The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DR. KERI TURNER CIVIL DOCKET
VERSUS NO. 21-664
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE SECTION: “J”(3)
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA
SYSTEM, ET AL.
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court are two Motions for Summary Judgment (Rec. Docs. 47,
48) The first (Rec. Doc. 47) was filed by Defendants, Board of Supervisors of the
University of Louisiana System (“Board of Supervisors”) and Steven H. Kenney, Jr.
(“Kenney”). Plaintiff, Dr. Keri Turner (“Dr. Turner”) opposed the motion (Rec. Doc.
52), and Defendants replied to Plaintiff’s opposition. (Rec. Doc. 57). The second
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 48) was filed by Plaintiff and
was opposed by the Defendant (Rec. Doc. 51). Plaintiff also filed a reply to
Defendant’s opposition. (Rec. Doc. 63). Having considered the motions and legal
memoranda, the record, and the applicable law the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 48) is DENIED, and
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 47) is GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case involves claims under both the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. 2601, et. seq. and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination
Law (“LEDL”), La. R.S. 23:301, et. seq. Plaintiff, Dr. Keri Turner was employed by
Nicholls State University in Thibodeaux, Louisiana as a tenured Associate
Professor of English Languages and Literature and a grant writer. Dr. Turner was
diagnosed with irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”), and in 2017, her symptoms began
to worsen. (Rec. Doc. 22, at 3). By the spring of 2018, Dr. Turner’s condition had
progressed to the point that she began to have difficulty appearing for her in-person
classes and office hours. (Rec. Doc. 47-1, at 1). Because of her illness, she applied for
and was granted intermittent FMLA leave on March 28, 2018. Id. Dr. Turner claims
that during this period of intermittent FMLA leave she continued to be paid
without interruption and without having to submit additional medical evidence for
her absences in order to qualify for sick leave. (Rec. Doc. 48-2, at 3). Dr. Turner also
claims that she requested permission to teach remotely during this time but was
denied. Id. at 4.
By the fall of 2018, Dr. Turner’s department chair Dr. Ellen Barker
recommended that her tenure be revoked because of her inability to teach in-person
classes. Id. Dr. Turner appealed this recommendation to the University Tenure
Revocation Committee. After a hearing in the spring of 2019, the committee voted
against dismissal. Id. Dr. Turner further alleges that the committee recommended
that she be allowed to teach online. Id.
In March of 2019, Dr. Turner requested an ADA accommodation from
Defendant Steven Kenney, Vice President and Director of Human Resources and
Nicholls State (“Kenney”). Id. She requested that she be permitted to teach classes
exclusively online because of her need to have constant access to a restroom due to
her IBS symptoms which was supported by a note from her treating physician. Id.
at 5. Nicholls State denied her request and instead offered to move all of her classes
next door to a restroom. (Rec. Doc. 47-1, at 2). The University alleges that allowing
Dr. Turner to teach exclusively online would have required the firing of four
adjuncts as well as reassigning a professor to cover her in-person classes. Id. Dr.
Barker also testified at her deposition that Dr. Turner was no longer permitted to
teach online prior to her making any FMLA or ADA requests. (Rec. Doc. 57, at 2.)
Dr. Turner avers that her reassignment would not have cost the University any
money and that it was typical for last minute changes to the teaching schedule to
occur in the English Department. (Rec. Doc. 52, at 6, 7). Further, Dr. Turner points
to the fact that Dr. Barker also testified that she was never informed of the faculty
committee’s recommendation to allow Dr. Turner to teach exclusively online and
that “if they had asked me to accommodate her and to give her all online classes, I
would have done that.” Id. at 8. Dr. Turner also filed EEOC charges on June 21,
2019 arising out of the same set of circumstances. (Rec. Doc. 47-1, at 2).
During the fall semester of 2019, Defendants allege Dr. Turner accumulated
40 absences in the course of two and a half to three months. Id. at 6. During this
time Dr. Turner was not covered by the FMLA. Id. At some point during the fall of
2019, Dr. Turner met with University President Jay Clune. Plaintiff’s filings
provide inconsistent dates as to when this meeting occurred, but she states it was
either on September 30th, 2019 or on October 31, 2019.1 At this meeting, Plaintiff
1 Plaintiff states in her Complaint that this meeting took place on September 30th, 2019. (Rec. Doc.
22, at 5). However, Plaintiff’s Sworn Declaration provides that this meeting took place on October 31,
states that she was removed from her teaching position and reassigned to the
writing lab, a position she alleges is normally reserved for undergraduate workers.
(Rec. Doc. 52, at 14, 15). At this same meeting Dr. Turner alleges that University
President Jay Clune demanded that she either resign immediately, go through the
Tenure Revocation Committee again and face termination, or accept reassignment
to the writing lab and retire in May of 2020. (Rec. Doc. 52-9, at 4). Dr. Turner stated
that she complied with President Clune’s request at that time and wrote a letter of
resignation stating she intended to retire at the end of the 2019-2020 academic
year. Id. Dr. Clune testified that Dr. Turner would have been allowed to resume
teaching had she continued in the writing lab and “felt able to show up for classes
regularly again.” (Rec. Doc. 47-1, at 10). However, this fact stands in contrast to the
fact that Dr. Turner alleges she had already submitted her resignation and would
be leaving at the end of the 2020 Spring Semester regardless of her health status.
(Rec. Doc. 22, at 5).
Dr. Turner also alleges that on October 17, 2019 she attended a meeting in
Kenney’s office in which she was informed that she would be required to produce
doctor’s notes for each time she took medical leave, although she maintains she had
never abused the University sick leave policy. (Rec. Doc. 48-2, at 5). At this time,
she was not covered by the FMLA. (Rec. Doc. 51, at 4). University policy allows that
in the event of excessive absenteeism, supervisors may choose to require medical
documentation for each absence to grant paid sick leave. (Rec. Doc. 48-11, at 14).
2019. (Rec. Doc. 52-9, at 4.) Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts also states that this meeting
took place on September 30th, 2019. (Rec. Doc. 47-3, at 2).
Defendant Kenney maintains that he was not the one who asked for the doctor’s
notes, but that the doctor’s notes were used to evaluate paid sick leave rather than
intermittent FMLA leave. (Rec. Doc. 51, at 2).
However, Dr. Turner was once again granted intermittent FMLA leave on
November 7th, 2019.2 (Rec. Doc. 47-2, at 107). She claims that even though she was
once again covered by the FMLA, she was still required to submit a medical excuse
each time she took leave. (Rec. Doc. 48-12, at 3). The University maintains that
these doctor’s notes were unconnected to Dr. Turner’s FMLA leave but were instead
required justification for paid sick leave. (Rec. Doc. 51, at 2). Dr. Turner also states
that she questioned the requirement of medical excuses while under FMLA leave in
a series of emails with HR, but she was unsuccessful in challenging the
requirement. Id. Dr. Turner alleges that she attempted to appeal to the University
Board of Supervisors throughout the remainder of the school year to be
accommodated for her disability to return to teaching. (Rec. Doc. 22, at 6). However,
Dr. Turner was unsuccessful in these attempts. Finally, Dr. Turner resigned on
May 15, 2020. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56); see Little
2 Plaintiff states in her Sworn Declaration that she requested FMLA leave on November 11th, 2019.
(Rec. Doc. 48-12, at 3).
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a
dispute as to any material fact exists, a court considers “all of the evidence in the
record but refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th
Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but
a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations or
unsubstantiated assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. A court ultimately must be
satisfied that “a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Delta, 530 F.3d at 399.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden
of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would
‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving
party can then defeat the motion by either countering with sufficient evidence of its
own, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not
persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”
Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing
out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element
of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts
to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out
specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may
not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine
issue for trial. See id. at 325; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff, Dr. Turner makes two claims in this case. The first is against HR
Director Steven Kenney for interference with intermittent medical leave and
retaliation under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. 2601, et. seq. The second is against Nicholls
State University for a violation of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law.
La. R.S. 23:301, et. seq.
I. FMLA Claims
Plaintiff makes two types of claims under the FMLA: one for interference and
one for retaliation but has only moved for summary judgment on the interference
claim. Defendant Kenney has moved for summary judgment on both of these FMLA
claims and also asserts qualified immunity.
A. FMLA Interference
Plaintiff claims FMLA interference because she was required to produce
doctor’s notes after each time she was absent. Under the FMLA, a covered employer
must provide eligible employees with up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave when the
employee has “a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to
perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). It
is illegal for employers to “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the
attempt to exercise” any right under the FMLA or to “discharge or in any manner
discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful” under
the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). To make a prima facie case for FMLA interference,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) he was an eligible employee; (2) his employer
was subject to FMLA requirements; (3) he was entitled to leave; (4) he gave proper
notice of his intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) his employer denied him the
benefits to which he was entitled under the FMLA.” Caldwell v. KHOU-TV, 850
F.3d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 2017).
Generally, once an employee is initially certified for intermittent FMLA
leave, employers cannot ask employees to recertify their medical condition more
often than every 30 days. 29 C.F.R. § 825.308. Employers may request certification
in less than 30 days if the circumstances described by the previous certification
have changed significantly or if “the employer receives information that casts doubt
upon the employee’s stated reason for the absence or the continuing validity of the
certification.” Id.
Plaintiff claims Defendant Kenney interfered with her FMLA rights when he
required her to obtain doctor’s notes providing medical justification for each
absence. (Rec. Doc. 48-2, at 5). This requirement began while Dr. Turner was
between periods of FMLA leave but allegedly continued once her leave was restored
in November. (Rec. Doc. 48-12, at 3). Defendant never claims that there was any
doubt as to Dr. Turner’s condition or the validity of her FMLA certification that
would justify recertification under the FMLA more frequently than every 30 days.
Defendant also denies that he was the one who requested the doctor’s notes. Id.
Defendant further asserted that all requests for doctor’s notes were not made under
the FMLA, but rather were required in order to grant paid sick leave. (Rec. Doc. 51,
at 2).
Employers are allowed to require employees to substitute accrued paid sick
leave for unpaid FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(A). Alternatively, employers
can allow paid and unpaid leave to run concurrently, which is what the Defendant
alleges happened in Dr. Turner’s case. (Rec. Doc. 51, at 2). The Fifth Circuit has
held that “an employer generally does not violate the FMLA if it terminates an
employee for failing to comply with a policy requiring notice of absences, even if the
absences that the employee failed to report were protected by the FMLA.” Acker v.
Gen. Motors, L.L.C., 853 F.3d 784, 791 (5th Cir. 2017). Therefore, employees are
required to comply with company policy concerning notice of absences even while
under FMLA protection.
In Acker, the plaintiff claimed FMLA interference when he suffered several
weeks of disciplinary layoff while taking approved intermittent FMLA leave. Id. at
786. However, the court found that his discipline was the result of his failure to
properly notify his employer on the days he needed to take his FMLA leave. Id. at
789. Unlike the claim in Acker, Dr. Turner’s claim does not deal with notice of
absences but rather with providing medical justification for those absences.
However, the rationale still applies: Nicholls State policy allows supervisors to
require doctor’s notes for each absence when there has been excessive absenteeism
in order to grant paid sick leave (Rec. Doc. 48-11, at 14); Defendant Kenney alleges
that Dr. Turner had been excessively absent, a determination which is up to her
employer (Rec. Doc. 47-2, at 110); Dr. Turner allegedly sought paid and unpaid
FMLA leave concurrently; id. therefore, the University was allowed to require
doctor’s notes from Dr. Turner for each absence as long as those notes were in
conjunction with her paid sick leave rather than with her intermittent FMLA leave.
Dr. Turner relies on a district court case from Oregon as an example of a
court holding that requiring doctor’s notes for each absence under the FMLA was
tantamount to recertification. Oak Harbor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Antti, 998 F. Supp.
2d 968, 975-79 (D. Or. 2014). However, the plaintiffs in Oak Harbor, unlike Dr.
Turner, had no concurrent paid leave with their FMLA intermittent leave.
Therefore, this Court is not persuaded that the reasoning of Oak Harbor applies to
the instant case.
Furthermore, the doctor’s notes did not actually prevent Dr. Turner from
taking FMLA leave. In a 2021 case out of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana, Judge Brian Jackson held that absent a finding that an
employee was actually prevented or discouraged from taking FMLA leave, there can
be no interference. Erickson v. Penn National Gaming, Inc., No. 19-00451, 2021 WL
1150067 (M.D. La. March 25, 2021). In Erickson, the plaintiff was initially approved
for intermittent FMLA leave. Id. at *1. However, after recertifying her medical need
for intermittent leave, she was informed by her supervisor that she was required to
go to her doctor every time she was absent. Id. The plaintiff discussed the illegality
of this requirement with the defendant’s HR department and was thereafter
suspended. Id. However, after her attorneys contacted the defendant on her behalf,
the employee was called back into work several days later and was never required
to return to the doctor for illegally-frequent recertifications. Id. In Erickson, the
court held that because the plaintiff was never actually denied leave and because
she was never actually required to illegally recertify, she suffered no FMLA
interference. The plaintiff argued that she was prejudiced because she had to
expend monetary resources for legal assistance to get HR to end her suspension.
However, the court held that “prejudice to the Plaintiff must be related to the actual
act of taking leave under the FMLA, not efforts to prevent technical violations of the
statute” in order to constitute interference. Id. at *3. The court held that “because
Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she was discouraged from taking or denied leave,
or that she was prejudiced as a result of Defendant’s unlawful policy, her
interference claim fails.” Id.
There are two distinctions between Erickson and the instant case: Dr. Turner
actually had to provide doctor’s notes during her period of FMLA leave, while
Erickson did not, but Dr. Turner’s employer requested doctor’s notes for paid sick
leave while Erickson’s specifically requested them for FMLA leave. Even though
Erickson’s employer’s request for doctor’s notes was illegal, this was still not
sufficient to constitute FMLA interference. Thus, a legal request for doctor’s notes
for paid sick leave in Dr. Turner’s case is also not enough to constitute FMLA
interference.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 48) should
be DENIED. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 47) should be
GRANTED as to the claim for FMLA interference.
B. FMLA Retaliation
Plaintiff also claims retaliation under the FMLA. Defendant has moved for
summary judgment on this claim. The FMLA prohibits employers from
“[discharging] or in any manner [discriminating] against any individual for
opposing any practice made unlawful” under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a).
Plaintiff claims for the first time in her opposition to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment that she was constructively discharged because she was
allegedly pressured to retire. (Rec. Doc. 52, at 14). Plaintiff claims that she faced
additional adverse employment actions such as “significant reductions in job
responsibility: reassignment, twice to insignificant and meaningless work,
supervised by individuals younger and inferior in rank to Dr. Turner” as well as
“the retaliatory institution of an illegal and improper requirement to obtain doctor’s
notes for intermittent FMLA leave.” Id. at 13.
In order to prove constructive discharge,
An employee must offer evidence that the employer made the
employee's working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable
employee would feel compelled to resign. Stated more simply, [the
plaintiff's] resignation must have been reasonable under all the
circumstances. Whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to
resign depends on the facts of each case, but we consider the following
factors relevant, singly or in combination: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in
salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial
or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a younger
supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment or humiliation by the employer
calculated to encourage the employee's resignation; or (7) offers of early
retirement [or continued employment on terms less favorable than the
employee's former status].
Brown v. Bunge Corporation, 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000). Dr.
Turner claims that she meets the requirements for numbers 1, 3, 4, and 5
listed by the Fifth Circuit, namely demotion, reduction in job responsibilities,
reassignment to menial and degrading work, and reassignment to work
under a younger supervisor. (Rec. Doc. 52, at 14). She claims that
reassignment to work in the writing lab constitutes an adverse action such
that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign in retaliation for
her taking FMLA leave. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that the writing lab at Nicholls State is largely staffed
by undergraduate students, and that her supervisor was a much younger
person of inferior academic rank. Id. at 15. Defendants claim that the writing
lab simply constituted a “less formal one-on-one setting” for her to teach
students. Plaintiff characterizes the writing lab more akin to a tutoring
resource center. However, notably Dr. Turner claims that her reassignment
to the writing lab and Dr. Clune requesting that she turn in a letter of
resignation happened at the same meeting. (Rec. Doc. 52-9, at 4). Therefore,
Defendant had already decided that Dr. Turner should no longer be employed
at the University. Plaintiff states that President Clune told her she would
never teach again and gave her the option to either resign immediately, face
the Tenure Revocation Committee again, or accept reassignment to the
writing lab and write a letter agreeing to retire at the end of the school year.
Id. Dr. Turner claims that her reassignment to the writing lab was a push to
make her resign when her resignation happened simultaneously to the
reassignment. Therefore, Dr. Turner’s reassignment cannot be construed as
an adverse employment action that amounted to constructive discharge. Dr.
Turner had functionally already resigned, and her reassignment to the
writing lab was a way to allow her to finish out the school year before her
retirement. A reasonable jury could not find that Dr. Turner was
constructively discharged due to her reassignment to a non-classroom setting
as she had already turned in her resignation letter. Because this Court
dismisses all FMLA claims, it is unnecessary to decide whether Kenney
would have a viable claim for qualified immunity. This Court finds that
summary judgement should be GRANTED in favor of Defendants on all
FMLA claims.
II. LEDL Claim
Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to Dr. Turner’s claim that
Nicholls State violated the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law. Dr. Turner
claims that she was denied a reasonable disability accommodation to which she was
entitled when Nicholls State refused to let her teach online-only classes. (Rec. Doc.
22, at 6). Defendants argue that Dr. Turner’s LEDL claim fails because she was not
a qualified individual under the LEDL who could perform the essential functions of
her employment and because the accommodation she requested is not reasonable.
(Rec. Doc. 47, at 4, 7). Plaintiff counters that she was qualified under the LEDL
because teaching in person is not an essential function of her position and because
she could have been accommodated with little or no cost or disruption to the
University. (Rec. Doc. 52, at 2, 5).
Under the LEDL, employers must make reasonable accommodations to
support qualified employees. “To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim brought
under either the LEDL or the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a qualified
individual; (2) the disability with its consequential limitations were known by the
covered employer; and (3) the employer failed to make reasonable accommodations
for the known limitations.” Huber v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., No. CV
20-3059, 2022 WL 1528564, at *5 (E.D. La. May 13, 2022) (citing Feist v. Louisiana,
Dep't of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013)). It is not
disputed that Dr. Turner’s employer was aware of her disability and its limitations.
Therefore, the issues with the LEDL claim are whether Dr. Turner is a qualified
individual and whether her requested accommodations were reasonable.
A qualified individual under the LEDL is defined as “a person with a
disability who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment positions that such person holds or desires.” La. R.S. § 23:322(8).
Defendants argue that Dr. Turner cannot be a qualified individual because an
essential function of her job is to teach in person. (Rec. Doc. 47, at 5). Defendants
point to Credeur v. Louisiana, 860 F.3d 785, 793 (5th Cir. 2017) in which the Fifth
Circuit stated that “there is a general consensus among courts, including ours, that
regular work-site attendance is an essential function of most jobs.” This is not to say
that every job requires in-person attendance. This Court recognizes that remote
work is a regular part of many different fields, a reality that has grown even more
prevalent since the Covid-19 Pandemic. However, just because some employers
allow remote work does not mean that all fields or workplaces are equally suited to
this type of arrangement.
However, even if Dr. Turner is a qualified employee, the accommodations she
requests are not reasonable. “A ‘reasonable accommodation’ under the ADA does not
require the employer to ‘relieve the employee of any essential functions of the job,
modify the actual duties, or reassign existing employees or hire new employees to
perform those duties.’”3 Claiborne v. Recovery School District, 690 Fed. Appx. 249,
255 (5th Cir. 2017), citing Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 295 (5th
Cir. 1998). Dr. Turner admits in her opposition that in order to accommodate her
request to teach online, three of her in-person sections would have to be swapped
with three online sections which were already assigned to adjunct professors. (Rec.
Doc. 52, at 7). Although these changes may have had a net cost of zero for the
University as Dr. Turner claims (Rec. Doc. 52, at 7), the fact remains that an
employer is not legally obligated to reassign existing employees to new duties in
order to accommodate a qualified employee. Dr. Turner’s request would require
reassigning adjuncts who were supposed to teach online to instead teach in person.
3 Louisiana courts look to federal employment law as a guideline to interpret the LEDL Therefore a
reasonable accommodation is defined the same under the ADA and the LEDL. Credeur, 860 F.3d at
791, n. 3.
Therefore, even though there is a genuine dispute as to whether Dr. Turner is a
qualified employee, the accommodations she requested are not reasonable. Thus,
this Court finds that summary judgment as to the LEDL claim should be
GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs claims present no genuine issue of material fact. IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 48)
is DENIED, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 47) is
GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of September, 2022.
LI Soke
HVA
CARL J. BA yk RV
UNITED STAVES DISTRICT JUDGE
17