“The standards for a temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction.”
How later courts described this case
- “The standards for a temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOYCE MARIE MOORE, ET AL CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 65-15556
TANGIPAHOA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD SECTION: “B”(1)
OPINION
Plaintiff Taj Mikhail Jackson is a student within the
Tangipahoa Parish Public Schools system. He seeks equitable
relief, including a temporary restraining order. The relief sought
essentially amounts to a court declaration that his school-
approved Majority to Minority (“M&M”) transfer from Hammond High
School to Ponchatoula High School should not prevent his
participation in athletic sports, specifically basketball.1 That
declaration would entail modifying the current desegregation order
by deleting a provision within same entitled “Athletic
Eligibility”. It reads thusly:
Athletic eligibility for students attending a school
outside the attendance zone in which they reside shall
be subject to the rules of the Louisiana High School
Athletic Association. Student athletic eligibility for
students returning to their attendance zone school form
a transfer school shall be subject to the rules of the
Louisiana High School Athletic Association.
Rec. Doc. 1630-1 at 6.
1 M&M or Diversity Transfers generally speaking for purposes here include
transfers of minority students from a minority school to a majority school.
See also Rec. Doc. 1661. As acknowledged by the parties, this court still
maintains jurisdiction over Student Assignments, including M&M or Diversity
Transfers.
Before a Court may issue a temporary restraining order, the
moving party must show: (1) a substantial likelihood that they
will prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that
irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted; (3)
that the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the
non-moving party; and (4) that the granting of the injunction will
serve the public interest. Wexler v. City of New Orleans, No. 03-
990, 2003 WL 1903294 at *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6561 at *4 (E.D.
La. Apr. 15, 2003) (Duval, J.) (citing Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d
991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987)); see also Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F. Supp.
445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“The standards for a temporary
restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary
injunction.”). Cf. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir.
1987); Hope Med. Grp. for Women v. LeBlanc, No. CV 06-9176, 2006
WL 8460106, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2006), aff'd, 259 F. App'x
626 (5th Cir. 2007). The prerequisites for granting injunctive
relief were set out in Canal Authority of the State of Florida v.
Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.1974), which held that such
extraordinary relief would issue only where (1) there is a
substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits;
(2) there is a substantial threat that irreparable harm will result
if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury
outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) the
granting of the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public
interest. Id. at 572–73. The party seeking such relief must satisfy
a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated
before a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction can
be granted. Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline,
760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir.1985).
The athletic eligibility provision if allowed to stand would
and has a chilling effect upon achieving student assignment
improvements and final unitary status, especially upon transfers
by student and aspiring student athletes. It allows a third party,
the Louisiana High School Athletic Association (“LHSAA”), to be
the final arbiter of this black student’s eligibility to play
basketball pursuant to a federal court desegregation order
involving M&M or Diversity Transfers. The constitutional authority
of federal courts to ultimately determine the proper means towards
unitary status in a desegregation case cannot be supplanted by or
given away to anyone or any entity. The conditional grant of
unitary status is not final until the Court determines in a final
decree that discrimination in the subject areas, e.g. student
assignments, has been eliminated in all aspects and affects. See
Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 921 F.3d 545, 547-49 (5th
Cir. 2019), aff’g 2017 WL 3116483. That process includes
examination and correction, as needed here, of part of the decree
that un-expectantly resulted with a policy decision of an external
body that adversely impacts the school system reaching
unconditional unitary status. See Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch.
Bd., 864 F.3d 401, 406-07 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Taylor v.
Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 965 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763-64 (W.D. La.
2013).
It is important to state that plaintiff-student’s M&M
transfer from Hammond High School to Ponchatoula High School was
approved on June 13, 2022, (Rec. Doc. 1712-3). He received the
Official LHSAA Eligibility Response Form on October 20, 2022,
stating that he was “ineligible for varsity & sub-varsity
[sports.]” See Rec. Doc. 1712-6. The principal of Ponchatoula High
School sought an appeal on October 26, 2022, but plaintiff does
not indicate any outcome. See Rec. Doc. 1712-5. The basketball
season started on November 15, 2022, and plaintiff filed the motion
for a TRO on December 11, after eleven games had passed. See Rec.
Doc. 1712. Plaintiff’s counsel on the subject motion appears
therefore to have had ample time to request a TRO prior to now.
There is no allegation that after missing two-thirds of the season
that the student would even be afforded the opportunity to play in
one of the remaining games. Further, moving counsel for the student
either misread or overlooked the restrictive provision at issue in
the subject desegregation agreement prior to its adoption by the
court. See Rec. Doc. 1630-1 at 6.2 Moving counsel relies on LHSAA
Rule 1.13.3, which states:
Transfers Within the Athletic Attendance Zone: If at any
time a student transfers from one-member school to
another member school in the same attendance zone, the
student shall become immediately ineligible for a period
of one calendar year from the date of
enrollment/attendance in the second school. The student
may be eligible at his/her school of first choice in the
attendance zone. A transfer student will be ineligible
for a period of one calendar year at the new school
unless he/she transfers under one of the following
exceptions:
1. Majority to Minority Transfer as written into a
federal court desegregation order.
Rec. Doc. 1712-5 at 1. While plaintiff argues that the above
exception applied to his circumstance, the LHSAA argues that the
M&M transfer from Hammond High School to Ponchatoula High School
was a transfer outside his athletic attendance zone and LHSAA Rule
1.13.4 applies instead of LHSAA Rule 1.13.3. See id.; Rec. Doc.
1717 at 3-5. LHSAA Rule 1.13.4 states:
Outside the Athletic Attendance Zone: Any student who
attends a school outside his/her athletic attendance
zone shall be ineligible to participate in
interscholastic athletics at that school for a period of
one calendar year from his/her first day of attendance
unless he/she transfers under one of the following
exceptions:
1. A first year 7th, 8th or 9th grade student who
is transferring outside his/her athletic attendance
zone shall be eligible to participate at the sub-
varsity level only if the student has attended the
first day of school.
2 We cannot punish the student for moving counsel’s delay in seeking relief.
In the interest of justice, we have taken responsibility with this opinion to
correct an oversight by parties, counsel and the court that led to the
instant situation.
2. The student continuously attended the entire
7th and/or 8th grades at a middle/junior high
school of that same member school or school system
located outside of his/her athletic attendance
zone. The school shall be required to register and
certify the student’s eligibility status on the
Members’ Only website.
Rec. Doc. 1717 at 5. However, Judge Alvin B. Rubin of the Eastern
District of Louisiana ordered in this case that “No student shall
be prevented from participating in athletic contests, or any other
activity, conducted or sponsored by the Tangipahoa Parish School
System as a result of changes in school or class assignment made
to effect this Order.” Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
304 F. Supp. 244, 253 (E.D. La. 1969). LHSAA Rule 1.13.4
apparently circumvents the clear language of the Court.
Even if the LHSAA Rule 1.13.4 is applicable, and for reasons
noted above and now, it would create unreasonable and
discriminatory violations of the student’s constitutional rights
to due process and equal protection. Under either a rational or
strict scrutiny analysis, the provision singles out athletes from
other M&M transfer students in a highly punitive fashion. Having
considered all legal factors for a TRO weigh in favor of granting
a TRO, we also find that the student and schools within the instant
educational system would face sanctions from the LHSAA unfairly
and unconstitutionally for adhering to federal court orders as
here. See Rec. Doc. 1714 at 2-4 (citing LHSAA By-Laws).
Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The current athletic eligibility provision is stricken from
the desegregation order;
2. To prevent continuing violations as noted above, a temporary
restraining order is issued, nullifying the instant ineligibility
decision of the LHSAA and to hereby allow plaintiff-student, Mr.
Taj Mikhail Jackson, to participate in any remaining and future
basketball games and other sports with Ponchatoula High School,
without sanctions from the LHSAA; and
3. Within 10 days, all parties shall jointly propose in writing
a date for a preliminary injunction hearing and other remaining
issues if any.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 6th day of January, 2023
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE