Todd v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DAVID WAYNE TODD CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 21-550-JVM

TERREBONNE PARISH CONSOLIDATED

GOVERNMENT, ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Plaintiff, David Wayne Todd, a state pretrial detainee,1 filed this federal civil action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, Richard

Neal, and EMT Jacob Guidry,2 claiming that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs.

In prior rulings, all of plaintiff’s claims were dismissed except for his individual-capacity

claims against Guidry.3 With respect to those remaining claims, Guidry has now filed a motion

for summary judgment,4 which plaintiff opposes.5

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court may grant the motion when no

genuine issue of material fact exists and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). There is no “genuine issue” when the record taken as a whole could not lead a

1 In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was a pretrial detainee. Rec. Doc. 4, p. 3.

2 In the complaint, Guidry was identified only as “EMT Jacob”; however, in the pending motion for summary

judgment, Rec. Doc. 41, that defendant’s surname was revealed.

3 Rec. Docs. 17 and 19; Todd v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, Civ. Action No. 21-550, 2021 WL

5828127 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 5826367 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2021).

4 Rec. Doc. 41.

5 Rec. Doc. 46.

rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

“Procedurally, the party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Taita Chemical

Co., Ltd. v. Westlake Styrene Corp., 246 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and

brackets omitted). The party opposing summary judgment must then “go beyond the pleadings

and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Provident Life and Accident

Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). The Court has no duty to search the record

for evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment; rather, “[t]he party opposing

summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the

precise manner in which the evidence supports his or her claim.” Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline

Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Conclusory statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated

assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence and will not suffice to defeat a properly

supported motion for summary judgment. Id.; Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d

1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996).

In his motion for summary judgment, Guidry makes three arguments:

• Guidry was not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs;6

6 Rec. Doc. 41-2, pp. 9-12.

• At worst, plaintiff experienced only a delay in receiving medical care, and that delay

resulted in no substantial harm to plaintiff;7 and

• Guidry is entitled to qualified immunity.8

Because the Court finds that Guidry’s first argument has merit and is dispositive for the following

reasons, the Court need not address the remaining two arguments.

In this lawsuit, plaintiff claims that his constitutional right to medical care while

incarcerated was violated by Guidry at the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex.

However, although such a constitutional right does indeed exist, it is a limited one. Specifically,

with respect to medical care, the Fourteenth Amendment only “guarantees pretrial detainees a right

not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining

officials.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). Here,

Guidry argues that plaintiff cannot show deliberate indifference.9 For the following reasons, that

is correct.

“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Domino v. Texas

Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). In fact, “[d]eliberate

indifference encompasses only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the

conscience of mankind.” McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997). Further,

the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned:

It is indisputable that an incorrect diagnosis by prison medical personnel does not

suffice to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Rather, the plaintiff must show

that the officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated

him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a

7 Id. at p. 12.

8 Id. at pp. 12-14.

9 Guidry does not contest the seriousness of plaintiff’s medical needs.

wanton disregard for any serious medical needs. Furthermore, the decision whether

to provide additional treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical

judgment.

Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, plaintiff suffered complications, including the development of an abscess, while he

was being treated for a scrape on his arm.10 In this lawsuit, he claims that Guidry ignored his

medical complaints and refused his requests for medical assistance for those medical issues on two

occasions, i.e. a brief period in November of 2020 and then again on one night in January of 2021,

as follows.11

With respect to the claim arising in November of 2020, plaintiff made the following

statement in his verified complaint:

The medication nor the cream was helping. The abscess became bigger and got

very painful. … It got to the point that I could barely walk and I began to run fever,

get chills, was sweating, had chest pains, and started to lose motor functions. I

complained to EMT Jacob of my symptoms for 3 days and he refused to provide

me with the proper treatment or do anything at all. I even informed him that I

previously had triple bypass heart surgery and the chest pains needed to be checked

out. He still refused to do anything to help me.12

10 In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that a rash developed after he scraped his arm on or about October 9, 2020. He

further alleged that he was prescribed Bactrim, a “green pill,” and a cream for the rash, and he was examined by the

facility physician, Dr. Scott Haydel, on October 29. Rec. Doc. 4, p. 6.

11 Plaintiff’s claims against Guidry are expressly limited to those two occasions, and, in fact, plaintiff’s medical

records establish that Guidry was quite responsive to plaintiff’s medical needs on numerous other occasions.

Moreover, even plaintiff himself concedes that his medical care at the facility was otherwise “good,” testifying at his

deposition as follows:

A. The medical at this facility has been good without them three occasions.

Q. So Richard “Petie” Neal, [the jail’s Medical Administrator,] he’s running a good operation

over there for the medical department, isn’t he?

A. As far as I can tell.

Rec. Doc. 41-3, pp. 13-14 (Todd Deposition, pp. 24-25).

12 Rec. Doc. 4, pp. 6-7.

In his deposition, though, plaintiff stated that on two days in a row, Guidry “told me he’d get to

it,” but then, apparently, did not.13 In any event, it is undisputed that plaintiff later requested help

from other EMTs, and those requests resulted in him being transported to the hospital.

With respect to the claim arising in January of 2021, plaintiff alleged that, after his

discharge from the hospital, he then requested that Guidry provide the prescribed follow-up wound

care but, again, Guidry was not responsive. In his verified complaint, plaintiff stated:

In 1-8-2021, for 8 PM pill call I told EMT Jacob that my wound was leaking bad

and I needed it to be cleaned. He said that he just came back after being off for two

weeks and didn’t know what was going on, and that all he could do is give me a

band aid. He refused to do wound care for me.14

Because the foregoing allegations were included in plaintiff’s verified complaint and sworn

deposition testimony, they are competent summary judgment evidence. See Owens v. Neovia

Logistics, L.L.C., 816 F. App’x 906, 909 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that a deposition is competent

summary judgment evidence); Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 581 (5th Cir. 2014)

(“Allegations in a verified complaint may serve as competent summary judgment evidence.”).

Moreover, the Court must view such competent summary judgment evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-movant (here, plaintiff) and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See,

e.g., Johnson v. PRIDE Industries, Inc., 7 F.4th 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2021) (“In considering a motion

for summary judgment, the court must view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party and draw all reasonable factual inferences in the non-movant’s favor.”).

Therefore, if a constitutional violation invariably results whenever a penal official ignores an

13 Rec. Doc. 41-3, pp. 7-8 (Todd Deposition, pp. 15-16) (emphasis added).

14 Id. at p. 7.

inmate’s request for medical care or denies such medical care, then plaintiff’s allegations in the

verified complaint and deposition might be sufficient to defeat Guidry’s motion.

But a constitutional violation does not invariably result from such actions or inactions –

rather, there is an additional component to the “deliberate indifference” requirement. Specifically,

to establish “deliberate indifference,” a plaintiff must also show that the penal official knew his

actions or inactions posed a significant risk to the plaintiff. For example, the United States

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

To act with deliberate indifference, a state actor must know of and disregard an

excessive risk to the victim’s health or safety. The state actor’s actual knowledge

is critical to the inquiry – a failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, does not rise to the level

of deliberate indifference.

Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 641 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets

omitted); accord Blank v. Eavenson, 530 F. App’x 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2013) (“A prison medical

official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that the official should have perceived, but did not

is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Because actual knowledge of a significant risk is essential, it is not enough for a plaintiff

simply to argue that a defendant should have known better than to ignore requests for medical

attention or deny care. Therefore, for example, a plaintiff cannot prevail merely by arguing that

that “even a layperson would understand and know from his or her own life experiences” that a

particular course of conduct could cause serious pain and suffering. See Martin v. Seal, 510 F.

App’x 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, it is not enough for a

plaintiff to allege that a defendant knew that a different standard of care was appropriate, because

“[d]eliberate indifference … exists wholly independent of an optimal standard of care.” Id.; see

also Broussard v. Nelson, 503 F. App’x 259, 260 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Even if further treatment was

advisable,” that fact alone is not enough to show that a given defendant in fact “drew the inference

that a substantial risk of serious harm existed if it was not provided.”). In short, anything less than

actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm simply does not constitute “deliberate

indifference.” See Martin, 510 F. App’x at 315 (noting that a defendant’s “fail[ure] to act

reasonably … is inadequate to support an inference of deliberate indifference”; also noting that

negligence or “poor judgment” do not constitute deliberate indifference (quotation marks

omitted)).

For these reasons, the issue before the Court is not whether Guidry acted appropriately.

Instead, the issue is whether plaintiff has any evidence that Guidry knew that his failure to provide

medical care posed a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff. And, as Guidry correctly notes in his

motion, plaintiff has pointed to no such evidence.15 That is fatal.

Simply put: Because plaintiff has not pointed the Court to any evidence indicative of

Guidry’s actual knowledge, and because actual knowledge is a factual element of plaintiff’s claim

on which he will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting that summary judgment will be granted against

“a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial”; “a complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders

all other facts immaterial”); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)

15 See Rec. Doc. 41-2, p. 7 (“There is no evidence demonstrating that Jacob knew of and disregarded an excessive risk

to Plaintiff’s health or safety.”).

(“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate in any case where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on

an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Guidry’s motion for summary judgment, Rec. Doc. 41, is

GRANTED and plaintiff's claims against him are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th _ day of November, 2022.

JANIS VAN MEERVELD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE