The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JD FLOYD CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 19-8769
JOHN DILLMANN ET AL. SECTION: “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Stephen London’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
140). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from Plaintiff JD Floyd’s wrongful conviction and
imprisonment for the murder of William Hines, Jr.
In November 1980, William Hines, Jr. and Rodney Robinson were
murdered in the New Orleans French Quarter, one mile apart and close in time
to one another. Hines, a gay white male, was found nude and stabbed to death
in his bedroom. There were no signs of forced entry, and one glass of alcohol
was found in Hines’s bedroom, another in his kitchen. Friends of Hines told
Detective John Dillmann, the lead detective on the murder investigation, that
Hines would often attempt to pick up sexual partners while intoxicated. The
New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) Crime Laboratory analyzed evidence
recovered from the scene and found hairs belonging to an African American
person on Hines’s bed sheets. Because Hines’s body was not discovered until
at least 24 hours after his death, any evidence of seminal fluid or spermatozoa
was undetectable. The blood at the scene, however, was from a person with
Type A blood. Fingerprints lifted from a bottle of whiskey on Hines’s kitchen
table did not match the victim’s or Plaintiff’s prints, though this evidence was
never disclosed to the defense.
About three days after Hines’s murder, Robinson was stabbed to death
at a nearby hotel. Detective Michael Rice acted as lead detective on the
Robinson investigation. Robinson, a gay Black male, was found with a blue
knit cap stained with Type O blood, which was Robinson’s blood type. The knit
cap also contained hair belonging to an African American—but not, according
to the NOPD lab, Robinson’s. Inside Robinson’s hotel room, police found
drinking glasses on each end table next to the bed and a white tissue paper
with seminal fluid on it. An analysis of the semen revealed that it was produced
by someone with Type A blood. Fingerprints taken from the drinking glasses
and the passenger side of Robinson’s car did not match Plaintiff’s, though again
this was not revealed to Plaintiff until years after trial. Additionally, a hotel
security guard reported that she saw an African American man running from
the back door of the hotel shortly before the police arrived.
Initially, Detectives Dillmann and Rice investigated Black men as the
lead suspects in the Hines and Robinson cases. Later, after a tip from someone
that Plaintiff had made incriminating statements to him, the detectives shifted
their focus to Plaintiff—a white male with Type B blood. At the time, Plaintiff
was living in the French Quarter as a “drifter” with a drug and alcohol problem.
Plaintiff has an intellectual disability and an IQ of 59. On January 19, 1981,
Detective Dillmann and NOPD Officer John Reilly found Plaintiff drinking at
the Louisiana Purchase Bar in the French Quarter. They bought him at least
one drink before taking him outside to arrest him. At NOPD’s Homicide Office,
Detective Dillmann and Officer Reilly, joined by Detective Rice, interrogated
Plaintiff, who initially denied involvement in the murders but later broke down
and confessed. The officers obtained signed confessions to both murders from
Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges these officers fabricated the confessions and included
details in them known only to the perpetrator of the murders. Plaintiff further
alleges that the officers then physically assaulted, threatened, and coerced him
into signing the confessions.
Plaintiff was indicted on two counts of second-degree murder. He then
waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a joint bench trial in Orleans
Parish Criminal District Court. After Plaintiff was found guilty of Hines’s
murder but was acquitted of Robinson’s, he was sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and
sentence.1
In 2008, the Innocence Project New Orleans (IPNO) discovered copies of
the NOPD Latent Print Unit’s logbook that revealed that Plaintiff was not the
source of fingerprints left at both murder scenes. This evidence was generated
pre-trial yet never disclosed to Plaintiff or his counsel. That same year, IPNO
also discovered that John Clegg, a close friend of Hines, had told Detective
1 State v. Floyd, 435 So. 2d 992 (La. 1983).
Dillmann during the investigation that Hines had a distinct sexual preference
for Black males. Dillmann had testified at trial that he was told that Hines
had sexual relations with both Black and white males.
In light of this new evidence, and on a motion for federal habeas relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, another section of this Court found that Plaintiff had
satisfied the Carrier standard of “a constitutional violation [that] has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent” and that therefore
his habeas petition was not untimely.2 The Court then granted habeas relief
based on the State’s Brady violations of withholding the exculpatory
fingerprint results and the statement from Clegg.3 The State was ordered to
retry or release Plaintiff within 120 days of the decision. This order was stayed
when the State appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this
Court’s rulings on both grounds: evidence of Plaintiff’s actual innocence meant
his petition was not untimely, and he was entitled to relief on the merits based
on his Brady claims.4 Once the United States Supreme Court denied cert on
the State’s appeal, all charges against Plaintiff were dismissed.
Based on his wrongful imprisonment, Plaintiff brings clams under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City of New Orleans, former District
Attorney Leon Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney Jason Williams, and New
Orleans Police Department Detective John Dillman, Detective Michael Rice,
and Lieutenant Stephen London. In the instant Motion, Defendant London
2 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); see also Floyd v. Cain, CIVIL ACTION NO:
11-2819, 2016 WL 4799093 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2016) (Vance, J.).
3 See Floyd v. Vannoy, CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-2819, 2017 WL 1837676 (E.D. La. May 8,
2017) (Vance, J.).
4 See Floyd v. Vannoy, 894 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2018).
moves for dismissal of the § 1983 claims against him, arguing that he is
entitled to judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c) and to qualified immunity. Plaintiff opposes.
LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(c) motion is subject to the same standard that is applicable to
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.5 To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts “to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.”6 A claim is “plausible on its face” when
the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”7 A court must accept the
complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”8 The court need not, however, accept as true
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.9 To be legally sufficient, a
complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff’s
claims are true.10 If it is apparent from the face of the complaint that an
insurmountable bar to relief exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, the
court must dismiss the claim.11 The court’s review is limited to the complaint
5 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004).
6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 547 (2007)).
7 Id.
8 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
9 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
10 Id.
11 Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.
and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the
claim and referenced by the complaint.12
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts the following five § 1983 claims against
Defendant London: (1) a claim for deprivation of liberty without due process,
(2) a claim for unlawful seizure and detention without probable cause, (3) a
claim for failure to intervene, (4) a civil rights conspiracy claim, and (5) a claim
for supervisory liability. Defendant London argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint
does not allege sufficient facts implicating him specifically to support any of
these claims.
Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint only specifically references London in four
instances. Those paragraphs state as follows:
28. Defendant Stephen London was at all times relevant herein a
duly appointed and acting Lieutenant of the NOPD, acting under
color of law pursuant to the statutes, ordinances, regulations,
policies, customs, and usage of New Orleans and the State of
Louisiana. He is sued in his individual capacity.
58. As Lieutenant Stephen London recalled when interviewed by
[Innocence Project New Orleans] in 2009, the Times-Picayune was
“all over” the NOPD to solve the murder of one of their own. The
Robinson murder was also big news—making the front page of
Times-Picayune’s Friday, November 28th evening edition and its
Saturday, November 29th morning edition.
215. Defendants London and John Doe Supervisors were
personally and directly involved in the case against Mr. Floyd and
12 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
knew, or in the absence of their deliberate indifference,
recklessness, and gross negligence should have known, that their
subordinate officers had deprived Mr. Floyd of his clearly
established constitutional rights through misconduct that
included but was not limited to coercing and fabricating
confessions from Mr. Floyd; beating and threatening Mr. Floyd;
deliberately ignoring evidence of Mr. Floyd’s innocence; and
violating Defendants’ ongoing affirmative obligation to come
forward with evidence of innocence and the truth of their own
misconduct.
276. Upon information and belief, Defendants London and other
John Doe supervisors of the individual Defendants in this case,
acting in their individual capacities, failed to take due care in
supervising the investigative practices of the individual
Defendants.
In further support of each of the five § 1983 claims, Plaintiff makes the
following collective allegations against the Defendants sued in their individual
capacities, namely, Dillmann, Rice, and London.
First, as to his deprivation of liberty claim, Plaintiff alleges that all
individual Defendants
improperly fabricated false confessions to the murders of William
Hines and Rodney Robinson, which they later coerced Mr. Floyd
into signing; fabricated false evidence to support the coerced
confessions; suppressed exculpatory evidence that would have
contradicted the false confessions, . . . and instead followed
through with the unlawful prosecution of Mr. Floyd.13
Plaintiff elaborates each of these allegations with specific facts from the case
but never mentions Defendant London individually.
13 Doc. 1, ¶ 178.
Second, as for his unlawful seizure claim, Plaintiff alleges that the
individual Defendants arrested, detained, and prosecuted him even though
they knew they had no probable cause to do so. Plaintiff also alleges that
Defendants willfully or recklessly ignored exculpatory evidence and evidence
incriminating other suspects. Plaintiff’s Complaint specifies the evidence that
Defendants allegedly ignored, but it does not mention Defendant London by
name or describe his specific role in these violations.
Third, Plaintiff brings a failure to intervene claim against all individual
Defendants, alleging that even though they had the opportunity to intervene
to prevent violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Defendants failed to do
so. Plaintiff only makes this sole collective allegation in support of the failure
to intervene claim.
Fourth, with respect to his conspiracy claim against all individual
Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that “Dillmann, Rice, John Doe Latent Print Unit
analyst, and others yet unknown” agreed with others to act in concert to
deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights.14 Plaintiff lists the overt acts of
the conspiracy committed by “Defendants,” though London is not referenced
specifically.15
Finally, Plaintiff brings a supervisory liability claim against London and
“John Doe Supervisors.”16 Plaintiff alleges that London and other unknown
supervisors were personally involved in Plaintiff’s case and knew or should
have known that their subordinate officers had deprived Plaintiff of his
14 Id. at ¶ 211.
15 Id. at ¶ 212.
16 Id. at ¶ 215.
constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that London failed to supervise his
subordinate officers and allowed them to act with impunity, which led to the
deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
The parties dispute whether these collective allegations that lump
together multiple individuals are sufficient to allege a claim against London in
particular. In Cain v. City of New Orleans, another section of this Court
encountered this same issue.17 There, the Court noted that the plaintiffs’
complaint “directs its allegations not towards the City, or any other individual
or entity, but towards ‘defendants’ as a group.”18 The Court explained that
“[t]his pleading structure—lumping all defendants together and asserting
identical allegations as to each, without distinction—largely prevents the
Court from discerning which defendants are allegedly responsible for which
allegedly unlawful actions.”19 “Because the notice pleading requirement[s] of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure entitle ‘each defendant...to know what he
or she did that is asserted to be wrongful,’ allegations based on a ‘theory of
collective responsibility’ cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.”20
17 NO. 15-4479, 2016 WL 2849478 (E.D. La. May 13, 2016) (Vance, J.).
18 Id. at *4.
19 Id. at *5.
20 Id. (quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013)); see also Tilson
v. DISA, Inc., CIVIL ACTION 17-240, 2019 WL 208871, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 15, 2019);
Angelle v. Town of Duson, No. 6:18-cv-00272, 2018 WL 4649788, at *9 (W.D. La. Aug. 7, 2018)
(citing Cain and concluding that “allegations in the complaint related to the constitutional
violations under § 1983 as well as state law fail to make clear exactly who is alleged to have
done what to whom”); Zola H. v. Snyder, No. 12-14073, 2013 WL 4718343, at *7 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 3, 2013) (dismissing complaint that lumped defendants together and failed “to impute
concrete acts to specific litigants”); Petri v. Kestrel Oil & Gas Properties, L.P., No. CIV.A. H-
09-3994, 2011 WL 2181316, at *7 (S.D. Tex. June 3, 2011).
Here, the Court reaffirms and reapplies its reasoning in Cain. In support
of the first and second § 1983 claims, Plaintiff charges all individual
Defendants with coercing a confession, fabricating statements, suppressing
exculpatory evidence, and pursuing arrest and prosecution without probable
cause. Just as in Cain, these collective allegations prevent the Court from
discerning whether Defendant London is charged with any, some, or all of
these constitutional violations. This is especially true given the factual
background provided by Plaintiff’s Complaint, which never once specifies or
elaborates on London’s involvement in Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff’s third § 1983
claim—failure to intervene—suffers from this same defect, as it consists of a
single collective, conclusory allegation.
Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is similarly ambiguous as to whether and to
what extent it applies to Defendant London. Plaintiff first identifies a number
of conspirators—save London—by name: Dillmann, Rice, Officer John Reilly,
Detective Fred Dantagnan, Sergeant Paul Drouant, and Detective Martin
Venezia. Plaintiff then attributes various overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy to “Defendants,” collectively. While London is a defendant and thus
appears to be implicated in Plaintiff’s list of overt acts, there is no allegation
that London was part of any agreement. Thus, it seems that Plaintiff has
charged London with furthering a conspiracy to which he was not a party.
Moreover, the overt acts are alleged collectively, just like the allegations
discussed above, meaning it is unclear if London engaged in one, some, or all
of them. For example, the allegation of “fail[ing] to investigate leads pointing
to other suspects and corroborating Mr. Floyd’s innocence” is ostensibly leveled
at London (among others), but reading it as such does not square with
Plaintiff’s recitation of the facts. It was Dillmann and Rice, not London, who
investigated the Hines and Robinson murders, according to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s final § 1983 claim—supervisory liability—contains a hair
more factual content as to Defendant London, but not enough to meet the
Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard. While Plaintiff avers that “London and
John Doe Supervisors were personally and directly involved in the case against
Mr. Floyd,” he fails to say how they were so involved.21 Plaintiff then goes on
to state in a conclusory fashion that London knew or should have known that
certain subordinate officers had violated Plaintiff’s rights.22 “While legal
conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported by
factual allegations.”23 Plaintiff purports to allege that “London, as the acting
Lieutenant of the NOPD . . . oversaw the investigation of the Hines and
Robinson murders.”24 The Court cannot locate such an allegation, however.
Plaintiff states that “Defendant Stephen London was at all times relevant
herein a duly appointed and acting Lieutenant,” but not that he oversaw the
Hines and Robinson investigations.25 Similarly, Plaintiff merely implies that
London acted as supervisor to Detectives Dillmann and Rice, but that does not
mean he was involved in or even knew of their treatment of Plaintiff.
The Fifth Circuit has made it clear that “[i]n order to state a cause of
action under section 1983, the plaintiff must identify defendants who were
21 Doc. 1, ¶ 215.
22 See id.
23 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664.
24 Doc. 144 at 11.
25 Doc. 1, ¶ 28 (emphasis added).
either personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are
causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged.”26 “It is not enough
to allege that government officials with no direct contact with a plaintiff are
responsible for acts of their subordinates.”27 Here, Plaintiff fails to specify—
individually, factually, and in a non-conclusory fashion—how London was
involved in or causally connected to any constitutional violations. Thus, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint, as it stands, fails to state a claim against
London. “[U]nless futile, courts generally allow one chance to amend deficient
pleadings before dismissing with prejudice.”28 The Court finds that
amendment in this case would not be futile. Accordingly, the Court grants
Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint in order to attempt to remedy the
deficiencies identified herein.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED
that Plaintiff is given leave to file an amended complaint to attempt to fix the
deficiencies identified in this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must file his amended
complaint, if any, within 15 days of the date of this Order.
26 Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756,
768 (5th Cir. 1983)).
27 Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Woods,
51 F.3d at 583).
28 Buc-ee’s, Ltd. v. Bucks, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 453, 467 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (citing Great Plains
Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)).
New Orleans, Louisiana this 13th day of July, 2022.
g TRICHE Lh >
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13