Grant v. Gusman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RODNEY GRANT CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS CASE NO. 17-2797

MARLIN GUSMAN et al. SECTION: “G”(3)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Plaintiff Rodney Grant’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Attorney’s Fees.1 In

the motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court award him $211,989.94 in attorney’s fees and costs

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as the prevailing party in this action. Plaintiff prevailed on claims

related to alleged violations of his constitutional and state law rights by Defendants the Orleans

Parish Sheriff’s Office’s (“OPSO”), former Sheriff Marlin Gusman (“Gusman”), OPSO Sheriff

Susan Hutson (“Hutson”), OPSO Captain Sidney Holt (“Holt”), OPSO Deputy Corey Amacker

(“Amacker”) (collectively, “OPSO Defendants”).2 OPSO Defendants oppose the motion and ask

the Court to award $35,000 in attorney’s fees and costs.3 Plaintiff replies in further support of the

motion.4 Having considered the motion, the memoranda in support and opposition, the record, and

the applicable law, the Court grants the motion in part, denies it in part, and awards Plaintiff

1 Rec. Doc. 261.

2 Id. at 1–2. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), a “court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a

reasonable attorney’s fee.”

3 Rec. Doc. 264 at 21.

4 Rec. Doc. 268.

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$103,830.84 in attorney’s fees and costs.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

On July 2, 2000, Plaintiff was arrested for simple burglary in New Orleans, Louisiana.5

Plaintiff allegedly spent 61 days in Orleans Parish Prison (“OPP”) following his arrest before being

released from OPP custody on September 3, 2000 after the District Attorney failed to file a Bill of

Information before the statutory deadline.6 Plaintiff avers that on October 30, 2000, the District

Attorney filed a Bill of Information against Plaintiff.7 Plaintiff asserts that his arraignment was

rescheduled because of a court closure and Plaintiff did not appear for arraignment on November

29, 2000 because he did not receive a summons.8 Plaintiff alleges that the Bill of Information

eventually expired by operation of law but his arrest warrant for the simple burglary charge from

November 2000 “stayed in the system.”9

Thereafter, between 2008 and 2015, Plaintiff was incarcerated in the custody of the

Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (the “DOC”) at the Dixon Correctional

Institute for a different crime.10 On June 27, 2016, approximately one year after his release from

the Dixon Correctional Institute, Plaintiff was trying to obtain a driver’s license when was arrested

5 Rec. Doc. 48 at 2.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 2–3.

8 Id. at 3.

9 Id.

10 Id. Rec. Doc. 129-18 at 1.

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for simple burglary based on the November 2000 warrant issued nearly sixteen years earlier.11 On

June 30, 2016, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the simple burglary charge in Orleans Parish Criminal

District Court before Judge Camille Buras (“Judge Buras”).12 Judge Buras sentenced Plaintiff to

one year at the Department of Corrections, with “credit for time served from 9-14-08 to 2015” (the

time Plaintiff had served at Dixon Correctional Institute on the earlier crime).13

On June 30, 2016, the day of sentencing, Judge Buras contacted Blake Arcuri (“Arcuri”), an

attorney for OPSO, to request expedited processing for Plaintiff.14 Arcuri then sent an email to

OPSO employees stating: “[Plaintiff] really shouldn’t have to actually serve any time once DOC

processes it.”15 Gusman responded to Arcuri’s email on the same day, stating that “once [Plaintiff]

enters a plea and is sentenced, we can get the DOC to compute his time.”16 Holt also responded to

Arcuri’s email, stating that he had forwarded Arcuri’s email to Amacker to have him “contact

DOC and see what can be done.”17 Amacker then emailed Arcuri stating that he would “work on

getting [Plaintiff’s] packet sent to the DOC tomorrow but with the holiday weekend he will not

get calculated till Tuesday [July 5, 2016] most likely.”18

On July 7, 2016, seven days after Plaintiff was sentenced by Judge Buras, the DOC sent

11 Rec. Doc. 48 at 3; Rec. Doc. 136-12.

12 Rec. Doc. 165-1 at 2.

13 Id.

14 Rec. Doc. 133-5 at 2.

15 Rec. Doc. 164-1 at 2.

16 Rec. Doc. 133-16.

17 Rec. Doc. 136-12.

18 Rec. Doc. 133-15.

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OPSO an inmate transfer request with July 12, 2016 as the transfer date.19 Plaintiff remained in

OPSO custody until July 12, 2016, when OPSO transported Plaintiff to the DOC facility Elayn

Hunt Correctional Center in St. Gabriel, Louisiana (“Elayn Hunt”).20 While at Elayn Hunt,

Plaintiff allegedly explained that his sentence was “time served” and he “should be released.”21

According to Plaintiff, an official at Elayn Hunt confirmed that Plaintiff’s “sheet indicated ‘no

sentence.’”22 Nevertheless, Plaintiff remained in custody and was transferred to the Madison

Parish Correctional Center (“MPCC”) in Tallulah, Louisiana.23

Approximately 15 days after Plaintiff appeared before Judge Buras, Plaintiff’s friend Alfred

Marshall purportedly became concerned and told Judge Buras that Plaintiff had not yet been

released.24 Judge Buras allegedly called Gusman and MPCC warden Chris Stinson to determine

why Plaintiff had not been released from custody.25 Three days later (or 18 days after being

sentenced), on July 18, 2016, Judge Buras held a hearing at which she vacated Plaintiff’s one-year

sentence for the simple burglary charge from November 2000 and resentenced him to “CREDIT

FOR TIME SERVED.”26 Yet, according to Plaintiff, “despite having no legal authority to hold

19 Rec. Doc. 136-2 at 2.

20 Id.

21 Rec. Doc. 48 at 9.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Id. at 3, 9; Rec. Doc. 158-1 at 1.

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[Plaintiff],” the DOC still did not release him.27 On July 25, 2016, Judge Buras contacted two DOC

employees three separate times (one email and allegedly two phone calls) to determine why

Plaintiff had not been released.28 In her July 25, 2016 email to a DOC employee, Judge Buras

stated:

I originally sentenced [Plaintiff] on June 30, 2016 to 1 year DOC with [credit for

time served] from 2008 as [Plaintiff] had already served a sentence in DOC and my

2000 case did not pop up until he was ready to be discharged. The court was

informed that [Plaintiff] was still incarcerated and so I amended his sentence [on]

July 18 2016 to CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED so that he could be immediately

released. This morning I was informed by [a DOC captain] that their records show

[Plaintiff’s] discharge date on NOV 24 2023. Please advise as to what might be the

issue with this case as the clear intention of all parties when [Plaintiff] pled guilty

was to have this credit for time served sentence result in a release.29

Finally, 27 days after Judge Buras sentenced Plaintiff to time served and instructed OPSO to

expedite his release, Plaintiff was released from custody on July 27, 2016.30

B. Procedural Background

On April 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint against officials from OPSO, and against DOC

Secretary LeBlanc (“LeBlanc”) and DOC Warden Timothy Hooper (“Hooper”) (collectively, the

“DOC Defendants”) and several other officials.31 On June 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed the First

Amended Complaint.32 On June 28, 2017, DOC Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

27 Rec. Doc. 48 at 9.

28 Id.; Rec. Doc. 129-18 at 7; Rec. Doc. 129-22.

29 Rec. Doc. 143-16 at 2.

30 Rec. Doc. 158-1 at 2.

31 Rec. Doc. 1.

32 Rec. Doc. 16.

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First Amended Complaint.33 On March 27, 2018, the Court granted the DOC Defendants’ motion

to dismiss in part, dismissing Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim based on respondeat superior liability

and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for monetary damages against DOC Defendants in their official

capacity, and denied the motion as to all other claims.34 On March 29, 2018, the Court granted

Gusman, Holt, and Amacker’s motion to dismiss in part, dismissing Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim

based on respondeat superior liability and denied the motion as to all other claims.35 The Court

also granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint to address the deficiencies

identified.36

On April 10, 2018, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint.37 On August 14, 2018,

the Court granted DOC Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part to “the extent that the Court

dismisse[d] Plaintiff’s federal law claims against Warden Hooper;”38 however, the Court denied

DOC Defendants’ motion to dismiss “as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Secretary

LeBlanc and as to Plaintiff’s Monell claim against [Secretary] LeBlanc.”39 That same day, the

Court granted OPSO Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part to the extent that it dismissed Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims for monetary damages against them in their individual capacities.40

33 Rec. Doc. 17.

34 Rec. Doc. 46.

35 Rec. Doc. 47.

36 Rec. Docs. 46, 47.

37 Rec. Doc. 48.

38 Rec. Doc. 66 at 26.

39 Id.

40 Rec. Doc. 67.

6

On January 7, 2019, DOC Defendants filed a “Motion for Stay of Proceedings” because their

counsel’s military duties affected his ability to represent DOC Defendants.41 On January 7, 2019,

the Court granted DOC Defendants’ “Motion for Stay of Proceedings.”42 On June 4, 2019, the

Court issued an order lifting the stay and reopening the case.43

On April 13, 2020, the Court denied Plaintiff’s “Motion for Sanctions, or in the Alternative,

to Compel Preservation and Production of Documents,” wherein the Court rejected Plaintiff’s

request for the Court to issue an adverse inference sanction against DOC Defendants as a sanction

for alleged spoilation of electronic data.44 In its March 30, 2021 Order and Reasons, the Court

denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against OPSO Defendants and granted OPSO

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment only to the extent that it sought dismissal without

prejudice of Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.45 In its March 31, 2021 Order

and Reasons, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against DOC Defendants,

granted DOC Defendants’ motion for summary judgment to the extent it sought dismissal of

Plaintiff’s state law tort claims against Warden Hopper in his individual capacity and injunctive

relief against Secretary LeBlanc in his official capacity pursuant to Section 1983, and denied DOC

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in all other respects, including Secretary LeBlanc’s

request for qualified immunity.46

41 Rec. Doc. 87.

42 Rec. Doc. 89.

43 Rec. Doc. 90.

44 See Rec. Doc. 206.

45 Rec. Doc. 230.

46 Rec. Doc. 231.

7

On April 26, 2021, Secretary LeBlanc appealed to the Fifth Circuit this Court’s denial of his

motion for summary judgment based, in part, on its denial of qualified immunity regarding

Plaintiff’s federal and state due-process claims.47 Accordingly, on May 28, 2021, the Court granted

Secretary LeBlanc’s motion to stay and administratively close these proceedings pending

Secretary LeBlanc’s interlocutory appeal.48

On February 23, 2022, the Fifth Circuit rendered judgment in favor of Secretary LeBlanc on

Plaintiff’s federal and state due process claims on the basis of qualified immunity and remanded

the matter back to this Court.49 Accordingly, on July 12, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion

to lift the stay in this matter and reopen the case.50

On September 26, 2022, the parties informed the Court that they had consummated a

settlement on all remaining claims in this matter.51 As part of the settlement, OPSO Defendants

agreed to pay Plaintiff damages and to consider Plaintiff a prevailing party for the purpose of

attorney’s fees, but Plaintiff would submit a fee and cost petition to the Court if the parties could

not agree on the quantum of attorney’s fees and costs.52 Thus, that same day, the Court issued an

order dismissing the action without costs and prejudice to the right to reopen the action if

settlement was not consummated within sixty days.53 The Court explicitly retained jurisdiction to

47 Rec. Doc. 234.

48 Rec. Doc. 239.

49 Rec. Doc. 240.

50 Rec. Doc. 249.

51 Rec. Doc. 256.

52 Id.

53 Rec. Doc. 259.

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enforce the settlement terms and to determine the amount of attorney’s fees.54

On November 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.55

On December 13, 2022, Amacker, Gusman, Holt, Hooper, and Hutson opposed the motion.56 On

December 29, 2022, Plaintiff replied in further support of the motion with leave of Court.57

II. Parties’ Arguments

A. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Support of the Motion for Attorney’s Fees

In support of the instant motion, Plaintiff avers that, after OPSO Defendants and Plaintiff

reached a settlement, “[o]ver the next month and a half, the parties endeavored to resolve the

quantum of fees and costs without court intervention” and “exchanged twenty-one pieces of

correspondence in the effort to reach [an] agreement, but were unable to do so.”58 Thus, Plaintiff

requests that the Court fix the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses at $211,989.94.59 Plaintiff

bases the request on the following calculation (the “Fee Application”):60

Attorney Number of Hours Hourly Rate Fees

William Most 411.5 $350 $144,025.00

William Most (Joint

109.5 $350 (divided by 6) $6,387.50

Over-Detention)

David Lanser 71.1 $275 $19,552.50

54 Id.

55 Rec. Doc. 261.

56 Rec. Doc. 264.

57 Rec. Doc. 268.

58 Id. at 4.

59 Rec. Doc. 261-1 at 24.

60 Rec. Doc. 261 at 1–2.

9

Caroline Gabriel 28.2 $250 $7,050.00

Meghsha Barner 19.5 $235 $4,582.50

Amanda Hass 15.6 $225 $3,510.00

Allison Sickle 127.85 $125 $15,981.25

Grant-Specific Costs $4,577.89

Over-Detention Costs (divided by 6) $274.36

Subtotal: $201,088.75

Reduction for Billing Judgment (-$12,653.25) $188,435.50

Reduction for Success of Claims (-25%): $141,326.63

Proposed Johnson Multiplier (1.5x): $211,989.94

Total: $211,989.94

Plaintiff advances nine arguments in support of the Fee Application using the lodestar

method.61 First, Plaintiff argues that, as a prevailing party in a civil rights action, he is entitled to

reasonable attorney’s fees.62 Plaintiff contends that he is a prevailing party because he and OPSO

Defendants “agreed on an amount of damages to be paid by Defendants to Plaintiff, and agreed

that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for the purpose of attorney’s fees and costs.”63 Thus, Plaintiff

concludes that he “is entitled to fees and costs per 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”64

Second, Plaintiff argues that the hourly rates of counsel used for the lodestar calculation

61 See id. at 8–9.

62 Id. at 9.

63 Id. at 10 (quoting Rec. Doc. 257 at 3 (the parties’ Joint Status Update)).

64 Id.

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are reasonable.65 Plaintiff contends that he “submits the declaration of lead counsel, verifying the

submitted billing entries and verifying that the rates reflect the attorneys’ actual billing rates.”66

Plaintiff further contends that he has “submitted the declarations of [seven] attorneys working in

the Eastern District [of Louisiana] opining that the hourly rates charged by counsel here are

reasonable.”67 Plaintiff provides the following table and argues that the requested rates are

reasonable based on each attorney’s years of experience and the rates applied in comparable cases

within the Eastern District of Louisiana:68

Team Member Years of Practice Hourly Rate

William Most 11 $350

David Lanser 5 $275

Caroline Gabriel 4 $250

Meghsha Barner 3 $235

Amanda Hass 2 $225

Allison Sickle N/A $125

Third, Plaintiff argues that the hours submitted in the Fee Application are reasonable and

have been subjected to billing judgment.69 Plaintiff asserts that he “has attached a verified copy of

the contemporaneous billing records for this case which includes the dates, amount of time billed,

65 See id.

66 Id. at 11 (citing Rec. Doc. 261-19).

67 Id. (citing Rec. Docs. 261-9, 261-10, 261-11, 261-12, 261-13, 261-14, 261-15); Plaintiff avers that one

declaration from a partner at Jones Walker, LLP states that the requested rates “are less than what I am used to seeing

in private practice in New Orleans.” Id. (quoting Rec. Doc. 261-15).

68 See id. at 12–14 (citing cases).

69 See id. at 14.

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and a description of the services performed.”70 Plaintiff avers that his “counsel has reviewed the

time entries . . . and deducted an amount totaling $12,653.25 for “entries that would not be billed

to the client” and based on “the exercise of billing discretion.”71 Finally, Plaintiff contends that

“counsel sought opportunities to work efficiently: for example, by employing a law student clerk

with a lower billable rate than attorneys, and by noting work that was jointly of benefit to several

over-detention cases.”72

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the hours billed have been adjusted to reflect hours spent on

this case jointly with other over-detention cases.73 Plaintiff avers that counsel “has been involved

in a range of over-detention cases, including others against [OPSO].”74 Where counsel conducted

work that applied to these over-detention cases generally, “Plaintiff proposes dividing these hours

by six, for the six individual Louisiana over-detention cases brought by undersigned counsel.”75

Fifth, Plaintiff argues that the hours billed have been adjusted to reflect hours spent on

unsuccessful claims. Plaintiff avers that, although he prevailed against OPSO Defendants but not

DOC Defendants, “[i]t is not possible . . . to divide work done into ‘OPSO hours’ and ‘DOC hours’

. . . due to the nature of [OPSO Defendants and DOC Defendants’ respective] defenses: each of

them blamed the other for [Plaintiff’s over-detention].”76 However, Plaintiff acknowledges that “it

70 Id. at 15 (citing Rec. Doc. 261-21).

71 Id.

72 Id.

73 See id. at 16.

74 Id.

75 Id. at 16–17.

76 Id. at 17.

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is appropriate to discount some of the hours” to account for the unsuccessful claims.77 “Plaintiff

proposes discounting hours by half of half (i.e. 25%) to account for the idea that perhaps half of

the DOC’s half of the case was DOC-only and not of value to prevailing against OPSO

[Defendants].”78

Sixth, Plaintiff argues that OPSO Defendants’ “aggressive defense strategy,” which

involved filing “repeated dispositive motions, . . . resist[ing] discovery, and engag[ing] in lengthy

and inappropriate tactics during deposition,” resulted in these fees and costs.79 Plaintiff avers that

DOC Defendants “named their own defense counsel as a 30(b)(6) witness to testify for OPSO,”

refused to make a settlement offer, and “repeatedly threatened Plaintiff—including a threat to put

Plaintiff back in prison for the explicit purpose of obtaining advantage in the civil suit.”80 Thus,

Plaintiff concludes that OPSO Defendants must “pay for the consequences of that choice.”81

Seventh, Plaintiff argues that the Court should apply a 50% multiplier to the lodestar

amount based on the facts identified in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express.82 Plaintiff argues

that the first Johnson factor—the time and labor required—warrants an upward adjustment

because counsel “was a solo practitioner with one contract attorney for assistance” when the case,

began, which strained the resources of the firm.83 Plaintiff avers that the second Johnson factor—

77 Id. at 17.

78 Id.

79 Id. at 18.

80 Id. (citing Rec. Docs. 261-6, 261-7).

81 Id.

82 Id. (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)).

83 Id. at 19.

13

novelty and difficulty of the case—warrants an upward adjustment because “this case presented

questions of first impression regarding OPSO’s policy of over-detention and the interplay of

responsibility between [the DOC] and sheriffs in the days after sentencing;” and because such civil

rights cases are “difficult, protracted, and risky” given defendants’ unwillingness to discuss

settlement.84 Plaintiff contends that the third Johnson factor—the skill required—warrants an

upward adjustment because counsel prevailed against OPSO despite “dealing with unethical

threats by opposing counsel, repeated dispositive motions, an interlocutory appeal, and a large set

of documents.”85 Plaintiff asserts that the fourth Johnson factor—preclusion of other employment

due to accepting the case—weighs in favor of an upward adjustment because counsel’s small firm

was required to turn down other work due to the time needed to litigate this case.86

Plaintiff argues that the fifth Johnson factor—the customary fee for similar work—

warrants an upward adjustment given the affidavit from a partner at Jones Walker stating that the

rates requested are less than typical for private practice.87 Plaintiff avers that the sixth Johnson

factor—whether the fee is fixed or contingent—weighs in favor of an upward adjustment because

the fee was entirely contingent.88 Plaintiff contends that the seventh Johnson factor—time

limitations—warrants an upward adjustment because the case was stayed multiple times based on

defense counsel’s military service and Secretary LeBlanc’s interlocutory appeal, which allowed

84 Id. at 19–20 (quoting Rec. Doc. 261-10).

85 Id. at 20.

86 Id.

87 Id. at 20–21.

88 Id. at 21.

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OPSO Defendants to save due to inflation over the protracted litigation.89 Plaintiff asserts that the

eighth Johnson factor—the amount involved and the results obtained—warrant an upward

adjustment because Plaintiff obtained “a life-changing sum, given Plaintiff’s indigent status” and

the litigation “prompted OPSO to change its ‘drive the paperwork once per week policy.’”90

Plaintiff argues that the ninth Johnson factor—experience, reputation, and ability of

attorneys—warrants an upward adjustment because “Plaintiff’s counsel are attorneys that

specialize in civil rights cases” who, although young, are highly respected.91 Plaintiff avers that

the tenth Johnson factor—the undesirability of the case—weighs in favor of an upward adjustment

because many private firms avoid civil rights cases as they are less likely to be profitable.92

Plaintiff contends that the eleventh Johnson factor—the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client—weighs in favor of an upward adjustment because counsel worked

with Plaintiff for more than half a decade to obtain this outcome and change OPSO’s policy, and

“required patience and mutual trust.”93 Plaintiff asserts that the twelfth Johnson factor—awards in

similar cases—has already been addressed in determining reasonable hourly rates.94 Thus,

“[b]ecause all of the Johnson factors weigh in favor of an upward[] adjustment, Plaintiff proposes

a 1.5 times multiplier be applied to the attorneys fees.”95

89 Id.

90 Id. at 21–22.

91 Id. at 22.

92 Id.

93 Id. at 23.

94 Id.

95 Id.

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Eighth, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to costs along with attorney’s fees as the

prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1).96

Thus, Plaintiff avers that, in the Fee Application, costs are divided into those unique to this case

and those “that were joint to the individual over-detention cases,” the latter of which are divided

by six.97

Ninth, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to the requested attorney’s fees because the lawsuit

was of substantial benefit to the public.98 Plaintiff avers that, after the filing of this lawsuit, OPSO

changed its policy of having a deputy pick up paperwork for delivery to the DOC’s headquarters

that resulted in the over-detention of inmates.99 Plaintiff asserts that OPSO began “to electronically

transmit records to the DOC,” which “reduced the number of overdetained people sentenced in

Orleans Parish” and “reduced the [resulting] financial burden on Louisiana taxpayers.”100 For these

reasons, Plaintiff asks the Court to grant the motion and award him $211,989.94 in attorney’s fees

and costs.101

B. OPSO Defendants’ Arguments in Opposition to the Motion for Attorney’s Fees

OPSO Defendants advance five arguments in opposition to the instant motion.102 First,

OPSO Defendants argue that the 783.25 hours claimed by Plaintiff’s lead counsel, four associates,

96 Id. at 23–24.

97 Id. at 24.

98 See id. at 7.

99 Id. at 7–8.

100 Id. at 8.

101 Id. at 25.

102 See Rec. Doc. 264.

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and one law student are “grossly excessive under the governing legal standard” and grossly

disproportionate in being nine times greater than the settlement received by Plaintiff.103

Specifically, OPSO Defendants argue that the hours requested are unreasonable because: (1) the

timesheets contain vague time entries; (2) those timesheets contain block billing; (3) the Fee

Application charges for administrative tasks; and (4) Plaintiff’s lead counsel, William Most

(“Most”) charged his premium fees for associate-level work.104

OPSO Defendants assert that the hours requested are unreasonable because the timesheets

include vague time entries.105 OPSO Defendants aver that the Court cannot “judge the

reasonableness of the time expended with descriptions as scant as ‘correspondence,’ ‘meeting,’

and ‘phone call,’” and so the “vague entries should be reduced and disallowed.”106

OPSO Defendants also argue that the hours requested are unreasonable because Plaintiff

submits “block-billed time entries” that “describe multiple activities in one time entry or record

time by the day instead of the specific tasks.”107 OPSO Defendants aver that these entries “may

not offer sufficient evidence of the reasonableness and necessity of the time expended” and thus

“a flat reduction of a specific percentage from the award” is warranted that is “commensurate with

103 Id. at 2–3.

104 See id. at 4–12.

105 Id. at 6 (arguing that the following dates include vague time entries: 7/12/2016, 7/22/2016, 8/4/2016,

9/21/2016, 10/6/2016, 10/24/2016, 11/18/2016, 11/21/2016, 12/19/2016, 12/22/2016, 2/23/2016, 3/15/2017,

3/20/2017, 3/27/2017, “4/3/2017, 4/28/2017, 5/8/2017, 5/8/2017, 6/8/2017, 6/12/2017, 6/12/2017, 6/12/2017,

6/5/2017, 6/15/2017, 6/25/2017, 7/19/2017, 9/8/2017,9/8/2017, 9/12/2017, 10/2/2017, 10/19/2017, 10/25/2017,

11/20/17, 12/7/2017).

106 Id. at 6–7.

107 Id. at 7 (citing C and D Prod. Servs. v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp., 376 F. App’x 392, 394 (5th Cir.

2010)).

17

the egregiousness of the inadequacy of the documentation.”108 OPSO Defendants attach an exhibit

of entries they assert are block billed.109 Based on these entries, where “several tasks are grouped

under one time entry,” OPSO Defendants ask the Court to reduce the fee award.110

OPSO Defendants further argue that the number of hours requested is unreasonable

because the Fee Application contains charges for administrative tasks that should not be included

in the award.111 OPSO Defendants aver that several entries include charges for tasks that “could

have been performed by administrative [assistants].”112 OPSO Defendants conclude that these

entries should be disallowed for being “clearly clerical in nature.”113

Finally, OPSO Defendants argue that the number of hours requested is unreasonable

because Most “performed tasks that could have been performed by less experienced attorneys.”114

OPSO Defendants aver that Most charged excessive hours for legal research, drafting, preparing

discovering requests, document review, and preparing documents for filing.115 OPSO Defendants

contend that the award should therefore be reduced because this work “should have been passed

on to one of the associates on the case.”116

108 Id.

109 Id. at 7, n.27 (citing Rec. Doc. 264-2); see also id. at 8–9 (offering a sample of block billing entries from

Plaintiff’s counsel).

110 Id. at 9.

111 See id.

112 Id. at 10 (citing In re Educ. Testing Serv. Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. La. 2006) (explaining that

some work, such as researching, drafting, and document review, should be performed by associate-level attorneys)).

113 Id.

114 Id.

115 See id. at 11 (providing a sample of entries where Most bills up to 9.1 hours completing these tasks).

116 Id. at 11–12.

18

Second, OPSO Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s requested hourly rates are not reasonable

and should be reduced.117 OPSO Defendants assert that under the “General Maximum Hourly Fee

Schedule” promulgated by the Louisiana Attorney General (the “General Fee Schedule”), Most

should receive $225 per hour, Caroline Gabriel (“Gabriel”), David Lanser (“Lanser”) and Meghsha

Barner (“Barner”) should receive $150 per hour, Amanda Hass (“Hass”) should receive $125 per

hour, and Allison Sickle (“Sickle”) should receive $40 per hour.118 OPSO Defendants further argue

that the affidavits of other attorneys supporting the reasonableness of the fees requested should be

given “no weight” because they pertain to rates “reasonable for civil rights litigation work” rather

than over-detention cases.119 OPSO Defendants also contend that the affidavits are from plaintiffs’

attorneys practicing in the Eastern District of Louisiana who “have a vested interest in establishing

precedent for higher hourly rates.”120 Finally, OPSO Defendants aver that the fees requested are

unreasonable because Plaintiff “obtained only a portion of the relief he sought” after the Court

dismissed his Section 1983 claim based on respondeat superior liability and claims for injunctive

and declaratory relief.121 Thus, OPSO Defendants conclude that the rates requested are

unreasonable.122

Third, OPSO Defendants argue that the Johnson factors do not warrant an upward

117 See id. at 12–16.

118 Id. at 13–14.

119 Id. at 14.

120 Id. at 15.

121 Id. at 15–16. OPSO Defendants also point out that the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a

third amended complaint and motion for summary judgment. Id.

122 Id. at 16.

19

adjustment of the lodestar amount.123 They argue that “there was nothing particularly undesirable

about this case as many civil rights litigation cases have problematic and unpleasant aspects of the

case.”124 Thus, OPSO Defendants conclude that an upward adjustment of the lodestar amount is

not warranted.125

Fourth, OPSO Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request for out-of-pocket costs should be

reduced because it includes expenses that “are generally considered overhead, [] part of the cost

of operating a law firm,” or “vague and strictly for counsel’s convenience.”126 For example, OPSO

Defendants aver that recovery for postage and service, and mileage for attendance at oral argument,

settlement conferences, depositions and meetings should be excluded.127

Fifth, OPSO Defendants argue that Plaintiff seeks “‘fees on fees’ for time spent preparing

the motion for an attorney’s fee award” in the amount of ten billable hours that should be

excluded.128 OPSO Defendants assert that courts have found eight hours to draft a motion to fix

attorney’s fees to be excessive, and under two hours to be reasonable.129

For these reasons, OPSO Defendants assert that $35,000 in attorney’s fees is reasonable.130

OPSO Defendants aver that they “settled the matter in a good faith attempt to resolve all aspects

123 See id.

124 Id.

125 Id. at 18.

126 Id. at 19.

127 Id.

128 Id.

129 Id. at 20 (citing Williams v. Res-Care, Inc., No. 17-10200, 2020 WL 4816141, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 19,

2020)).

130 Id. at 21.

20

of this case, including fees.”131 OPSO Defendants assert that they offered to settle the claim for

$35,000 along with an attorney’s fees settlement but Plaintiff’s counsel “convinced his client to

accept less money in the settlement ($25,000) so that he could attempt to litigate this matter for an

excessive amount in attorney’s fees in bad faith.”132 Thus, OPSO Defendant’s conclude that “[t]he

proposed settlement amount of attorney’s fees” is reasonable.133

C. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Further Support of the Motion for Attorney’s Fees.

In reply, Plaintiff makes five arguments in further support of the instant motion. First,

Plaintiff argues that OPSO Defendants “declined to follow the well-established method” of

calculating the lodestar amount and adjusting it based on the Johnson factors to determine the

appropriate attorney’s fee award.134 Plaintiff asserts that, whereas he used this method to calculate

reasonable attorney’s fees, OPSO Defendants determined $35,000 to be a reasonable attorney’s

fee award “without describing what process they used for calculating that amount.”135

Second, Plaintiff argues that the time entries submitted are not inadequate or vague.136

Plaintiff asserts that the Supreme Court does not require the Court to conduct “auditing perfection”

but rather simply to “do ‘rough justice’” to its “overall sense of suit.”137 Plaintiff further contends

that OPSO Defendants’ opposition is “comprised of reproductions of time entries already

131 Id. at 20.

132 Id.

133 Id. at 21.

134 Rec. Doc. 268 at 1.

135 Id.

136 See id. at 2.

137 Id. (quoting Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011)).

21

submitted to the court by Plaintiff—but without the notations for Plaintiff’s counsel’s exercise of

billing judgment.”138 Plaintiff asserts that OPSO Defendants withheld that Plaintiff wrote off some

of those entries “through the exercise of billing discretion.”139 Plaintiff further avers that certain

entries that OPSO Defendants labeled as “block billing” actually decreased the amount of time

billed.140 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the context of Most’s practice—he began this case as “a solo

practitioner in a newly-formed practice” and his firm “remains a small one by necessity, given the

risks and long time horizons for payment in civil rights work”—is relevant to attorney’s fees.141

Third, Plaintiff argues that his proposed hourly rates should be adopted because “Plaintiff

offered a range of evidence for [their] reasonableness.”142 Plaintiff asserts that, in response, OPSO

Defendants only cite the General Fee Schedule, which this Court has found to be irrelevant because

no counsel is representing the State of Louisiana.143 Plaintiff further asserts that OPSO Defendants

know that some of the attorneys that provide affidavits in support of the hourly rates do practice

over-detention cases and, regardless, “the Lodestar analysis is [not] so cramped in focus” for

affidavits from attorneys who have litigated Section 1983 cases in this district to be inapplicable

to over-detention cases.144 Finally, Plaintiff contends that, although the Court should not double-

138 Id. (citing Rec. Doc. 261-21).

139 Id.

140 Id. at 3.

141 Id. at 3–4 (citing Bode v. Kenner City, No. 17-5483, 2018 WL 4701541, at *7 (E.D. La., Oct. 1, 2018)

(Brown, C.J.)); Plaintiff notes that Most gave associates work as his firm expanded and as they became familiar with

the case. Id. at 3.

142 Id. at 4.

143 Id. at 4–5 (citing Bode, 2018 WL 4701541, at *6).

144 Id. at 5.

22

count based on the Johnson factors, “the fact that some factors overlap with the Lodestar analysis

is not dispositive” given that all factors point to an upward adjustment.145

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that OPSO Defendants’ argument that the award requested is

unreasonable because it is nine times greater than the damages obtained has been rejected by the

Supreme Court in Riverside v. Rivera.146 Plaintiff asserts that courts in other circuits have upheld

substantial attorney’s fees on top of only nominal damages.147 Plaintiff further contends that OPSO

Defendants are wrong that counsel “has sought payment for ‘every minute worked on this case’”

because Plaintiff “proposes a 25% reduction of fees due to his success on claims against some

defendants but not others.”148 Thus, Plaintiff concludes that the requested fee award is fair,

“especially considering the significant policy changes achieve[d] through this lawsuit.”149

Fifth, Plaintiff argues that OPSO Defendants’ accusations of ethical misconduct regarding

the settlement are false.150 Plaintiff avers that he was given two options during settlement

negotiations: (1) receive $25,000 in damages and determine attorney’s fees through negotiation or

fee petition; or (2) agree to a $32,854.21 damages award conditioned upon the parties reaching

“agreement on the quantum of attorneys fees before the overall agreement [is] finalized.”151

Plaintiff states that he chose the first option, not through his counsel’s misconduct, but because it

145 Id. at 6.

146 Id. (quoting Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986) (“We reject the proposition that fee awards

under § 1988 should necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff actually recovers.”).

147 Id. (citing cases).

148 Id. at 7.

149 Id.

150 See id. at 7–8.

151 Id. at 7.

23

was a “swift, certain settlement” rather than an “uncertain contingent settlement that would be

farther away in time.”152 Thus, Plaintiff concludes that “[OPSO] Defendants’ accusations of

misconduct—offered with no evidence and only a faulty inference—should be disregarded.”153

III. Law and Analysis

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), the Court, in its discretion, may allow a prevailing party

in any action brought under Section 1983 “a reasonable attorney’s fee as party of the costs.” In the

September 26, 2022 Joint Notice of Settlement, the parties “agreed that Plaintiff is the prevailing

party for the purpose of attorneys fees and costs.”154 Thus, the Court must determine the reasonable

fees and costs to award Plaintiff as the prevailing party over OPSO Defendants.

Reasonable attorney’s fees are calculated using the “lodestar” method.155 Under this

method, “the court calculates a ‘lodestar’ fee by multiplying the reasonable number of hours

expended on the case by the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers.”156 “[T]here is

a strong presumption that the lodestar figure is reasonable.”157 However, after calculating the

lodestar, a district court may decrease or enhance the amount of attorney’s fees based on the

relative weights of the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.158

152 Id. at 8.

153 Id.

154 Rec. Doc. 256 at 1.

155 Rutherford v. Harris Cty., Tex.,, 197 F.3d 173, 192 (5th Cir. 1999).

156 Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.

Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995)).

157 Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010).

158 Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp.,

Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974)). The Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required to represent the

client or clients; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues in the case; (3) the skill required to perform the legal

services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney; (5) the customary fee charged for those

24

The lodestar may not be adjusted due to a Johnson factor, however, if the creation of the lodestar

award already took that factor into account.159 Such reconsideration is “impermissible double-

counting.”160

Here, Plaintiff requests a total award of $211,989.94 based on the following calculation in

the Fee Application, which includes the proposed billing rates and the number of hours billed by

Plaintiff’s counsel:161

Attorney Number of Hours Hourly Rate Fees

William Most 411.5 $350 $144,025.00

William Most (Joint

109.5 $350 (divided by 6) $6,387.50

Over-Detention)

David Lanser 71.1 $275 $19,552.50

Caroline Gabriel 28.2 $250 $7,050.00

Meghsha Barner 19.5 $235 $4,582.50

Amanda Hass 15.6 $225 $3,510.00

Allison Sickle 127.85 $125 $15,981.25

Grant-Specific Costs $4,577.89

Over-Detention Costs (divided by 6) $274.36

Subtotal: $201,088.75

services in the relevant community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the

client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability

of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the

client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19.

159 Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

160 Id.

161 Rec. Doc. 261 at 1–2.

25

Reduction for Billing Judgment (-$12,653.25) $188,435.50

Reduction for Success of Claims (-25%): $141,326.63

Proposed Johnson Multiplier (1.5x): $211,989.94

Total: $211,989.94

A. The Number of Hours

“[T]he first step in determining reasonable attorney’s fees is an evaluation of the number

of hours reasonably expended.”162 “The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement

to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.”163 “[A] district

court may reduce the number of hours awarded if the documentation is vague or incomplete.”164

Furthermore, when an attorney or paralegal performs a task that could be handled by clerical staff,

the opponent should not be charged.165 Tasks that are purely clerical in nature include faxing,

mailing, filing and delivering legal documents.166 “Charges for excessive, duplicative, or

inadequately documented work must be excluded.”167 The party seeking fees must demonstrate

the exercise of billing judgment, which refers to the usual practice of writing off unproductive,

excessive, or redundant hours.168

162 Louisiana Power, 50 F.3d at 324.

163 Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

164 Id.

165 Kuperman v. ICF Int’l, No. 08- 565, 2009 WL 10737138, at *9 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2009).

166 See Lalla v. City of New Orleans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 686, 710–11 (E.D. La. 2001); Kuperman, 2009 WL

10737138, at *9.

167 McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453,

457 (5th Cir. 1993)).

168 Walker v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996).

26

In support of the motion, Plaintiff offers timesheets, which record the professional services

performed by each attorney in this matter.169 The documentation contains information on the tasks

performed, by whom they were performed, the date they were performed, the time expended to

accomplish that task, and the applicable hourly rates charged.170 Plaintiff argues that the requested

hours are reasonable because Plaintiff’s counsel provided verified copies of contemporaneous

billing records that comply with Local Rule 54.2, reviewed the entries and deducted $12,653.25

through the exercise of billing judgment, and worked efficiently by employing a law student clerk

with a lower billable rate and dividing by six any hours worked to the benefit of all six of counsel’s

over-detention cases.171 OPSO Defendants argue that the requested hours are unreasonable

because the time entries are overly vague, include block billing and charges for administrative

tasks, and apply senior partner rates to work that could have been handled by junior lawyers.172

After careful review of the Fee Application and attached records, the Court finds OPSO

Defendants’ arguments unavailing. Regarding the argument that the entries are too vague, the

Supreme Court has stated that a motion for attorney’s fees “should not result in a second major

litigation.”173 “Trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accounts” but

rather “may take into account their overall sense of a suit” where the party “submit[s] appropriate

documentation.”174 Thus, in recognizing that the “practical considerations of the daily practice of

169 Rec. Doc. 261-21.

170 See id.

171 Rec. Doc. 261-1 at 15.

172 See Rec. Doc. 264 at 3–12.

173 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).

174 Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437) (“The fee applicant . . . must,

of course, submit appropriate documentation to meet ‘the burden of establishing entitlement to an award.’ But trial

27

law in this day and age preclude ‘writing a book’ to describe in excruciating detail the professional

services rendered,” the Fifth Circuit has found that a district court does not err “in refusing to

reduce the hours in question for vagueness” where it has “familiarity with [the] case, including the

quality of the attorneys’ work over a period of several years.”175 Accordingly, the Court declines

to reduce the number of hours billed over the course of a litigation where Plaintiff prevailed after

five and a half years and where Plaintiff provides the appropriate documentation to support his

request.

For these same reasons, the Court declines to reduce the number of hours due to the block

billing time entries submitted. Block billing is the practice of “describing multiple activities in

only one time entry.”176 “A reduction for block billing is not automatic” even though “[c]ourts

disfavor the practice . . . because it impairs the required reasonableness evaluation.”177 The Fifth

Circuit has affirmed attorney’s fee awards where the requested fees were reasonable despite block

billing.178 Therefore, given that Plaintiff’s requested number of hours is reasonable, the Court

declines to reduce the hours requested based on Plaintiff’s use of block billing.179

courts need not . . . become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees . . . is to do rough justice,

not to achieve auditing perfection.”) (internal citations omitted).

175 Louisiana Power, 50 F.3d at 327.

176 C and D Prod. Servs. v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp., 376 F. App’x 392, 394 (5th Cir. 2010)).

177 Fralick v. Plumbers and Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund, No. 09-752, 2011 WL 487754, at *5 (N.D. Tex.

Feb. 11, 2011).

178 See Jinsun, L.L.C. v. Mireskandari, No. 20-20563, 2022 WL 35622, at *1 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam).

179 The Court also notes that rather than provide only one listing per day with all tasks performed, Plaintiff

generally blocked related tasks into a single entry, which makes it less difficult for the Court to assess that entry’s

reasonableness. See Rec. Doc. 264-2.

28

OPSO Defendants also contend that the Court should exclude hours billed for

administrative tasks, but they only object to approximately 10 of the 783.25 hours billed in this

case.180 Furthermore, OPSO Defendants’ objections omit that Plaintiff excluded some of these

entries from his calculation through the exercise of billing judgment.181 Accordingly, the Court

will not reduce the number of hours on this basis.182

OPSO Defendants also argue that the number of hours should be reduced because

Plaintiff’s counsel billed senior partner rates for work that could have been handled by junior

lawyers.183 However, as Plaintiff argues, Most was a sole practitioner when he began representing

Plaintiff. The submitted timesheets reflect Plaintiff’s assertion that “[a]s [Most] hired associates

and they became conversant with the case, he assigned associate-level work to them.”184

Furthermore, Most represented Plaintiff “without guarantee [he] would be paid, and the case

required considerable time and effort.”185 Thus, the Court finds that Most’s allocation of work

does not warrant a reduction in the number of hours billed.

Finally, OPSO Defendants argue that the number of hours spent by Most preparing the

instant motion should be reduced because the number of hours billed on the task is excessive and

180 See Rec. Doc. 264-3.

181 Compare Rec. Doc. 261-21 at 4 with 264-3 at 1 (providing one of multiple instances where OPSO

Defendants ignore that Plaintiff omitted the entry objected to from his calculation).

182 See Bode v. Kenner City, No. 17-5483, 2018 WL 4701541, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2018) (Brown, C.J.)

(declining to exclude “less than 10 hours” billed on inter-office communications and administrative tasks out of

approximately 200 hours over the course of a two-year litigation).

183 Rec. Doc. 264 at 10–12.

184 See Rec. Doc. 261-21; Rec. Doc. 268 at 3.

185 Bode, 2018 WL 4701541, at *7 (declining to reduce the lodestar amount given the riskiness of counsel’s

decision to represent the plaintiff).

29

unreasonable.186 Upon review, Most billed 11.2 hours for preparation of this motion.187 In

Williams v. Res-Care, Inc., another judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana found that “8.0 hours

to draft a motion to fix attorneys’ fees is quite excessive” and noted “the lack of substantive depth

in the motion” in reducing the number of hours billed preparing the motion from eight to three

hours.188 Although the Court finds 11.2 hours to prepare the instant motion excessive, the motion

filed cannot be described as “lacking in substantive depth.” Accordingly, the Court reduces the

number of hours spent preparing the instant motion by 50%, or 5.6 hours. Thus, the Court finds

that Most is entitled to bill for 405.9 hours.189 The Court declines to further reduce the number of

hours billed because it finds that Plaintiff exercised billing judgment in reducing the number of

hours requested by $12,653.25 and dividing some of Most’s hours by six to account for work he

performed that applied to all six of his over-detention cases.190

B. The Hourly Rates

The second step of the analysis is to determine a reasonable hourly rate for each attorney.

“Hourly rates are to be computed according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant legal

market, not the rates that lions at the bar may command.”191 It is the plaintiff’s burden to “produce

satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the relevant

186 Rec. Doc. 264 at 19–20.

187 See Rec. Doc. 261-21 at 19.

188 No. 17-10200, 2020 WL 4816141, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2020).

189 The 411.5 hours billed by Most reduced by 5.6 hours equals 405.9 hours.

190 See Rec. Doc. 261-1.

191 Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 281 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citation omitted).

30

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and

reputation.”192

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s Fee Application indicates hourly billing rates of $350 for

Most, who has practiced for approximately 11 years and has eight years of civil rights litigation

experience, $275 for Lanser, who has practiced for approximately five years, $250 for Gabriel,

who has practiced for approximately four years, $235 for Barner, who has practiced for

approximately three years, $225 for Hass, who has practiced for approximately two years, and

$125 for Sickle, a law student intern from Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.193

Plaintiff asserts that the requested rates are reasonable in light of comparable cases in the Eastern

District of Louisiana.194 Plaintiff also offers declarations from other attorneys working in the

district stating that the requested rates are reasonable.195 OPSO Defendants argue that the billing

rates are unreasonable because they exceed those in the General Fee Schedule, the attached

declarations are self-serving and inapplicable to over-detention cases, and Plaintiff achieved only

partial success on his claims.196

The Court may reduce the hourly rate if it determines that the requested rate is not within

the range of prevailing market rates. Although Plaintiff offers declarations from other attorneys in

the Eastern District of Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit makes clear that the district court “is itself an

192 Wheeler v. Mental Health & Mental Retardation Auth. of Harris Cty., Tex., 752 F.2d 1063, 1073 (5th Cir.

1985).

193 Rec. Doc. 261-1 at 12–14.

194 Id. at 12.

195 Id. at 11.

196 Rec. Doc. 264 at 13–16.

31

expert on the question [of reasonable billing rates] and may consider its own knowledge and

experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either

with or without the aid of testimony.”197 Therefore, the declarations attached to the Fee Application

are not determinative. Furthermore, many of the cases cited by Plaintiff to support the attorneys’

hourly rates are not for similar services performed during civil rights litigation.198 Accordingly,

the Court conducts its own analysis regarding the attorneys’ reasonable hourly rates.

Upon a review of the case law, the Court determines that the requested billing rates for the

services provided are excessive. As the senior attorney representing Plaintiff, Most requests a

billing rate of $350 per hour based on his 11 years of practice and eight years of civil rights

litigation experience. In 2014, another judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana found that $185

was a reasonable hourly billing rate for an attorney with 11 years of practice in a civil rights case.199

Furthermore, in 2018, the court in Gilmore v. Audobon Nature Institute, Inc. awarded $275 per

hour to two attorneys in a civil rights case with 16 years of experience, finding that $275

“represents a reasonable blending of various other hourly rates awarded in other cases [in the

Eastern District of Louisiana].”200 Most recently, four months ago this Court determined that a rate

of $350 per hour was a reasonable billing rate for an attorney with 30 years of experience in a civil

rights case.201 By comparison, Most has only been practicing for 11 years and, when he first began

197 Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940).

198 See Rec. Doc. 261-1 at 12–13, n.80 (citing numerous cases that did not involve the denial of a plaintiff’s

civil rights).

199 Cacho v. Gusman, No. 11-225, 2014 WL 4854737, at *6 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2014).

200 Gilmore v. Audobon Nature Inst., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 499, 509–510 (E.D. La. 2018).

201 Richard v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 17-9703, 2022 WL 4534728, at *2–*3 (E.D. La. Sept.

28, 2022).

32

representing Plaintiff over five years ago, he had less than three years of civil rights litigation

experience. Accordingly, the Court finds $275 per hour to be a reasonable billing rate for an

attorney of Most’s experience.202

Regarding the hourly billing rates for the rest of Plaintiff’s attorneys, they are entitled to

lower hourly billing rates as associates with five years or less experience. “Judges in this district

award attorney’s fees in the amount of $200 for work performed by an associate with less than five

years of experience.”203 However, associates with five to six years of experience can command

hourly billing rates up to $250.204 Accordingly, the Court finds $225 to be a reasonable hourly

billing rate for Lanser, the most senior associate, and $200 to be a reasonable hourly billing rate

for Gabriel, Barner, and Hass. With regard to the work performed by Sickle, this Court has found

that a “$75.00 hourly rate. . . for work performed by a law clerk [is] appropriate.”205 Thus, the

Court finds that $75 is a reasonable hourly billing rate for Sickle. “The Court finds that further

reduction of the hourly rates is not warranted in light of the [General Fee Schedule] as counsel was

not representing the State of Louisiana in this matter” and because the General Fee Schedule is not

district specific.206

202 See Ivy v. Tran, No. 20-1475, 2021 WL 1428877, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 2021) (determining that Most’s

request that he receive attorney’s fees at an hourly billing rate of $275 per hour was prima facie reasonable given that

the requested rate was not opposed).

203 Girod LoanCo, LLC v. Heisler, No. 19-13150, 2020 WL 3605947, at *8 (E.D. La. July 2, 2020) (Brown,

C.J.) (citing Batiste v. Lewis, No. 17-4435, 2019 WL 1591951, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 2019) (awarding $200.00 per

hour to attorney with five years of experience)).

204 Metro Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Waste Connections Bayou, Inc., No. 21-1136, 2022 WL 17830466, at *8 (E.D.

La. Dec. 21, 2022) (Brown, C.J.).

205 Bode, 2018 WL 4701541, at *6.

206 Id.

33

C. The Lodestar Calculation

In the final step, “the court calculates a ‘lodestar’ fee by multiplying the reasonable number

of hours expended on the case by the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers.”207 In

sum, the Court awards $116,641.25 for work performed by Most (109.5 hours at $275 per hour

divided by 6, plus 405.9 hours at $275 per hour), $15,997.50 for work performed by Lanser (71.1

hours at $225 per hour), $5,640 for work performed by Gabriel (28.2 hours at $200 per hour),

$3,900 for worked performed by Barner (19.5 hours at $200 per hour), $3,120 for work performed

by Hass (15.6 hours at $200 per hour), and $9,588.75 for work performed by Sickle (127.85 hours

at $75 per hour). Accordingly, the lodestar amount equals $154,887.50.

The Court also finds that a further reduction based upon Plaintiff’s partial success is

necessary. In the Fee Application, Plaintiff asks the Court to reduce the lodestar amount by 25%

to account for his lack of success on some claims.208 The Fifth Circuit has recognized that

unsuccessful litigation efforts cannot be recognized as reasonable and must be deducted.209 If

recoverable fees can be segregated from unrecoverable fees, even if difficult, the party seeking

recovery must segregate unrecoverable fees.210 When the prevailing party incurs costs for a claim

that involves a common core of facts or will be based on legal theories related to another claim,

and counsel’s time is devoted to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours

expended on a claim-by-claim basis, the court need not segregate fees.211 Federal courts authorize

207 Migis, 135 F.3d at 1047 (citing Louisiana Power, 50 F.3d at 324).

208 See Rec. Doc. 261-1.

209 See Leroy v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 1068, 1084 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Jason D.W. v. Houston Indep.

Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 205, 211 (5th Cir. 1998).

210 United States for Varco Pruden Bldgs. v. Reid & Gary Strickland Co., 161 F.3d 915, 922 (5th Cir. 1998).

211 Mota v. University of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 528 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Varco,

34

a percentage reduction of overall fees when a fee award is due on a claim that is so intertwined

with another claim that the time cannot be segregated.212

Plaintiff argues that a 25% reduction is appropriate because OPSO Defendants and DOC

Defendants defended the claims against them by blaming each other for Plaintiff’s over-detention,

requiring him “to do discovery and research about DOC Defendants to defeat OPSO Defendants’

defenses, and vice versa.”213 Plaintiff asserts that a 25% reduction is fair because it approximates

that only half of the hours spent on DOC Defendants were specific them.214 The Court agrees that

the claims against DOC Defendants and OPSO Defendants involved a common core of facts. The

Court also acknowledges that counsel obtained a settlement of approximately $1,000 per day for

each of Plaintiff’s 27 days of over-detention to constitute substantial relief in its claims against

OPSO Defendants. However, the Court does not believe that a 25% reduction is sufficient to

capture work on unsuccessful claims. Upon review of the timesheets, Plaintiff’s counsel charges

for communications exclusively with DOC Defendants’ attorneys,215 time spent on unsuccessful

discovery motions against DOC Defendants,216 and time spent on DOC Defendants’ successful

161 F.3d at 919–20 (holding that a party who won claim for costs of extra work but lost claims for delay damages,

fraud and misrepresentation was not required to segregate fees for the successful versus unsuccessful claims because

the claims arose out of the same transaction and were so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entailed proof

or denial of essentially the same facts).

212 See, e.g., Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, No. 02-2186, 2006 WL 2437882, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug.

22, 2006).

213 Rec. Doc. 261-1 at 17.

214 Id.

215 See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 261-21 at 3 (entry regarding phone call with DOC Defendants’ counsel).

216 See, e.g., id. at 14–15 (entries regarding unsuccessful motion for spoliation sanctions).

35

appeal.217 Accordingly, the Court determines that a reduction of 35% is appropriate.218 Thus, the

lodestar amount is reduced to $100,676.88.219

D. Further Adjustment to the Lodestar Calculation

After calculating the lodestar, a district court may decrease or enhance the amount of

attorney’s fees based on the relative weights of the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia

Highway Express, Inc.220 The lodestar may not be adjusted due to a Johnson factor, however, if

the creation of the lodestar award already took that factor into account.221 Such reconsideration is

“impermissible double-counting.”222 A court should presume that the lodestar calculation is

reasonable and should only modify it in exceptional circumstances.223 Here, the Court finds that

the circumstances of this case do not warrant an adjustment to the lodestar. The relevant factors

that would warrant an increase or decrease are already accounted for in the Court’s determination

of the reasonable number of hours and hourly rate. The Court has already factored the time and

labor required to represent Plaintiff, the desirability of the case, and Plaintiff’s limited success in

217 See, e.g., id. at 17–18 (entry regarding replying to DOC Defendants’ appeal).

218 See Navigant Consulting, 2006 WL 2437882, at *2 (reducing fees by 40% where successful claims were

inextricably intertwined with unsuccessful claims).

219 65% of $154,887.50 is $100,676.88.

220 Black, 732 F.3d at 502 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19). The Johnson factors are: (1)

the time and labor required to represent the client or clients; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues in the case; (3)

the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney; (5)

the customary fee charged for those services in the relevant community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)

the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the

experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19.

221 Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800 (citation omitted).

222 Id.

223 Watkins, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)).

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determining the lodestar. The Court has also factored the experience of the attorneys in reducing

the hourly billing rates included in the lodestar calculation. Adjusting the lodestar based on these

same factors “would be impermissible double counting.”224 The parties’ other arguments for

adjusting the lodestar calculation are unavailing because they do not provide evidence of

exceptional circumstances that would warrant a changing of the lodestar amount based on any of

the other Johnson factors.

However, OPSO Defendants also argue that the original request should be reduced because

it was “almost 9 times what his client received in the instant case.”225 As Plaintiff correctly asserts,

the Supreme Court has “reject[ed] the proposition that fee awards under § 1988 should necessarily

be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff actually recovers” in part because

“a successful civil rights plaintiff often secures important social benefits that are not reflected in

nominal or relatively small damages awards.”226 This reasoning is applicable here. Plaintiff’s

litigation has contributed to OPSO amending its policies and decreasing the number of days

inmates are over-detained. Accordingly, the Court rejects the argument that the attorney’s fee

award should be reduce because they are disproportionate to the relief obtained.

Finally, OPSO Defendants argue that the fee award should be reduced because they agreed

to settle the claim in good faith for $35,000 but Plaintiff’s counsel convinced Plaintiff to accept a

$25,000 settlement so that counsel could litigate the quantum of fees in this Court.227 However,

224 Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800 (citation omitted).

225 Rec. Doc. 264 at 2.

226 City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 US 561, 574 (1986).

227 Rec. Doc. 264 at 20.

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Plaintiff’s counsel represents that the higher settlement amount was conditioned upon the parties’

later agreeing to attorney’s fees through negotiation.228 The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s argument

that it was reasonable, and perhaps advisable, for him to accept a definite and immediate $25,000

offer over a conditional higher settlement amount that would be received at a later date, if at all.

Thus, the Court declines to reduce the fee award for this reason. Accordingly, the Court awards

Plaintiff $100,676.88 in attorney’s fees.

E. Costs and Expenses

In addition to attorney’s fees, Plaintiff requests $3,153.96 in costs.229 OPSO Defendants

argue that these costs should be reduced because they include costs for counsel’s convenience and

costs that are generally considered overhead.230 “In view of the length and complexity of the case,”

$3,153.96 is a modest request.231 Furthermore, a review of the costs charged indicate that the

entries are not unreasonable.232 Accordingly, the Court declines to reduce the costs requested.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court awards Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount

of $100,676.88 and expenses in the amount of $3,153.96 for a total award of $103,830.84

Accordingly,

228 Rec. Doc. 268 at 7.

229 See Rec. Doc. 261 at 1–2. Plaintiff reduces attorney’s fees and costs by 25%. Id. at 2. However, the Court

has determined that a 35% reduction is appropriate. Therefore, the Court calculates the costs requested by adding the

“case specific costs” ($4,577.89) to 1/6 of the costs applicable to all six of Most’s over-detention cases ($274.36) and

reducing this amount by 35%.

230 Rec. Doc. 264 at 19.

231 Fucich Contracting, Inc., v. Shread-Kuyrkendall & Assocs., Inc., No. 18-2885, 2023 WL 156874, at *5

(E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2023) (reducing a $150,852.17 request for costs by only five percent given the nature of the case).

232 See Rec. Doc. 261-19 at 4–5.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Rodney Grant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees”°?

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Rodney Grant is hereby awarded $103,830.84

in attorney’s fees and costs recoverable against OPSO Defendants.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 19th day of January, 2023.

NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN a

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

233 Rec. Doc. 261.

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