Opinion

Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Jan 6, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.4%

“The standards for a temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction.”

How later courts described this case

  • “The standards for a temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOYCE MARIE MOORE, ET AL CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 65-15556

TANGIPAHOA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD SECTION: “B”(1)

OPINION

Plaintiff Taj Mikhail Jackson is a student within the

Tangipahoa Parish Public Schools system. He seeks equitable

relief, including a temporary restraining order. The relief sought

essentially amounts to a court declaration that his school-

approved Majority to Minority (“M&M”) transfer from Hammond High

School to Ponchatoula High School should not prevent his

participation in athletic sports, specifically basketball.1 That

declaration would entail modifying the current desegregation order

by deleting a provision within same entitled “Athletic

Eligibility”. It reads thusly:

Athletic eligibility for students attending a school

outside the attendance zone in which they reside shall

be subject to the rules of the Louisiana High School

Athletic Association. Student athletic eligibility for

students returning to their attendance zone school form

a transfer school shall be subject to the rules of the

Louisiana High School Athletic Association.

Rec. Doc. 1630-1 at 6.

1 M&M or Diversity Transfers generally speaking for purposes here include

transfers of minority students from a minority school to a majority school.

See also Rec. Doc. 1661. As acknowledged by the parties, this court still

maintains jurisdiction over Student Assignments, including M&M or Diversity

Transfers.

Before a Court may issue a temporary restraining order, the

moving party must show: (1) a substantial likelihood that they

will prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that

irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted; (3)

that the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the

non-moving party; and (4) that the granting of the injunction will

serve the public interest. Wexler v. City of New Orleans, No. 03-

990, 2003 WL 1903294 at *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6561 at *4 (E.D.

La. Apr. 15, 2003) (Duval, J.) (citing Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d

991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987)); see also Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F. Supp.

445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“The standards for a temporary

restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary

injunction.”). Cf. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir.

1987); Hope Med. Grp. for Women v. LeBlanc, No. CV 06-9176, 2006

WL 8460106, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2006), aff'd, 259 F. App'x

626 (5th Cir. 2007). The prerequisites for granting injunctive

relief were set out in Canal Authority of the State of Florida v.

Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.1974), which held that such

extraordinary relief would issue only where (1) there is a

substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits;

(2) there is a substantial threat that irreparable harm will result

if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury

outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) the

granting of the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public

interest. Id. at 572–73. The party seeking such relief must satisfy

a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated

before a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction can

be granted. Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline,

760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir.1985).

The athletic eligibility provision if allowed to stand would

and has a chilling effect upon achieving student assignment

improvements and final unitary status, especially upon transfers

by student and aspiring student athletes. It allows a third party,

the Louisiana High School Athletic Association (“LHSAA”), to be

the final arbiter of this black student’s eligibility to play

basketball pursuant to a federal court desegregation order

involving M&M or Diversity Transfers. The constitutional authority

of federal courts to ultimately determine the proper means towards

unitary status in a desegregation case cannot be supplanted by or

given away to anyone or any entity. The conditional grant of

unitary status is not final until the Court determines in a final

decree that discrimination in the subject areas, e.g. student

assignments, has been eliminated in all aspects and affects. See

Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 921 F.3d 545, 547-49 (5th

Cir. 2019), aff’g 2017 WL 3116483. That process includes

examination and correction, as needed here, of part of the decree

that un-expectantly resulted with a policy decision of an external

body that adversely impacts the school system reaching

unconditional unitary status. See Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch.

Bd., 864 F.3d 401, 406-07 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Taylor v.

Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 965 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763-64 (W.D. La.

2013).

It is important to state that plaintiff-student’s M&M

transfer from Hammond High School to Ponchatoula High School was

approved on June 13, 2022, (Rec. Doc. 1712-3). He received the

Official LHSAA Eligibility Response Form on October 20, 2022,

stating that he was “ineligible for varsity & sub-varsity

[sports.]” See Rec. Doc. 1712-6. The principal of Ponchatoula High

School sought an appeal on October 26, 2022, but plaintiff does

not indicate any outcome. See Rec. Doc. 1712-5. The basketball

season started on November 15, 2022, and plaintiff filed the motion

for a TRO on December 11, after eleven games had passed. See Rec.

Doc. 1712. Plaintiff’s counsel on the subject motion appears

therefore to have had ample time to request a TRO prior to now.

There is no allegation that after missing two-thirds of the season

that the student would even be afforded the opportunity to play in

one of the remaining games. Further, moving counsel for the student

either misread or overlooked the restrictive provision at issue in

the subject desegregation agreement prior to its adoption by the

court. See Rec. Doc. 1630-1 at 6.2 Moving counsel relies on LHSAA

Rule 1.13.3, which states:

Transfers Within the Athletic Attendance Zone: If at any

time a student transfers from one-member school to

another member school in the same attendance zone, the

student shall become immediately ineligible for a period

of one calendar year from the date of

enrollment/attendance in the second school. The student

may be eligible at his/her school of first choice in the

attendance zone. A transfer student will be ineligible

for a period of one calendar year at the new school

unless he/she transfers under one of the following

exceptions:

1. Majority to Minority Transfer as written into a

federal court desegregation order.

Rec. Doc. 1712-5 at 1. While plaintiff argues that the above

exception applied to his circumstance, the LHSAA argues that the

M&M transfer from Hammond High School to Ponchatoula High School

was a transfer outside his athletic attendance zone and LHSAA Rule

1.13.4 applies instead of LHSAA Rule 1.13.3. See id.; Rec. Doc.

1717 at 3-5. LHSAA Rule 1.13.4 states:

Outside the Athletic Attendance Zone: Any student who

attends a school outside his/her athletic attendance

zone shall be ineligible to participate in

interscholastic athletics at that school for a period of

one calendar year from his/her first day of attendance

unless he/she transfers under one of the following

exceptions:

1. A first year 7th, 8th or 9th grade student who

is transferring outside his/her athletic attendance

zone shall be eligible to participate at the sub-

varsity level only if the student has attended the

first day of school.

2 We cannot punish the student for moving counsel’s delay in seeking relief.

In the interest of justice, we have taken responsibility with this opinion to

correct an oversight by parties, counsel and the court that led to the

instant situation.

2. The student continuously attended the entire

7th and/or 8th grades at a middle/junior high

school of that same member school or school system

located outside of his/her athletic attendance

zone. The school shall be required to register and

certify the student’s eligibility status on the

Members’ Only website.

Rec. Doc. 1717 at 5. However, Judge Alvin B. Rubin of the Eastern

District of Louisiana ordered in this case that “No student shall

be prevented from participating in athletic contests, or any other

activity, conducted or sponsored by the Tangipahoa Parish School

System as a result of changes in school or class assignment made

to effect this Order.” Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,

304 F. Supp. 244, 253 (E.D. La. 1969). LHSAA Rule 1.13.4

apparently circumvents the clear language of the Court.

Even if the LHSAA Rule 1.13.4 is applicable, and for reasons

noted above and now, it would create unreasonable and

discriminatory violations of the student’s constitutional rights

to due process and equal protection. Under either a rational or

strict scrutiny analysis, the provision singles out athletes from

other M&M transfer students in a highly punitive fashion. Having

considered all legal factors for a TRO weigh in favor of granting

a TRO, we also find that the student and schools within the instant

educational system would face sanctions from the LHSAA unfairly

and unconstitutionally for adhering to federal court orders as

here. See Rec. Doc. 1714 at 2-4 (citing LHSAA By-Laws).

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The current athletic eligibility provision is stricken from

the desegregation order;

2. To prevent continuing violations as noted above, a temporary

restraining order is issued, nullifying the instant ineligibility

decision of the LHSAA and to hereby allow plaintiff-student, Mr.

Taj Mikhail Jackson, to participate in any remaining and future

basketball games and other sports with Ponchatoula High School,

without sanctions from the LHSAA; and

3. Within 10 days, all parties shall jointly propose in writing

a date for a preliminary injunction hearing and other remaining

issues if any.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 6th day of January, 2023

___________________________________

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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