Williams v. Magnolia Community Services, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ANGELA WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 21-2200

MAGNOLIA COMMUNITY SERVICES SECTION “B”(5)

INC., ET AL

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are plaintiff’s Complaint (Rec. Doc. 1-1),

defendant’s motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 9), plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint (Rec. Doc. 18), defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 21), plaintiff’s second

amended complaint (Rec. Doc. 26), and defendant’s supplemental

memorandum (Rec. Doc. 29). For the following reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc.

9) is DENIED, retaining plaintiff’s claims for hostile work

environment, disparate treatment, wrongful termination,

retaliatory discharge, and interference under the Family Medical

Leave Act (“FMLA”).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 21) is DISMISSED as moot.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This lawsuit arises from Magnolia Community Services’

(“Magnolia” or “Defendant”) alleged wrongful termination of Angela

Williams (“Williams” or “Plaintiff”) because of her race and sex.

Rec. Doc. 26 (Second Amended Complaint). Williams, a fifty-eight-

year-old African American woman, began working at Magnolia on or

about September 18, 2013. Id. Between that date and April 16, 2021,

when she was allegedly wrongfully terminated, plaintiff worked as

a direct service personnel worker and/or a staff worker. Id.

During her employment at Magnolia, plaintiff asserts that she

was subjected to disparate treatment, a hostile work environment,

racial and sexual harassment, and retaliation. Id. According to

plaintiff, all the above-alleged treatment was due to her status

as an African American, a woman, and a person over the age of

forty. Id. Williams alleges she suffered disparate treatment from

defendant when it utilized certain “employment practices” which

disproportionately impacted her ability to succeed as an employee.

Rec. Doc. 26. Specifically, she asserts she suffered disparate

treatment at the hands of defendant’s employees Ricky Hebert, Donna

Lowey, and Jennifer Hebert. Id. She claims that she was highly

scrutinized on a regular basis because of her race. Id.

Additionally, plaintiff presents that Magnolia did not allow her

to take breaks like similarly situated Caucasian co-workers

because of her race. Id.

Williams also alleges that she was subjected to a hostile

work environment on numerous occasions when she was frequently

called the “n-word” by her fellow co-workers. Id. The atmosphere

at Magnolia allegedly became even more aggressive and

discriminatory when plaintiff was informed that she was not allowed

to use the workplace restroom because of her race. Rec. Doc. 26.

Williams claims she felt humiliated on several occasions when she

was forced to use the bathroom on herself because she was denied

access to a restroom or a break to relieve herself. Id. Williams

alleges she was also subjected to numerous physical assaults, and

verbal abuse because of her race. Id.

Additionally, plaintiff alleges that Magnolia violated the

Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) when it required her to return

to work during her designated FMLA leave period. Id. According to

Williams, she followed all policies and protocols established by

Magnolia to be entitled to FMLA leave. Id. Plaintiff also presents

that her unpaid leave was set to commence on March 20, 2021 and

cease on April 30, 2021. Rec. Doc. 26. Nonetheless, defendant

allegedly interfered with plaintiff’s designated leave time and

forced her to return to work on April 16, 2021. Id. Defendant

then allegedly preceded to terminate her employment on that date.

Id.

Williams alleges she reported her co-worker’s behavior to

defendant along with her oppositions to defendant’s discriminatory

practices, but Magnolia ignored her; and instead, choose to

retaliate against her by terminating her employment. Id. Plaintiff

filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) and received her right to sue letter on August 11, 2021.

Id.

On or about November 22, 2021, plaintiff filed suit in the

24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson, alleging

both state and federal causes of action. Rec. Doc. 1. On November

30, 2021, Magnolia filed a notice of removal, asserting this Court

has federal question jurisdiction because plaintiff asserted

claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §

1981, and the FMLA. Id.

On December 28, 2021, defendant filed the instant motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Rec. Doc. 9. Subsequently,

plaintiff filed an unopposed motion requesting an extension of

time to file her response to defendant’s motion. Rec. Doc. 13. The

Court granted her motion, extending plaintiff’s deadline to file

a responsive pleading to February 3, 2022. Rec. Doc. 15. Plaintiff

did not file an opposition by the previously mentioned deadline.

Instead, on February 7, 2022, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint

realleging several assertions from her original complaint. Rec.

Doc. 20. On February 21, 2022, defendant filed a motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, raising the same arguments from its

previously filed motion to dismiss. Rec. Doc. 21.

On March 29, 2022, the Court received oral argument on

defendant Magnolia community Services, Inc.’s motions to dismiss

(Rec. Docs. 9, 21). See Rec. Doc. 25. After consideration of the

parties’ arguments, and for orally assigned reasons, the motions

were taken under advisement. Id. Plaintiff was instructed to file

a second amended and supplemental complaint, articulating in very

specific terms her factual allegations. Id. On April 19, 2022,

plaintiff filed the requisite second amending and supplemental

complaint. Rec. Doc. 26. Defendant was also instructed to provide

supplemental briefing after receiving plaintiff’s newly filed

complaint. Rec. Doc. 25. On May 26, 2022, the defendant filed its

reply in support of dismissal. Rec. Doc. 29.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. 12(b)(6) Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint “must contain enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Varela v. Gonzalez, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)

(internal quotes omitted)). A claim is facially plausible when the

plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true

and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th

Cir. 2009); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).

However, the Court is not bound to accept as true legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[C]onclusory allegations or legal

conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice

to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Taylor v. Books A Million,

Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). A fortiori, a complaint

may be dismissed when it appears “beyond a doubt that plaintiff

can prove no set of facts” that would entitle him to prevail.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560–61, 127 S.Ct. 1955; First Am. Bankcard,

Inc. v. Smart Bus. Tech., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 390, 399 (E.D. La.

2016). However, the Fifth Circuit has stated that motions to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) are “viewed

with disfavor and [are]...rarely granted.” Lormand v. U.S.

Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir.2009).

B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is Applicable to Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint

In discerning whether a motion to dismiss is applicable to an

amended complaint, the question is whether the amended complaint

is so different from the original complaint as to make the motion

to dismiss moot. See In re R.E. Loans, L.L.C., 553 Fed. App'x 453,

456 (5th Cir.2014); Cousin v. St. Tammany Par. Jail, No. CIV.A.

14-1514, 2015 WL 5017113 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2015). A motion to

dismiss need not be denied as moot when it attacks the original

complaint for deficiencies that persist in the amended complaint.

Williams’ Second Amended Complaint is not so far removed from

her initial complaint as to prevent the court from applying

Defendant’s first motion to dismiss to the present complaint.

First, plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not raise any new

causes of action; instead, she merely reasserts may of the same

allegations and claims she raised in her initial complaint. Second,

defendant contends in its supplemental memorandum that the

deficiencies previously raised in its motion to dismiss persist in

plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court will

apply the arguments raised by defendant’s motion and supplemental

memorandum to the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Rountree

v. Dyson, 892 F.3d 681, 683–84 (5th Cir. 2018) (The court may

consider a motion to dismiss “as being addressed to the amended

pleading”); Greene v. DeMoss, No. 3:20-CV-00578, 2020 WL 7755690

(W.D. La. Dec. 11, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No.

3:20-CV-00578, 2020 WL 7755655 (W.D. La. Dec. 29, 2020) (applying

defendants’ motions to dismiss to plaintiff’s amended complaint.)

C. Whether Plaintiff’s Claims Should be Dismissed

In Magnolia’s supplemental briefing, it admitted that

plaintiff has “likely alleged sufficient facts to state a claim

for retaliatory discharge under Title VII and Section 1981, as

well as a claim for interference under the FMLA.” Rec. Doc. 29 at

p. 3. Because this Court agrees with the defendant’s assessment,

we will focus on the plaintiff’s remaining claims still in dispute.

i. Disparate treatment in violation of Title VII

Title VII creates a federal cause of action for two largely

separate theories of discrimination: (1) disparate treatment; and

(2) disparate impact. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787 (5th

Cir. 2006). Disparate-treatment discrimination addresses

employment actions that treat an employee worse than others based

on the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Id. For purposes of surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, there are

two ultimate elements the plaintiff must plead to support her

disparate treatment claims: (1) an adverse employment action; and

(2) that it was taken against plaintiff “because of her protected

status.” See Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th

Cir. 2013); Cicalese v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762,

767 (5th Cir. 2019) (“there are two ultimate elements a plaintiff

must plead to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII:

(1) an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2) taken against a plaintiff

“because of her protected status.”)

“In such disparate-treatment cases, proof and finding of

discriminatory motive is required.” Cicalese v. University of

Texas Medical Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting

Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 2006)). A plaintiff

can prove discriminatory motive through either direct or

circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing Portis v. First Nat'l Bank of

New Albany, Miss., 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994)). When a

plaintiff builds a case on circumstantial evidence, a court

analyzes the plaintiff's claim under the McDonnell Douglas

framework. See Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir.

2003). “Under this framework, the plaintiff must first create a

presumption of discrimination by making out a prima facie case of

discrimination.” Id. “The plaintiff must establish a prima facie

case that the defendant made an employment decision that was

motivated by a protected factor. A plaintiff can establish a prima

facie claim by showing that:

(1) [s]he is a member of a protected class, (2) [s]he

was qualified for the position at issue, (3) [s]he was

the subject of an adverse employment action, and (4)

[s]he was treated less favorably because of his

membership in that protected class than were other

similarly situated employees who were not members of the

protected class, under nearly identical circumstances.

Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir.2009)

(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),

holding modified by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113

S. Ct. 1701, 123 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1993)).

Once established, the defendant bears the burden of producing

evidence that its employment decision was based on a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason. Keller v. DeJoy, No. CV 19-13191, 2022

WL 93577, *7 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2022) (quoting Mayberry v. Vought

Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1995)). The burden then

shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's

proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Id.

Williams has alleged sufficient facts to support her

disparate treatment claim. She satisfied the first element of her

claim when she asserted that Magnolia constructively terminated

her employment. Rec. Doc. 26. Additionally, she provided

sufficient factual allegations for this Court to infer that

Magnolia’s termination of her employment was done “because of her

protected status.” Plaintiff was required to plead facts

sufficient to establish discriminatory motive on the part of

Magnolia, and she satisfied that requirement when she pled the

necessary facts under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Williams

alleged that she suffered disparate treatment from Magnolia based

on her status as a member of a protected class, an African

American. Rec. Doc. 26. Plaintiff also alleged that she was

qualified for her job when she stated that she maintained

impeccable “credentials and work history.” Id.

Lastly, plaintiff asserted that on several occasions she was

treated less favorably that other similarly situated non-protected

employees. See id. For example, Williams alleged she suffered

disparate treatment at the hands of defendant’s employees Ricky

Hebert, Donna Lowey, and Jennifer Hebert. Rec. Doc. 26 at p. 2.

She asserted that she was not allowed to take breaks or use the

restroom facilities like similarly situated employees who were not

members of her protected class. Id. at p. 4. Plaintiff further

claimed that she was highly scrutinized on a regular basis because

of her race, unlike her similarly situated co-workers. Id. Because

plaintiff adequately pled all the elements required for her

disparate treatment claim based on these facts, this claim must be

maintained.

ii. Hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and

Section 1981

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers

from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Under Title VII,

plaintiff must prove the following five elements in order to

establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment based

on racial harassment or discrimination: “(1) the employee belongs

to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome

harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race;

(4) the harassment complained of affected a term[,] condition or

policy of employment; [and] (5) the employer knew or should have

known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt

remedial action. Dimiceli v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.C., No.

CIV.A. 09-7344, 2011 WL 1671332 (E.D. La. May 3, 2011); Young v.

Delta Towing, L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 03-518, 2004 WL 439896 (E.D. La.

Mar. 8, 2004).

Additionally, plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged

harassment was severe or pervasive. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc.,

302 F.3d 474, 482 (5th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must show that the

environment was both “objectively and subjectively offensive, one

that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one

that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Calmes v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, 943 F. Supp. 2d 666 (E.D. La. 2013), see also Butler

v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir.1998)). To

determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or

abusive, courts must look at “all the circumstances, including the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it

is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee's work performance.” Calmes, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 680.

“Occasional racial comments do not rise to the level of severe or

pervasive harassment.” Numa v. Cannizzaro, No. CIV.A. 13-515, 2014

WL 1329829, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2014) (quoting Meritor Sav.

Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).

Here, Magnolia challenges plaintiff’s ability to satisfy any

element of her hostile work environment claim. Rec. Doc. 29.

Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiff’s claims are

conclusory, and she failed to establish that she was subjected to

severe and pervasive harassment. Id. Magnolia also contends that

plaintiff alleged she was subjected to verbal abuse and derogatory

racial slurs, but she did not allege which of her working

conditions were impacted. Id. By contrast, plaintiff alleges that

she suffered a hostile work environment because she was called

racial slurs at work and was not allowed to use the restroom

facilities. Rec. Doc. 26. Each allegation will be taken in turn.

Derogatory Racial Slurs

Plaintiff’s claim based on alleged derogatory racial slurs

must be maintained because she pled all the required elements.

Plaintiff satisfied the first three elements when she pled that

she is an African American, she was subjected to unwelcome

harassment in the form of racial slurs (the “n-word”), and the

harassment she suffered was due to her race. Rec. Doc. 26.

Additionally, taking the complaint in its entirety, plaintiff has

satisfied the fourth element given she asserted that the employment

practices at Magnolia “disproportionately impacted her ability to

succeed as an employee.” Id. Williams also satisfied the fifth and

final element of her claim when she alleged that she informed

Magnolia of her co-workers’ frequent harassing conduct, and

Magnolia allegedly failed to act. Id. Therefore, plaintiff has

successfully alleged a claim for hostile work environment based on

these facts, and this claim must be maintained.

Banned from Utilizing Restroom or Taking breaks

Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim based on

Magnolia’s alleged denial of access to restrooms and breaks must

be maintained. Plaintiff satisfied the first three elements when

she pled that she is an African American, she was denied access to

restrooms and denied break time, and that this conduct was because

of her race. Rec. Doc. 26. Additionally, Magnolia’s alleged conduct

of not allowing Williams to use the restroom at work because of

her race is objectively and subjectively offensive, which

satisfies the fourth element. Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub.

Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.1999) (stating the challenged

conduct must be both objectively and subjectively offensive.) The

defendant’s alleged actions also clearly impacted a condition of

plaintiff’s employment given her claims that she was humiliated by

being forced to use the restroom on herself. Rec. Doc. 26 at p.3.

Additionally, Williams’ employment conditions were impacted

because she was allegedly prohibited from taking legally mandated

breaks like similarly situated Caucasian employees. Id. at p. 4.

Plaintiff also properly pled the last element of her claim when

she stated that she reported these discriminatory practices to

Magnolia, and instead of rectifying the issue, Magnolia allegedly

ignored her and terminated her employment. Id. Because plaintiff

adequately pled all the elements required for her hostile work

environment claim based on these facts, this claim must be

maintained.

iii. Wrongful termination in violation of Title VII, Section

1981, and the LEDL

In a Title VII discriminatory termination case, plaintiff has

the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93

S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In order to meet this initial

burden, plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she was a member of

a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the position in

question; (3) that she was discharged from that position; and (4)

that she was either replaced by someone outside the protected class

or otherwise discharged because of the protected trait. See

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Cooper v. Cornerstone

Chem. Co., No. CV 20-1454, 2022 WL 19354 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2022)

(stating Louisiana courts apply the same McDonnell Douglas burden-

shifting framework when analyzing claims of discrimination under

the LEDL); Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957

(5th Cir.1993).

Once the plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to produce a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.

Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir.1994).

“This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve

no credibility assessment.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod.,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000)

(quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113

S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)).

In Berry v. Texas Woman's Univ., plaintiff Berry, a black

employee at defendant University, sued alleging among other things

that defendant violated Title VII when it wrongfully terminated

his employment. 528 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Tex. 2021).

Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

claim, arguing that Berry failed to properly plead his cause of

action. Id. at 588. Defendant contended that Berry did not properly

plead the fourth element of his claim, that he was replaced by

someone outside of his protected class. Id. at 612-13. The Eastern

District of Texas court began its analysis by articulating the

four-prong test plaintiff was required to establish for his prima

facie case. Id. In essence, plaintiff was required to demonstrate

that he “(1) [was] a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified

for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some

adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by

someone outside his protected group or was treated less favorably

than other similarly situated employees outside the protected

group.” Id. (quoting Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 320 (5th

Cir. 2014)).

After review, the Court ruled to deny defendant’s motion to

dismiss, finding Berry pled sufficient facts to give rise to a

reasonable inference that he was treated less favorably than

similarly situated white employees. Berry, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 612-

13. The Court noted that although plaintiff did not allege that he

was replaced by someone outside his protected group, he did however

allege that he was treated less favorably. Id. In his complaint,

plaintiff alleged he was “terminated solely because of the

discriminatory actions of Defendants in treating him differently

from other non-Black co-workers, because of the ethnic animus

manifested by [defendant’s employee] on several prior occasions

and in retaliation for prosecuting Title VII and FMLA claims.” Id.

Plaintiff further alleged that he was treated “differently from

other non-Black co-workers” because “[n]o other similarly situated

employees within the facility were required to comply with the

Central Plant Vacation Leave Policy, made to fill out separate

blue slips for each day of requested leave or find their own fill-

in replacements when taking leave.” Id. Taking plaintiff’s well-

pleaded allegations in the light most favorable to him, the Court

held plaintiff plausibly alleged that similarly situated employees

outside [his] protected class were treated more favorably. Id.

Williams’ wrongful termination claim must also be maintained.

Plaintiff satisfied the first prong when she alleged that she was

a member of multiple protected classes, an African American and a

woman. Likewise, she properly alleged that she suffered an adverse

employment action when she stated that Magnolia allegedly

constructively terminated her employment. Rec. Doc. 26. Williams

also alleged that she was qualified when she asserted that her

“credentials and work history were impeccable.” Rec. Doc. 26 at p.

3. Plaintiff also put forth any facts that she was treated less

favorably than persons outside of her protected class. She asserts

that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated

Caucasian employees, when she was denied breaks, denied access to

restrooms, and subject to the frequent use of the “n-word.” See

Rec. Doc. 26. Like the plaintiff in Berry, who provided specific

instances of how similarly situated white employees were treated

more favorably, Williams also provided such information. Because

plaintiff has adequately alleged all the elements of her prima

facie case, her wrongful termination claim is maintained.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 12th day of July, 2022

___________________________________

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE