Vega v. Gusman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

OLIVIA VEGA CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 20-1931

MARLIN GUSMAN, ET AL. SECTION D (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendants Orleans Parish Sheriff Deputy Michelle

Johnson, Deputy Floyd Stevenson, and Deputy Bryan Favorite1 (collectively, the

“Deputy Defendants”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Qualified

Immunity.2 Plaintiff Olivia Vega has filed an Opposition.3 The Deputy Defendants

have filed a Reply.4 After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record,

and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the Deputy Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment on the Issue of Qualified Immunity.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from an altercation and subsequent arrest of Plaintiff Olivia

Vega at Harrah’s Casino (“Harrah’s”). On the early morning of July 8, 2019, Plaintiff

was attending an event sponsored by Larry Morrow Events at the Masquerade night

club at Harrah’s when a fight broke out.5 At one point, deputies approached Plaintiff

1 Deputy Bryan Favorite was improperly named “Deputy Alvis Favorite” in Plaintiff’s Complaint. See

R. Doc. 65, footnote 1.

2 R. Doc. 65.

3 R. Doc. 72.

4 R. Doc. 81.

5 R. Doc. 49 at ¶ 34.

and requested her identification card.6 Plaintiff handed her license to a friend who

provided the license to a deputy.7 Plaintiff and three friends who attended the event

with her followed the deputies out of the club and into Harrah’s lobby to gain

information about the deputy’s inquiry.8 Plaintiff alleges that when she entered the

lobby of Harrah’s, she was forcefully knocked to the ground without any justification,

provocation, or prior warning by three to four deputies, including Orleans Parish

Sheriff Office (“OPSO”) Deputy Michelle Johnson and Deputy Floyd Stevenson.9

Plaintiff contends that the deputies pulled her hair and knocked her to the ground

using so much force that her clothes were removed, leaving her breasts exposed in

public.10 She claims that she was then handcuffed and wrongfully detained in a

holding room in the casino where at least two of the deputies directed verbal attacks

as well as physical abuse.11

Plaintiff was arrested on three charges: Battery of a Police Officer, Resisting

by Force, and Disturbing the Peace.12 She was then transported to the Orleans Parish

Justice Complex.13 Plaintiff alleges that at the jail, staff took various items from her

which were never returned, that she was forced to strip and wear a jumpsuit and

underwear so tight that the clothing bruised her, that she was treated with excessive

6 Id. at ¶ 16.

7 Id. at ¶ 17.

8 Id. at ¶ 18.

9 Id. at ¶ 19.

10 Id.

11 Id. at ¶ 21.

12 Id. at ¶ 23.

13 Id. at ¶ 24.

force, and that a medical unit employee used a hypodermic needle to inject her with

an unknown substance that caused her to lose consciousness.14

Plaintiff was released during the afternoon on July 8 after posting bail.15 She

then attended a court appearance.16 She alleges that the Orleans Parish District

Attorney’s Office (“OPDA”) pursued charges against her based on false reports

written by Deputy Floyd Stevenson, without properly screening the case.17 The case

was ultimately dismissed on March 3, 2020.18

Plaintiff then filed suit against Defendant Marlin Gusman as Sheriff of

Orleans Parish in his official capacity, Defendant Leon Cannizzaro as District

Attorney for Orleans Parish in his official capacity,19 Deputies Michelle Johnson,

Floyd Stevenson, and Bryan Favorite in their official and individual capacities,

various John and Jane Doe Deputies, Harrah’s Casino, and Larry Morrow Events,

LLC.20 Plaintiff alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendants Gusman, and

Deputies Stevenson, Johnson, Favorite, and Does arising out of her arrest and

detention at Orleans Jail Center, as well as against Defendant Cannizzaro for her

prosecution.21 Plaintiff also brings a claim for negligent supervision against

14 Id. at ¶¶ 25-28.

15 Id. at ¶ 29.

16 Id. at ¶ 31.

17 Id.

18 Id. at ¶ 32.

19 The Court notes that Jason Williams has been sworn in to succeed Mr. Cannizzaro as Orleans Parish

District Attorney and therefore Mr. Williams, in his official capacity, would be the proper party. On

May 17, 2021, the Court granted Defendant Jason Williams’ Motion to Dismiss, dismissing him from

the case. R. Doc. 45.

20 See generally R. Doc. 1.

21 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 48-55. By Court Order dated May 17, 2021, Plaintiff’s claims against the District

Attorney (formerly Cannizzaro and currently Williams), were dismissed. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

alleging a violation based on a false police report against Deputy Floyd Stevenson, in his individual

and official capacity, was dismissed (leaving only a § 1983 claim against Deputy Stevenson for any

Defendants Harrah’s Casino and Larry Morrow Events,22 and a claim for negligence

under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 against Defendants Johnson, Stevenson,

Favorite and Does.23 It is the individual capacity claims against Deputies Johnson,

Stevenson and Favorite which form the basis for the Motion for Summary Judgment.

On May 17, 2021, the Court stayed discovery as to the Deputy Defendants

other than that discovery needed to determine the facts necessary to rule on the

Deputy Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity.24 Specifically, the Court limited

discovery to the actions of Deputies Floyd Stevenson, Michelle Johnson, and Bryan

Favorite on the night of July 8-9, 2019 that Plaintiff asserted in her Complaint, and

the objective reasonableness thereof.25

Thereafter the Deputy Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

the Issue of Qualified Immunity.26 The Deputy Defendants argue that they are

entitled to qualified immunity because they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and

that they did so without using excessive force.27 Among the evidence relied on by the

Deputy Defendants in support of its motion are affidavits from Deputy Johnson,

Deputy Favorite, and Deputy Stevenson and a video from Harrah’s from the night of

the incident.28

other violation). Finally, all official capacity claims against Deputies Floyd Stevenson, Michelle

Johnson and Bryan Favorite were dismissed with prejudice. R. Doc. 45.

22 Id. at ¶¶ 56-61.

23 Id. at ¶¶ 62-65.

24 R. Doc. 46.

25 Id.

26 See R. Doc. 65.

27 Id.

28 See R. Doc. 69 referencing R. Docs. 65-5, 65-8, and 65-9. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the

Affidavits Presented in Support of the Deputy Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment asserting

that they include inadmissible hearsay statements as well as legal conclusions. In a separate Order,

Plaintiff filed a response to the Deputy Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on the Issue of Qualified Immunity.29 Plaintiff argues that the Deputy

Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest her because she was not resisting

arrest when the Deputy Defendants took her to the ground and handcuffed her.30

Further, Plaintiff argues that she did not present an immediate threat to the safety

of the officers and that the officers acted with excessive force and in violation of

OPSO’s Use of Force Policy when she was taken to the ground and handcuffed.31

The Deputy Defendants filed a reply in which they argue that Plaintiff has

failed to provide any evidence to prove that the Deputy Defendants acted

unreasonably, thus failing to carry her burden to defeat qualified immunity. Further,

the Deputy Defendants distinguish the facts of this matter from several Fifth Circuit

decisions cited by Plaintiff.32

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”33 When assessing whether a

dispute regarding any material fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in

the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the

the Court granted this motion in part and struck legal conclusions from the Deputy Defendants’

declarations. See R. Doc. 110. The Court has only relied on the portions of the Deputy Defendants’

affidavits which have not been stricken for purposes of this motion.

29 R. Doc. 72.

30 Id.

31 Id.

32 R. Doc. 81.

33 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

evidence.”34 While all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving

party, a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations,

unsubstantiated assertions or “only a scintilla of evidence.”35 Instead, summary

judgment is appropriate if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.36

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden

of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”37 The non-

moving party can then defeat summary judgment by either submitting evidence

sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, or by

“showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the

reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”38 If, however,

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue,

the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in

the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s claim.39 The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond

the pleadings and, “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

34 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citations omitted).

35 Id. (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

36 Delta & Pine Land Co., 530 F.3d at 399 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986)).

37 International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991).

38 Id. at 1265.

39 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’”40

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a damages remedy for the violation of federal

constitutional or statutory rights under color of state law. Specifically, it provides as

follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any . . . person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured.41

Because § 1983 merely provides a remedy for designated rights, rather than creating

any substantive rights, “an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a

predicate to liability.”42 To establish § 1983 liability, the plaintiff must establish the

following three elements: (1) deprivation of a right secured by the United States

Constitution or federal law; (2) that occurred under color of state law; and (3) was

caused by a state actor.43

As a defense to § 1983 claims, government officials may invoke qualified

immunity, which “shields government officials performing discretionary functions ...

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.”44 Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to

40 Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

41 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

42 Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

43 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

44 Mabry v. Lee County, 100 F.Supp.3d 568, 572 (N.D. Miss. 2015) (quoting Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d

712, 718 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, decision rev’d on other grounds, 136 S.Ct. 305, 193 L.Ed.2d 255

(2015)).

hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need

to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their

duties reasonably.45 The Supreme Court has made clear that qualified immunity

functions as an immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to liability.46 “[T]he

qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by

protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”47

“This means that even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly

commit a constitutional violation are entitled to immunity.”48 Once the government

official asserts the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

negate the defense.49

To overcome a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)

that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) that the right was

“clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.50 It is up to the district

courts’ sound discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular

case.51

In her § 1983 claim, Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Johnson, Deputy Favorite,

and Deputy Stevenson violated her Fourth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendment

45 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

46 Id. at 237 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).

47 Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326-27 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d

226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000).

48 Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d

307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

49 Collier v. Montgomery, 569 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

50 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citation omitted).

51 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

rights to be free from false arrest, excessive force, and wrongful detainment.52 The

Court analyzes Plaintiff’s claims under each amendment separately.

A. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff makes two claims under the Fourth Amendment: (1) that she was

unlawfully arrested by the Deputy Defendants; and (2) that the Deputy Defendants

employed excessive force when arresting her.53 These claims are addressed

separately below.

i. Unlawful Arrest

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that

citizens have the right to be free from arrests made without probable cause.54 Thus,

to prevail on a § 1983 claim alleging false arrest Plaintiff must show the arresting

officers lacked probable cause to arrest her.55 “Probable cause exists when the totality

of the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of

arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had

committed or was committing an offense.”56 This Court has held that probable cause

means a “fair probability” that a crime has been committed.57 According to the Fifth

Circuit, Plaintiff must clear a significant hurdle to defeat Defendants’ assertion of

52 R. Doc. 49 at ¶ 50.

53 Id. at ¶ 49.

54 Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994).

55 Haggerty v. Texas Southern University, 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2004).

56 Id. at 655-56 (quoting Glenn, 242 F.3d at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted).

57 See Fillios v. Harahan Police Department, Civ. A. No. 19-45, 2019 WL 2009241 (E.D. La. May 7,

2019) (citing United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1999)); Babin v. Par. Of Jefferson,

Civ. A. No. 16-2954, 2018 WL 794535, at *8 (E.D. La. Feb. 8, 2018) (citing Haggerty, 391 F.3d at 656

(noting that “fair probability” requires more than a bare suspicion but less than a preponderance of

evidence).

qualified immunity because, “[T]here must not even arguably be probable cause for

the . . . arrest for immunity to be lost.”58 Additionally, although “the requisite ‘fair

probability’ is something more than a bare suspicion, [it] need not reach the fifty

percent mark.”59

Here, Plaintiff was arrested and booked with the following charges: (1) La. R.S.

14:34.2, battery of a police officer; (2) La. R.S. 14:103, disturbing the peace; and (3)

La. R.S. 14:108.2, resisting a police officer with force.60

(1) La. R.S. 14:34.2 – Battery of a Police Officer

Battery of a police officer is a battery committed without the

consent of the victim when the offender has reasonable grounds to

believe the victim is a police officer acting in the performance of his

duty.61

(2) La. R.S. 14:103 -- Disturbing the Peace

Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the following in such

manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public:

(1) engaging in a fistic encounter; or

(2) Addressing any offensive, derisive, or annoying words to any

other person who is lawfully in any street, or other public place; or call

him by any offensive or derisive name, or make any noise or exclamation

in his presence and hearing with the intent to deride, offend, or annoy

him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business, occupation, or

duty; or

(3) appearing in an intoxicated condition; or…62

(3) La. R.S. 14:108.2 – Resisting a Police Officer with Force

Resisting a police officer with force or violence is any of the

following when the offender has reasonable grounds to believe the victim

58 Haggerty, 391 F.3d at 656 (citation omitted).

59 Garcia, 179 F.3d at 269.

60 R. Doc. 49 at ¶ 23.

61 La. R.S. 14:34.2.

62 La. R.S. 14:103.

is a police officer who is arresting, detaining, seizing property, serving

process, or is otherwise acting in the performance of his official duty:

(1) Using threatening force or violence by one sought to be

arrested or detained before the arresting officer can restrain him and

after notice is given that he is under arrest or detention.

(2) Using threatening force or violence toward or any resistance

or opposition using force or violence to the arresting officer after the

arrested party is actually placed under arrest and before he is

incarcerated in jail.

(3) Injuring or attempting to injure a police officer engaged in the

performance of his duties as a police officer.

(4) Using or threatening force or violence toward a police officer

performing any official duty.63

While these charges were eventually dropped,64 the Court notes that whether

or not there was probable cause is determined at the “moment of the arrest.”65 In

determining whether probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s arrest, the Court focuses

on the Plaintiff’s and Deputy Defendants’ actions leading to Plaintiff’s arrest.

According to Plaintiff, the facts leading up to her arrest begin in the early

morning hours of July 8, 2019.66 Plaintiff was attending an event sponsored by Larry

Morrow Events at the Masquerade night club in Harrah’s when a fight broke out.67

During the fight, a female patron struck OPSO Deputy Keppard and caused her

injuries.68 On site Orleans Parish deputies approached Plaintiff and requested her

identification card.69 Plaintiff contends that she provided her license and the deputy

then walked out of the club with Plaintiff’s license.70 Plaintiff and three friends

63 La. R.S. 14:108.2

64 Id. at ¶ 32.

65 Haggerty, 391 F.3d at 655 (quoting Glenn, 242 F.3d at 313).

66 R. Doc. 49 at ¶ 34.

67 Id.

68 R. Doc. 65.

69 R. Doc. 49 at ¶ 16.

70 R. Doc. 49 at ¶ 17-18.

followed.71 Plaintiff alleges that she was attacked from behind, unprovoked, by one

of the deputies while she walked into the lobby of Harrah’s to inquire why her ID was

taken.72 In her deposition, Plaintiff testified, “As we were walking out, right after I

got through the curtains is when I got attacked from behind.”73 Plaintiff was taken

to the ground and handcuffed and subsequently escorted to the interview room.74

Plaintiff asserts that she was wrongfully arrested.75 Plaintiff contends that Deputy

Keppard falsely claimed that she was involved in the fight which resulted in the

deputy being struck and that a jury would find that the Deputy Defendants could not

have reasonably believed that she had committed a serious crime.76

In her Opposition brief, Plaintiff analogizes the present case to Rice v.

Morehouse, a Ninth Circuit case in which the plaintiff declined to provide his driver’s

license to an officer during a traffic stop and repeatedly asked to speak to the officer’s

supervisor.77 The officer radioed for backup and when additional officers arrived, they

removed plaintiff from his car, tripped him, pinned him down, and handcuffed him.78

The Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that qualified immunity did not apply to

the officers.79 Plaintiff argues that the present case is similar because the Deputy

Defendants acted on a false statement that Plaintiff was involved in the battery of

71 R. Doc. 49 at ¶ 18.

72 Id.

73 R. Doc. 65-7 at 10.

74 Id.

75 R. Doc. 72.

76 Id.

77 989 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2021).

78 Id. at 1116-1117.

79 Id.

Deputy Keppard and subsequently restrained Plaintiff and arrested her.80 Plaintiff

also notes that the actual perpetrator of the battery of Deputy Keppard was already

in custody.81

The Deputy Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s allegations. The Deputy Defendants

claim that Plaintiff had been identified as possibly being involved in the fight in which

Deputy Keppard was struck and was being walked to an interview room for

questioning.82 The Deputy Defendants contend that while Plaintiff was being

escorted to the interview room for questioning, she swung at Deputy Johnson, which

required the deputies to restrain and handcuff her.83 It was after these events that

she was arrested for the above offenses. Accordingly, the Deputy Defendants argue

that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.

In support of their motion, Defendants have provided declarations from Deputy

Johnson, Deputy Favorite, and Deputy Stevenson as well as surveillance video from

Harrah’s from the evening in question.84 The evidence provided by the Deputy

Defendants reveals that Deputy Keppard informed her fellow deputies that Plaintiff

was involved in the fight in which she was struck.85 Deputy Johnson acted on this

information by escorting Plaintiff to the interview room for questioning.86 While being

80 R. Doc. 72.

81 Id.

82 Id.

83 Id.

84 See R. Doc. 65-5, R. Doc. 65-8, and R. Doc. 65-9.

85 Id.

86 See R. Doc. 65-5.

escorted to the interview room, a struggle ensued, ending when Plaintiff was taken

to the ground and handcuffed.87

The declarations also describe each deputy’s observation that Plaintiff was

being aggressive and swung her arms at Deputy Johnson while being escorted to the

interview room.88 There is no evidence that the deputies intended to arrest Plaintiff

when they detained her for questioning. Indeed, the portions of the deputies’

declarations that reflect that Plaintiff was being taken for questioning are

uncontested.

A review of the surveillance footage provided by the Deputy Defendants in

further support of their Motion shows Plaintiff being walked by Orleans Parish

Deputies in Harrah’s.89 Plaintiff is not handcuffed.90 The deputies are in uniform with

one deputy, presumably Deputy Johnson, walking behind the Plaintiff.91 Plaintiff can

then be seen reaching an arm up in a swinging motion towards Deputy Johnson.92 At

that point, Deputy Johnson and another deputy attempt to restrain Plaintiff by

taking her to the ground.93 The video does not show any striking of Plaintiff.94 Within

25 seconds of being taken to the ground, Plaintiff stands up, now handcuffed, and the

video shows her being walked to the interview room.95 The video also reveals

approximately 50 people, most appearing to be Harrah’s patrons, including Plaintiff’s

87 Id.

88 Id.

89 R. Doc. 65-6, Exhibit A.

90 Id.

91 Id.

92 Id.

93 Id.

94 Id.

95 Id.

friends, in the vicinity, some only steps away from the Plaintiff and the deputies at

the time.96 Deputy Johnson then escorts Plaintiff to the interview room without any

further struggle.97

Plaintiff contends that she was attacked from behind, allegedly by one of the

deputies, although Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she did not know who

attacked her from behind.98 In her deposition, Plaintiff contends that she never

resisted arrest, but rather was taken to the ground from behind, her hair was being

pulled, her shirt was being partially pulled off and that she was merely attempting

to cover her exposed breasts.99 While the Court draws all reasonable inferences in

favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment on an unsubstantiated

assertion.100 Plaintiff has provided the Court with nothing more than an

unsubstantiated assertion that she was attacked from behind by one of the

defendants. Plaintiff has failed to provide any additional video surveillance or direct

the Court to any portion of the video which was provided by the Deputy Defendants

in their motion, witness statements, including any statement from any of Plaintiff’s

friends who were present and can be seen in the video, or other evidence that supports

her recollection of the events. Instead, the evidence presented by Defendants,

including the video, refutes Plaintiff’s assertions.

96 Id.

97 Id.

98 R. Doc. 65-7 at p. 34.

99 R. Doc. 65-7.

100 Delta & Pine Land Co., 530 F.3d at 398-99 (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075).

Plaintiff’s reliance on Rice is misplaced. Initially, Rice, as a Ninth Circuit case,

is not binding on the present Court. More importantly, Rice is distinguishable from

the present facts. In Rice, the plaintiff was initially stopped by the police officer for

failing to signal for a full five seconds before changing lanes.101 However, here, the

Deputy Defendants initially sought to escort Plaintiff to the interview room because

they believed she had been involved in a fight in which a fellow deputy was struck, a

far more serious crime than a failure to signal.102 In addition, the officers in Rice

tripped and then beat Plaintiff while he was lying on the ground before handcuffing

him, causing significant long-term physical injuries.103 As discussed above, there is

no evidence beyond Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated assertion that the deputies attacked

her. Indeed the video shows that Plaintiff swung her arm towards the deputies while

the deputies were walking her, unhandcuffed, for questioning.104 Plaintiff’s swinging

of her arm towards the deputies occurs before the deputies attempt to restrain

Plaintiff.105 The struggle which ensued between Plaintiff, Deputy Johnson, and the

other OPSO officers lasted less than thirty seconds before Plaintiff was handcuffed

and escorted by Deputy Johnson without incident to the interview room.106 Notably,

Plaintiff does not allege that she was beaten by Deputy Johnson or the other OPSO

officers beyond being taken down to the ground.107

101 989 F.3d at 1115.

102 See R. Doc. 65-5, R. Doc. 65-8, and R. Doc. 65-9.

103 989 F.3d at 1115.

104 See R. Doc. 65-6, Exhibit A.

105 Id.

106 Id.

107 See generally R. Doc. 65-7.

“Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within

a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable

person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.”108

This Court has held that probable cause means a “fair probability” that a crime has

been committed.109 Similarly, courts have held that probable cause exists when police

arrest a person based on a physical description coupled with other evidence

suggesting the suspect’s connection to the offense.110 In Charles v. Smith, the Fifth

Circuit held that a police officer had probable cause to arrest a rape suspect based

solely on the facts that he was wearing clothing matching a description by the victim

and was found hitchhiking in an area close to the scene of the rape.111 Likewise, in

United States v. Burbridge, the Fifth Circuit held that a citizen's eyewitness account

of illegal conduct and identification of the perpetrator to police was sufficient to

establish probable cause for the arrest of the defendant for illegally carrying a

handgun.112

Accordingly, the Court finds that there was probable cause for the subsequent

arrest of Plaintiff for battery of a police officer, disturbing the peace, and resisting a

police officer with force.

108 Haggerty, 391 F.3d at 655 (quoting Glenn, 242 F.3d at 313).

109 See Fillios, 2019 WL 2009241 (citing Garcia, 179 F.3d at 269); Babin, 2018 WL 794535, at *8 (citing

Haggerty, 391 F.3d at 656 (noting that “fair probability” requires more than a bare suspicion but less

than a preponderance of evidence)).

110 See United States v. Burbridge, 252 F .3d 775, 778 (5th Cir.2001); Charles v. Smith, 894 F.2d 718,

724 (5th Cir. 1990).

111 894 F.2d at 724.

112 252 F.3d at 778.

ii. Excessive Force

The Fourth Amendment also provides citizens with the right to be free from

excessive force. “Excessive force claims are necessarily fact-intensive; whether the

force used is ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ depends on ‘the facts and circumstances of

each particular case.’”113 The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the

20/20 vision of hindsight.114 “The ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case

is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard

to their underlying intent or motivation.115 “Reasonableness in these circumstances

‘must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-

second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-

about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.’”116

To overcome the claim of qualified immunity on her claim for excessive force,

Plaintiff must show “(1) an injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of

force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly

unreasonable.”117 In determining whether the use of force was clearly excessive and

113 Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at

396); see also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (observing that this “area is one in which

the result depends very much on the facts of each case.”).

114 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)).

115 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-139 (1978); Terry 392 U.S.

at 21).

116 Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 320–21 (5th Cir.2007) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).

117 Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009).

clearly unreasonable, the Court evaluates each deputy’s actions separately, to the

extent possible.118

Regarding the first factor, Plaintiff alleges that she suffered physical injuries

including cuts, bruising, swelling as well as mental and emotional anguish.119 The

Deputy Defendants do not contest that these injuries occurred. Accordingly, Plaintiff

has properly alleged an injury.

Turning to the next two factors, the Court notes that the Deputy Defendants

addressed each deputy’s actions separately. However, Plaintiff opted to address the

Deputy Defendants’ actions in general and did not conduct a separate analysis for

each deputy. Plaintiff contends that the Deputy Defendants fail to show that their

actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances

surrounding them.120

Plaintiff was questioned during her deposition about the actions of each deputy

defendant separately.121 To the extent that her testimony is relevant to this analysis,

her testimony is included. Plaintiff argues that the factors delineated in the Ninth

Circuit case Lowry v. City of San Diego apply and that when assessing the objective

reasonableness of a particular use of force, the court should consider: (1) the severity

of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating the type

and amount of force inflicted; (2) the government’s interest in the use of force; and (3)

118 Id. (citing Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 421-22 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that each officer’s

individual actions should be considered in determining whether qualified immunity applies).

119 R. Doc. 49 at ¶ 47.

120 R. Doc. 72.

121 See R. Doc. 65-7.

the balance between the gravity of the intrusion on the individual and the

government’s need for that intrusion.122

Plaintiff then urges the Court to apply the factors outlined in Graham v.

Connor to evaluate the state’s interest at stake in an arrest, and specifically consider:

(1) how severe the crime at issue was; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect was actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.123

Plaintiff also cites several Fifth Circuit cases arguing that a police officer

violates the Fourth Amendment if he abruptly resorts to overwhelming physical force

rather than continuing verbal negotiations with an individual who poses no

immediate threat or flight risk during a traffic stop.124 Plaintiff argues that the state

had a minimal interest in the arrest of Plaintiff because the Deputy Defendants did

not attempt to negotiate with Plaintiff, that Plaintiff did not pose an immediate

threat or attempt to flee, and that Plaintiff did not engage in anything more than

passive resistance before the Deputy Defendants resorted to overwhelming physical

force.125 Plaintiff concludes that since the video surveillance does not clearly

contradict her claim that she was not resisting arrest, the Court should not grant

summary judgment.126

122 R. Doc. 72 (citing 858 F.3d 1248, 1256 (9th Cir. 2017)).

123 R. Doc. 72. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.

124 R. Doc. 72 (citing Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2017) and Deville, 567 F.3d at 167-

69.

125 Id.

126 Id.

As described above, the Court must evaluate each deputy’s actions separately,

to the extent possible, when analyzing an excessive force claim.

a. Deputy Michelle Johnson

Deputy Michelle Johnson is a reserve deputy with OPSO.127 On July 8, 2019,

Deputy Johnson was working a detail at Harrah’s on behalf of OPSO.128 The Deputy

Defendants state that Deputy Johnson escorted the Plaintiff to the back room of

Harrah’s for questioning regarding a fight that occurred at Club Masquerade and

resulted in a female patron striking Deputy Keppard, causing her injuries.129 The

Deputy Defendants allege that while Deputy Johnson was escorting the Plaintiff to

the back room, Plaintiff swung her arms at Deputy Johnson.130 Deputy Johnson and

other OPSO officers placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and then escorted her to the

interview room for questioning.131

In her deposition, Plaintiff was unable to recall what role Deputy Johnson

played in her arrest and only alleged that Deputy Johnson was “verbally aggressive”

towards her.132 The Deputy Defendants contend that even if this Court determines a

constitutional right was violated, Deputy Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity

because she acted objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting her.133 Specifically, she sought to escort Plaintiff to the interview room

only after being told that Plaintiff was involved in a fight wherein Deputy Keppard

127 R. Doc. 65.

128 Id.

129 Id.

130 Id.

131 Id.

132 See R. Doc. 65-7.

133 Id.

was struck.134 Further, Deputy Johnson placed Plaintiff in handcuffs only after

Plaintiff swung her arms at the deputy, in a public area surrounded by casino

patrons, while being escorted to the interview room.135 For these reasons, the Deputy

Defendants argue Deputy Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity.

Plaintiff relies on two Fifth Circuit decisions to argue that Deputy Johnson

used excessive force.136 Plaintiff compares the present case to Hank v. Rogers¸ in

which the Fifth Circuit determined that an officer was not entitled to qualified

immunity after he struck a plaintiff during a motor vehicle stop while plaintiff was

not resisting his orders to stand with his hands behind his back during a traffic

stop.137 Plaintiff also cites Deville v. Marcantel, in which the Fifth Circuit determined

that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity after they dragged plaintiff from

her car after stopping her for driving 10 mph over the speed limit.138 Plaintiff argues

that Deputy Johnson engaged in a similar act of excessive force when taking down

and handcuffing Plaintiff.139

The Court finds that Deputy Johnson’s actions were neither excessive nor

unreasonable. The evidence reflects that Deputy Johnson escorted Plaintiff to the

interview room only after being told that Plaintiff was involved in a fight wherein

Deputy Keppard was struck.140 Further, unlike the officers in Hank and Deville, who

arrested plaintiffs who had been complying with officer commands during minor

134 R. Doc. 65-5.

135 Id.

136 R. Doc. 72.

137 R. Doc. 72 (citing 853 F.3d 738 at 743).

138 R. Doc. 72 (citing 567 F.3d at 167-69).

139 R. Doc. 72.

140 Id.

motor vehicle stops, the evidence in the record supports that Deputy Johnson placed

Plaintiff in handcuffs only after Plaintiff swung her arms at the deputy while being

escorted to the interview room.141 A review of the surveillance video does not appear

to show Deputy Johnson, or any deputy, strike Plaintiff when restraining or

handcuffing Plaintiff.142 The video shows approximately 50 people, most of whom

appear to be Harrah’s patrons, in the surrounding area, some only steps away from

the deputies and Plaintiff.143 As such, Plaintiff’s swinging of her arm towards the

deputies posed a threat to both Deputy Johnson as well as the surrounding people.

The video does not show any physical restraint or altercation between Plaintiff and

the Deputy Defendants until Plaintiff turns around and swings her arms at Deputy

Johnson. Plaintiff is then restrained on the ground for approximately 30 seconds upon

which she is handcuffed, resumes standing, and then is escorted to the interview

room without further incident.144 Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege that Deputy

Johnson struck her beyond the initial take down while attempting to handcuff her.

Further, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence detailing excessive use of force

by Deputy Johnson. In her deposition, Plaintiff was unable to describe what actions

Deputy Johnson took that were excessive or unreasonable. Plaintiff states that she

was “taken to the ground” and her “hair was being pulled.”145 However, Plaintiff is

unable to describe who engaged in these actions.146 Plaintiff stated “I don't know if

141 Id.

142 See R. Doc. 65-6, Exhibit A.

143 Id.

144 Id.

145 Id. at p. 34-35.

146 Id. The Court notes that while Plaintiff states in her deposition that she is unaware who took her

to the ground and handcuffed her, Deputy Johnson confirms in her declaration (R. Doc. 65-5) that she

she [Deputy Johnson] herself was physically harmful. I don't know if she was the one

that attacked me from behind, but she was a willing participant in the situation.”147

Denial of a qualified immunity defense to an excessive force claim is warranted if “a

reasonable officer would have known that the degree of force was unconstitutionally

excessive under the circumstances.”148 Considering the evidence in the record, and

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court concludes that

Deputy Johnson’s actions were objectively reasonable and she did not employ

excessive force when restraining Plaintiff.

b. Deputy Bryan Favorite

Deputy Bryan Favorite is a reserve deputy with OPSO.149 On July 8, 2019,

Deputy Favorite was working a detail at Harrah’s on behalf of OPSO.150 Deputy

Favorite received a call that a “certain female was resisting arrest” and witnessed

Deputy Johnson escorting Plaintiff to the interview room and walked over to assist

with the apprehension of the Plaintiff.151 Plaintiff was already handcuffed by the time

Deputy Favorite arrived to assist.152

In her deposition, Plaintiff was unable to recall what role Deputy Favorite

played in her arrest and only alleged that Deputy Favorite was “coming inside and

handcuffed Plaintiff after Plaintiff swung her arms at the deputy while being escorted to the interview

room.

147 R. Doc. 65-7 at pp. 87-90.

148 Deville, 567 F.3d at 169.

149 R. Doc. 65.

150 Id.

151 Id.; see also R. Doc. 65-8.

152 Id.

kind of threatening me [during her interview] and then going outside and telling my

cousin a whole different story.”153

The Deputy Defendants argue that none of Deputy Favorite’s actions

amounted to a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.154 The Deputy Defendants

contend that even if this Court determines a constitutional right was violated, Deputy

Favorite is entitled to qualified immunity because he acted objectively reasonable in

light of the facts and circumstances confronting him.155 Specifically, he assisted with

the interview of Plaintiff in the interview room because he was under the

understanding that Plaintiff was involved in a fight wherein Deputy Keppard was

struck.156 Further, he witnessed Deputy Johnson attempt to escort the struggling

Plaintiff to the interview room.157 For these reasons, the Deputy Defendants argue

Deputy Favorite is entitled to qualified immunity.158

Considering the evidence before the Court, the Court finds that Deputy

Favorite’s actions were objectively reasonable. There is no evidence that Deputy

Favorite was involved in any struggle with Plaintiff or, indeed, used any physical

force on her whatsoever.159 Plaintiff does not allege that Deputy Favorite was

involved in her arrest or that he physically harmed or touched her.160 Accordingly,

153 R. Doc. 65-7 at pp. 44-47.

154 R. Doc. 65.

155 Id.

156 R. Doc. 65-8.

157 Id.

158 R. Doc. 65.

159 See R. Doc. 65-8.

160 See R. Doc. 65-7.

the Court concludes that Deputy Favorite’s actions were reasonable and he did not

use excessive force on Plaintiff.

c. Deputy Floyd Stevenson

Deputy Floyd Johnson is a reserve deputy with OPSO.161 On July 8, 2019,

Deputy Johnson was working a detail at Harrah’s on behalf of OPSO.162 The Deputy

Defendants explain that Deputy Stevenson witnessed Plaintiff turning around and

swinging her arms at Deputy Johnson who was trying to escort Plaintiff to the

interview room.163 However, Deputy Stevenson was not involved in the arrest of

Plaintiff.164

Plaintiff was unable to recall precisely what role Deputy Stevenson played in

her arrest and only alleged that he read her Miranda rights to her while in the

interview room.165

The Deputy Defendants argue that none of Deputy Stevenson’s actions

amounted to a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Deputy Defendants

contend that even if this Court determines a constitutional right was violated, Deputy

Stevenson is entitled to qualified immunity because he acted objectively reasonable

in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him.166 Specifically, he assisted

with the interview of Plaintiff in the interview room because he was under the

understanding that Plaintiff was involved in a fight wherein Deputy Keppard was

161 R. Doc. 65.

162 Id.

163 Id.

164 R. Doc. 65-9.

165 R. Doc. 65-7 at pp. 90-91.

166 R. Doc. 65.

struck.167 Further, he witnessed Plaintiff “being aggressive” as Deputy Johnson

escorted Plaintiff to the interview room.168 For these reasons, the Deputy Defendants

argue Deputy Stevenson is entitled to qualified immunity.169

Considering the evidence before the Court, the Court finds that Deputy

Stevenson’s actions were objectively reasonable. There is no evidence that Deputy

Stevenson was involved in the restraint of Plaintiff or, indeed, used any physical force

on her whatsoever.170 Plaintiff does not allege that Deputy Stevenson was involved

in her arrest, beyond reading her Miranda Rights, or that he physically harmed or

touched her.171 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Deputy Stevenson’s actions

were reasonable and he did not use excessive force on Plaintiff.

d. Violation of the OPSO Use of Force Policy.

Plaintiff separately alleges that the actions of the Deputy Defendants violate

the OPSO’s Use of Force Policy and that this violation is further proof that the Deputy

Defendants acted unreasonably.172 Plaintiff argues that the Deputy Defendants

failed to ensure that the arrest was lawful and made unsubstantiated assumptions

before resorting to excessive physical force.173 The OPSO’s Use of Force Policy

outlines a number of factors affecting the decision to use force, most notably the

“immediate need to protect one’s self, or others, from physical assault” as well as:

The totality of the circumstances considered when making a decision to

use force. The question is whether the actions are “objectively

167 R. Doc. 65-9.

168 Id.

169 R. Doc. 65.

170 See R. Doc. 65-9.

171 See R. Doc. 65-7.

172 R. Doc. 72.

173 Id.

reasonable” in light of all the facts and circumstances confronting the

staff member, at the time the force used.174

As described above, the Court has determined that the individual Deputy

Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and did not act with excessive force

when restraining Plaintiff and handcuffing her. In addition, Plaintiff’s swinging of

her arm towards the deputies posed a threat to both Deputy Johnson as well as the

surrounding people at Harrah’s. Accordingly, the Court finds it unnecessary to

determine whether the Deputy Defendants violated the OPSO Use of Force Policy

because it has already determined that the Deputy Defendants’ use of force was

objectively reasonable based upon the totality of circumstances present.

e. John and Jane Doe Defendants.

Plaintiff also asserts claims against several unnamed deputies.175 Pleadings

with “fictitious designation is [sic] common when the true names of the defendants

are not yet known and, in most cases, such names are learned only through the

process of discovery.”176 “[I]t has long been an accepted practice to allow claims

against an unknown defendant to be amended to identify the defendant when his

identity is discovered.”177 “[T]he court may not dismiss an action for failure to

prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a

174 R. Doc. 72-3.

175 R. Doc. 1 at p. 3 ¶ 7.

176 Gallegos v. Slidell Police Dept., No. 07-6636, 2008 WL 1794170, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2008) (citing

Gilmore v. Stadler, No. Civ. A. 06-1509, 2007 WL 324582, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 31, 2007)) (citing Bivens

v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 288 (1971)).

177 Taylor v. City of Winnfield, 191 F.R.D. 511, 513 (W.D. La. 2000) (Little, C.J.) (emphasis added)

(citing Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 536-37 (1939); Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Price, 170 F.2d

715, 717 (5th Cir. 1948)).

reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be

substituted into an action.”178

Here, no objection has been made by Defendants regarding the John Doe

defendants. However, the parties have conducted extensive discovery and Plaintiff

has failed to amend her complaint to name the specific John Doe defendants. Because

these defendants have not yet been named, the Court is unable to analyze their

actions in regard to this motion for summary judgment.

B. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in

relevant part that “no State shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.”179 Plaintiff does not differentiate between her Fourth

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Regardless, in accordance with

Fifth Circuit precedent, the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s claims under both

amendments is identical.180 Accordingly, in keeping with the Court’s determination

that the Deputy Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, the

Court further finds that the Deputy Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights.

178 Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3).

179 U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

180 Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 901 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying the same analysis and standards to

excessive force claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment); see also Deris v. Norman, No.

12–1456, 2014 WL 906185 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2014) (explaining that a plaintiff does not have a “due

process” claim under the Fourteenth Amendment if his claim is susceptible to analysis under a specific

constitutional source). Here, Plaintiff’s claim is susceptible to analysis under the Fourth Amendment,

thus separate analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable and would be duplicative.

C. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Claim.

The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States prohibits

excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.!8! The Eighth

Amendment does not apply until an individual is held in custody after a criminal

conviction. 182

Here, there is no allegation that the events at issue occurred while Plaintiff

was in custody after a criminal conviction. Thus, Plaintiff's complaint does not state

a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment

claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment on the

Issue of Qualified Immunity filed by the Deputy Defendants Michelle Johnson, Floyd

Stevenson and Bryan Favorite!®3 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims

against Deputy Johnson, Deputy Stevenson, and Deputy Favorite are DISMISSED

with prejudice.

New Orleans, Louisiana, March 29, 2022.

Vcttey

WENDY B. VITTER

United States District Judge

181 U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII.

182 Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 20038) (quoting Johnson v. City of Dall., 61 F.3d 442,

444 (5th Cir. 1995)).

188 R, Doc. 65.

30