Branch v. Lobello

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

FERDINAND BERNARD BRANCH, CIVIL ACTION

JR.

VERSUS NO. 21-603

VINCENT LOBELLO, ET AL. SECTION “R” (4)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is defendant Judge Vincent Lobello’s motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against him.1 Plaintiffs Ferdinand Branch, Jr.,

Liryca Beville, and Gaynelle Neville oppose the motion.2 For the following

reasons, the Court grants defendant’s motion, and dismisses all claims

against Lobello.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this case are three alleged members of the Tchou Tchouma

Tchoupitoulas Nation, who, proceeding pro se, assert that they have been

falsely charged in Louisiana state court with forgery, La. Rev. Stat. § 14:72,

injuring public records, La. Rev. Stat. § 14:132, and filing a false lien, La. Rev.

1 R. Doc. 30.

2 R. Doc. 35.

Stat. § 14:133.6.3 On March 31, 2021, plaintiffs filed suit in this court,

alleging, inter alia, that a sheriff’s deputy, John Morse, led twelve FBI

officers into their home and arrested them for crimes they did not commit.4

They further allege that Morse caused Marietta Barnes, the “Director of

Recording & Elections,” to destroy certain public records from the “public

registry.”5 They assert that they did not commit the charged crimes,6 and

that they “are not subject to State law, as Citizens of the United States[,] not

United States of America.”7

Throughout their complaint, plaintiffs name various state officials,

three of whom have been served and made defendants in this matter: (i)

Judge Vincent Lobello, the state judge presiding over plaintiffs’ criminal

proceedings in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court of Louisiana; (ii)

Warren Montgomery, the District Attorney for the Twenty-Second Judicial

District of Louisiana; and (iii) Marietta Barnes, a deputy clerk of the Twenty-

Second Judicial District Court. Plaintiffs ask the Court to dismiss the state

3 R. Doc. 5 at 1 (Complaint).

4 Id. at 2.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 5-7.

7 Id. at 8.

action,8 and seek various other forms of declaratory, injunctive, and

monetary relief.

On August 6, 2021, defendant Vincent Lobello moved under Rules

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss all of

plaintiffs’ claims against him.9 Defendant contends that plaintiffs’ claims

should be dismissed on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity,

absolute judicial immunity, Younger abstention, and the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.10

The Court considers the motion below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs

challenges to the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. “A case is properly

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the

statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders

Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187

8 Id. at 10.

9 R. Doc. 30.

10 R. Doc. 35.

(2d Cir. 1996)). Because a 12(b)(1) motion is jurisdictional, the Court

considers such a motion “before addressing any attack on the merits,” see In

re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig. (Miss. Plaintiffs), 668

F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012), in order to “prevent[ ] a court without

jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice.” Id. at 286-

87 (quoting Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).

In assessing a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction, the Court

“may dismiss . . . on any one of three different bases: (1) the complaint alone;

(2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of

disputed facts.” Clark v. Tarrant Cnty., 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986)

(citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).

Furthermore, plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that subject matter

jurisdiction exists. See Celestine v. TransWood, Inc., 467 F. App’x 317, 318

(5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161).

Under “firmly established” U.S. Supreme Court precedent, “the

absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate

subject-matter jurisdiction.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.

83, 89 (1998). A federal court lacks jurisdiction over a claim that “clearly

appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining

jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Id.

A court may dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on

the inadequacy of the alleged federal claim “only when the claim is ‘so

insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the U.S.

Supreme Court], or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a

federal controversy.’” Id. (citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of

Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead

enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The Court

must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d

228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). But the Court is not bound to accept as true

legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must limit its review to the

contents of the pleadings, including attachments. Brand Coupon Network,

L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). The Court

may also consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss or an

opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in the

pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims. Id. “In addition to facts

alleged in the pleadings, however, the district court ‘may also consider

matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.’” Hall v. Hodgkins, 305 F.

App’x 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc.,

78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, so their pleadings are to be construed

liberally. See Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). But this

does not mean that the Court “will invent, out of whole cloth, novel

arguments on behalf of a pro se plaintiff in the absence of meaningful, albeit

imperfect, briefing.” Jones v. Alfred, 353 F. App’x 949, 952 (5th Cir. 2009).

Here, in reviewing the pleadings, the Court finds that plaintiffs assert claims

for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and money damages, against Judge

Lobello. The Court first addresses plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and

injunctive relief, and then proceeds to their claims for money damages.

A. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs primarily seek declaratory and injunctive relief from the state

criminal proceedings against them.

To the extent that plaintiffs seek to enjoin or otherwise interfere with

the ongoing state-court proceedings, the Court’s authority is limited by the

abstention doctrine set out in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under

Younger, the Court must decline to exercise jurisdiction if the requested

relief would interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding. The Court

must decline to exercise jurisdiction over a state criminal defendants’ claims

when three conditions are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere

with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important

interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has

an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional

challenges.” Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S.

423, 432 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

First, the Court must determine whether the federal proceeding

“interfere[s] with an ‘ongoing state judicial proceeding.’” Id. at 716 (quoting

Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432). “Interference is established ‘whenever the

requested relief would interfere with the state court’s ability to conduct

proceedings, regardless of whether the relief targets the conduct of a

proceeding directly.’” Id. at 717 (quoting Joseph A. ex rel. Wolfe v. Ingram,

275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002)). Here, plaintiffs’ complaint explicitly

asks this Court to “dismiss the State action.”11 Plaintiffs also seek other relief

that would plainly amount to interference in the state proceedings. For

instance, they seek “[i]njunctive relief preventing the defendants et al[.] from

[causing] further irreparable harm to the petitioners,” and, to that end, ask

the Court to “terminate or quash the charges against” them.12 A federal

injunction preventing state criminal prosecution is prototypical of the class

of claims precluded by Younger. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 40-41. Plaintiffs

here also seek a “Declaratory Judgment against the State actions,” as well as

a “Declaratory Judgement that petitioners are out of the jurisdiction of State

actors at all times unless some crime had been committed.”13 For Younger

purposes, declaratory relief is no different from injunctions. As the U.S.

11 R. Doc. 5 at 10.

12 Id. at 3.

13 Id. at 10.

Supreme Court explained in a companion case to Younger, “ordinarily a

declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and

disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting

injunctions was designed to avoid.” Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72

(1971). For these reasons, the first Younger condition is satisfied.

Second, the Court must consider whether the State has “an important

interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim.” Bice, 677 F.3d at 717.

Of course, “[t]he state has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws.”

DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1984). Here, plaintiffs

contest their state charges for injury to public records,14 forgery,15 and filing

a false lien against a law-enforcement or court officer.16 These are all crimes

under Louisiana law. See La. Rev. Stat. §§ 14:132; 14:72; 14:133.6. The Court

therefore finds that Louisiana has a strong interest in regulating the subject

matter of plaintiffs’ claims.

Third, the federal plaintiffs must have “an adequate opportunity in the

state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Bice, 677 F.3d at 716

(quoting Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432). Here, plaintiffs indicate in their

opposition memorandum that their primary objections to the state charges

14 Id. at 5.

15 Id. at 6.

16 Id.

are evidentiary, not constitutional, in nature. For instance, they contend that

Lobello has “ignore[d] evidence,” and “ordered dismissals when he never

looked at the evidence.”17 Plaintiffs elsewhere argue that “there is absolutely

NO EVIDENCE of them committing th[e] acts alleged,” and ask “where is the

evidence[?] [I]t does not exist.”18 These concerns, regarding the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting their criminal charges, are precisely the types of

arguments that are properly raised during the course of the state criminal

proceedings. And to the extent that plaintiffs’ arguments are constitutional,

the state court may hear and rule on those claims as well. See Younger, 401

U.S. at 49 (“A [criminal] proceeding was already pending in the state court,

affording [the plaintiff] an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.”);

Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 431 (“Minimal respect for the

state processes, of course, precludes any presumption that the state courts

will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.” (emphasis in original)).

Furthermore, if plaintiffs are ultimately convicted, they will have the

opportunity to appeal the decision, and to argue any evidentiary or

constitutional errors that they believe the trial court made. The Court

therefore finds that the third and final Younger condition is satisfied.

17 R. Doc. 35 at 3.

18 Id. at 3-4.

If the three conditions for Younger abstention are met, “the ‘doctrine

requires that federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction’ over the lawsuit

unless ‘certain narrowly delimited exceptions to the abstention doctrine

apply.’” Blakely v. Andrade, 360 F. Supp. 3d 453, 467 (N.D. Tex. 2019)

(quoting Bice, 677 F.3d at 716). As to the exceptions, the Court may disregard

the Younger doctrine when:

(1) the state court proceeding was brought in bad faith or with

the purpose of harassing the federal plaintiff, (2) the state statute

is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional

prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in

whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made

to apply it,” or (3) application of the doctrine was waived.

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted).

Here, plaintiffs do not contend that they qualify for any of the

exceptions to Younger, and the Court does not find that any exception

applies. First, plaintiffs make no allegation that the state-court proceeding

was brought in bad faith or that the state officials are at all “motivated by a

desire to harass.” Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977). Indeed, courts

have largely limited application of the exception for bad-faith prosecutions

to extraordinary situations, involving, for instance, repeated arrests or

prosecutions, retaliatory prosecutions, prosecutions intended solely to

attract publicity, or “seizure of materials under a statute of questionable

constitutionality.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, § 13.5 (7th ed.

2016); see, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Lewellen v.

Raff, 843 F.2d 1103 (8th Cir. 1988); Fitzgerald v. Peek, 636 F.2d 943 (5th

Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981); Shaw v. Garrison, 467

F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972). There are no such

facts alleged here. The first exception does not apply.

Second, there is no indication that the Louisiana criminal statutes that

plaintiffs are charged with violating are “flagrantly and patently violative of

express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and

paragraph.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S.

387, 402 (1941)). The state laws at issue pertain to the relatively

uncontroversial crimes of forgery, injury to public records, and the filing of

false liens. Plaintiffs do not allege, and this Court does not find, any issues

relating to the underlying criminal statutes, much less issues of

constitutional dimension. The second exception does not apply.

Third, the state government has not waived the Younger doctrine. On

the contrary, defendant Lobello here expressly argues for dismissal of

plaintiffs’ claims, partially on the grounds of Younger.19 Accordingly, the

third exception does not apply.

19 R. Doc. 30-1 at 6-9.

Because the three conditions for Younger abstention are satisfied, and

because no exception to Younger abstention applies, the Court must decline

to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory

relief against Judge Lobello. Those claims are accordingly dismissed without

prejudice. See Manning v. Republic of Tex., No. 16-265, 2016 WL 1242649,

at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2016) (dismissing claims without prejudice on the

grounds of Younger abstention); Novie v. Vill. of Montebello, No. 10-9436,

2012 WL 3542222, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012) (same).

The Court notes that defendant Lobello also moves to dismiss

plaintiffs’ claims against him under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.20 See

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 462 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). But Rooker-Feldman bars federal-court

review of state-court decisions and judgments rendered before the

commencement of the federal action. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., c, 284 (2005) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined

to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” (emphasis added)). Here, plaintiffs have not identified or

20 Id. at 9-10.

sought review of a prior state-court decision or judgment. They instead seek

to enjoin ongoing state proceedings. The relief that plaintiffs request is the

purview of Younger, not Rooker-Feldman. The Court finds that the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine does not apply.

C. Claims for Money Damages

In their complaint, plaintiffs make one reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

which authorizes a broad range of remedies, including equitable relief and

money damages. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.11 (7th

ed. 2016). Because the Court has already found that plaintiffs are not entitled

to declaratory or injunctive relief as to Judge Lobello, the Court addresses

their § 1983 claim only insofar as it seeks money damages.

The law that dictates the viability of plaintiffs’ damages claims depends

on whether those claims are brought against Judge Lobello in his official

capacity or his individual capacity. As the Supreme Court has explained, “the

phrase ‘acting in their official capacities,’ is best understood as a reference to

the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the

officer inflicts the alleged injury.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991).

While it is not clear from plaintiffs’ pleadings the capacity in which they

purport to sue Judge Lobello, the Court need not decide between the two,

because plaintiffs cannot prevail via either avenue.

To the extent that plaintiffs seek to recover damages from Judge

Lobello in his official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution bars their claims. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits

against a state government by its own citizens, citizens of another state, or

citizens of a foreign country. See U.S. Const. amend. XI; Edelman v. Jordan,

415 U.S. 651 (1974); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); In

re New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). While the Eleventh Amendment permits

“prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against a state,”21

“[r]etrospective relief in the form of a money judgment in compensation for

past wrongs—no matter how small—is barred.” Brennan v. Stewart, 834

F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1988). State-court judges are state actors for the

purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., 565

F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009), and Louisiana “has not waived its sovereignty

within the federal system.” Holliday v. Bd. of Supervisors of LSU Agr. &

Mech. Coll., 149 So. 3d 227, 229 (La. 2014). Accordingly, to the extent that

21 Again, plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory or injunctive relief in this case

are barred as a matter of Younger abstention. See supra.

plaintiffs purport to sue Judge Lobello in his official capacity, their claims

must be dismissed.

To the extent that plaintiffs seek to recover damages from Judge

Lobello in his individual capacity, the claims are barred by judicial immunity.

It is well-established that, “generally, a judge is immune from a suit for

money damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (citations omitted).

As the Supreme Court explained 150 years ago, “it is a general principle of

the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial

officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his

own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to

himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872). Judicial

immunity is overcome only if (i) the challenged action was nonjudicial in

nature, or if (ii) the challenged action, though judicial in nature, was taken

in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

357 (1978) (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351).

Here, the challenged action—presiding over the state proceedings

against plaintiffs—is plainly judicial in nature. Second, there is no “clear

absence of . . . jurisdiction.” Id. Judge Lobello is a judge of the Twenty-

Second Judicial District Court of Louisiana, which, by state constitution, has

original jurisdiction over all criminal matters. See La. Const. art. V § 16(A).

Accordingly, any claim for recovery against Judge Lobello in his individual

capacity is precluded by Lobello’s judicial immunity from suit.

For these reasons, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for money

damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, all damages claims

against Judge Lobello are dismissed with prejudice.

Having dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims against Judge Lobello for

money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief, the Court finds that

no claims against Judge Lobello remain. Judge Lobello is hereby dismissed

as a defendant in this matter.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to

dismiss.22 Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against

Judge Vincent Lobello are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs’

claims for damages against Lobello are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this_ 11th day of February, 2022.

bern Varner

SARAH S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22 R. Doc. 30.

17