The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ANGELA WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 21-2200
MAGNOLIA COMMUNITY SECTION "B"(5)
SERVICES INC., ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff’s motion to continue trial date
and reset scheduling order deadlines (Rec. Doc. 49) and defendants’
opposition (Rec. Doc. 53). For the following reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion (Rec. Doc. 49) is DENIED.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The above-captioned case was first removed to this Court on
November 30, 2021. Rec. Doc. 1. A scheduling conference was held
on February 3, 2022, and a pre-trial conference was set for October
13, 2022, at 10:00 a.m., a jury trial was set for October 24, 2022,
at 8:30 a.m., and all discovery was ordered to be completed by
September 13, 2022. Rec. Doc. 16. At the time of the scheduling
conference, counsel of record was Leo Caillier, III, and
Christopher Carbine. Id. at 1; see Rec. Doc. 13 at 2. On June 30,
2022, plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to substitute counsel,
withdrawing Christopher Carbine, and enrolling Willard J. Brown,
Sr., as counsel of record. Rec. Doc. 30 at 1. This Court granted
the motion to substitute on July 1, 2022, and it was subsequently
entered into the record on July 5, 2022. Rec. Doc. 31. Leo
Caillier, III, remained on as counsel of record as well. Rec. Doc.
49-1 at 1.
On July 5, 2022, defendants served plaintiff with
“Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production
of Documents, and Requests for Admission to Plaintiff, Angela
Williams.” Rec. Doc. 33-1 at 1; Rec. Doc. 33-2 at 13. At
plaintiff’s deposition on July 22, 2022, Mr. Brown informed
defendants’ counsel that their responses would be timely. Rec.
Doc. 53 at 2. Plaintiff’s responses were due on August 4, 2022,
but plaintiff failed to provide such responses. Rec. Doc. 33-1 at
1. Defendants permitted a brief extension, and plaintiff provided
“Plaintiff’s Answer to Magnolia’s Request for Admission,” on
August 9, 2022, but did not provide responses to “Magnolia’s
Interrogatories or Requests for Production of Documents.” Id. at
2. On August 11, 2022, defendant filed a motion to compel discovery
from plaintiff as to the interrogatories and requests for
production of document, which was granted on August 31, 2022, and
provided plaintiff with ten days to comply with discovery. Rec.
Doc. 33.
On August 16, 2022, defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, set for submission on August 31, 2022. Rec. Doc. 34.
Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to file an
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, however, this motion
was marked deficient. Rec. Doc. 36. On September 9, 2022, plaintiff
filed a motion for extension to file a response to defendants’
motion for summary judgment, but this was also marked deficient by
the Court. Rec. Doc. 38. Then on September 13, 2021, plaintiff
filed a motion to withdraw Leo Caillier, III, as counsel of record.
Rec. Doc. 39. The motion to withdraw was granted on September 21,
2022, leaving Willard J. Brown as the only remaining counsel of
record for plaintiff. See Rec. Doc. 41. Nearly a month after the
submission date for defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file opposition to summary
judgment. Rec. Doc. 44.
Defendants responded to plaintiff’s motion for leave to file
opposition to summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 46) and this Court
granted plaintiff’s motion (Rec. Doc. 47), and allowed defendants
to submit a reply memorandum in support of their motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff’s opposition was entered into the record on
September 28, 2022 (Rec. Doc. 48), and defendant’s reply was filed
on October 4, 2022 (Rec. Doc. 55). After the discovery deadline of
September 13, 2022, had passed, Mr. Brown contacted defense counsel
to inquire about pending discovery owed to plaintiff filed by
previous plaintiff counsel, but defense counsel informed Mr. Brown
that no discovery was pending, and no discovery had been conducted
by any previous plaintiff counsel. See Rec. Doc. 49-1 at 2; Rec.
Doc. 53 at 3.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) states, “[a scheduling order] may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The Fifth Circuit has held, “[t]he good cause
standard requires the party seeking relief to show that the
deadlines cannot reasonable be met despite the diligence of the
party needing the extension.” S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust
Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Leone
v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 16-cv-6830, 2017 WL 3098169, at *1 (E.D.
La. July 21, 2017) (Lemelle, J.) (quoting S&W Enters., L.L.C., 315
F.3d at 535). The Court uses four factors to determine if there is
good cause under Rule 16: “(1) the explanation for the failure to
timely [comply with the scheduling order]; (2) the importance of
the [modification]; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the
[modification]; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure
such prejudice.” Squyres v. Heico Companies, L.L.C., 782 F.3d
224, 237 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v. Folgeman, 607 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir.
2010)).
Here, plaintiff cannot show that the deadlines could not have
reasonably been met despite plaintiff’s due diligence. Mr. Brown
was enrolled in the above-captioned matter on July 1, 2022 (Rec.
Doc. 31), and he, along with his co-counsel, have, on several
instances, failed to meet deadlines and required extensions by
this Court. Mr. Brown has been counsel for plaintiff since the
beginning of July and discovery was not due until September 13,
2022, and it was not until after this date that Mr. Brown inquired
as to the state of discovery for his client. See Rec. Doc. 49-1 at
2; Rec. Doc. 53 at 3. Upon finding no discovery had been conducted
the instant motion was filed. All deadlines were available to
counsel at the time he was enrolled in the matter and counsel
waited until all such deadlines had passed before making an inquiry
as to the state of discovery. The Fifth Circuit is clear that good
cause requires that the requesting party show that the deadlines
cannot be met despite the requesting party’s diligence, and
plaintiff’s counsel has not demonstrated such due diligence. See
S&W Enters., L.L.C., 315 F.3d at 535.
In addressing the first factor of good cause under Rule 16,
plaintiff argues that “she relied on her previous counsel to timely
file and take appropriate actions as directed by this Honorable
Court,” and adds that “previous counsels disagreements failed to
comply with this court’s scheduling order at the prejudice of the
plaintiff.” Rec. Doc. 49-1 at 3. However, Mr. Brown was counsel of
record well before the discovery deadlines and should have
appraised himself to the status of this case. Mr. Brown was present
at plaintiff’s deposition and was aware of defendants’ pending
discovery in July, yet, at that time, made no inquiry as to the
status of plaintiff’s discovery. See Rec. Doc. 53 at 2. Plaintiff
presents no evidence as to why she was incapable of adhering to
the discovery deadline.
Factor two looks to the importance of the modification. See
Squyres, 782 F.3d at 237. Allowing a continuance of trial and
resetting scheduling order deadlines could allow plaintiff to
conduct discovery and prepare for trial, as well as continue
settlement discussion. See Rec. Doc. 49-1 at 3. However, plaintiff
has had ample time to conduct discovery and has made no attempt to
do so before the discovery deadline.
Factor three considers the potential prejudice in allowing
the continuance. See Squyres, 782 F.3d at 237. Defendants point
out that trial is scheduled for October 24, 2022, less than a month
away, and in Tabor v. Cox Operating, L.L.C., No. 19-cv-11859, 2022
WL 1120074, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 2022), this Court held that
a late-stage trial continuance may create prejudice. Tabor v. Cox
Operating, L.L.C., No. 19-cv-11859, 2022 WL 1120074, at *2 (E.D.
La. Apr. 14, 2022) (Lemelle, J.) (citing Batiste v. Lewis, 976
F.3d 493, 501 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted)
(“finding plaintiff did not show good cause for changing a
scheduling order when doing so would have disrupted the trial date,
which was less than a month away”)). Here, trial is less than a
month away, continuing trial would prejudice defendants, who have
made an effort to comply with the scheduling order deadlines.
Plaintiffs on the other hand, have requested extensions, failed to
submit discovery responses necessitating an order to compel, and
through plaintiff’s own oversight, failed to conduct her own
discovery before the deadline.
Finally, factor four considers “the availability of a
continuance to cure such prejudice.” Squyres, 782 F.3d at 237.
Here, any such continuance may further prejudice defendants with
trial being less than a month away. See Tabor, 2022 WL 1120074, at
*2. The above factors weigh in favor of denying a continuance.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 6th day of October, 2022
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE