stating that a Rule 7(a) reply is only required when the claims in the complaint are not supported “with sufficient precision and factual specificity to raise a genuine issue as to the illegality of [a] defendant's conduct at the time of the alleged acts.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that a Rule 7(a) reply is only required when the claims in the complaint are not supported “with sufficient precision and factual specificity to raise a genuine issue as to the illegality of [a] defendant's conduct at the time of the alleged acts.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
HOPE DAVIS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 21-1666
ARTHUR FERNANDEZ, ET AL. SECTION: “B”(3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are plaintiff’s complaint (Rec. Doc. 1),
defendants’ answer (Rec. Doc. 13), plaintiff’s amended complaint
(Rec. Doc. 19), defendants’ answer to the amended complaint (Rec.
Doc. 21), defendants’ motion to require plaintiff to reply to their
answer pursuant to FRCP Rule 7(a) (Rec. Doc. 22), and plaintiff’s
response to defendants’ motion (Rec. Doc. 23). For the following
reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ motion to require a
reply pursuant to FRCP 7(a) (Rec. Doc. 22) is GRANTED in part,
requiring a Rule 7(a) reply within ten days of the date of this
order, detailing the specific acts of defendants Crosby and
Blanchard that allegedly caused a constitutional wrong.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On or about September 8, 2021, plaintiff Hope Davis
(“Plaintiff”), an African American woman, filed suit in this Court,
alleging that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants Arthur
Fernandez (“Fernandez”), Milton Crosby (“Crosby”), and Russel
Blanchard (“Blanchard”) violated her constitutional rights. Rec.
Doc. 1 (Complaint); Rec. Doc. 19 (Amended Complaint).
On September 8, 2020, plaintiff was summoned to the Gretna
Municipal Court to answer for a traffic violation when she was
allegedly unlawfully arrested. Rec. Doc. 19. Plaintiff asserts
that she was standing in line, waiting to enter the courthouse,
when she observed that some people in line were not practicing
social distancing. Id. Plaintiff voiced her concerns about the
lack of enforcement of the CDC guidelines to others near her in
line. Id. A court employee overheard plaintiff’s comments and
responded by telling plaintiff that court personnel was aware of
the social distancing guidelines. Id. Plaintiff then informed the
court employee that she had not directed her remarks to her. Id.
After the exchange, defendant Fernandez, an on-duty Gretna
Police Department officer at the courthouse, allegedly approached
plaintiff and told her that he did not appreciate how she spoke to
the court employee. Rec. Doc. 19. Plaintiff responded to Fernandez
by stating that social mandates were not being enforced and that
he could not keep her from stating that fact. Id. Fernandez then
allegedly responded by ordering plaintiff to immediately leave the
courthouse, or she would be arrested. Id. Plaintiff did not go.
Id. Subsequently, Fernandez placed plaintiff in handcuffs, removed
her from the line, and instructed her about her Miranda rights.
Id.
Plaintiff contends that she did not physically resist being
placed in handcuffs; however, Fernandez tightened her handcuffs,
and raised her hands higher behind her back, causing plaintiff
severe physical pain. Rec. Doc. 19. After Fernandez arrested
plaintiff, he allegedly called defendant Crosby to request a patrol
unit to transport plaintiff from the courthouse to Jefferson Parish
Correctional Center (“JPCC”). Id. Defendant Blanchard was the
officer that arrived to transport plaintiff to JPCC. Id. Upon
arriving at JPCC, Blanchard placed plaintiff in a holding cell.
Id. Plaintiff asserts the cell was dark and cold, with raw sewage
leaking into it. Id. Plaintiff further contends that at no time
during her confinement did the defendants or any other person offer
her a telephone call, food, water, a toilet, or a mask. Rec. Doc.
19. Plaintiff was released from the holding cell several hours
later and charged with violating Gretna’s codal Ordinances,
specifically “§16-114 disturbing the peace” and “§16-49 entry on
or remaining in places after being forbidden.” Id. As a result of
this ordeal, plaintiff asserts entitlement to compensatory damages
for injuries resulting from deprivation of constitutional rights.
Id.
On January 24, 2022, defendants filed an answer to plaintiff’s
complaint, asserting, among other things, the defense of qualified
immunity. Rec. Doc. 13. On February 14, 2022, plaintiff amended
her complaint to include more specific allegations. Rec. Doc. 19.
Thereafter, on March 14, 2022, defendants filed an amended answer,
reasserting defenses previously raised in their initial response.
Rec. Doc. 21.
On March 14, 2022, defendants filed a motion to require a
reply to their answer pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
7(a). Rec. Doc. 22. Defendants contend that plaintiff’s complaint
does not contain factually specific allegations regarding each
defendant’s actions that violated plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. Id. On March 22, 2022, plaintiff filed a response to
defendants’ motion, recognizing the Court’s discretion to order a
Rule 7(a) reply and deferring to this Court’s judgment. Rec. Doc.
23.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Qualified Immunity Defense
To plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff is
required to allege facts demonstrating that: (1) the defendant
violated the Constitution or federal law; and (2) the defendant
was acting under the color of state law while doing so. See Wilson
v. Dallas Cty. Hosp. Dist., 715 F. App'x 319, 323 (5th Cir. 2017).
Government officials can defend against a Section 1983 claim by
asserting qualified immunity. Ramos v. Louisiana, 506 F. Supp. 3d
398, 403 (E.D. La. 2020). This doctrine protects government
officials sued in their individual capacities “from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 403; Babb v. Dorman,
33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.1994); see also Gibson v. P.A. Rich, 44
F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir.1995). Since qualified immunity does not
merely offer immunity from liability, but also provides immunity
from suit, see Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 428
(5th Cir.1994), plaintiffs must allege more than conclusory
allegations to support their claims. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d
1427, 1434 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc).
In Shultea, the Fifth Circuit discussed the level of
particularity with which a plaintiff must plead a § 1983 claim to
overcome a defense of qualified immunity. 47 F.3d at 1433. Relying
upon Federal Rule 7(a), the Fifth Circuit held:
When a public official pleads the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity in his answer, the district court
may, on the official's motion or on its own, require the
plaintiff to reply to that defense in detail. By
definition, the reply must be tailored to the assertion
of qualified immunity and fairly engage its allegations.
Id. The Shultea court established a two-step procedure to apply in
any § 1983 suit against a public official: (1) a plaintiff must
file a short and plain statement of his complaint, but the
statement cannot rest on conclusions alone; and (2) the Court may
require the plaintiff to file a reply tailored to responding to
the defense of qualified immunity. Id. The Fifth Circuit also
instructs that “[v]indicating the immunity doctrine will
ordinarily require such a reply, and a district court's discretion
not to [require a reply] is narrow indeed when greater detail might
assist.” Id.; see also Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158 (5th Cir.1999)
(“[f]aced with sparse details of claimed wrongdoing by officials,
trial courts ought [to] routinely require plaintiffs to file a
reply under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) to qualified
immunity defenses.”).
The reply the Fifth Circuit is referring to in Shultea is
articulated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 7(a). To
comport with Rule 7(a), a reply must provide more than “mere
conclusions” and “cannot be allowed to rest on general
characterizations.” Shultea, 47 F.3d at 1433. Instead, a Rule 7(a)
reply must comport with the principle of “heightened pleading” by
including “allegations of fact focusing specifically on the
conduct of the individual who caused the plaintiffs’ injury.” Id.
Additionally, the reply “must be tailored to the assertion of
qualified immunity and fairly engage its allegations.” Id.
The allegations against Fernandez met the heightened pleading
standard necessary to overcome his defense of qualified immunity.
However, plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual
specificity regarding the actions of Crosby and Blanchard to
satisfy the heightened pleading standard required under the
doctrine.
At most, Crosby and Blanchard are either dispatchers,
transporters, or guards at the JPCC. There is no allegation that
Crosby or Blanchard were the wardens or official custodians over
the conditions within that facility. Conclusory allegations that
they violated constitutional rights cannot stand without
supporting factual allegations. Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434 (stating
that a Rule 7(a) reply is only required when the claims in the
complaint are not supported “with sufficient precision and factual
specificity to raise a genuine issue as to the illegality of [a]
defendant's conduct at the time of the alleged acts.”).
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for a Rule 7(a) reply is
GRANTED in part, requiring a fact-focused reply detailing the
specific acts of defendants Crosby and Blanchard that allegedly
caused a constitutional wrong. That reply must be filed no later
than ten (10) days from the date of this order. FAILURE TO TIMELY
COMPLY WITH THIS ORDER MAY LEAD TO DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE
LATTER DEFENDANTS WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 3rd day of May, 2022
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE