The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MANUEL ADAMS, JR. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 20-2794
ROBERT WALKER ET AL. SECTION: “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Keith Moody’s Motion to Dismiss, or
Alternatively for a More Definite Statement, and to Strike (Doc. 17). For the
following reasons the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Manuel Adams, a former Captain with the Harahan Police
Department, brings claims against the City of Harahan, Chief of Police Robert
Walker, and Assistant Chief of Police Keith Moody, alleging that Walker and
Moody targeted him with unfounded and fabricated investigations in an effort
to end his law enforcement career. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Moody concocted a disciplinary investigation into Plaintiff based on falsehoods
and misrepresentations and that Chief Walker intentionally sent the findings
of this investigation to the Jefferson Parish District Attorney to have Plaintiff
placed on the Giglio list, knowing that such placement was permanent and
that it would destroy Plaintiff’s career in law enforcement.
Now before the Court is Defendant Keith Moody’s Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or Alternatively for a More Definite Statement
pursuant to Rule 12(e), and to Strike pursuant to Rule 12(f). Defendants City
of Harahan and Robert Walker previously filed similar Motions to Dismiss, or
for a More Definite Statement, and to Strike (Docs. 4 & 5). Defendant Keith
Moody asserts and adopts all allegations, statements, and legal arguments
brought in the Memoranda filed by the City of Harahan (Doc. 4-1) and Robert
Walker (Doc. 5-1).
In addition, Defendant Moody makes three new arguments. First, Moody
asserts Plaintiff’s § 1983 stigma-plus claim against him should be dismissed
based on his plea of qualified immunity and for failure to allege facts sufficient
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Second, Moody argues
that Plaintiff cannot show that he is entitled to recover punitive damages
against Moody. Third, Moody asserts the inflammatory language used in the
Complaint must be stricken pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
Plaintiff opposes Defendant Moody’s Motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”1 A claim is
“plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”2
A court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw
1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 547 (2007)).
2 Id.
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”3 The court need not, however,
accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.4 To be legally
sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the
plaintiff’s claims are true.5 If it is apparent from the face of the complaint that
an insurmountable bar to relief exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief,
the court must dismiss the claim.6 The court’s review is limited to the
complaint and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are
central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.7
LAW AND ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that after Defendant Moody
filed the present Motion, this Court issued Order and Reasons (Doc. 23)
denying the Motions to Dismiss, or for a More Definite Statement, and to
Strike filed by Defendants City of Harahan and Robert Walker. Thus, for the
reasons articulated in this Court’s prior Order and Reasons, Moody’s Motion is
also denied as to the arguments copied in extenso therein. The present Order
and Reasons addresses the three additional arguments Moody asserts.
I. Section 1983 Stigma Plus Defamation Claim
First, Defendant Moody seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 stigma-plus
claim against him. The Fifth Circuit requires persons bringing § 1983 stigma-
plus claims to show “the infliction of a stigma on the person’s reputation by a
state official” plus “an infringement of some other interest.”8 This Court notes
that, upon review of the Plaintiff’s Complaint, it is unclear precisely which
communications form the basis Plaintiff’s “stigma plus” claim against Moody.
3 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
4 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
5 Id.
6 Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.
7 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
8 Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 935−36 (5th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff’s Opposition to the present Motion focuses on two communications:
(1) the Giglio letter sent to the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s office and
(2) the communications made by Moody to Plaintiff’s military superiors. This
Court will address each communication in turn.
1. The Giglio Letter
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains numerous allegations involving the
“Giglio letter” sent to the office of the Jefferson Parish District Attorney (the
“JPDA”), which informed the JPDA of the results of Plaintiff’s disciplinary
hearing and ultimately led to the JPDA placing Plaintiff on its “Witness
Notification/Giglio list.” The Witness Notification/Giglio list is maintained by
the JPDA in compliance with Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States
where the Supreme Court held that due process requires the prosecution turn
over evidence favorable to the accused and material to his guilt or punishment,
which includes evidence that may be used to impeach the prosecution’s
witnesses, including police officers.9 Plaintiff alleges placement on the Giglio
list is a “death knell” to a career in law enforcement, as a police officer’s
credibility is the hallmark of the profession.
Construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he
seems to be alleging that the false nature of the Giglio letter has permanently
stigmatized him because he was placed on the Giglio list, and as a result his
due process rights were violated because he was deprived of his liberty interest
in his career in law enforcement without adequate process. Thus, this Court
finds that Plaintiff has alleged a stigma-plus claim against Defendant Moody
based on the Giglio letter. Defendant Moody does not present any arguments
9 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972).
for dismissal of Plaintiff’s stigma-plus claim arising out of the Giglio letter.
Accordingly, the claim remains.
2. The Communications to Plaintiff’s Military Superiors
Defendant Moody does move to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 stigma-plus
claim against him to the extent it is based on Moody’s communications with
Plaintiff’s military superiors. Plaintiff’s Complaint includes allegations that
Defendant Moody contacted Plaintiff’s military commander via phone calls,
text messages, and emails and also that he contacted the military base through
its phone number. Plaintiff contends that these communications were made
under the guise of notifying Plaintiff that his disciplinary hearings would be
delayed but that the true intent was to harm Plaintiff’s military career.
Defendant Moody argues the claim is barred by qualified immunity and, even
if it is not, that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support the claim.
a. Dismissal Based on Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”10 “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving it is inapplicable.”11 Courts use a two-prong
test to determine the applicability of qualified immunity to a claim.12 First, the
court must decide whether the facts Plaintiff alleged are a violation of a
statutory or constitutional right.13 Second, the court must decide whether the
10 Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation omitted).
11 Waganfeald v. Gusman, 674 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 2012).
12 Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731 (2011)).
13 Id.
conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the
time of the incident.14
This Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to cite, and this Court is
unaware of, any statutory or constitutional right not to be contacted or have
your commanding officer contacted regarding confirming or reminding of a
pending disciplinary hearing by an outside employer. Further, this Court finds
that even after being put on notice of Defendant’s qualified immunity defense,
Plaintiff still failed to allege any statutory or constitutional right that
Defendant violated by contacting Plaintiff’s military superiors. Indeed,
Plaintiff’s Opposition to the present Motion simply rephrased the allegations
from his Complaint—that Defendant Moody contacting Plaintiff’s superiors
was not to remind Plaintiff of his pending disciplinary hearing, but that it was
to cause damage to Plaintiff’s military career. Even accepting that allegation
as true, this Court finds that Defendant Moody is entitled to qualified
immunity because Plaintiff failed not only to allege the violation of a
constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time of
Moody’s actions but also to allege the violation of any constitutional or
statutory right at all.15 Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff’s stigma-plus claim is
based on Defendant Moody’s contact with Plaintiff’s military superiors, the
claim is barred by qualified immunity and thus dismissed.
14 Id.
15 Out of an abundance of caution and because it is unclear from the Plaintiff’s Complaint
and Opposition to the present Motion, this Court notes that, in the event the alleged
constitutional violation is the alteration of Plaintiff’s liberty interest in his future
advancement in the military (Doc. 1 at 38), the ruling remains the same. “Allegations of
damage to one’s reputation or the impairment of future employment prospects fail to state a
claim of denial of a constitutional right.” State of Tex. v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 390, 392 (5th
Cir. 1995) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233−34 (1995)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
“stigma plus” claim against Moody based on Moody’s contact with Plaintiff’s military
superiors would be dismissed.
b. Dismissal Based on the Facts Alleged
Defendant Moody also seeks dismissal of this stigma-plus claim on the
grounds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim that is plausible on its face based
on the facts alleged. Although this Court dismissed this claim on the basis of
qualified immunity, the Court notes the claim could have been dismissed for
the following reasons as well.
The Fifth Circuit requires persons bringing § 1983 stigma-plus claims to
show “the infliction of a stigma on the person’s reputation by a state official”
plus “an infringement of some other interest.”16 “To satisfy the stigma prong of
the test, the plaintiff must prove that the stigma was caused by a false
communication.”17 Further, the Fifth Circuit “[has] found sufficient stigma
only where a state actor has made concrete, false assertions of wrongdoing on
the part of the plaintiff.”18 Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Moody notifying
Plaintiff’s military superiors of the upcoming disciplinary hearings was a false
assertion. Instead, Plaintiff contends the disciplinary hearings themselves are
the result of falsehoods and misrepresentations made by Moody. This Court
finds that notification of an upcoming disciplinary hearing does not qualify as
a “concrete assertion of wrongdoing.” Consequently, this Court finds that
Plaintiff fails to allege facts that support the finding of a sufficient stigma that
would satisfy the stigma prong of a § 1983 stigma-plus claim. Therefore,
assuming arguendo qualified immunity does not apply, to the extent Plaintiff’s
stigma-plus claim is based on Defendant Moody’s contact with Plaintiff’s
military superiors, the claim would still be dismissed.
16 Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 935−36 (5th Cir. 1995).
17 Id. at 936 (citing Phillips v. Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217, 1221 (5th Cir. 1983)).
18 Id. (citing San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1991)).
II. Punitive Damages Claim
Next, Defendant Moody seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive
damages against him. Under Louisiana law, punitive damages are available
only where expressly authorized by statute.19 Plaintiff fails to provide any
statutory provision that allows the recovery of punitive damages for the state
law claims asserted against Moody. Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s
punitive damage claim against Moody for the Louisiana state law claims is not
plausible on its face, and thus, the claim is dismissed.
As to the § 1983 claims, Defendant Moody argues that there can be no
claim for punitive damages for any claims brought under § 1983 against him
in his official capacity. Though that is true, the stigma-plus claim discussed
herein and asserted in Count 4 of Plaintiff’s Complaint is against Defendant
Moody in his individual capacity.20 Therefore, Defendant’s motion is denied as
moot in regard to the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages for any
claims brought under § 1983 against Defendant in his official capacity.
III. Motion to Strike
Finally, Defendant Moody moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s
Complaint. Pursuant to Rule 12(f), “[t]he court may strike from a pleading . . .
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” “Such
motions are viewed with disfavor because they often are sought by the movant
simply as a dilatory tactic.”21 “To succeed on a motion to strike, the movant
must show that the allegations being challenged are so unrelated as to be
unworthy of any consideration and that their presence in the pleading
19 Albert v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 940 So.2d 620, 622 (La. 2006) (citation omitted).
20 Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 stigma-plus claim against the City of Harahan in Count 5 of the
Complaint, which includes the stigma-plus claims against Defendants Moody and Walker in
their official capacities.
21 Glob. Adr, Inc. v. City of Hammond, No. 03-457, 2003 WL 21146696, at *1 (E.D. La. May
15, 2003).
throughout the proceeding will be prejudicial to the moving party.”22 Further,
“even when technically appropriate and well-founded,” a motion to strike
should not be granted unless the moving party demonstrates prejudice.23
Whether to grant a motion to strike is committed to the trial court’s sound
discretion.24
This Court finds that Defendant has failed to satisfy his burden. First,
Defendant Moody does not seek the dismissal of certain allegations but all
“inflammatory, embarrassing, and insulting language used in the Complaint,
specifically in reference to [him].” Though this Court agrees that some of the
phrases and descriptors Plaintiff uses in his allegations and factual assertions
are offensive and could be prejudicial, Defendant has not shown that those
phrases nor the allegations or factual assertions to which they correspond are
“so unrelated as to be unworthy of any consideration.”25 Further, Plaintiff
argues that the descriptions of Moody are necessary to state his claim against
Chief Walker for negligently hiring Moody. Accordingly, because motions to
strike are generally disfavored and Defendant Moody failed to bear his burden
as the moving party, this Motion to Strike is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.
22 Morehouse v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 9:05-CV-75, 2005 WL 8160875, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
July 14, 2005).
23 Abene v. Jaybar, LLC, 802 F. Supp. 2d 716, 723 (E.D.La.2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted); accord Diesel Specialists, LLC v. MOHAWK TRAVELER M/V, Nos. 09–2843, 11–
1162, 2011 WL 4063350, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2011).
24 Who Dat, Inc. v. Rouse’s Enters., LLC, No. 12–2189, 2013 WL 395477, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan.
31, 2013).
25 Morehouse v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 9:05-CV-75, 2005 WL 8160875, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
July 14, 2005).
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs § 1983 stigma-plus claim against Keith
Moody is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to the extent it is based on
Moody’s communications with Plaintiff's military superiors.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claim for punitive
damages is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the Louisiana state law
claims against Keith Moody.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 9th day of December, 2021.
g TRICHE Lh 5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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