The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DARRELL DUPARD CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS CASE NO. 19-1982
JOSEPH P. LOPINTO, III, et al. SECTION: “G”
ORDER AND REASONS
Pending before the Court is Defendant Jon Gegenheimer’s (“Gegenheimer”) “Motion for
Summary Judgment.”1 In this litigation, Plaintiff Darrell Dupard (“Plaintiff”) alleges that he was
subjected to an unlawful search and seizure by deputies of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office.2
Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional
violations and under Louisiana state law for alleged tort violations by Gegenheimer, the Clerk of
Court for the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson, as well as Jefferson Parish
Sheriff Joseph P. Lopinto, III (“Lopinto”) and Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Deputy Wayne Augillard
(“Augillard”).3 In the instant motion, Gegenheimer argues that he is entitled to summary judgment
on all of Plaintiff’s claims against him because Gegenheimer was never provided with an
application for the relevant search warrant and Plaintiff fails to present evidence of any prejudice
1 Rec. Doc. 54.
2 Rec. Doc. 1 at 11–13.
3 Id. at 18–21.
1
or actual injury due to Gegenheimer’s conduct.4 Having considered the motion, the memoranda
in support and opposition, and the applicable law, the Court grants the motion.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 20, 2018, Augillard and other deputies arrived at
Plaintiff’s residence to conduct a search related to a missing gun.5 Plaintiff alleges that the officers
discovered two firearms which were confiscated.6 Plaintiff also alleges that Augillard and the
other deputies forcibly searched two vehicles located in front of the property.7 Accordingly,
Plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the search was unconstitutional, and for
various tort violations under Louisiana law.8 Additionally, Plaintiff brings suit against Lopinto,
alleging that Lopinto failed to adequately train, supervise and/or discipline law enforcement
officers.9 Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Gegenheimer, the Clerk of Court, failed to maintain any and
all affidavits for search warrants, which Plaintiff alleges is a deprivation of his federal and state
constitutional rights and violates the Louisiana Public Records Law.10
4 Rec. Doc. 54 at 1.
5 Rec. Doc. 1 at 11–13.
6 Id. at 13.
7 Id. at 14.
8 Id. at 18–22.
9 Id. at 24.
10 Id. at 25–29.
2
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on March 4, 2019, bringing claims against Lopinto,
Augillard, Gegenheimer and other unknown and unnamed defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
alleged constitutional violations and under Louisiana state law for alleged tort violations.11 On
March 30, 2020, the Court denied Gegenheimer’s motion to dismiss, and granted Plaintiff leave to
file a Rule 7(a)(7) reply regarding Plaintiff’s 1983 claims.12 On April 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed a
second amended complaint13 and a Rule 7(a)(7) reply.14 On September 27, 2021, Gegenheimer
filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment.15 On October 12, 2021, Plaintiff opposed the
motion.16
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. Gegenheimer’s Arguments in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment
First, Gegenheimer argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because he is not the
custodian of the application for the search warrant, and the application was never submitted to
him.17 Gegenheimer points to the affidavits of Cherie Ball and Leshawan Johnson, which both
11 Rec. Doc. 1.
12 Rec. Doc. 21.
13 Rec. Doc. 24.
14 Rec. Doc. 23.
15 Rec. Doc. 54.
16 Rec. Doc. 60.
17 Rec. Doc 54–1 at 5.
3
assert that law enforcement officers do not submit documents to the Clerk of Court in order to
obtain search warrants, and instead submit search warrant applications either to district court
judges or commissioners.18 The affidavits further assert that those applications are maintained by
those judges’ or commissioners’ secretaries.19 Additionally, both affidavits assert that an
application for a search warrant relating to Plaintiff was never submitted to the Clerk of Court.20
Defendant argues that, based on court records and the affidavits of Cherie Ball and Leshawana
Johnson, “there is no question that the application for search warrant of Darrel Dupard was not
provided to the Clerk of Court.”21
Next, Defendant asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant notes that the
Court’s March 30, 2020 Order and Reasons ruled that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by qualified
immunity because Plaintiff did not allege prejudice or actual injury as a result of Gegenheimer’s
actions, but granted Plaintiff leave to amend.22 Defendant argues that “nowhere in his [Second
Amended Complaint] does Plaintiff allege that he has suffered any prejudice or actual injury as a
result of the Clerk’s actions.”23 Furthermore, Defendant notes that Plaintiff has not sought to
18 Rec. Doc 54–1 at 5; 54–5 at 1–3; 54–5 at 1–3.
19 Rec. Doc. 54–1 at 5.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 6–7.
22 Id. at 7.
23 Id.
4
depose anyone in connection with this matter.24 Thus, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has
“presented no facts, nor attempted to obtain facts through discovery, to support the notion that he
has suffered actual injury or prejudice.”25 As a result, Defendant contends that he is entitled to
qualified immunity.
B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
In opposition, Plaintiff first argues that the affidavits of Cherie Ball and Leshawna Johnson,
which were attached to Gegenheimer’s Motion, should be stricken.26 Plaintiff asserts that they are
unreliable because they are “not the words and statements of the deputy clerks signing them, but
rather [] prepared statement[s] that they have been asked to endorse for the purpose of a favorable
outcome on this summary judgment.”27 Plaintiff further cites Chaney v. Dreyfus Service Corp. for
the proposition that “the court should disregard any evidence from the moving party that the jury
is not required to believe.”28 Plaintiff argues that the affidavits fall within this category of evidence
and therefore should be stricken.29 Plaintiff contends that neither affiant stated that they were the
minute clerk working in Commissioner Joyce’s courtroom on the date the warrant was issued.30
24 Id.
25 Id. at 8.
26 Rec. Doc. 60 at 1.
27 Id. at 1–2.
28 Id. at 2.
29 Id.
30 Id.
5
As a result, Plaintiff argues that the affidavits “cannot conclusively state whether or not the warrant
affidavit or application was available for recording.”31 Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that the
affidavits should be stricken.
Plaintiff argues that the relevant dispute of fact is whether “the clerk [took] the necessary
steps to ensure warrants and warrant applications are provided to his office for recording.”32
Plaintiff argues that the clerk did not, and points out that Gegenheimer has asserted that he does
not have a duty to “seek out and retain” the warrant application.33 Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends
that whether the warrant application “is handed/submitted to the clerk or not, it is the duty of the
clerk to record and maintain the records of the district court.”34 Plaintiff notes that Louisiana Code
of Civil procedure article 251 states that “[t]he clerk of court is the legal custodian of all of its
records and is responsible for their safekeeping and preservation.”35 Thus, Plaintiff argues that
there is no “affirmative duty on others,” but rather a duty on the clerk to preserve “all” records,
including the warrant application.36
In response to the contention that the commissioners or judges’ secretaries are the
custodians of search warrant applications, Plaintiff points to an email he received from Renee
31 Id. at 3.
32 Id. at 5.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 6.
35 Id. at 7.
36 Id.
6
Hatch Aguilar, the Deputy Judicial Administrator for the 24th Judicial District Court, which states
that “[t]he 24th Judicial District Court is not the custodian of the record you have requested.”37
Furthermore, Plaintiff notes an opinion from the Louisiana Attorney General which states that
“[t]he Clerk of Court, rather than the Judicial Administrator’s Office or any other Court Agency,
is the official keeper of the [court’s] records.”38
Plaintiff argues that the affidavits attached to Gegenheimer’s Motion do not establish that
he is not the custodian of the warrant application. Plaintiff asserts that the affidavits are from two
of Gegenheimer’s deputy clerks who “blindly state with no support or basis” that Gegenheimer is
not the custodian of the warrant application.39 Although Plaintiff acknowledges that “[t]he clerk
puts forward facts showing it did not and does not maintain search warrants,” Plaintiff argues that
this merely “demonstrates a failure of the clerk to perform his ministerial duties of maintaining the
record of the district court.”40
Next, Plaintiff appears to argue that the clerk should have a copy of the warrant application
because it was signed by Commissioner Joyce on March 14, 2019 at 2:00 p.m., which “suggests it
was submitted and the warrant was issued in a session of the court.”41 Plaintiff asserts that the
application for the warrant was presented via the court’s electronic system to Commissioner Joyce
37 Id. at 8.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 9.
41 Id.
7
at the courthouse, and the “[m]inute clerk assigned to the court should have been present.”42
Plaintiff further asserts that “[w]hile in session, the court issued a judgment—a search warrant—
and the clerk of court did not take possession or retain the records of the court or enter a minute
entry of the court’s order.”43
Next, Plaintiff argues that Gegenheimer is not entitled to qualified immunity. Responding
to Gegenheimer’s argument that Plaintiff has not presented evidence of prejudice or actual injury,
Plaintiff states that he “has presented his prejudice and injury in his (second) amended complaint
and Rule 7(a)(7) memorandum.”44 Plaintiff further states that there have been no other occasions
for him to detail these injuries, as the clerk has not taken his deposition nor engaged in written
discovery.45 Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Lopinto’s written discovery “does not
seek such information.”46
Plaintiff asserts that Gegenheimer’s actions have damaged him. Plaintiff asserts that he has
incurred legal fees in attempting to locate the warrant through public record requests.47 Plaintiff
further asserts that he has been unable to obtain a certified copy of the warrant, or access to the
42 Id. at 10.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 11.
8
“actual application and affidavit” filed by Aguillard.48 As a result, Plaintiff argues that he is
“potentially deprive[d]” of his Fourth Amendment rights.49
Lastly, Plaintiff contends that even if Gegenheimer is entitled to qualified immunity,
immunity extends only to Plaintiff’s constitutional claim, not his claims under Louisiana law.50
III. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits
demonstrate “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”51 To decide whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the court
considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or
weighing the evidence.”52 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.
Yet “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and
conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”53
If the entire record “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then
no genuine issue of fact exists and, consequently, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 12.
51 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
52 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008).
53 Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
9
matter of law.54 The nonmoving party may not rest upon the pleadings.55 Instead, the nonmoving
party must identify specific facts in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that
evidence establishes a genuine issue for trial.56
The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of showing the
basis for its motion and identifying record evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.57 “To satisfy this burden, the movant may either (1) submit evidentiary
documents that negate the existence of some material element of the opponent’s claim or defense,
or (2) if the crucial issue is one on which the opponent will bear the ultimate burden of proof at
trial, demonstrate that the evidence in the record insufficiently supports an essential element of the
opponent’s claim or defense.”58 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to
the nonmoving party to “identify specific evidence in the record, and to articulate” precisely how
that evidence supports the nonmoving party’s claims.59 The nonmoving party must set forth
“specific facts showing the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning every essential component
of its case.”60
54 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
55 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
56 See id.; Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
57 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
58 Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Little, 939 F.2d at 1299).
59 Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994); see also Morris
v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
60 Morris, 144 F.3d at 380; see also Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012).
10
The nonmovant’s burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact is not satisfied
merely by creating “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” “by conclusory
allegations,” by “unsubstantiated assertions,” or “by only a scintilla of evidence.”61 Moreover, the
nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in its pleadings.62 Hearsay
evidence and unsworn documents that cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in
evidence at trial do not qualify as competent opposing evidence.63
IV. Analysis
In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff initially argues that the affidavits attached to
Gegenheimer’s motion should be stricken. Plaintiff then appears to argue that Gegenheimer is not
entitled to summary judgment because 1) Gegenheimer is the custodian of the warrant application
and 2) he is not entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons explained below, the Court need
not address whether the affidavits should be stricken, as Plaintiff has not carried his burden of
producing evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rule in his favor.
A. Whether Gegenheimer is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Claims under
Louisiana Law
Gegenheimer argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims under
the Louisiana Public Records Law because there is no dispute that he was not given the search
61 Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (internal citations omitted).
62 Morris, 144 F.3d at 380.
63 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987).
11
warrant application at issue. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Gegenheimer is liable under
Louisiana law because Gegenheimer “failed to put procedures in place” to ensure that warrant
applications are delivered to the Clerk’s office to be filed and maintained.64 Plaintiff asserts that
“[w]hether [the warrant application] was handed/submitted to the clerk or not, it is the duty of the
clerk to record and maintain the records of the district court.”65
Plaintiff points to two provisions of Louisiana law in support of this argument. Louisiana
Revised Statute § 13:914 provides the following:
A. The clerk shall record all pleadings, original documents, and judgments either
in a bound book, or by means of photorecording, photocopying, microfilming, or
other photographic method of reproduction, or electronically on non-rewritable
magnetic, optical, or laser type storage media, including but not limited to CD-
ROM. However, if the clerk elects to record by means of microfilming or other
photographic method of reproduction, or electronically, he shall have copies of the
films, tapes, or disks available for inspection.66
Additionally, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 251 states:
A. The clerk of court is the legal custodian of all of its records and is responsible
for their safekeeping and preservation. He may issue a copy of any of these records,
certified by him under the seal of the court to be a correct copy of the original.
Except as otherwise provided by law, he shall permit any person to examine, copy,
photograph, or make a memorandum of any of these records at any time during
which the clerk's office is required by law to be open. However, notwithstanding
the provisions of this Paragraph or R.S. 44:31 et seq., the use, placement, or
installation of privately owned copying, reproducing, scanning, or any other such
imaging equipment, whether hand-held, portable, fixed, or otherwise, within the
offices of the clerk of court is prohibited unless ordered by a court of competent
64 Rec. Doc. 60 at 5.
65 Id.
66 La. Rev. Stat. § 13:914.
12
jurisdiction.67
In the Court’s March 30, 2020 Order on Gegenheimer’s motion to dismiss, the Court
reviewed each of these provisions and ruled that Plaintiff had stated a plausible claim against
Gegenheimer under both.68 As for Section 13:914, the Court explained that “Gegenheimer has a
duty to record all original documents of the court.”69 Nevertheless, the Court explained that
whether the affidavit was provided to Gegenheimer, and thus whether he is the rightful custodian
of the affidavit, is a “factual issue that cannot be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”70
Similarly, regarding article 251, the Court found that “the clerk of court is the legal custodian of
all of the court’s records and is responsible for their safekeeping and preservation.”71 The Court
explained that “[i]f the affidavit in support of the search warrant was provided to Gegenheimer for
filing, he would be responsible for its safekeeping” under article 251.72 Again, however, the Court
ruled that “[t]he question of whether the affidavit was provided to Gegenheimer for filing is a
factual issue that cannot be decided” on a motion to dismiss.73
Thus, the inquiry at the summary judgment stage is whether there remains a genuine
67 La. C.C. P. art. 251.
68 Rec. Doc. 21.
69 Id. at 20.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 25.
72 Id. at 26.
73 Id. at 25.
13
dispute of material fact as to whether the warrant application was provided to Gegenheimer. A
defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the issue “is one on which the opponent will
bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial” and “the evidence in the record insufficiently supports
an essential element of the opponent’s claim or defense.”74 In civil cases, of course, the burden of
proof at trial rests on the plaintiff or the party seeking relief.75 Here, Plaintiff has not put forth any
evidence demonstrating that the warrant application was provided to Gegenheimer. Because
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the warrant application was provided to Gegenheimer,
and Plaintiff has not put forward any evidence to support that allegation, Gegenheimer is entitled
to summary judgment on this question.
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff makes no attempt to demonstrate that the warrant
application was provided to Gegenheimer. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Gegenheimer is liable even
if the warrant application was never provided to him, and that Gegenheimer had a duty to “seek
out and retain” the warrant application after it was presented to the state court judge. However,
Plaintiff cites to no authority that interprets Louisiana law to impose this heightened duty on the
Clerk of Court. There may well be a host of documents that are provided to state court judges that
are not given to the Clerk for filing. Absent authority to the contrary, the Court will not read this
novel duty on the Clerk into Louisiana law. Therefore, Gegenheimer is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claim.
74 Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Little, 939 F.2d at 1299).
75 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 171.
14
Accordingly, the Court need not address whether the affidavits should be stricken. Even
without considering them, Gegenheimer is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not
carried his burden of offering evidence that the warrant application was provided to Gegenheimer.
B. Whether Gegenheimer is entitled to Qualified Immunity
As the Court explained in its March 30, 2020 Order, to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a plaintiff is required to allege facts demonstrating that: (1) the defendant violated the
Constitution or federal law; and (2) that the defendant was acting under the color of state law while
doing so.76 The Court noted that it was not clear precisely what constitutional right Plaintiff is
alleging was violated. Construing the Complaint liberally, the Court considered whether Plaintiff
had stated a constitutional claim that he was denied access to (1) the affidavit in support of the
search warrant, or (2) the court, in general.77 First, the Court explained there is no clearly
established constitutional right to access affidavits in support of search warrants, and thus
Gegenheimer would be entitled to qualified immunity on any such claim.78 The Order also
concluded that Plaintiff failed to plead a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right to access the
courts. The Order explained that:
[T]he right of access is “implicated where the ability to file suit was delayed, or
blocked altogether.” As long as the plaintiff is able to file suit, the right of access
is not abridged.
A claim that an individual has been unconstitutionally deprived of his right of
76 Rec. Doc. 21 at 34; See Wilson v. Dallas Cty. Hosp. Dist., 715 Fed. App’x. 319, 323 (5th Cir. 2017).
77 Rec. Doc. 21 at 38.
78 Id.
15
access to the courts requires a showing of actual injury. A plaintiff “must be able
to show that [he has] suffered some cognizable legal prejudice or detriment as a
result of the defendant’s actions.” Because the right to access to the courts “rest[s]
on the recognition that the right is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which
a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court . . . the underlying
cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in
the complaint.”
Access-to-court claims are categorized as either a forward-looking claim or a
backward-looking claim. A plaintiff asserts a forward-looking claim when he
alleges “that systemic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in
preparing and filing suits at the present time,” while a plaintiff asserts a backward-
looking claim when he alleges that an official action has “caused the loss or
inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, the loss of an opportunity to sue, or the
loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.”
The Court then ruled that Plaintiff has “not alleged prejudice or actual injury as a result of
Gegenheimer’s actions.”79 Because Plaintiff “does not assert that [Gegenheimer’s failure to
maintain the affidavit] denied [Plaintiff] access to the court,” the Court found that Gegenheimer
was entitled to qualified immunity.80 However, short of granting the motion to dismiss, the Court
granted Plaintiff leave to file a Rule 7(a)(7) reply.81 Plaintiff has since amended the Complaint
and filed a Rule 7(a)(7) reply.82
Gegenheimer now asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity because “nowhere in his
newly asserted allegations does Plaintiff allege that he has suffered any prejudice or actual injury
79 Id. at 42.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 42–43.
82 Rec. Docs. 23, 24.
16
as a result of [Gegenheimer’s] actions.”83 Furthermore, Gegenheimer argues that Plaintiff has
“presented no facts, nor attempted to obtain facts through discovery, to support the notion that he
has suffered actual injury or prejudice.”84 In response, Plaintiff argues that Gegenheimer’s actions
have damaged him.85 Plaintiff asserts that he has incurred legal fees in attempting to locate the
warrant application through public record requests.86 He also argues that he is injured because,
without an original copy of the application, “the parties will never truly know if [the copy
submitted by Lopinto] is the authentic document submitted to the court.”87 Lastly, Plaintiff asserts
that he is deprived of the right to view an “above-reproach, unaltered order that deprived him of
his fundamental rights.”88
These assertions are plainly insufficient to defeat summary judgment. A party opposing a
motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its
pleadings.”89 The nonmovant has the burden to “identify specific evidence in the summary
judgment record.”90 However, “only evidence—not argument, not facts in the complaint—will
83 Rec. Doc. 54–1 at 7.
84 Id. at 8.
85 Rec. Doc. 60 at 11.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Morris, 144 F.3d at 380
90 Forsyth, 18 F.3d at 1533
17
satisfy the burden.”91 Plaintiff offers no evidence of prejudice or actual injury regarding Plaintiff’s
access to court. Indeed, attached to Plaintiff’s opposition is the very affidavit that Plaintiff argues
that he was denied access to due to Gegenheimer’s conduct.92 Plaintiff now appears to argue that
he cannot be sure that this copy of the affidavit is authentic, and claims that this “potentially
unreliable document” “potentially deprives” him of his rights.93 However, Plaintiff fails to offer
any evidence to this effect, and indeed notes that “there is no appearance of alteration” to the
affidavit.”94 Because Plaintiff has not carried his burden of offering evidence that he suffered
prejudice or actual injury due to Gegenheimer’s conduct, the Court finds that Gegenheimer is
entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
91 Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1994)
92 Plaintiff notes that this copy of the warrant application was provided by Defendant Lopinto in discovery.
93 Rec. Doc. 60 at 11.
94 Id. at 11.
18
Y. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Gegenheimer’s Motion for Summary
Judgment” is GRANTED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 24th day of January, 2022.
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
°° Rec. Doc. 54.
19