Opinion

Weiser v. Castille

Court: District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed: Oct 14, 2022
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 22.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DEBORAH WEISER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 20-2043

ELIZABETH CASTILLE, ET AL SECTION: "S" (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rec. Doc. 133) filed by the City of Gretna, Belinda

Constant, Mark Morgan, and Danika Gorrondona is GRANTED in part, and plaintiff’s claims

against them related to the permit issuance are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment

(Rec. Doc. 133) filed by the City of Gretna, Belinda Constant, Mark Morgan, and Danika

Gorrondona is GRANTED in part, and plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against them related

to the lawn maintenance contract are DISMISSED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's state law claims are DISMISSED for lack

of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

In underlying state court litigation, plaintiff, Deborah Weiser, sought to nullify certain

acts of donation of real property by her deceased husband, Howard Weiser, Sr., to his daughter,

Elizabeth Castille,1 including property located at 1518 Claire Avenue in Gretna, Louisiana. By

judgment dated April 30, 2019, the 24th Judicial District Court rendered judgment in favor of

Castille. Plaintiff herein appealed to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, which affirmed

in an opinion dated March 17, 2020. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs on October 14,

2020.

Plaintiff disagrees with these rulings. She contends that as part of a racially-motivated

conspiracy, the state courts failed to properly apply Louisiana law, and if they had done so, the

rulings would have been in her favor. Plaintiff filed the instant federal suit seeking the reversal

of state court decisions against her, including the return of property adjudicated in those

proceedings, damages for violations of her rights, and declaratory relief.2 In her federal suit,

plaintiff alleges that her stepchildren, financial institutions, attorneys involved in state court

litigation, judges who presided over plaintiff's state court cases, the City of Gretna, and Gretna

city officials – individually and collaboratively – violated her state and federal rights. She alleges

1 Weiser, Sr. (Castille's father) and plaintiff were married in 2004, divorced in 2014, and

reconciled in 2015. They were married at the time of Weiser's death in 2018.

2 Plaintiff's amended complaint invokes the following federal laws: 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201

and 2202 (the Declaratory Judgment Act), the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Constitution, Louisiana Constitution Articles I §§ 2 and 3, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. §§§ 1983, 1985 (2) and (3), and 1986, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681,

and the Fair Debt Collection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Plaintiff alleges pendent state law claims,

invoking Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 863, and Louisiana Civil Code articles 2298,

2315, 2316, and for Intentional Negligence, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,

Conversion, Mental Anguish, Tortious Interference with Contract, Breach of Contract, and

violations of the Professional Code of Conduct, and the Louisiana Tort Claims Act. In addition,

plaintiff invokes criminal statutes: Louisiana Revised Statutes title 14, sections 123 (perjury) and

133 (filing or maintaining false public records).

that these actors used fraudulent documents, statements, omissions, and actions in furtherance of

the fraud. She argues that but for the fraud, legal error, and racial discrimination, she would have

prevailed in all of her state court litigation.

The court previously dismissed the following defendants based on lack of jurisdiction:

Judge Stephen D. Enright, Judge Stephen C. Grefer, Morrison Law Group, PLC, Ronald W.

Morrison, Jr., First Horizon Bank, Konrad Law Firm, LLC, Gordon R. Konrad, 21st Mortgage

Corporation, Elizabeth Castille, and Howard Weiser, Jr.

With respect to movants herein, the City of Gretna and Gretna officials, plaintiff alleges

she was harmed in two ways: by the City of Gretna granting a permit to alter water lines on

property at 1518 Claire Avenue before it was finally adjudicated to belong to Elizabeth Castille,

and for terminating a lawn care contract with the City of Gretna, which she alleges was done

based on her race and sex. In the instant motion, the City of Gretna and Mayor Constant,

Morgan, and Gorrondona (hereinafter, sometimes "Gretna defendants") seek dismissal, arguing

that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Alternatively, they seek summary judgment that plaintiff lacks evidence to support necessary

elements of her claims, and further, that she cannot overcome a qualified immunity defense. In

opposition, plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman and qualified immunity do not apply.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

"Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party

to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case.” Ramming v.

United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). “Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be

found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by

undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts

plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Id. In a 12(b)(1) motion, the party asserting

jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exists. Id.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Granting a motion for summary

judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file,

and affidavits filed in support of the motion demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The court must find "[a]

factual dispute . . . [to be] 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] 'material' if it might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882

F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue,

the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue

for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The non-movant cannot satisfy the

summary judgment burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a

scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

If the opposing party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party does not have

to submit evidentiary documents properly to support its motion, but need only point out the

absence of evidence supporting the essential elements of the opposing party’s case. Saunders v.

Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991).

B. Motion to Dismiss Based on the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman3 doctrine bars federal courts from entertaining cases "brought by

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). "A state

court judgment is attacked for purposes of Rooker–Feldman 'when the [federal] claims are

"inextricably intertwined" with a challenged state court judgment,' Richard v. Hoechst Celanese

Chem. Grp., Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir.2003), or where the losing party in a state court

action seeks 'what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment.' Johnson v. De

Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994)." Weaver v. Texas Cap. Bank N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904

(5th Cir. 2011). Those who lose their cases in state courts have but one federal recourse, “an

application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.” Liedtke v. State Bar of

Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prohibit a plaintiff from “‘present[ing] some

independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a

3 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

case to which he was a party.’” Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284). However, where the relief sought via the fraud

claim requires reversal of the state court judgment, it is not independent. Id.; see also, e.g.,

Sookma v. Millard, 151 Fed. App’x 299, 300–01 (5th Cir. 2005) (Rooker–Feldman bars a federal

plaintiff's claim that her state-court opponents and state judges conspired to deprive her of civil

rights when she sought to enjoin enforcement of a state divorce decree.).

The court previously dismissed numerous defendants that plaintiff alleged had conspired

to violate her constitutional and civil rights when, motivated by race, they colluded to obtain,

enter, and enforce state court judgments to deprive her of property and grant it to her

stepdaughter, Elizabeth Castille. As relief, plaintiff had sought to have the judgments declared

null and void. Thus, the allegations presented a collateral attack on the state court judgments, for

which the requested could not be granted without reversing the state court judgment. The court,

applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine dismissed those claims for lack of jurisdiction. The

Gretna defendants now argue that the claims against them are also precluded by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, because they also collaterally attack the state court judgment.

1. Claim based on permit issuance

Plaintiff alleges that due to her race, the Gretna defendants granted a permit to Castille

before the property was adjudicated as belonging to Castille, thereby depriving her of federally

protected property rights.4 However, despite the timing of the permit issuance, the fact remains

4 In connection with her opposition to the motion, plaintiff has not provided any copies of

the permit application or permit, so it is not conclusively established that the permit was issued

before title was adjudicated in Elizabeth Castille's favor. Nevertheless, on a motion to dismiss

that the property was adjudicated as belonging to Castille. Thus, thus plaintiff has no ownership

right in the property to be enforced, or to be violated by state or municipal actors. The only

means by which that could potentially change would be a reversal of the state court judgment in

Castille's favor. Accordingly, this claim is inextricably intertwined in the state court judgment,

and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes this court's exercise of jurisdiction over the claim.

2. Claim based on lawn contract cancellation

Plaintiff also alleges that the Gretna defendants cancelled a long-term contract it made

with plaintiff and her deceased husband based on her race and sex. The fact that ultimately a

state court judgment was rendered in favor of Castille decreeing her to be the owner of the Claire

Avenue property does not undermine these claims. No state court judgment adjudicating the

lawn care claim has been supplied or referenced. Accordingly, these claims are independent of

the state court adjudication and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to deprive the court

of jurisdiction over them.

C. Motion for Summary Judgment on Section 1983 Claims

The Gretna defendants have alternatively moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's

remaining claims stemming from the lawn care contract. Plaintiff's claims related to the lawn

care contract are excerpted below:

68. Plaintiff and her husband, during his lifetime, negotiated and executed a

contractual agreement with City of Gretna to provide lawncare services for the

City.

under Federal Rule 12(b)(1), the court accepts the allegations as true. See Wooten v. Roach, 964

F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2020).

69. Plaintiff contends that, their company provided lawncare services for ten

years on behalf of City of Gretna, and she was discriminated against on the basis

of her race after her husband passed away.

70. Plaintiff contends that, she received disparage [sic] treatment by the City of

Gretna, Mayor and staff members because of her race (black) and gender

(female) terminating her contract and hiring a white entity owned by a white

male.

71. Plaintiff avers that, defendant Mayor Brenda C. Constant’s policies and

custom upon the demise of her spouse, concocted a scheme to discriminate

against her based on her race and sex terminating her contract and procured

another White entrepreneur alleging Plaintiff did not meet the qualifications to

perform lawn care services relative to RFP standards.

72. Plaintiff reiterates that, notwithstanding their entity [sic] tenure of services

conducting lawn care services on behalf of the City of Gretna, defendant Brenda

C. Constant deprived and denied her liberty to earn a living in her chosen

profession and tortuously [sic] interfering with her contract by requiring her to

compete in an RFP bid for the contract.

73. Plaintiff contends that, defendant Mayor Brenda C. Constant deprived and

denied her property right and interest by terminating her contract and hiring a

white male.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Rec. Doc. 5 (emphasis added).

Parsing these allegations, it appears that as to the Gretna defendants, plaintiff alleges she

was subject to disparate treatment in contracting based upon her race and gender, her procedural

due process rights were violated when she was deprived of the lawn care contract with the City

of Gretna, and the Gretna defendants violated state law when they tortiously interfered with the

lawn care contract. Thus, the allegations incorporate both section 1983 and state law claims.

1. Section 1983 claims

Section 1983 provides a remedy against every person, who under color of state law,

deprives another of any rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hous.,

185 F.3d 521, 525 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1999). “To pursue a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must:

(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2)

that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Sw. Bell

Tel., LP v. City of Hous., 529 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2008).

Section 1983 actions are governed by the Rule 8 pleading standard set forth in Twombly

and Iqbal. Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a

claimant to give “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

a. Race-based disparate treatment claim

Plaintiff alleges that the Gretna defendants treated her disparately in connection with the

lawn care contract based upon her race. Such claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and are

cognizable under section 1983. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731. Section 1981

prohibits intentional race discrimination with respect to certain enumerated activities, including

contracting. Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2003). Included are the

making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all

benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) &

(b). Of course, “[a]ny claim brought under § 1981 ... must initially identify an impaired

‘contractual relationship[ ]’ ... under which the plaintiff has rights.” Domino's Pizza, Inc. v.

McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) (internal citation omitted; footnote omitted). “Section 1981

offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well

as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff

has or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.” Id. at 476.

In moving for summary judgment, the Gretna defendants argue that plaintiff bears the

burden of proof at trial on the elements of her claim, and she has pointed to no evidence to

suggest the elements of her claim are satisfied. The court agrees. While it is undisputed that

plaintiff is black, in opposing summary judgment, plaintiff has come forward with no evidence

to establish that plaintiff ever had a contract with the City of Gretna that could have been

illegally terminated.5 Nor has she submitted any Statement of Contested Facts averring such.

Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence in support of her claims in response to the Gretna

defendants' motion for summary judgment, and thus she cannot survive the motion for summary

judgment on her section 1983 claims based on section 1981.6

5In fact, it is not entirely clear that the plaintiff was in privity of contract with the City of

Gretna at all. Her allegations assert that her and her husband's company provided lawn care

services to the City of Gretna, and she has not demonstrated that whatever agreement existed

was not between the City and her husband (now deceased), or the City and an LLC (not a party

to this litigation).

6In addition, it appears the claim may be prescribed. Courts considering section 1983

claims borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Redburn v. City

of Victoria, 898 F.3d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 2018). Louisiana provides a one-year prescriptive period

for such claims. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492. Plaintiff alleges the contract was terminated upon the

death of her husband, which occurred on March 28, 2018; plaintiff's suit was filed in July 2020,

over two years later.

b. Gender-based disparate treatment claim

“[N]o court has held that allegations of gender based discrimination fall within [§ 1981's]

purview.” Washington v. National Oil Well Varco, L.P., 2022 WL 6250690, at *3 (N.D. Tex.

Oct. 7, 2022) (citing Bobo v. ITT, Cont'l Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1981) (other

citations omitted). Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff's claims are based on gender

discrimination, the claims are Equal Protection claims brought under section 1983.

The Equal Protection clause prohibits a state from “deny[ing] to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. It “essentially

requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike.” Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 244

(5th Cir. 2018) (citing Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist.of Harris Cnty., 836 F.2d 921, 932 (5th Cir.

1988)). Accordingly, to prevail on a claim of gender discrimination under the Equal Protection

clause a plaintiff “must allege and prove that he received treatment different from that received

by similarly situated individuals and that the unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory

intent.” Priester v. Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Taylor v.

Johnson, 257 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2001)). To establish discriminatory intent, a plaintiff must show

“that the decision maker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his

course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effect on an identifiable

group.” Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 411–12 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal

quotations omitted)). “Allegations of discriminatory intent that are merely conclusory, without

reference to specific facts, will not suffice.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

In this case, plaintiff has not adequately alleged, nor pointed to evidence that would

establish, that the Gretna defendants acted with discriminatory intent. Her sole supporting

allegations are that after her husband's death, the contract was given to a white male. In addition

to the fact that such conclusory allegations are insufficient, plaintiff's complaint acknowledges a

non-discriminatory reason for the City's action: that the award was based on the fact that she was

determined not to meet the requirements of the City's Request for Proposals ("RFP"). Defendants

have pointed to a lack of evidence necessary to plaintiff's claim, and plaintiff has failed to

provide “any evidentiary basis on which the court might find that the [defendants] intended to

discriminate against [her].” Crain v. City of Selma, 952 F.3d 634, 642 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal

quotations omitted). The Gretna defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiff's Equal Protection claim.

c. Due Process claim

Plaintiff also alleges that in terminating the lawn care contracts, the Gretna defendants

deprived her of a property right in violation of the Due Process clause. The Due Process clause

prohibits a state from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, to state a claim, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege

a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. In this case, plaintiff contends that she has a property

interest in a contract for lawn care with the City of Gretna.

As previously discussed in connection with plaintiff's section 1981 claim, in responding

to the Gretna defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has not come forward with any

evidence of a contract with the City of Gretna, nor an ownership interest in one. Again, the

defendants have pointed out the absence of evidence supporting the essential elements of the

plaintiff's case, and plaintiff has not come forward with any supporting evidence to establish this

claim. See Saunders v. Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991). Accordingly,

defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's Due Process claim.

3. State Law claims

Plaintiff alleges a claim for tortious interference with contract against the Gretna

defendants, which, if cognizable, would arise under state law. However, in the Fifth Circuit, the

“‘general rule’ is to decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims when all

federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case prior to trial.” Batiste v. Island

Recs. Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227 (5th Cir. 1999). All federal claims as to all defendants having been

eliminated in this matter, to the extent plaintiff intended to direct any of her state law claims to

the Gretna defendants, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons,