Williams v. Biggs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JEVIN WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 21-333

c/w 21-334

DANIEL BIGGS, et al SECTION: “H” (4)

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Limit Discovery to the Issue of Officers’ Qualified

Immunity (R. Doc. 52), seeking an order limiting discovery against defendants Southeast

Louisiana Flood Protection, Daniel Biggs, Kerry Najolia Donald Juneau, Albert Pellitteri, Darnell

Laurant, Michael Brenckle, Bruno Mason, and Vance Bieniemy to the issue of qualified immunity.

The motion is opposed by both Plaintiffs. R. Doc. 59 and 60.

I. Background

This action is a consolidated matter that arises out of events occurring on February 16,

2020, in a parking lot off Lakeshore Drive near Franklin Ave in New Orleans, Louisiana. R. Doc.

1, p. 2, Case No. 21-333. In their complaints, Plaintiffs Williams and Hampton allege that they

were in a parking lot off Lakeshore Drive near Franklin Avenue in New Orleans with other

unnamed drivers doing donuts in the parking lot when a complaint was made about two cars doing

donuts in that location. Id.

They allege that Officer Daniel Biggs (“Biggs”) of the Orleans Levee Board responded to

the call and when they tried to leave the location, began shooting at them even though they were

no threat to him. Id. Plaintiffs contend that after being shot by Biggs, he made no attempt to assist

them and instead made a call for “officer in need of help”. Id. at p. 10. The officer who responded

to his call was the first officer to notify EMS that Hampton and Williams were shot and needed

assistance. Id. The plaintiffs contend that while they survived the shooting, they experienced

physical and emotional injuries and that Biggs’ decision was under color of law and violative of

their constitutional rights. Id. at p. 12. They point out that the act of doing donuts was simply a

misdemeanor offense, and Biggs brandishing and using his weapon was excessive force. Id. at p.

8. Plaintiff’s also point out that Biggs denied them assistance and did not follow department

policies by completing an incident report. Id. at p. 11.

The plaintiffs also complain that the after the fact investigation was a sham because Biggs

was not disciplined, Hampton was arrested, and that the department was only interested in covering

up the officer’s behavior. They also complain that the leadership of the department failed to

comply with their own policies, failed to adequately train Briggs and failed to properly discipline

him among other violations.

II. Standard of Review

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to issue a protective

order after a showing of good cause “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,

oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)'s “good cause”

requirement indicates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to show the

necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as

distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302,

306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) ).

“Trial courts possess broad discretion to supervise discovery.” Landry v. Air Line Pilots

Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 436 n.114 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “A trial court has

broad discretion and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions that may dispose

of the case are determined.” Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1987).

“The qualified immunity defense affords government officials not just immunity from

liability, but immunity from suit.” Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985)). Qualified immunity shields government

officials from individual liability for performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct

violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

“One of the most salient benefits of qualified immunity is protection from pretrial

discovery, which is costly, time-consuming, and intrusive[.]” Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648

(5th Cir. 2012) (citing Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986) ).

Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit “has established a careful procedure under which a district

court may defer its qualified immunity ruling if further factual development is necessary to

ascertain the availability of that defense.” Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. Under this procedure, “a district

court must first find ‘that the plaintiff's pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the

defense of qualified immunity.’ ” Id. (citing Wicks v. Miss. State Emp't Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 994–

95 (5th Cir. 1995); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, (2009) (directing that a plaintiff must

“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face”—excluding statements that are “no more than

conclusions” which are “not entitled to the assumption of truth”)).

“Thus, a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that

both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he

has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Backe, 691 F.3d

at 648. “After the district court finds a plaintiff has so pled, if the court remains ‘unable to rule on

the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts,’ it may issue a discovery order

‘narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim.’ ” Id. (citing

Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1987)).

III. Analysis

Defendant-movers, seek an order from the Court limiting discovery to the issue of qualified

immunity. Defendants argue they have raised qualified immunity by alleging it in their answer,

and on that basis request the court to limit discovery that does not pertain to qualified immunity.

Rec. Doc. 52-1. Defendants ignore the fact that they have not yet filed a dispositive motion raising

qualified immunity for the court’s resolution. Generally, the defendant-movers contend that

pursuant to Fifth Circuit law, the court should issue a discovery order narrowly tailored to

discovery of the facts needed to make a qualified immunity ruling citing Lion Boulos v. Wilson,

834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiffs Williams and Hampton oppose the motion and contend that Defendants have not

challenged the adequacy of their pleadings, nor do they have dispositive motions pending, such

that the request is premature. See R. Doc. 59 p. 2, and R. Doc. 60, p.2. The plaintiffs therefore

contend that the defendant’s motion should be denied.

In order to seek a stay based on the qualified immunity defense, Defendants must first raise

the issue in a dispositive motion. See, e.g., Rowe v. Romero, 225 F.R.D. 640, 644 (D. Colo. 2004)

(Holding that it may be appropriate to stay discovery only after the issue of qualified immunity is

presented to the Court for adjudication). The government official who does not raise qualified

immunity in a motion to dismiss “cannot be said to be unduly burdened if he foregoes an

opportunity to address the issue prior to the commencement of discovery, and instead waits to

assert it until some point later in the litigation.” Id.

While the defendants rely upon Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir.

1987) to support their position that an order limiting the scope of discovery is warranted, Lion

supports the opposite position. In Lion Boulos, the Court in lieu of granting summary judgment,

issued an order allowing limited discovery on qualified immunity so that the Court could resolve

a factual dispute prior to ruling on summary judgment. Clearly in Lions the Court was squarely

presented the issue of the adequacy of the plaintiff’s pleadings unlike in this case.

In contrast, the case law in this area weighs against the position of the defendants. As the

defendants have only raised the issue of qualified immunity as an affirmative defense and has not

yet officially present the issue to the court for consideration, an order limiting discovery would not

be appropriate. While there are no cases in this district on the issue, the available authorities

suggest that the more prudent approach is to deny such a request where the issue has not been

raised in either a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. See also Scherbarth v.

Woods, Civil Action No. 16–CV–2391–KHR, 2018 WL 851344, (S.D. Col. 2018)(where the

court held that if there is no pending motion to resolve whether qualified immunity applies, the

Plaintiff’s interest in proceeding expeditiously and the convenience of the court outweigh the

burden to Defendants); Migliacio v. City of Plaquemine, Civil Action No. 18-621-SDD-RLB,

2019 WL 267915 (M.D. La. Jan. 18, 2019)(where Judge Bourgeois in the Middle District Court

denied Defendant’s request to limit discovery solely based on the assertion of qualified immunity

as an affirmative defense)

In addition to the above authority, there are other factors complicating the validity of the

defendants’ request. First, one of the defendants who seek the discovery limitation order was only

sued in his official capacity by Plaintiff Hampton, therefore qualified immunity does not apply.

See R. Doc. 1, p. 3, Case No. 21-334, Second, the plaintiffs in addition to the Federal §1983 claims

also assert supplemental state law claims for assault and battery, emotional distress, and Hampton

separately seeks punitive damages to which the defense of qualified immunity does not apply. See

R. Doc. 1, Case No 21-00333; R. Doc. 1, Case No. 21-000334.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Limit Discovery to the

Issue of Officers’ Qualified Immunity (R. Doc. 52) is DENIED for the reasons assigned above.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of March 2022.

KAREN WELLS ts .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE