Carter v. St. Tammany Parish School Board

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ERIN CARTER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 21-1303

ST. TAMMANY PARISH SCHOOL SECTION M (1)

BOARD, et al.

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure filed by defendants the St. Tammany Parish School Board (the “School Board”),

William “Trey” Folse, III, Peter “Pete” Jabbia, Michael Cossé, Regina Sanford, Aimee Lemane,

and Amy T. Burns (collectively, the “School Board Defendants”).1 Plaintiff Erin Carter responds

in opposition.2 Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the

Court issues this Order & Reasons granting the School Board Defendants’ motion because the

doctrine of res judicata precludes Carter’s claims.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns the alleged discrimination Carter is said to have faced at Pitcher Junior

High (“Pitcher”) during her tenure there from 2015-2017, including, but not limited to, Pitcher’s

denial of her requests for extended sick leave.3 Carter alleges that on April 24, 2017, she became

extremely ill due to debilitating migraines and, therefore, was unable to continue working.4 She

requested extended sick leave through the end of the school year, which Jabbia, the associate

1 R. Doc. 22.

2 R. Doc. 29.

3 R. Doc. 29-1 at 7. Extended sick leave is paid leave under Louisiana law. La. R.S. 17:1202.

4 R. Doc. 29-1 at 8.

superintendent, denied.5 Carter was, however, eligible for unpaid medical leave and was instructed

to complete and return an application for such leave if she were unable to return to school.6 Carter

did not complete the application, nor did she return to school for the rest of the year.7

On June 13, 2017, Burns, Pitcher’s principal, conducted an administrative hearing

concerning Carter’s unauthorized leave of absence; her “mishandling” of a non-sanctioned school

fundraiser; and her failure to comply with the school’s gradebook standards.8 Carter did not show

up for the hearing.9 As a result, Burns recommended to Folse, the superintendent, that Carter be

terminated and that a second administrative hearing be conducted to investigate and review

Carter’s status as an employee of the School Board.10 At the second administrative hearing, which

occurred on June 26, 2017, Cossé, the assistant superintendent, recommended that Carter be

terminated due to her “willful neglect of duty through unauthorized leave and poor performance.”11

The School Board accepted the recommendation and terminated Carter on July 5, 2017.12

On December 4, 2017, Carter filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging (1) discrimination based on race and disability; and

(2) retaliation.13 The EEOC issued a dismissal and notice of rights on May 23, 2019.14 In the

meantime, on April 23, 2019, Carter filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Louisiana (“Carter I”), which was docketed as civil action no. 19-9651 and assigned to

this section of Court. Carter I, like the instant action (“Carter II”), concerned the alleged

5 Id.

6 R. Doc. 22-1 at 2.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 3.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id. In the notice, the EEOC noted its determination that “[b]ased upon its investigation, [it was] unable to

conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes.” R. Doc. 22-3 at 1.

discrimination during Carter’s tenure at Pitcher, including the School Board’s denial of Carter’s

sick leave requests due to her migraines. Compare R. Doc. 22-4 (Carter I complaint), with R.

Doc.1 (Carter II complaint). On March 29, 2021, this Court granted summary judgment for the

School Board Defendants in Carter I, dismissing Carter’s claims with prejudice.15 The Fifth

Circuit affirmed.16 Carter filed Carter II on July 6, 2021.17

The complaint in Carter II sets forth two counts.18 In Count I, she lists the following

authorities in her subtitle for the count as if they constitute the basis for her claims: (1) 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) “Monell Claim Section 1983”; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (5) 42

U.S.C. § 1986; (6) “14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection”; (7) “Section 1983 –

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause”; and (8) “Section 1983 – Fourteenth Amendment

Equal Protection Clause.”19 In Count II, Carter lists the following authorities in her subtitle for

the count, again as if they constitute the basis for her claims: (1) Section 301 of the Labor-

Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) “Monell Claim

Section 1983”; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1986; (6) “14th Amendment Due Process

and Equal Protection”; (7) “Section 1983 – Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause”; and (8)

“Section 1983 – Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.”20 Additionally, in her

description of the events giving rise to Count II, Carter notes that she also “asserts [(1)] violation

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (deprivation of property interest

without due process of law); (2) violation of the CBA [that is, collective-bargaining agreement

15 R. Doc. 22-1 at 5.

16 Carter v. St. Tammany P ar. Sch. Bd., 2022 WL 485197, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2022).

17 R. Doc. 1 at 1.

18 Id. at 35, 39.

19 Id. at 35.

20 Id. at 39.

(“CBA”)]; (3) denial of equal protection under the law, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional

distress,”21 although she does not say against whom she asserts these claims.22

II. PENDING MOTION

In their motion to dismiss, the School Board Defendants argue that the instant action is

barred by res judicata, the statute of limitations, and Carter’s failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.23 Like Carter II, Carter I concerned the alleged discrimination Carter faced

at Pitcher, including its denial of Carter’s sick leave requests, say the School Board Defendants.24

Therefore, they argue that because Carter “was afforded ample opportunity to prosecute her case

[in Carter I] under the same facts and alleged causes of action asserted [in the instant action],”25

her claims are precluded.26 The School Board Defendants further argue that Carter’s suit is barred

by the statute of limitations, as Title VII claimants must file suit within 90 days of receipt of an

EEOC right-to-sue letter, which, here, was issued on May 23, 2019, and the instant action (Carter

II) was filed on July 6, 2021.27 Finally, the School Board Defendants argue that Carter’s complaint

does not satisfy the requisite pleading standards because it fails to allege anything more than

insufficient labels and conclusions, and, therefore, her claims must be dismissed.28

In a rambling and repetitive 37-page opposition, Carter provides a history of 42 U.S.C.

§1981, argues that a four-year statute of limitations applies under 28 U.S.C. §1658, and argues that

res judicata is inapposite because she is not raising identical claims against identical defendants.29

21 Id. at 48.

22 See id. (failing to identify a particular defendant or defendants against whom she brings these four claims).

23 R. Doc. 22 at 1.

24 Compare R. Doc. 22-4, with R. Doc.1; see also R. Doc. 22-1 at 4 (stating the School Board Defendants’

argument that Carter II is duplicative of Carter I).

25 R. Doc. 22 at 1.

26 R. Doc. 22-1 at 10.

27 Id. at 3, 9.

28 Id. at 9-10.

29 R. Doc. 29-1 at 14-18.

Carter asserts that the claims alleged in Carter II pertain to events that happened during her

employment and after the termination of Carter I.30 Carter charges the School Board with

“withholding evidence,” presumably after Carter I was filed, although no such allegation is made

in her complaint, nor is any explanation given as to what evidence is being withheld, when it was

withheld, or its relevance.31 Carter redescribes (several times) the alleged discriminatory events

she noted in her complaint and prays that all relief and associated costs be granted in her favor.32

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule

8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The statement of the claim must

“‘give the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A pleading does

not comply with Rule 8 if it offers “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action,” or “‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557) (alteration omitted).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move to dismiss

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

30 Id. at 20.

31 Id.

32 Id. at 35.

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on the face of the complaint “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility does not equate

to probability, but rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Thus, if the facts

pleaded in the complaint “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to

relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration omitted).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court employs

the two-pronged approach utilized in Twombly. The court “can choose to begin by identifying

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions [unsupported by factual allegations],

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. However, “[w]hen there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether

they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “‘[The] task, then, is to determine whether

the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s

likelihood of success.’” Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 385 (5th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir.

2012)). Motions to dismiss are disfavored and rarely granted. Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770,

775 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir.

2009)). A court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is limited to the complaint, any

documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that

are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.

Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)).

B. Res judicata

“‘Claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars the litigation of claims that either have been

litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit.’” Hadley v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2021 WL

5513979, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 2021) (quoting In re Southmark Corp., 163 F.3d 925, 934 (5th

Cir. 1999)). Four conditions must be met in order for res judicata to apply: “‘(1) the parties to both

actions are identical, or in privity; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered the judgment in

the first action; (3) the first action concluded with a final judgment on the merits; and (4) both suits

involved the same claim or cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Warren v. Mortg. Electronic

Registration Sys., Inc., 616 F. App’x 735, 737 (5th Cir. 2015)). “‘A final judgment on the merits

of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have

been raised in that action.’” Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 467 (5th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981)). “‘Even if the second

suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question, or fact once so determined must, as

between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the

judgment in the first suit remains unmodified.’” Id. (quoting Landmark Land Co. v. Office of

Thrift Supervision, 990 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1993)) (alteration and emphasis omitted).

“Accordingly, ‘a case pending appeal is res judicata and entitled to full faith and credit unless and

until reversed on appeal.’” Id. (quoting Fid. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust

Co., 510 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1975)) (alteration omitted).33

Carter’s claims against the School Board Defendants are res judicata, as all four conditions

for its application are met. First, the parties to both actions are either identical or in privity.

“Privity is merely another way of saying that there is sufficient identity between parties to prior

and subsequent suits for res judicata to apply.” Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1266

(5th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit recognizes privity in three “narrowly-defined” situations where

non-parties in a second suit are “sufficiently close” that they have privity with parties in the first

lawsuit: “(1) where the non-party is a successor in interest to a party’s interest in property; (2)

where the non-party controlled the prior litigation; and (3) where the non-party’s interests were

adequately represented by a party to the original suit.” Clyce v. Farley, 836 F. App’x 262, 269

(5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Meza, 908 F.2d at 1266). In Carter I, Carter brought suit against the

School Board and Burns in her individual and official capacities.34 In Carter II, she again brings

suit against the School Board and Burns, but also against Folse, Jabbia, Cossé, Sanford, and

Lemane (all in their individual and official capacities).35 The School Board Defendants argue that

the parties in Carter I are identical to the parties in Carter II.36 Indeed, Carter, Burns, and the

School Board are identical. The School Board Defendants, however, do not address the remaining

movants not party to Carter I: Folse, named as the superintendent of the School Board; Jabbia,

33 The Court notes that “[a]lthough res judicata generally cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss and should

instead ‘be pleaded as an affirmative defense,’ dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the res judicata bar is

apparent from the complaint and judicially noticed facts and the plaintiff fails to challenge the defendant’s failure to

plead it as an affirmative defense.” Anderson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 953 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005)). Here, the res judicata bar is apparent

from the complaint and Carter made no challenge concerning any failure to plead res judicata as an affirmative defense.

34 R. Doc. 22-4 at 1-2.

35 See R. Doc. 1 at 7-12. Three other nonmoving parties unaffiliated with the School Board were also sued

and have brought a separate motion to dismiss. R. Doc. 23.

36 R. Doc. 22-1 at 7.

named as the associate superintendent of the School Board; Cossé, named as an assistant

superintendent of the School Board; Sanford, named as an assistant superintendent of the School

Board; and Lemane, named as an assistant superintendent of the School Board. But because

Carter’s claims against them concern actions taken as members of the School Board, the remaining

movants are in privity with the defendants in Carter I. See Dean v. Miss. Bd. of Bar Admissions,

394 F. App’x 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that individual members of board of bar examiners

were in privity with the board where alleged wrongdoing in second action concerned actions taken

as board members); see also Schuster v. Martin, 861 F.2d 1369, 1373 (5th Cir.1988) (“It is also a

general principle of the law of preclusion that state officials are, as a matter of law, in privity with

the agency or department in which they serve.”); Slaughter v. Atkins, 305 F. Supp. 3d 697, 709

(M.D. La. 2018) (“Board members sued in their individual capacities are in privity with the Board

they serve.”); Felton v. Leake Cty. Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5190652, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 7, 2015)

(holding that superintendent was in privity with the school board where allegations against

superintendent only concerned his conduct as superintendent); Rushing v. Bd. of Supervisors of

Univ. of La. Sys., 2008 WL 4200292, at *7 (M.D. La. Sept. 11, 2008) (holding that due process

claims against individual board members were precluded in second lawsuit because the board

members were in privity with the board sued in first lawsuit); Moses v. Flanagan, 727 F. Supp.

309, 312 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (holding that “[o]fficials of the school district are clearly in privity

with the school district”).

Second, this Court was a court of competent jurisdiction in rendering the judgment in

Carter I. Third, that action ended with a final judgment on the merits, as this Court granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendants in Carter I and the Fifth Circuit affirmed this Court’s

decision. And fourth, both Carter I and Carter II involve the same claims or causes of action. The

Fifth Circuit applies a transactional test to determine whether the same claim or cause of action

was involved in both suits. Dotson v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1840423, at *4 (E.D. La.

May 7, 2021) (citing Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir. 2004)), aff’d,

24 F.4th 999 (5th Cir. 2022). “‘Under the transactional test, a prior judgment’s preclusive effect

extends to all rights of the plaintiff with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of

connected transactions, out of which the original action arose.’” Id. (quoting Test Masters, 428

F.3d at 571). “What grouping of facts constitutes a ‘transaction’ or a ‘series of transactions’ must

be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related

in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their

treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.” Test

Masters, 428 F.3d at 571 (citing Petro-Hunt, 365 F.3d at 396)). “Under the transactional test ‘the

critical issue is not the relief requested or the theory asserted but whether the plaintiff bases the

two actions on the same nucleus of operative facts.’” Dotson, 2021 WL 1840423, at *4 (quoting

Agrilectric Power Partners, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 20 F.3d 663, 665 (5th Cir. 1994)). Here, Carter

I and Carter II are based on the same nucleus of operative facts: the alleged discrimination Carter

faced while employed at Pitcher. Carter attempts to differentiate the two actions, arguing that

Carter I concerned claims under the Family Medical Leave Act and the Americans with

Disabilities Act, whereas Carter II concerns claims for racial discrimination, retaliation,

harassment, breach of contract, wrongful termination, “and other conduct by the Defendants during

and after her employment.”37 But Carter fails to argue that the claims brought in Carter II were

unavailable at the time of Carter I, see Progressive Waste Sols. of LA, Inc. v. St. Bernard Par.

Gov’t, 2016 WL 4191847, at *14 (E.D. La. Aug. 9, 2016) (applying transactional test to sort claims

37 R. Doc. 29-1 at 20.

based on same nucleus of operative facts from those that were not), and the Court cannot conceive

how they could not have been, with the possible exception of claims involving conduct on the part

of the School Board Defendants occurring after Carter’s employment. But Carter identifies no

such claims as having been made in her complaint. Instead, the only new “claims” Carter

references in her opposition that supposedly bar res judicata – namely, a “taking [claim that] was

never raised in the 2002 Complaint” and a claim for “the withholding of evidence by the

Defendants” – are not alleged in the complaint in the instant action (Carter II), are not fleshed out

in the opposition, and thus amount to naked and conclusory assertions having no factual or

contextual support whatsoever.38 Suffice it to say that any such new “claims,” referenced for the

first time in an opposition and devoid of factual allegations or other support, cannot undermine the

application of res judicata. Because all claims in the instant suit stem from the same transaction

or occurrence, or series of connected transactions, out of which Carter I arose, res judicata applies.

Therefore, all of Carter’s claims against the School Board Defendants are precluded and must be

dismissed with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that the School Board Defendants’ motion to dismiss (R. Doc. 22) is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Carter’s claims against the School Board Defendants are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

38 Id. A “2002 Complaint” is never referenced or defined at any other place in Carter’s opposition, much less

her complaint. Nor is the “taking cla im” or the claim for withholding evidence. Thus, the complaint does not include

the kind of factual allegations necessary to establish the elements of any of these claims. In two instances in her

opposition, Carter does make the charge that “[a]fter Carter’s termination, her family and children were targets of

retaliation, harassment, and bullying,” which included her children being “refused out of district waivers to continue

their education in St. Tammany Parish.” Id. at 27, 34. However, this charge is neither mentioned in her complaint

nor supported by anything more than these unspecific and conclusory assertions.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 24th day of February, 2022.

________________________________

BARRY W. ASHE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE