Jackson v. Tanner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BRANDON KEITH JACKSON CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 17-13503

ROBERT C. TANNER, ET AL. SECTION: “S” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants, the

Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”), Robert Tanner, E. “Dusty”

Bickham, Robert Goings, Ronnie Spears, Darryl Mizell, and Dr. Robert Cleveland. (Rec. doc.

97). Plaintiff opposes the motion, (Rec. doc. 110), and Defendants have filed a reply. (Rec.

Doc. 115). Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Rec. doc. 88) and

Defendants’ corresponding Motion to Stay Discovery. (Rec. doc. 107). Both motions are

opposed. (Rec. docs. 93, 107). Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court

rI.u les asF faocltlouwals B. ackground

Plaintiff Brandon Keith Jackson filed this lawsuit in proper person on November 22,

1

2017 asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various other federal statutes. Plaintiff

claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Constitution in numerous ways as

further detailed below. The two main incidents underlying this lawsuit, occurring on July

17 and 24, 2017 – involve allegations that Defendants Goings and Spears encouraged

Plaintiff to commit suicide in order to save his mother’s life and even provided him the

mII.e ans Stota dnod saor. d of Review

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to anyC emloatteexr iCaol rfpa. cvt. Caantdr etthtat the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element eIsds.ential to that party's case, and on which the party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” A party moving for summary judgment bears the

initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary judgment and identifying those

portions of the record, discovery, aIndd. any affidavits supporting the conclusion that there is

no genuine issue of material fact. at 323. If the moving party meets that burden, then

the nonmoving party must use evidence coIdg.nizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact. at 324.

A genuine issue oSfe em Aantedreiraslo fna cvt. eLxiibsetrst iyf aL orbebays,o Innacb.le jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party. Id. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The

substantive law identifies which facts are material. Material facts are not genuinely

disputed when a rational trier oSf efaec Mt caotsuuldsh nitoat Efilnedc. fIonrd uthse. C noo. nvm. Zoevniinthg Rpaadrtiyo uCporopn. a review

of the record takenE qausa al wEmhopl'et .O pportunity Comm'n v. Simbaki, Ltd. , 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986); , 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th

Cir. 2014). “[U]nsubstantiated assertions,” “conclusory allegations,” andS meee Arenldye crsoolonrable

factual bases areH ionpspuefrfi cvi.e Fnrta tnok defeat a motion for summary judgment. , 477

U.S. at 249-50; , 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on aS eseu Dmemltaar &y

judgment motion, a court may not resolve credibility issues or weigh evidence.

Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co.

, 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).

Further, a court must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate

inferences based on tSheee eTvoildaenn cve. Ciont ttohne light most favorable to theD apnairetlys vo.p Cpiotsyi nogf

sAurmlinmgtaorny judgment. , 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014);

, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). Yet a court only draws reasonable inferences

in favor of the nonmovant “when there is an actualL ciottnlet rvo.v Leirqsuyi, dt hAaitr iCs,o wrph.en both parties

have submitted evidence ofL cuojanntr va.d Nicatto'lr Wy ifladcltifse.” F ed'n , 37 F.3d 1069,

1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing , 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).

After the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute, the nonmovant

must articulate specific facts and pointS teoe Lsuynpcpho rPtrinopgs, .,c Ionmc.p ve. tPeontto emvaidc eInncse. Ctoh. aotf mIlla.y be

presented in a form admissible at trial. , 140

F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (c)(M2)a.t s Suushchit afacts must create

more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” , 475 U.S. at 586.

When the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue, the

moving party may simply point to insufficient admissible evidence to establish an essenStieael

eCleelmoteenxt of the nonmovant's claim in order to satisfy its summary judgment burden.

, 477 U.S. at 322-25; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B). Unless there is a genuine issue for trial

that couldSe seu Lpitptolert a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be

gIIrIa. ntedL. a w and An, 3a7ly Fs.i3sd at 1075-76.

The parties agree that after much motion practice, the following claims remain:

1. Count 1 – Unreasonable conditions of confinement against Defendants

Goings and Mizell in their individual capacities.

2. Count 2 – Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Dr.

Cleveland in his individual and official capacities and against Defendant

Bickham in his official capacity;

3. Count 3 – Excessive force against Defendants Goings, Spears, and Mizell in

their individual capacities and against Defendant Bickham in his official

capacity;

4. Count 4 – Retaliation against Defendants Goings, Spears, Mizell, and Dr.

Cleveland in their individual capacities and against Defendant Bickham in his

official capacity;

5. Count 5 – ADA and RA claims against DPSC;

6. Count 6 – Discrimination against Defendants Goings, Spears, Mizell, and Dr.

Cleveland in their individual capacities and against Defendant Bickham in his

official capacity; and,

7. Count 7 – Supervisory liability against Defendant Robert Tanner (former

WA. ardenE xaht Rauaystbiuornn a Cso trore Ccotiuonntasl C2e, 3nt, e4r,) a innd h i6s individual capacity.

Plaintiff is an offender sentenced to the custody of the DPSC. At all times relevant

hereto (including at the time he filed this lawsuit), Plaintiff was incarcerated in the

Rayburn Correctional Center (“RCC”) in Angie, Louisiana. Defendants first argue that

Plaintiff failed to exhaust the claims raised in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner . . . until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Federal

courts have taken a strict approach to the exhaustion requirement. Exhaustion must be

proper and in full compliance with applicable prison procedural rulGeusy avn. dL edBelaandclines;

substantial compliance with administrative procedures is insufficiWenrti.g ht v. Hollingswo, rNtho.

13-CV-2792, 2015 WL 65303 at *9 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 2015) (citing ,

260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001)). “A prisoner exhausts all available administrative

remedies for a claim only if he or she (1) completes the prison’s grievance process (2) in a

manner ‘sufficiently specific to give “officials a fair opportunity to address the problem that

Petzold v. Rostollan

will later form thJoen beas svis. Boof ctkhe lawsuit.” , 946 F.3d 242, 254 (5th Cir.

2019) (quoting , 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007)). ExhGaounstziaolne zo vf . aSdemalinistrative

remedies is essentially a condition precedent to bringing suit. , 702 F.3d

785, 788 (5th Cir. 2012). “Pre-filing exhaustion is mandatory, aIndd. the case must be

dismissed if available administrative remedies were not exhausted.”

The Supreme Court has held that to properly exhaust administrative remedies

prisoners must “complete thWe oaoddmfoinrdis tvr.a Ntivgeo review process in accordance with the

applicable procedural rules,” , 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) – rules that are

defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself. Compliance with

prison grieJovnaensce procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to “properly

exhaust.” , 549 U.S. at 218.

FailJuornee sto v e. xBhoacukst is an affirmative defense, for which the defendant has the burden

of proof. , 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). “At the summary-judgment stage, . . .

defendants ‘must establish beyond peradventure all of the essentiaWl ielsloenm ve.n Etsp posf the

defense of exhaustion to warrant sumDmiallroyn jvu. dRgomgeernst in their favor.’” , 776

F.3d 296, 299 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting , 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010)).

Louisiana has a two-step Administrative Remedy Procedure (“ARP”) for inmates

that they are required to use before filing suit Sinee dDisiltlroicnt court, and a prisoner has not

exhausted until he has completed both steps. , 596 F.3d at 265-66 (citing La.

Adm. Code tit. 22 § 325(A)). At the first step, the inmate initiates the process by submitting

a grievance letter to the Warden briefly setting out the basis for his claim andS eteh ied .relief

sought within 90 days of the alleged evSeenet i od.r incident subject to the complaint. The

Warden then has 40 days to respond. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the warden's

response, or no response is received within the 40-day time periSoede, idth. e inmate may

proceed to the second step and appeal to the SecretarCya mofp tfhieel dD vP.S TCa. n ner The Secretary

has 45 days to respond to that request for review. adopted with modifi, cNaoti.o 1n0-CV-1151,

2011 WL 4368723 at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2011), , 2011 WL

4368842 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2011). If the inmate is not satisfied with the second step

response, he may then file suit in the appropriate district court. La. Admin. Code tit. 22, Pt.

I, § 325(G)(2)(b).

Plaintiff submitted a grievance on July 31, 2017: RCC-2017-573. (Rec. doc. 97-6 at

pp. 8-21). The only incidentIsd .of which plaintiff complains in RCC-2017-573 occurred on

July 17 and July 24, 2017. Plaintiff acknowledges that RCC-2017-573 is the ARP he

submitted in connection to this lawsuit. (RIde.c. doc. 1 at p. 3). Indeed, Plaintiff attached only

RCC-2017-573 to his original complaint. ( at pp. 4-5).

Attached to Defendants’ memorandum as Exhibit F is an affidavit by RCC’s Executive

Staff Officer, Cynthia Crain Sumrall, who has custody of, and personally searched RCC’s ARP

records for filings by Plaintiff. (Rec. doc. 97-5 at ¶¶ 2, 9, 13). Sumrall testifIided. that Plaintiff

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6. ( at ¶¶ 14, 16-

18). Sumrall identified three ARPs that were filed during July and August 2017 and

October 2018, namely RCC-2017-518, RCC-2017-573, and RCC-2018-719. (Rec. doc. 97-6).

A reviewId o.f ARP RCC-2017-518 reveals that Plaintiff withdrew this ARP effectiveI dJu. ly 31,

2017. ( at pp. 2-7). Plaintiff then filed ARP RCC-2018-719 on October 1, 2018. ( at pp.

22-40). However, it related to anI di.ncident occurring September 26, 2018 and is not

addressed in Plaintiff’s complaint. ( ). Accordingly, ARP RCC-2018-719 is not at issue in

this litigation. Further, Plaintiff has had the opportunity to amend his complaint on two

occasions and has never addressed the incident raised in ARP RCC-2018-719 in any of his

2

filed complaints. (Rec. docs. 1, 25, 61).

Accordingly, RCC-2017-573 is the only operative ARP in this lawsuit. Plaintiff

submitted that ARP to RCC in connection with incidents that occurred on July 17, 2017,

involving Robert Goings, and on July 24, 2017, involving Ronnie Spears. RCC-2017-573

makes no mention whatsoever that Defendant Cleveland was deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs; that Defendants Goings, Spears, and Mizell retaliated against Plaintiff by

using excessive force on October 1, 2018; that Defendants Goings, Spears, Mizell, and

Cleveland retaliated against Plaintiff; or that Defendants Goings, Spears, Mizell, and

Cleveland discriminated against Plaintiff. (Rec. doc. 97-6 at pp. 8-21). Moreover, Plaintiff

makes noId r.equest to Defendant Bickham implicating any injunctive relief related to these

claims. ( ).

After a review of the controlling ARP and given Sumrall’s documented search for

any exhausted and relevant ARP, the Court finds that the evidence corroborates

Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff did not exhaust Claims 2, 3, 4, and 6 before filing this

lawsuit. The affidavit, made from personal knowledge and Sumrall’s review of the records,

reveals that no material fact exists regarding Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative

remedies as to Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6. (Rec. doc. 97-5). Plaintiff was required to comply with

RCC’s administrative remedy procedure and failed to do so with regard to these claims.

Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

2

Plaintiff also argues that there is evidence in the record of another ARP: RCC-2017-869, filed November 27,

administrative remedies regarding Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6. Thus, the Court finds that these

3

claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust.

To the extent that Plaintiff requests monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief

from Defendant Bickham in his official capacity as it relates to the unexhausted claims,

those claims must also be dismissed for failure to exhaust. Plaintiff only added Defendant

Bickham, RCC’s current warden, when he filed his second amended coIdm. plaint. (Rec. doc.

61). Plaintiff asserts claims against Bickham in his official capacity. ( ). In her affidavit,

Sumrall affirmed that RCC did not receive any ARPs from Plaintiff related to Bickham or to

any claim enumerated in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint as to Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6,

with the exception of ARP RCC-2018-719. (Rec. doc. 97-5). However, as noted above, ARP

RCC-2018-719 is not at issue in this lawsuit, and Plaintiff has never addressed that ARP in

this suit despite having filed two amended complaints. Any request for monetary,

4

injunctive, or declaratory relief with regard to Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6 are therefore dismissed

5

with prBej. udiceP alsa iunnteifxfh’sa uCsltaeidm. s under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the

Rehabilitation Act (Collectively, “the ADA”)

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act provides: “[N]o qualified individual

with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected

3

Plaintiff maintains that several other ARPs outline the facts that he brings in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6. However,

P4laintiffi .ael.so does not raise these ARPs in his complaint, nor does he attach them to that document.

GiveDna wthsaotn t Fhaisr mCos,u Lr.tL .fCin. dv.s F tahramt PSelarivnictief fA fgaeilnecdy to exhaust Count 2, it need not address that claim on the

m5 erits, , whether Defendant Cleveland was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs.

In , the Fifth Circuit stated, “Failure to exhaust “usually results

in a dismissal without prejudice,” but with prejudice dismissal is warranted when it is “too late” for the

plaintiff to exhaust. 504 F.3d 592, 607 (5th Cir. 2007). Here, Plaintiff’s 90-day window to submit a grievance

to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act provides in relevant part: “No otherwise qualified individual with a

disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded

from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under

any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Title II

of the ADA and Section 504 of thMe iRrAag “lhiaa vve. B idde. onft iScuapl erervmiseodrisa ol fs cLhae. mSteast”e aMnuds e“aurme generally

interpreted interchangeably[.]” , 901 F.3d

565, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). To demonstrate a violation of either Title

II of the ADA or Section 504 of the RA, “a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) that he has a qualifying

disability; (2) that he is being denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities for

which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise discriminated aIdg.a inst by the public

entity; and (3) that such discrimination is by reason of his disability.’” at 574.

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff does not have a qualifying disability because he

has not alleged that his anti-social disorder, bipolar disorder, depHreaslsei ov.n K, ianngd anxiety, (Rec.

doc. 61 ¶ 97), limit his ability to engage in “major life activities.” , 642 F.3d 492,

500 (5th Cir. 2011). This Court finds otherwise. Major life activities include “‘caring for

oneself, performIidn.g manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,

and working.’” Plaintiff points to – and this Court has revieSweeed, e –.g s., uEfpfilceiye nvt. Geovnidzeanlecze

demonstrating that his disabilities affect his major life activities. ,

860 F. App’x 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Epley has alleged sufficient facts that . . .

demonstrate that his PTSD and TBI substantially limit his ability to think and sleep. In

addition to describing the symptoms that these conditions cause – which include ‘migraine

attacks, confusion during stressful situations, sleeping disturbances, . . . anxiety and panic

attacks, vivid and distressing flashbacks and nightmares’ – his factual allegations illustrate

how these conditions affected his life at the time of the underlying incident.”). For example,

Plaintiff’s July 31, 2017 Healthcare Request Form states: “I am having serious problems”;

his August 10, 2017 Healthcare Request Form reveals “[s]erious mental problems, anxiety,

paranoid.”; his August 13, 2017 Healthcare Request Form states, “I have anxiety, paranoid,

can’t eat. . . . Mental Problem.”; the August 29, 2017 Doctor’s Call Form reveals “[a]nxiety &

paranoid. Mental health med review.”; and his December 17, 2017 Healthcare Request

Form reveals, “IS ecea,n e n.go.,t do my day to day [sic] activities without the meds that works [sic]

for my body.” ( Rec. doc. 110-3).

Defendants also maintain that Plaintiff cannot establish the second and third prongs

under the ADA. Defendants argue that Plaintiff points to no evidence that he has been

denied medical treatment because of his mental health. In other words, they maintain that

Plaintiff sets forth no evidence that his mental health was the reason that RCC employees

allegedly denied him medical treatment. Rather, they contend, Plaintiff bases his ADA/RA

claim on allegations that he was provided inadequate medical care; particularly, the alleged

failure of Defendant Cleveland to prescribe him Wellbutrin because Plaintiff, a non-medical

professional, thought that is what he ought to be prescribed based on his past medical care.

(Rec. doc. 61 at ¶ 41). Plaintiff’s claims in this regard fail Sbeee,c ea.ugs.,e H ahlee vis. Cunlttyim. Badte. olyf

cSoumpeprlvaiisnoirnsg only about the adequacy of his medical treatment.

, Civ. No. 1:14-cv-61, 2017 WL 10912269 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 31, 2017) (dismissing

plaintiff’s ADreAp oarnt da nSde crteioconm 1m9e8n3d abteiocnau asdeo pptlaedintiff merely disagreed with his medical

treatmeanftf)’d, , 2017 WL 1073376 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 21,

2017), , 8 F.4th 399 (5th Cir. 2021). Moreover, the Health Care Request Forms

(HRCFs”) attached to Plaintiff’s opposition reveal that on every occasion he filed a request

to see a doctor or a mental healthcare provider, he saw one. (Rec. doc. 110-3).

Plaintiff alleges that the evidence shows that between the July 24, 2017 incident and

his mother’s passing on September 7, 2017, Plaintiff made at least five formal requests to

speak to a mental health professional. (Rec. doc. 110-3). After his mother’s passing on

September 7, 2017, Plaintiff alleges that his pleas became more urgent. Between

September 7, 2017 and March 5, 2018, he made more than a dozen formal requests to

speak to a Imd.ental health professional, including in a personal letter to Defendant

Cleveland. ( ). Plaintiff contends that RCC’s employees ignored him but still fails to

support any claim that his mental health was the reason that RCC’s employees allegedly

ignored him. To invoke the ADA, Plaintiff must prove that his disability was the reason that

RCC employees denied him services while he was incarcerated at RCC.

To the contrary, the evidence that Plaintiff supplied to the Court with his opposition

prove exactly the opposite. The HRCFs to which Plaintiff cites and even attaches to his

opposition reveal that beItdw. een July 30, 2017 and March 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed

approximately 23 forms. ( ). As noted above, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion that the

medicalI dst.aff ignored him, every HCRF is signed by a screener, a health care professional, or

6

both. ( ). Every HRCF reveals an assessment, comments, and a disposition. If Plaintiff

had blank forms that he submitted and were ignored by the medical personnel at RCC, he

failed to submit them with his opposition to create a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether RCC employees ignored him. The HRCFs support Defendants’ claim that RCC

employees never denied medical treatment to or ignored him because of his disability.

