Opinion

Autin v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Nov 17, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.3%

holding the Court of Appeals erred in defining the clearly established right at a high level of generality by saying only that the right to be free of excessive force was clearly established

How later courts described this case

  • holding the Court of Appeals erred in defining the clearly established right at a high level of generality by saying only that the right to be free of excessive force was clearly established
  • applying Heck to prisoner’s Section 1983 challenge to prisoner’s administrative process because it could affect plaintiff’s good time credit
  • concluding that the plaintiff demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact where force was employed after he was handcuffed and shackled on the floor, notwithstanding the officers’ contention that the plaintiff continued resisting
  • permitting the plaintiff to proceed with his excessive force claim because he alleged that he was beaten after he submitted and was already restrained.

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TROY AUTIN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 20-1214

ROBERT GOINGS SGT., ET AL. SECTION “B”(2)

AMENDED ORDER AND REASONS

A previously issued Order and Reasons (Rec. Doc. 76) is hereby

amended to include analysis of the Heck Doctrine defense as to the

newly added defendant Lieutenant Stringer, and to address

defendants’ qualified immunity defense. For the following reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that the subject defenses are not appropriate

for summary judgment disposition to the extent shown below.1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case are laid out in greater detail in the

Order and Reasons denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Rec. Doc. 55) and the Order and Reasons deny defendants’ motion

for reconsideration (Rec. Doc. 76). Those facts are incorporated

here by reference along with the summary judgment standards set

forth in the latter Order and Reasons. As seen below, the ultimate

findings of fact will involve a weighing of disputed evidentiary

materials at a trial on the merits. Our recitation of material

1 This ruling also applies to a second motion for summary judgment filed by

defendants Robert Goings, Jonathan Stringer and Lance Wallace. (Rec. Doc. 64)

factual representations by each side at this summary judgment stage

is not determinative of credibility of any party or witness.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil

damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of

the challenged conduct. Murrell v. Chandler, 277 Fed.Appx. 341,

343 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (citing Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d

116, 120 (5th Cir.1996)). A qualified immunity defense alters the

usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the

plaintiff to show that the defense is not available. See Vann v.

City of Southaven, 884 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hanks

v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017)). The plaintiff cannot

rest on conclusory assertions but must demonstrate genuine issues

of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the official's

conduct. Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, Tex., 564 F.3d 379, 382

(5th Cir.2009) (noting that, to avoid summary judgment on qualified

immunity, a plaintiff need not present absolute proof but must

offer more than mere allegations).

To satisfy this burden and overcome qualified immunity, the

plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test. Morgan v. Swanson, 659

F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011). First, the plaintiff must show “that

the official violated a statutory or constitutional right.” Id.

Second, the plaintiff must show that the right was objectively

unreasonable in light of a clearly established law at the time of

the challenged conduct. Id. It is within the Court’s discretion

to decide which of the two questions should be addressed first.

See Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2017). The

qualified immunity defense does not change the requirement that

the Court view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. This

standard, even on summary judgment, “gives ample room for mistaken

judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.” See Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d

322, 326 (5th Cir.2008). Thus, even if the evidence supports a

conclusion that plaintiff’s rights were violated, qualified

immunity may still be invoked unless “the government official

violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Manis v. Lawson, 585

F.3d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 2009).

i. Clearly Established Law

It is often appropriate to consider the “clearly established

law” question first, as it may make the constitutional violation

question unnecessary to answer. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

224, 237 (2009). Concerning excessive force claims, the right to

be free from excessive force was clearly established. However, we

must also ask whether plaintiff had a clearly established right to

not have the defendants choke, punch, or kick him while he was

restrained and subdued from resisting. See City of Escondido, Cal.

v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (holding the Court of Appeals

erred in defining the clearly established right at a high level of

generality by saying only that the right to be free of excessive

force was clearly established). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly

told courts ... not to define clearly established law at a high

level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)

(quoting City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765,

1775–76 (2015)). “While there does not have to be a case directly

on point, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the

particular [action] beyond debate.... Of course, there can be the

rare obvious case, where the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct

is sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not

address similar circumstances.... But a body of relevant case law

is usually necessary to clearly establish the answer....” D.C. v.

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 581 (2018).

Plaintiff asserts that the defendants are prohibited from

using a qualified immunity defense because the “right to be free

from excessive/unnecessary force [is] clearly established.” Rec.

Doc. 70. In support of his claim, plaintiff relies on highly

generalized language that the Eighth Amendment prohibits prison

officials from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on

prisoners, including excessive force. That generalized argument is

insufficient. See City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct.

500, 503 (2019). Rather, plaintiff should point to existing

precedent that established the unlawfulness of the defendants’

specific actions were beyond debate.

In Bush v. Strain, the Fifth Circuit held that a certain

degree of force by law enforcement is impermissible after an

arrestee had been “restrained and subdued” and “was not resisting

arrest or attempting to flee.” 513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008).

Likewise, in Est. of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo, the Eleventh

Circuit agreed that the law was well established that striking an

unresisting inmate in the head while other officers restrained his

limbs was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 115 F.3d 1388 (8th

Cir. 1997). While these cases are not directly on point, they both

stand for the proposition that an officer’s use of force on an

unresisting inmate or a subdued person violates the Eighth

Amendment. There are material factual differences on whether force

was used by prison guards after plaintiff was restrained from

resisting their attempts to retrieve suspected contraband, i.e.

drugs, or in transporting within the prison.

ii. Violation of a Constitutional Right

To establish the use of excessive force in violation of the

Constitution, a plaintiff must prove: (1) injury, (2) which

resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly

excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly

unreasonable. Elizondo v. Green, 671 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2012).

In the context of an excessive-force claim against prison

officials, the “core judicial inquiry” is “whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).

Force beyond that which is reasonably required to maintain or

restore discipline is “wanton and unnecessary.” Id. at 7, 112 S.Ct.

995. An officer's use of deadly force is not excessive, and thus

no constitutional violation occurs, when the officer reasonably

believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the

officer or to others.” Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, Tex., 564

F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d

404, 416 (5th Cir.2007)).

The first and second elements are satisfied by plaintiff’s

testimony that he incurred broken ribs, two black eyes, a swollen

face, and organ failure as a direct result of allegedly unprovoked

(excessive) beatings by defendants. Rec. Doc. 49 at 9-10; Rec.

Doc. 70 at 10 (stating plaintiff was brought into the lieutenant’s

office, viciously attacked, and then brought to the infirmary for

his injuries). The complaint also alleges the beating “caused”

his injuries. Rec. Doc. 49 at 9. Plaintiff denied resisting

defendants or provoking their use of force, thusly satisfying the

third prong’s requirement that the use of force was clearly

unreasonable. Plaintiff also relies on the deposition testimony of

Keaton Wilson, in which Wilson stated that the defendant Robert

Goings physically assaulted plaintiff while he was cuffed behind

his back and fully restrained. Rec. Doc. 70 at 13; see also Rec.

Doc. 70-6. Plaintiff’s claim for force used after being restrained

survives; however, the claim for force used prior to being

restrained is barred by Heck.

B. Heck Bar Applicability to Defendant Stringer

A claimant who pursues a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must

“(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law.”

Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP V. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257,

260 (5th Cir. 2008); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To determine whether a

genuine issue of material fact exists in a Section 1983 claim, the

court must assess if plaintiff’s claims are barred under Heck v.

Humphrey. Williams v. Lowe, No. 18-916, 2019 WL 1199100, at *2

(E.D.La. March 13, 2019).

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Court held that a plaintiff may not

challenge the constitutionality of his conviction under Section

1983 unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared

invalid or called into question by federal habeas corpus. 512 U.S.

477, 486-87 (1994). “Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in

a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity

of his conviction of sentence[.]” Id. at 487. If so, the action

must be dismissed, “[b]ut if the district court determines that

the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate

the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the

plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.” Id.

If the Heck bar applies, then the court must grant summary

judgment as there are no genuine issues of material fact. Id. A

court’s determination on whether to apply the Heck bar is

“analytical and fact-intensive, requiring [the court] to focus on

whether success on the excessive force claim requires negation of

an element of the criminal offense or proof of a fact that is

inherently inconsistent with one underlying the criminal

conviction.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008).

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has held, “a ‘conviction,’ for

purposes of Heck, includes ruling in a prison disciplinary

proceeding that results in a change to the prisoner’s sentence,

including the loss of good-time credits.” Clarke v. Stalder, 154

F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.

641, 644 (1997) (applying Heck to prisoner’s Section 1983 challenge

to prisoner’s administrative process because it could affect

plaintiff’s good time credit)). However, the Supreme Court

clarified that Heck does not categorically apply to all Section

1983 challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings. Wilkinson v.

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 84 (2005). Instead, Heck may bar a prisoner’s

suit “not because it sought nullification of the disciplinary

procedures but rather because nullification of the disciplinary

procedures would lead necessarily to restoration of good-time

credits and hence the shortening of the prisoner’s sentence.” Id.

For the reasons stated in a previous ruling, the disciplinary

reports shall be admissible as reliable, subject to later

reconsideration of the admissibility of both Goings’ report and

Stringer’s report. See Rec. Doc. 55

In Aucoin v. Cupil, the plaintiff-prisoner at Dixon

Correctional Institute brought claims for excessive force under

Section 1983 against several prison guards and lieutenants. 958

F.3d 379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 567, 208 L. Ed. 2d

183 (2020). Plaintiff claimed defendants assaulted him in his

cell, in the prison lobby, and in the shower. Id. at 381. At a

subsequent disciplinary hearing, plaintiff was found guilty of

defiance, aggravated disobedience, and property destruction for

misconduct in his cell. Id. The district court ultimately dismissed

plaintiff’s claims as barred under the Heck doctrine. Id.

On review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Heck barred the

§ 1983 claim as to the alleged use of force in his cell—but not as

to the alleged use of force in the prison lobby and shower. Aucoin,

958 F.3d at 384. It reasoned that Heck did not bar claims based on

defendants use of excessive force after the plaintiff was subdued.

The circuit found Heck only bars claims in which a plaintiff’s

factual allegations supporting his claim for excessive force are

necessarily inconsistent with the validity of his criminal

conviction. See Id. at 383. Like Autin, Aucoin testified that

defendants’ use of force and violence against him were unprovoked,

and claimed the defendants beat him after he had surrendered. Id.

at 383. The latter claim challenged the exercise of force which is

distinct and isolated from the facts leading to the disciplinary

conviction. Id. at 383-84. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit ruled

that Heck did not bar claims for excessive force resulting from

the defendants’ actions after plaintiff surrendered. Id. at 384.

In Bush v. Strain, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s

allegation that “at no time did [she] resist her arrest” rendered

her excessive force claims barred by Heck for being inapposite to

the factual basis of her criminal proceeding. 513 F.3d 492, 498

(5th Cir. 2008). Although the court acknowledged, “if we were to

take this statement at face value, we might agree with the

defendants,” it ultimately determined that the statement taken in

context with other evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff was

subject to excessive force after she was restrained. Id. at 499.

Upon reversing summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit noted that the

lower court made no findings on how long the plaintiff’s resistance

lasted or the cause of her injuries – both of which the Fifth

Circuit deemed were material facts that were pertinent to her

claim. Id.

The instant action is analogous to Bush and Aucoin, discussed

supra. Like the plaintiff in Aucoin, this plaintiff also pled

excessive force claims against several correctional officers for

their actions allegedly done to the plaintiff both before and after

he was restrained. Plaintiff alleges that defendants used force

against him to subdue him and used excessive force after he was

restrained. Specifically, Autin asserted that Lt. Stringer “kept

his foot on [plaintiff’s] head” while he was restrained on the

floor of the Lieutenant’s office. During the incident on the sun

walk, he alleged that while handcuffed Sgt. Wallace came from the

sun unit and “began kicking Autin in his ribs in the left side.”

Plaintiff also alleged that both Sgt. Wallace and Lt. Stringer

“viciously stomped on [him]” while he was subdued on the ground.

Plaintiff’s claim that he was wholly blameless for the use of

force against him are in direct conflict with his disciplinary

convictions. The disciplinary ruling upheld the initial use of

force to extract suspected contraband from plaintiff. Thus, a

ruling by this Court of excessive force as to the incident leading

up to the plaintiff’s restraint would ultimately negate his

disciplinary conviction. This is precisely the type of claim Heck

seeks to bar and must be dismissed.

However, plaintiff’s excessive force claims based on actions

that occurred after he was restrained and handcuffed are outside

the realm of facts that led to his criminal conviction. See Bourne

v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2019) (permitting the

plaintiff to proceed with his excessive force claim because he

alleged that he was beaten after he submitted and was already

restrained.) These claims are “distinct” from the basis of his

disciplinary conviction because a finding of excessive force would

not negate the prison's finding that Autin violated its policies

and was subject to disciplinary action as a result. As in Bush,

plaintiff challenges the exercise of force that is isolated from

the facts forming the basis for his disciplinary conviction. As a

result, “the factual basis for the conviction is temporally and

conceptually distinct from the excessive force claim[s];” and

thus, the Heck bar is inapplicable.

Regarding plaintiff’s excessive force claims that are not

barred under Heck, plaintiff asserts that he did not resist the

officers after being restrained; and instead, the defendants

(including Lt. Stringer) attacked him for no reason. See Rec. Doc.

64-1 at 16; see also Rec. Doc. 70 at 11-12. The defendants,

however, allege that Autin “continued to resist [during the sun

walk] by jerking his body back and forth and kicking the officers.”

Rec. Doc. 64-1 at 16. The defendants also assert that plaintiff

continued to “physically resist” after being restrained in the

lieutenant’s office and “refused to comply” with their orders.

Rec. Doc. 64-1 at 4. Because genuine issues of material fact exist

as to whether the use of force was appropriate after plaintiff was

restrained, summary disposition under Heck is not appropriate. See

Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 492 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding

that the plaintiff demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact

where force was employed after he was handcuffed and shackled on

the floor, notwithstanding the officers’ contention that the

plaintiff continued resisting); Preston v. Hicks, 721 F. App'x

342, 345 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that the plaintiff alleged facts

sufficient to state an excessive-force claim, despite medical

documentation indicating that his injuries might not have been

that severe, where the prison guard twisted the plaintiff's right

arm while he was “face down on the ground”). Accordingly, the

defendant Stringer is not entitled to summary judgment relief under

the Heck doctrine.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 16th day of November, 2021

___________________________________

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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