore construe his motion to
vacate as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the court’s orders adopting the U.S.
Magistrate Judge’s reports and recommendations and dismissing the remaining
defendants. See Stone v. Brown, No. 10-150, 2010 WL 4955779, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec.
1, 2010) (construing pro se motions to vacate judgment and for a new trial as Rule
59(e) motions).
The instant motion to vacate was filed within the 28-day timeline
contemplated by Rule 59(e).13 The motion does not allege manifest error of law or fact,
present new evidence, or point to any intervening changes in law. By process of
13 See R. Doc. Nos. 16, 17, 18.
elimination, therefore, it appears that Dantzler is alleging that the instant motion is
necessary to avoid manifest injustice. See Jupiter, 1999 WL 796218, at *1.
Dantzler argues that he “had no knowledge of [the U.S. Magistrate Judge’s]
Report and Recommendation letter” as he “resigned from old job [sic] and started
working for a new company which is out of town in another parish and plaintiff has
not been back in town to check his mail for a few months.”14 Per Local Rule 11.1,
“[e]ach attorney and pro se litigant has a continuing obligation promptly to notify the
court of any address or telephone number change.” Therefore, if Dantzler moved to a
new address, he was obligated to inform the Court of the change.
Even if Dantzler did not permanently move addresses, and therefore intended
to continue using his current address, his admitted failure to check his mail for “a
few months”15 and therefore to timely object to the U.S. Magistrate Judge’s reports
and recommendations, resulting in his claims against the remaining defendants
being dismissed without prejudice, does not present a “manifest injustice.” “Plaintiffs
[have] a duty of diligence to inquire about the status of their case.” Trevino v. City of
Fort Worth, 944 F.3d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 2019). Any arguments16 Dantzler may have
14 R. Doc. No. 17, at 1.
15 Id.
16 Per Dantzler’s motion for leave to file an untimely response to the U.S. Magistrate
Judge’s report and recommendation pertaining to Brown, Dantzler alleges that he
did not file the necessary return of service reflecting service of process on Brown
because Dantzler’s “process server had died before summons could be fill[ed] out . . .
.” R. Doc. No. 18, at 2. As well, Dantzler’s motion for leave to file an untimely response
appears to request that his claims against Brown be voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice. Id. at 2 (“[P]laintiff prays . . . the court to [sic] consider plaintiff’s pleading
and motion against the remaining defendant . . . CLAIBORNE W. BROWN . . . also
be dismissed without prejudice . . . .”). As the Court has already dismissed Dantzler’s
offered in response to the recommended dismissal of his claims could have been
timely made prior to the Court’s entry of judgment if he had exercised a minimum
level of due diligence in checking his mail.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Dantzler’s motion!” to vacate this Court’s orders
adopting the U.S. Magistrate Judge’s reports and recommendations and this Court’s
entry of judgment in favor of defendant Brown and Garland is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dantzler’s motion!® requesting leave to
file an untimely objection to the U.S. Magistrate Judge’s January 10, 2023 report and
recommendation is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, April 3, 2023.
oad M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
claims against Brown without prejudice, R. Doc. Nos. 15, 16 and 19, Dantzler’s motion
is denied.
17 R. Doc. No. 17.
18 R. Doc. No. 18.