6

As noted above, Plaintiff’s main complaint is that Defendant Cleveland would not

prescribe him Wellbutrin. Plaintiff wrote a lengItdh.y letter to Cleveland in which he pleaded

with Cleveland to prescribe him WIedl.lbutrin. ( at p. 15). That letter was received and

stamped on December 12, 2017. ( ). Two days later, Cleveland saw Plaintiff due to an

HRCF in which PlaintIidff. only sought “[m]y chronic pain medications re-order, and I need to

see mental health.” ( at p. 16). Plaintiff had comIdp.leted that HRCF on December 13, 2017,

the day after Cleveland had received his letter. ( ). As Plaintiff himself recognizes, RCC’s

mental health records on him date back to 2004 and comprise approximately 750

documents. (Rec. doc. 110 at p. 17 n.6). Such records demonstrate that RCC provided

Plaintiff with medical care and did not deny him treatment based on his disability. Indeed,

the Fifth Circuit has held that “the ADA is not viNoloattteindg bhya ma pvr. iRsoicnh’as rsdismopnly failing to attend

to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners.” , 499 F. App’x 368,

377 (5th Cir. 2012). It has also been found that when a plaintiff's core complaint is

incompetent or inadequate treatment for an underlying medical condition, such a

complaint does arise to a Sveioel aBtaiocnk vo.f T tehxe. DAeDpA’t boef cCaruisme. tJhuest AicDe AIn dsot.e Ds inv.ot create a remedy

for medical malpractice. Hay v. Thaler , 684 F. App’x 356

(5th Cir. 2017) (same); , 470 F. App’x (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding summary

judgment when the pBlraoinwtnif fv c. oWmiplsloanined only of inadequate medical care and disagreement

with medical care); Moore v,. PCrivis.o An. HNeoa l5th:1 S0e-rCvVic-1es8, 1In, c2.012 WL 6719464, *3 (N.D.

Tex. Dec. 27, 201a2f)f’ d(quoting , 24 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168

(D. Kan. 1998), , 201 F.3d 448 (10th Cir. 1999)). This claim is therefore dismissed

because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff received adequate medical

treatment while incarcerated at RCC.

C. Supervisory Liability Against Warden Tanner

Plaintiff sues Tanner – former Warden of RCC – in his individual capacity for

supervisory liability, alleging that Tanner failed to train and supervise RCC’s employees.

(Rec. doc. 61 at ¶ 116). Specifically, in Count 7, Plaintiff alleges that Tanner “failed to train

Goings, Spears, and Dr. Cleveland on how to deal with inmates with serious mental health

conditions and on their obligations under the ADA”; “failed to train Major Mizell on his

duties to investigate incidents at RCC, including the July 17, 2017 and July 24, 2017

incidents involving Mr. Jackson”; and “failed to supervise Goings’s, Spears’s, and Dr.

Cleveland’s interactions with Mr. Jackson, with the tragic resulItd .that they have been

permitted to punish Mr. Jackson for, and aggravate, his disability.” ( at ¶¶ 116-20).

“A supervisory official may be held liable . . . only if (1) he affirmatively participates

in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2)G haete ism vp. lTeemxe. Dntesp u'tn ocfo Pnrsotitt.u &ti oRneagl.

pSeorlvicsi.es that causally result in the constitutional injury.”

, 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008). A supervisor may . . . be liable for failure to

supervise or train if: “‘(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate

official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of

the plaintiff's Priogrhttesr; va. nEdpp (s3) the failure to train or supervise amouGnotso dtmo adn evl.i bHearrarties

iCnndtiyf.ference.’” , 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting

, 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009)).

Liability for failure to traPionr toerr supervise both require that the defendant has acted

with deliberate indifference. , 659 F.3d at 776. “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a

stringent standard of fault, requiringC pornonoifc kth va. tT ah ommupnsiocnipal actor disregarded a known or

obvious consequence of his action.” , 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (internal

Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown

quotation marks omitted) (quoting , 520 U.S. 397, 409

(1997)). To establish that a state actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his

actions, there must be “actual or constructive notice” “that a particular omission in their

training program causes . . . employees to violate citizeInds.' constitBurtyioanna Cl nrtiyg.hts” and the

actor nevertheless “choose[s] to retain that program.” (citing , 520 U.S. at

407). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily

necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference,” because “[w]ithout notice that a course

of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have

dIde.liberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). Without cabining failure-to-train claims in this

manner, a standard “less stringent” than deliberate indifference would be emploIdye. d, and “a

fCaiitlyu oref -Ctaon-ttroanin v .c Hlaairmri s‘would result in de facto respondeat superior liability.’” (quoting

, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989)).

“Plaintiffs suing governmental officials in their individual capacities . . . must allege

specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation. This standard requires more than

conclusional assertions: ThOel ivperla ivn. tiSfcf otmtust allege specific facts giving rise to the

constitutional violations.” , 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted). MCooreromvieerr, v“.[ pE]dewrsaorndasl involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause

of action.” Thomp, sNono .v C. SVt e1e7le-241-SDD-EWD, 2019 WL 2438784, at *8 (M.D.

La. June 11, 2019) (citing , 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983)).

The evidence does not show that Defendant Tanner was ever personally involved in

examining, evaluating, or treating Plaintiff’s medical complaints or that Defendant Tanner

possesses any qualifications of or expertise as a health care provider, or in any way ever

participated in decision making regarding what treatment Plaintiff would and would not

receive. The evidence also does not demonstrate that Defendant Tanner otherwise had any

personal knowledge regarding Plaintiff’s medical condition or treatments, let alone does it

show that Defendant Tanner exercised any deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s request to

be treated with the medication of his choice. Indeed, there is no evidence that Tanner was

a doctor himself or had the professional medical expertise to train and supervise RCC’s

medical personnel.

Further, the evidence here also does not support the claim that Defendant Tanner

was ever personally involved in the day-to-day logistics of investigating Plaintiff’s ARP.

The evidence does not reveal that Defendant Tanner otherwise had any personal

knowledge regarding the incidents of which Plaintiff complains, nor does it show that

Defendant Tanner exercised any deliberate indifference in responding to Plaintiff’s ARP.

Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that Defendant Tanner failed to train and

supervise Defendant Mizell. Plaintiff makes no claim nor produces any evidence that

Warden Tanner was personally involved in any of the alleged acts or omissions upon which

his claims of failure to train or supervise are based. Plaintiff is also unable to establish

through evidentiary support a causal connection between an act of Defendant Tanner and

the alleged constitutional violations. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant

Tanner knew or should have known that any alleged failure to train or supervise Defendant

Mizell would result in a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Plaintiff argues only that he has not received adequate discovery to refute

Defendants’ arguments and to support his claims. Pointing to the evidence in the record,

Plaintiff argues that none of the Defendants received training on mental health and the

ADA. (Rec. doc. 110-4). However, it is unclear what the training programs that Defendants

underwent entailed. Plaintiff does not explain (and submits no evidence of) what

constitutes the “Code of Ethics for Public Servants” or “RCC Monthly Safety Training.” Thus,

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Tanner for supervisor liability fails and will be dismissed

as there is no genuine issue of material fat as to the lack of Defendant Tanner’s personal

involveDm. ent. The Incidents in ARP RCC 2017-5737

These incidents form the basis of Count 1. Defendants’ main argument on this count

is that Plaintiff’s claims surrounding the events that occurred on July 17 and 24, 2017 are

so frivolous and baseless as to be fanciful, fantastical, or delusional and should be

dismissed as clearly baseless. Section 1915(d) gives Dcoeunrtotsn tvh. eH eurnnuasnudaelz “authority to

‘pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations.’” , 504 U.S. 25,

32-33 (1992). To do so, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination

based solely Ido.n the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's

allegations.” The Supreme Court has found that district courts, “who are all too familiar

with factually frivolous claims,” are best situated to identify such complaints within their

discretion. Courts apply this stSaened Daerndt ocnautiously, but they have indeed dismissed

numerous lawsuits on this basis. T, 5a0g4ga Ur.tS .v a. tO 3ff3ic (en ooft itnhge tIhnastp iemctporro Gbaenb.le claims

may be dismissed on summary judgment); , 10 Civ.

5447, 2011 WL 13128214, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011) (rendering summary judgment

to the defendants on the plaintiff’s delusional claims of conspiracy).

7

1. July 17, 2017

On this date, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Goings forced him to drink a can of

insect repellent to save the life of his mother before he was placed on suicide watch.

Defendant contends that the allegation that Goings presented Plaintiff with the choice to

save his mother’s life only if he committed suicide begins as an incredible proposition; that

he presented Plaintiff with insect repellant as an instrument with which Plaintiff could

choose the latter option stretches believability further; and that Goings did so as part of a

conspiracy with the other Defendants (none of whom is alleged to have any motive or ill

will toward either of their potential “victims” whatsoever) is more fanciful still. Defendants

assert that this claim should be categorized as clearly baseless, and this is especially true in

light of Plaintiff’s admitted mental illness and his additional allegations against Defendant

Spears. Further, Defendants contend that video evidence proves that:

1. Plaintiff possessed the can of bug spray before being placed in his cell

as opposed to the spray being left in the cell by Defendant Goings or

any other RCC officer; and

2. Plaintiff did not ingest the entire can of bug spray at Defendant

Goings’ behest, but rather did so in order to become high and to

damage the tier, his cell, and the cell-monitoring camera.

The video evidence reveals the following. On July 17, 2017, Plaintiff was escorted

8

and placed in his cell around 10:20 a.m. (Rec. doc. 97-4, Ex. A). After the shackles are

removed, Plaintiff leans over his bunk and drops the can of insect repellant onto Itdh.e bed

before turning back to the escorting officer to have his foot restraints removed. ( ). He

then turns to face the officer to have his wrist restraints removed through the cell door.

8

Plaintiff does not allege or produce evidence that Defendant Mizell was involved in this incident, only that

Mizell later protected Defendant Goings from punishment after the incident. Plaintiff also does not present

Id.

( ). The officer only then conductsI tdh.e strip search, and the escorting officers can be seen

leaving the tier about 10:23 a.m. ( ). Plaintiff’s attempt to contradict this evidence by

arguing that because the officer strip-searched Plaintiff, he would have found the bug

repellent. But this version of the facts ignores that Plaintiff entered his cell, leaned over his

bed, and only then did the officer remove his restraints and conduct the strip search.

Around 10:55 a.mI.,d P. laintiff can be seen pacing around his cell with the can of Ibdu.g

spray in his right hand. ( , Ex. B). Plaintiff appears to beI yde. lling as he paces his cell. ( ).

Plaintiff then sprays the insect repellent into his mouth. ( ). When an officeIrd a.pproaches

his cell, Plaintiff retreats and sprays more insect repellent into his mouth. ( ). Plaintiff

rIedfu. ses to give the can of insect repellent to the officer and even attempts to spray him.

( ). Plaintiff can also be seen delibeIrda.tely spraying the bug spray onto the tier and onto to

the floor directly in front of his cell. ( ).

Plaintiff can also be seen spraying the bIudg. spray directly at the cell-monitoring

camera which monitors cell and tier activity. ( ). Once the officer is able to obtain a

protective gas mask, Ihde. returns to the Plaintiff’s cell where Plaintiff finally hands over the

can of bug spray. ( ). On the body camera footage, Plaintiff can be seen and heard

bragging about inIgde.sting the spray, saying, “I ate the whole can . . . I don’t give a f***, I ate

the whole can!” ( , Ex. C). Plaintiff then goes on to state, “That’sI da.ll I was trying to do . . . I

9

don’t know what the f*** . . . I know I’m high as a motherf***er.” ( ).

Citing a plethora of federal court decisions, Defendants contend that the Court

should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the ground that they are fantastical and baseless.

Having viewed the video evidence, this Court cannot accept Plaintiff’s allegations as

9

anything but that – bare allegations. Plaintiff insists he is mentally ill and that is evidenced

perhaps by his conduct in the video. His allegations may be no more than the product of

such illness. Indeed, the video evidence belies Plaintiff’s factual allegations. “A complaint

lacks an arguable basis in fact when “the facts alleged are fantastic or delusionalS ascmefnoarrdi ovs.

oDrr etthkee legal theory upon which a complainset er Melieeltso ins vi.n Admis.p Cuitvaibl lLyi bmeretriietsl eUsns.i”o n

, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009); , No. 3-07-

CV-0856, 2007 WL 2263953, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 30, 2007) (finding claims that the ACLU

was “seeking to impose minority rule through the courts, attacking the Boy Scouts of

America, defending child molessteeers a, lason dK oplorocomtrootninisg vl.e Cgliusbla otifo Rno mtoe have private property

rights revoked” were frivolous); , 109 F.3d 767 (5th Cir.

1997) (finding baseless Sai mcommopnlsa vin. tP adyensceribing a government plot to spread the AIDS virus

throughout the world); , 170 F. App'x 906, 907-08 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding

that district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the assertion of a vast

conspiracy by all levels of the state government and federal government was mAalenxiafensdtelyr

vfr. ivAonlhoeuuss ebre-cBauussceh the claims were fanciful, irrational, incredible, and delusional);

report and recomm, eNnod. a3t:i1on9 -aCdVo-p0t0e7d38, 2019 WL 5849371, at *7 (W.D. La. Oct. 24, 2019),

aff'd sub nom. Alexander, Nvo. . A3n:1h9e-uCsVer-0-B0u7s3c8h,, 2L0.L1.9C .WL 5858050 (W.D. La. Nov.

6, 2019), , No. 19-30993, 2021 WL

3439131 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2021) (finding incredulous a conspiracy claim between law

eKnimfobrecrelmeye nv.t Kaanrdd athshe iadnefendants to poison the plaintiff by placing poison into his beer);

, Civ. A. No. 12-1811, 2012 WL 3257857 (W.D. La. July 9, 2012)

(finding delusional clWaimhiste thheaatd Kvi.m W Khaitred a&s hCiaanse ,a sLsLaPulted complainant after he saw her

making a sex tape); , Civ. A. No. 12-cv-0399, 2012 WL

1795151 (W.D. La. 2012) (finding baseless claims that alleged a lifelong broad-ranging

conspiracy against the plaintiff by scores of federal judges and other persons).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations strain credulity, and this Court has no difficulty – after

viewing the video evidence – concluding that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are

patently and inarguably baseless, fanciful, fantastic, and delusional. Plaintiff points to no

evidence to support his version of the facts. On the contrary, the video evidence

undermines his story. This finding is buttressed by the fact that Plaintiff has filed four

other lawsuits in this Court against many of the same Defendants, two of which have been

dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. These baseless claims needlessly

consume the resources of the Court and delay justice for citizens with legitimate business

before the Court. The video evidence reveals that there is no genuine issue of material fact

as to Plaintiff’s2 c. laim Jrueglya r2d4in, 2g 0th1e7 events that occurred on July 17, 2017.

Plaintiff alleges that on July 24, 2017, while still on suicide watch, Defendant Spears

gave him toilet paper with a razor blade inside with which Plaintiff could commit suicide.

(Rec. doc. 61 at ¶ 29). Plaintiff also maintains thatI hd.e was wearing a body camera that he

had purchased from an RCC officer for $250.00. ( at ¶33). In his ARP, Plaintiff claims

that he was sold the body camera with the stipulation to “f*ck Lt. Williams over because the

body cameras was suppose [sic] to be in his control at all times.” (Rec. doc. 97-8 at pp. 18-

19).

Plaintiff contends that he used the body camera to film himself swallowing the razor

blade. However, this Court has watched the video from RCC and finds that no such thing

10

occurred. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Spears told Plaintiff,

“you wanted to kill yourself b*tch, well here is your chance” as part of a conspiracy with no

alleged motive is unlikely in and of itself. The Court ianlsstoa fnintldys that Plaintiff’s claim that he

requested toilet paper from Detfehnadt ahnet juSspte harasp pwehnoe d to have opnr ohviisd peedr shoinm the requested

toilet paper with a razor blade is also fanciful.

Moreover, the Court finds that when these claims are pitted against the video evidence,

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Spears are baseless.

According to the tier video footage, around 3:35 p.m., Plaintiff can be seen picking

up the body camera from his bed. (Rec. doc. 98). Defendant Spears approaches Plaintiff’s

cIedll., and Plaintiff can be seen holding something in his hand that he appears to swallow.

( ). DefeIdn.dant Spears activated his beeper and waited at Plaintiff’s cell until back up

arrived. ( ). Lt. Randall Williams approached the cell to restrain Plaintiff when Plaintiff

suddenly smaIsdh.ed the body camera to the ground before approaching the bars to be

restrained. ( ). Defendant SpIeda. rs’ Unusual Occurrence Report matches what the cell

monitoring camera captured. ( ; Rec. doc. 97-8). Moreover, medical evidence from July

24, 2017 reveals that Plaintiff had an x-ray, but no razor blade was found. (Rec. doc. 97-9

at p. 105). To counter this evidence, Plaintiff contends that later medical evidence

demonstrates that blood was found in his stool. (Rec. doc. 110-3). It is axiomatic, however,

that numerous medical conditions can cause blood in a person’s stool, and one need not

swallow a razor blade to create such a condition. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that

“everyone saw the razor blade.” (Rec. doc. 110 at p. 22). But there is no citation to any

10

The body camera captured Plaintiff in a self-gratifying situation. (Rec. doc. 98). The Court admonishes the

evidence for this general conclusion, and even had “everyone s[een] the razor blade,” he

does not produce evidence that anyone saw him swallow it.

The Fifth Circuit and Bcaokuerrt sv .i nM othoirse district have dismissed out of hand allegations

similar to those of Plaintiff. , 3 F.3d 439, 1993 WL 347226 (5th Cir. Aug. 19,

1993) (upholding findinTga ytlhoart vth. eQ upalaritnetrimff’asn lawsuit was clearly baseless that prison guards

were poisoning him); report and recomm,e Cnidva. tAio.n N aod. o5p:t0e9d-CV-182, 2010 WL 2671457

(N.D. Tex. June 29, 2010), , 2011 WL 588753 (N.D. Tex.

Feb. 10, 2011) (adopting report and recommendation that dismissed the plaintiff’s claims

as clearly baseless that spirits put a spell on him to swallow a razor). After viewing the

video evidence and reviewing the case law, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations of

what occurred on July 24, 2017 are baseless and delusional, and summary judgment is

11

wIVa. rranCteodn icnlu fasivoonr of Defendants as to the events that occurred on July 24, 2017.

FITo rI tSh eO fRoDreEgRoEinDg reasons,

that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants the

Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Robert Tanner, E. “Dusty” Bickham,

GRoRbAeNrtT EGDoings, Ronnie Spears, Darryl Mizell, and Dr. Robert Cleveland (Rec. doc. 97) is

, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Counts 1-7 – the only

remaining claims – of Plaintiff’s SeconDdI ASmMeISnSdEeDd CAoSm MpOlaOinTt.

All other pending motions are .

11

26th August

New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2022.

MICHAEL B. NORTH

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE