noting that, instead of Rule 12(f), “the parties can agree to file an early summary judgment motion without the need for full 6 discovery.”
How later courts described this case
- noting that, instead of Rule 12(f), “the parties can agree to file an early summary judgment motion without the need for full 6 discovery.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KERI TURNER CIVIL ACTION
v. NO. 21-664
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE SECTION "F"
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM, ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Keri Turner’s motion to strike the
defendants’ first and second affirmative defenses invoking
qualified immunity and sovereign immunity. For the reasons that
follow, the motion is DENIED as moot.
Background
This litigation arises from a former tenured associate
professor’s claims that Nicholls State University Vice President
and the Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System
forced her to retire and failed to accommodate her disability in
retaliation for taking leave and filing a complaint for disability
discrimination.
For 20 years, Dr. Turner was a tenured Associate Professor of
English Languages and Literature and a grant writer for Nicholls
1
State University in Thibodaux, Louisiana.1 In 2010, she was
diagnosed with Irritable Bowel Syndrome, which interfered with her
ability to concentrate, leave her house, and be in public places.2
Early in the Fall semester of 2017, Dr. Turner’s IBS symptoms
increased in frequency, but she was nevertheless able to fulfill
her instructional and administrative tasks in a satisfactory
manner. By Spring 2018, her symptoms progressed, and Dr. Turner
to sick leave. Her occasional absence from the classroom and from
her administrative duties placed additional responsibilities on
Dr. Ellen Barker, the Chair of the English Department. Dr. Barker
denied Dr. Turner’s request to teach remotely and removed Dr.
Turner from her on-campus courses. Nicholls State Vice President
and Direct of Human Resources, Steven H. Kenny, Jr., then informed
Dr. Turner that she would lose her job if she did not take FMLA
leave.
In August 2018, Dr. Barker recommended that Dr. Turner be
terminated, in part because of her inability to attend and conduct
in-person classes. The true reason Dr. Barker wished to terminate
Dr. Turner, it is alleged, was because Dr. Turner’s occasional
1 The Court takes as true the allegations of the amended complaint
for the purposes of the pending motion.
2 IBS symptoms include, among others, sudden onset of diarrhea,
unexplained and unexpected vomiting, difficulty swallowing, and
anemia.
2
absences from the classroom and her request to teach online classes
created administrative burdens for Dr. Barker. Dr. Turner appealed
to the University Tenure Revocation Committee, and a hearing was
held in February 2019. The Committee voted 4-2 to reject Dr.
Barker’s dismissal recommendation and the Committee recommended
that Dr. Turner teach only online courses.
The next month, with the requisite ADA paperwork from her
treating physician in hand, Dr. Turner requested accommodation for
her IBS disability to Mr. Kenny; specifically, her doctor supported
her request to teach only online courses for Fall 2019 and Spring
2020. Mr. Kenny denied Dr. Turner’s request. Allowing her to
teach from home would work an “undue hardship” on the University,
he said in May 2019. Mr. Kenny also refused to permit Dr. Turner
to take intermittent leave under the FMLA; instead, he required
that each medical absence must be separately excused and separately
accompanied by an excuse signed by a healthcare professional. Mr.
Kenny offered that assigned classrooms would be located in close
proximity to a restroom.
On June 21, 2019, Dr. Turner filed an EEOC complaint against
Nicholls State, charging disability discrimination. Meanwhile,
Dr. Turner returned to the classroom to teach the Fall 2019
semester, but she increasingly suffered IBS flareups, causing her
3
to take sick leave. On September 14, 2019, Dr. Turner’s EEOC
Charge was sent to Nicholls State University for their response.
Two weeks later, Dr. Turner was in class preparing to take roll
when she was called into the hallway by an assistant dean. The
assistant dean ordered her to leave the classroom immediately and
dismissed Dr. Turner’s class. Dr. Turner was ordered to meet with
the University President that morning at 9:00 a.m., at which time
President Jay Clune forbade Dr. Turner from teaching and reassigned
her to 25 hours of tutoring in the writing center and 15 hours or
research in her office. Clune demanded that Dr. Turner either
resign or be terminated on the spot. Dr. Turner opted to resign;
she wrote the resignation letter, informing the University of her
intention to retire at the end of the 2019-20 academic year. The
University acknowledged the letter and acknowledged her right to
rescind her retirement at any time.
Dr. Turner alleges that the meeting and ultimatum was
retaliatory. She alleges that her physicians have determined that
the University’s refusal to accommodate her medical needs put her
health at risk. Just 58 years old, Dr. Turner was not willing to
retire. She had not yet saved enough or contributed sufficient
funds to her Teachers Retirement System of Louisiana account to do
so comfortably.
4
For the remainder of the 2019-20 academic year, Dr. Turner
attempted to appeal this outcome as she continued to seek
accommodation for her IBS and be returned to teaching. But her
continued efforts were thwarted by the University administration.
On May 15, 2020, convinced that the University would not
accommodate her disability, Dr. Turner retired.
Dr. Turner sued the Board of Supervisors of the University of
Louisiana System and Steven H. Kenny, Jr. in state court, alleging
that the defendants violated her rights under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, et seq. and that they violated
her rights under the Louisiana Handicap Discrimination law,
La.R.S. 23:301, et seq. for failure to accommodate and for
retaliation.3 Invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction,
the defendants removed the lawsuit to this Court. The defendants
promptly answered the complaint and the Court issued a scheduling
order. On July 23, 2021, the defendants filed an unopposed request
for leave to file an amended answer and affirmative defenses (among
the defenses advanced, the defendants invoked sovereign immunity
and qualified immunity) with a jury demand; the motion was granted.
On August 16, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting leave
to file an amended complaint; the unopposed motion was granted.
3 Her whistleblower claim was later withdrawn when she filed an
amended complaint.
5
The plaintiff now moves to strike the defendants’ first and second
affirmative defenses invoking qualified and sovereign immunity.
I.
Rule 12(f) allows the Court to strike “from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.” A motion to strike is disfavored, “a drastic
remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of
justice.” Augustus v. Bd. Of Pub. Instruction of Escambia Cnty,
Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962)(quoting Brown v. Williamson
Tobacco Corp v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)).
“Even when technically appropriate and well-founded, motions to
strike are not [to] be granted in the absence of a showing of
prejudice to the moving party.” Abene v. Jaybar, LLC, 802 F. Supp.
2d 716, 723 (E.D. La. 2011)(Fallon, J.)(quoting 5C Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1381
(3d ed. 2004)).
Given the “insufficient defense” language of the Rule, “a
plaintiff desiring early resolution of an affirmative defense may
[invoke Rule 12(f)] to strike it[.]” C&C Inv. Properties, L.L.C.
v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 838 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2016)(noting
that, instead of Rule 12(f), “the parties can agree to file an
early summary judgment motion without the need for full
6
discovery.”). To prevail on a motion to strike an affirmative
defense, a party must show that the affirmative defense is
“insufficient as a matter of law.” Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales,
Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057-58 (5th Cir.
1982).
II.
The plaintiff moves to strike the defendants’ fist and second
affirmative defenses invoking qualified immunity and sovereign
immunity. The plaintiff contends that the defendant Board
voluntarily subjected itself to the jurisdiction of this Court,
thus waiving the defense of sovereign immunity, and further
contends that Mr. Kenny cannot raise the defense of qualified
immunity as to the plaintiff’s FMLA claims because he is considered
the “employer” for FMLA purposes. The defendants counter that the
plaintiff’s recently-filed amended complaint renders their
original Answer an inoperable pleading, thereby mooting the
plaintiff’s motion to strike it. If the defendants reassert these
challenged defenses in their amended answer, then that is the
appropriate time for the plaintiff to challenge them.
Additionally, the defendants submit that motions to strike are
highly disfavored such that where, as here, questions of law and
fact are presented, striking a pleading is premature and improper;
7
resolution of the sufficiency of such defenses would be more
reasonably addressed on the merits. The Court agrees.
The plaintiff has amended her complaint and the defendants
are now entitled and required to answer or otherwise respond to
the operative complaint.* For this reason alone, the plaintiff’s
request is moot. If the defendants advance the same affirmative
defenses in their amended answer, and the plaintiff seeks to
challenge those defenses again, the plaintiff should be mindful
that motions to strike are disfavored and any renewed challenge
should include supported reasons for why the defenses are
insufficient as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED as moot.
New Orleans, Louisiana, September 13, 2021
Mes ie ( Lua
MARTIN . C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4 In light of Hurricane Ida and its aftermath, the Court’s General
Order 21-12 automatically has extended the defendants’ responsive
pleading deadline.