The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TIFFINI WOODWARD CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 18-4236
SHERIFF JOSEPH P. LOPINTO, ET SECTION: "S" (4)
AL
ORDER AND REASONS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 144)
filed by defendants, CorrectHealth Jefferson, LLC ("CorrectHealth"), Ironshore Specialty
Insurance Company, Michelle Becnel, Vonzelle Gabriel, and Margaret Armant (collectively
"defendants"), is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff's claims brought on behalf of her minor child,
LW, are DISMISSED, and plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief and declaratory relief are
DISMISSED as to CorrectHealth, Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company, Michelle Becnel,
Vonzelle Gabriel, and Margaret Armant. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding
Deliberate Indifference (Rec. Doc. 147) filed by defendants is GRANTED in part, and the
claims against Vonzelle Gabriel and Margaret Armant are DISMISSED. In all other respects,
the motion is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding
Punitive Damages (Rec. Doc. 145) filed by defendants is GRANTED in part, and plaintiff's
claim for punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress is DISMISSED. The
motion is DENIED as to Nurse Becnel. With respect to CorrectHealth, the motion is
PRETERMITTED pending the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Moore v.
LaSalle Corr., Inc., No. 20-30739 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2020);
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Liability (Rec. Doc. 148) filed by plaintiff is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
In this case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff alleges her Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated by defendants' deliberate indifference to her serious medical
needs while incarcerated, resulting in her labor and the delivery of her son in her prison cell
toilet. Defendant CorrectHealth contracts with the Jefferson Parish sheriff's Office to provide
medical care to persons housed in the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, Ironshore Specialty
Insurance Company is its insurer, and nurses Becnel, Gabriel, and Armant are CorrectHealth
employees.
On May 22, 2017, plaintiff Tiffini Woodward, then eight months pregnant, was taken to
Jefferson Parish Correctional Center (“JPCC”) after testing positive for heroin, in violation of
her parole. At intake it was noted that she was pregnant and a drug user, and she was referred to
the infirmary. Staff at JPCC placed her in a cell and issued her a double mattress, double food
portions, prenatal vitamins, and Tylenol 3 times daily.
The next day, May 23, 2017, Woodward complained that she was bleeding. She was
taken to Tulane Lakeview Hospital for evaluation and treatment. Woodward was treated by Dr.
Cecelia Gambala, a specialist in obstetrics and maternal fetal medicine, and residents under her
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supervision. After observing Woodward for two days, Gambala determined she was not at a high
risk of having a precipitous delivery and discharged her to JPCC the afternoon of May 25. The
discharge report recommended that Woodward receive multiple medications and recommended
follow up appointments related to her pregnancy. The discharge report noted that, on her third
day in the hospital, there were “[n]o signs or symptoms of preeclampsia.”
Upon returning to JPCC, Woodward was booked into the same cell. Around 5:00 p.m.,
Woodward reported that she was bleeding and at around 6:00 p.m., she was given a pad by
Nurse Vonzelle Gabriel. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Woodward reported bleeding again, and,
having flushed the pad, was given another pad to verify the bleeding. Starting at approximately
10:45 p.m.,Woodward reported that she was experiencing contractions. She reported them as
worsening over the next 15 minutes, and at approximately 11:00 p.m., Nurse Michelle Becnel
took Woodward’s vitals. Becnel noted in Woodward’s chart that she did not see any “S/S” (signs
or symptoms) of pre-labor conditions, told Woodward to wear a sanitary pad, and told her to
keep her abreast of signs and symptoms. The JPCC logbook from around that time indicates that
Becnel told Woodward that she was having Braxton Hicks contractions, i.e., false labor.
However, Woodward has testified that Becnel cursed her, and alleges that at some point during
either the night of the 25th or the early morning of the 26th, after telling Becnel that she felt
really bad, Becnel told her to “Shut the f*** up. Go back to your corner.” There are no
documented interactions after 11:00 p.m. Becnel never called the treating physician. However,
Woodward alleges that she was complaining of stomach pain and vaginal pain at least every 20
minutes, banging on the door throughout the night, and screaming in anguish, although there is
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no sworn testimony on this point.
At 7:50 on the morning of May 26, shortly after Nurse Armant came on duty, Woodward
reported she was bleeding and in pain, and the physician’s assistant was called and it was
reported she would arrive in half an hour. Just before 8:30 a.m. Woodward reported that she was
having contractions every five minutes. Soon after, Woodward reported that she was having her
baby. Woodward testified that she was yelling for help, eventually went to the toilet in her cell,
pushed, and delivered her baby into the toilet. She said that the baby hit the toilet, went in to the
water, and flipped back up with the umbilical cord around his neck and was not making any
noise, and she thought he was dead.
It is unclear how long after Woodward delivered her baby that deputies and
CorrectHealth staff entered the cell to address the situation, though Woodward claims it took
them 15 minutes. Woodward testified that a deputy picked the baby out of the toilet. Around
8:40 a.m. Woodward and her child were taken to Ochsner Westbank where she eventually
delivered the placenta, having a seizure in the process, and both she and her child received
treatment.
From August 2017 to May 2018 Woodward was out of prison, and during that time she
received drug treatment counseling, including group therapy at Addiction Recovery in Metairie,
where she discussed the incident. She was subsequently arrested on other charges and pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to commit armed robbery. At the time of Woodward’s deposition, in
October 2019, she was waiting to be evaluated for mental health treatment at CrescentCare.
According to Woodward, she has recurring nightmares about the incident and is scared to allow
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her son near water, even to take a shower.
Woodward filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging claims under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments for deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs, as well as state
law causes of action for negligence and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
She also seeks punitive damages.
Defendants have filed three motions for summary judgment. In the motions, defendants
argue that plaintiff cannot succeed on her § 1983 claims because she cannot establish deliberate
indifference by either the individual nurses or CorrectHealth, and that she cannot establish that
she or her son sustained substantial harm caused by defendants' acts or omissions. Defendants
further argue that plaintiff did not experience emotional distress severe enough to establish
intentional infliction of emotion distress, and that punitive damages are not recoverable from the
moving defendants. Defendants also contend that plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive or
declaratory relief. Woodward opposes the motions, and has filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on liability against CorrectHealth, arguing that CorrectHealth's policies were the
moving force behind the harm suffered by Woodward.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Granting a motion for summary
judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file,
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and affidavits filed in support of the motion demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The court must find “[a]
factual dispute . . . [to be] 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] 'material' if it might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law.” Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882
F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. 242 (1986)).
If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue,
the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue
for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The non-movant cannot satisfy the
summary judgment burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a
scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
If the opposing party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party does not have
to submit evidentiary documents properly to support its motion, but need only point out the
absence of evidence supporting the essential elements of the opposing party’s case. Saunders v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991).
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code permits a plaintiff to bring a cause of
action against a state actor for a violation of her constitutional rights. Healthcare professionals
under contract with a prison to provide medical care to prisoners are considered state actors
because their actions in providing medical care to prisoners are fairly attributable to the state.
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Bishop v. Karney, 408 F. App'x 846, 848 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250,
2255-56, 2258-60 (1988)). "[P]retrial detainees have a constitutional right, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to have their serious medical needs met with
deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials." Thompson v. Upshur Cty., TX, 245
F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). While such
claims by pretrial detainees “sound in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,”
they “are analyzed under the same rubric as Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners.”
Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2013).
Section 1983 constitutional claims alleged by pretrial detainees arise from either episodic
acts or omissions of individual officials, or from the general conditions of confinement in the jail
or prison. See Shepherd v. Dall. Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009). A case is an episodic
act or omission case if the plaintiff's allegations are against specific jail officials, pointing to a
municipal policy or custom that caused those actions. See id.; Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hous.,
185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999). A conditions of confinement case “occurs when a
constitutional attack is made on the 'general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial
confinement.' A condition is usually the manifestation of an explicit policy or restriction, such
as the number of bunks per cell, mail privileges, disciplinary segregation, etc.” Brown v. Bolin,
500 F. App'x 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 644
(5th Cir. 1996) (other citations omitted)).
Here, plaintiff's complaint does not specify whether it is brought as an episodic act claim
or a conditions of confinement claim. Plaintiff makes arguments regarding both individual acts
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flowing from policies as well as a pattern of deficiencies in the JPCC. However, the Fifth
Circuit, in declining to permit a plaintiff to proceed under both theories, found that "when [an
official's] actions were interposed between the county and the decedent, it [is] clear that the case
was one for an episodic act or omission."Anderson v. Dallas Cty. Texas, 286 F. App'x 850, 858
(5th Cir. 2008) (citing Flores v. Cty. of Hardeman, Tex., 124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997). In
this case, while plaintiff alleges a pattern of deficiencies, her claim arises from the alleged
actions of the nurses, state actors interposed between plaintiff and CorrectHealth. Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit has also determined that a "complaint [which] turns on [jail officials'] alleged
failure to take better care of her, and [a jail official's] failure to medically screen her and secure
her to treatment . . . . perfectly fits the definition of the episodic omission." Olabisiomotosho,
185 F.3d at 526. Accordingly, the court analyzes this case as an episodic act or omissions claim.
To establish a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs:
The prisoner must first prove objective exposure to a substantial risk of serious
harm—in other words, the prisoner must prove a serious medical need. Second,
the prisoner must prove the officials' subjective knowledge of this substantial risk.
Third, the prisoner must prove that the officials, despite their actual knowledge of
the substantial risk, denied or delayed the prisoner's medical treatment. Finally,
the prisoner must prove that the delay in or denial of medical treatment resulted in
substantial harm, such as suffering additional pain.
Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 2019).
The parties do not seriously dispute that labor and delivery constitutes a serious need.
While “the general condition of being pregnant does not necessarily constitute a serious medical
need at any given moment in time during incarceration” . . . . when it progresses to labor, it does.
Preston v. Cty. of Macomb, 2019 WL 9899918, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2019) (collecting
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cases); see also, Bingham v. Webster Cty., (N.D. Miss. Oct. 1, 2007) (denying summary
judgment on claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs where prison staff had
knowledge of plaintiff's pregnancy, that she was bleeding and in pain, and waited 21 hours to act
on that knowledge).
In a case where the plaintiff alleges a denial of medical care, a plaintiff can demonstrate
deliberate indifference by showing that a prison official "refused to treat [her], ignored [her]
complaints, intentionally treated [her] incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would
clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs." Alderson v. Concordia Par.
Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted).
1. Claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs by nurses
To prevail on her § 1983 claim as to the nurses, plaintiff must demonstrate the nurses'
subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm, and that despite their actual
knowledge of the substantial risk, they denied or delayed medical treatment to plaintiff.
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on this issue, because
plaintiff is required to prove that defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of pre-
term labor and precipitous delivery, which defendants argue she cannot do. In support, they note
that on intake, plaintiff was noted as pregnant, and when she began bleeding she was referred to
a maternal fetal medicine specialist, and re-admitted to JPCC after it had been determined she
was not in labor, and preeclampsia was ruled out. Defendants have submitted the expert
testimony of board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist, Dr. Kathleen T. Sullivan, that
Woodward was appropriately screened at intake, and once re-admitted, was appropriately
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monitored, based on entries in JPCC logbooks and CorrectHealth's medical records. Dr. Sullivan
further opines that the delivery was precipitous, and completely unexpected by all concerned.
Thus, defendants contend they cannot be charged with subjective knowledge that plaintiff was at
risk for the premature labor and precipitous delivery that ensued.
This argument is premised on a mischaracterization of plaintiff's position. Woodward
does not argue that the defendants knew she was at risk of pre-term labor and a subsequent
precipitous delivery, and failed to respond appropriately. Rather, she contends that
notwithstanding her risk profile upon re-admission to JPCC, following her subsequent onset of
labor, which she reported to the staff and which the staff should have recognized, and following
repeated requests for help, defendants did not take steps to ensure she did not deliver the baby in
her cell, and experience the resulting unnecessary pain, traumatic delivery into a toilet, delayed
delivery of the placenta, and a resulting seizure. Thus, the issue is not whether defendants knew
that plaintiff was at risk for premature labor and precipitous delivery, but whether plaintiff can
establish that once labor commenced, the nurses, despite their knowledge of it, denied or delayed
medical treatment.
It is undisputed that when plaintiff reported bleeding to Nurse Gabriel, she responded by
appropriately monitoring her condition. With respect to Nurse Armant, the record reflects that
she checked on Woodward shortly after arriving for her shift, and at 7:50 a.m., upon learning of
plaintiff's complaint of contractions, she assessed plaintiff, noted blood, and notified the
physician's assistant. She followed-up with a second notice to the physician's assistant when she
had not arrived after 30 minutes. On this record, the court finds no evidence that Gabriel or
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Armant responded with deliberate indifference. Gabriel was appropriately monitoring to see if
and how much Woodward was bleeding; Armant determined there were active labor signs and
appropriately contacted the physician's assistant. Accordingly, Gabriel and Armant are entitled to
summary judgment on the § 1983 claims against them.
However, there is a fact dispute as to what occurred on Becnel's shift over the night of
May 25th and into the morning of May 26th. While the medical and JPCC records reflect no
interactions between around 11:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., plaintiff alleges that she begged for help
for hours, and testified that Becnel cursed her. A late entry in the JPCC log also lists, without
specifying a time, that Woodward reported bleeding and contractions. There is also a
discrepancy in that the prison log books reflect that Nurse Becnel diagnosed plaintiff with
Braxton Hicks false labor contractions at 11:00 p.m., suggesting that Becnel had noted some
contractions, but Becnel disputes that she made such a diagnosis.
Because a jury could conclude from these disputed facts that Becnel responded with
deliberate indifference to Woodward's serious medical needs, summary judgment is not
appropriate.
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2. Section 1983 claims against CorrectHealth
Plaintiff has also sued CorrectHealth for a violation of her constitutional rights. “The test
to determine liability for a private prison-management corporation under § 1983 is more or less
identical to the test employed to determine municipal or local government liability.” Alfred v.
Corr. Corp., 2009 WL 789649, at *2, n.1 (W.D. La. Mar. 24, 2009) (citing Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (other citations omitted)). Thus, to establish
CorrectHealth's liability under § 1983, Woodward must prove the existence of a policymaker, an
official policy, and a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights for which the moving force
was the policy or custom. See Duvall v. Dall. Cnty., Tex., 631 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir. 2011);
Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). The requirement of a
policymaker, an official policy, and the ‘moving force’ of the policy, serve to distinguish
individual violations by government healthcare contractor employees from those that can be
fairly considered actions of the government health contractor itself. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578.
In this case, plaintiff argues that CorrectHealth has the following policies that were the
moving force behind her traumatic labor and delivery: a policy and custom not to train its nurses
to detect labor or deliver babies; a policy and custom not to equip the infirmary to monitor labor
for pregnant arrestees; a policy and custom to not hire professionals with the ability to provide
prenatal care and deliver babies; and a policy and custom of excluding labor or childbirth from
its quality review process.
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CorrectHealth argues that its policy regarding pregnant women conforms to the relevant
and applicable accreditation standard, which meets or exceeds the constitutional minimum. The
policy provides:
When the patient exhibits signs and symptoms suggestive of active labor, the
healthcare staff will notify the on-call provider for instructions. If it is determined
that the patient is in labor, she will be transported via EMS to the delivering
hospital for evaluation. The healthcare staff will contact the labor & Delivery
staff to provide a patient report.
CorrectHealth Jefferson Policy & Procedure: Counseling and Care of the Pregnant Inmate, Rec.
Doc. 149-9, p. 2, ¶16.
The foregoing reflects that it is CorrectHealth's policy to transport to a hospital all
pregnant women showing signs of active labor. While there is nothing facially unconstitutional
about this policy, implicit in it is an obligation to train staff to detect the signs and symptoms of
labor, to hire professionals capable of detecting labor, to equip the JPCC facility to monitor for
the onset of labor, and to staff the facility adequately to undertake this task.
a. Failure to train
“An inadequate training program or a failure to train 'may serve as the basis for § 1983
liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the
persons with whom the [county officials] come into contact.'” Shepard v. Hansford Cnty., 110 F.
Supp. 3d 696, 716 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989)). To prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must establish that "(1) the training procedures
of the policymaker were inadequate; (2) the policymaker was deliberately indifferent in adopting
the training policy; and (3) the inadequate training policy directly caused the plaintiff's injury."
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Id. (citing Huong v. City of Port Arthur, 961 F. Supp. 1003, 1007 (E.D. Tex.1997) (citing Baker
v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 200 (5th Cir.1996)). To satisfy the deliberate indifference requirement in
connection with a failure to train claim, plaintiff must show that “the need for more or different
training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in violations of constitutional rights,
that the policymakers ... can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need.” Id. (quoting Benavides v. Cnty. of Wilson, 955 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).
In this case, the summary judgment evidence presented by plaintiff reflects that there was
no training regarding detection of labor. Plaintiff has provided the expert report of Dr. Homer
Venters. His report concludes that there was a gross failure by CorrectHealth and Jefferson
Parish Sheriff's Office to properly train, supervise and monitor conditions of health services in
JPCC, including an absence of training on how to detect and report symptoms of active labor. In
so concluding, Dr. Venters relied upon the testimony of Nurse Becnel that she had had some
obstetrics training in her initial orientation in 2005 or 2006, and that she was unaware of any
policy that indicated when she should check fetal heart rate, how to employ an OB/GYN kit that
was present in the infirmary, and under what circumstances it should be used. Further, the
30(b)(6) deposition of Jean Llovet, CorrectHealth's corporate representative, reflects that
CorrectHealth didn't provide training on detection of labor.
On the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could conclude that CorrectHealth's failure
to train its staff on how to detect labor is a policy that amounted to deliberate indifference that
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was the moving force for the harm suffered by plaintiff. Accordingly, summary judgment is not
appropriate on this claim.
b. Inadequate exam rooms and understaffing
Plaintiff also argues that inadequate exam rooms and understaffing reflect actionable
policy failures. However, no proof has been submitted that these alleged failures were a moving
force of plaintiff's harm. There is no evidence that had a larger exam room been available, Nurse
Becnel would have conducted an earlier examination and referred Woodward out sooner, and
avoided her delivery in the cell toilet. Likewise, there is no evidence that competing work
obligations prevented Becnel from attending and referring Woodward. To the contrary, while
there was a brief delay of 15 minutes or so in examining Woodward after the 11:00 p.m. call, the
logbook entries reflect a quiet night without numerous duties being imposed on Becnel. Thus,
inadequate exam rooms and understaffing do not provide a basis for CorrectHealth's liability to
plaintiff.
c. Quality improvement process failures
Plaintiff also alleges a policy failure in that CorrectHealth did not adequately address
pregnancy-related issues in its quality improvement process. Plaintiff argues that had
CorrectHealth focused on pregnancy in its quality improvement process, the other failures would
have been identified and cured, sparing her the traumatic labor and delivery. While the failure to
focus on pregnancy-related issues in its quality improvement process may have brought to light
the failure to train, to be considered the "moving force" for plaintiff's injuries, the fact-finder
would have to conclude that if CorrectHealth conducted a certain type of review, it would
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necessarily have reached specific conclusions that would trigger it to act in a way that would
have avoided plaintiff's harm. This chain of events is too attenuated to be considered a moving
force. However, the court finds that evidence regarding the quality improvement process is
relevant to establishing whether CorrectHealth's failure to train was the result of deliberate
indifference.
3. Medical causation of substantial harm
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff
cannot establish that she or her son sustained substantial harm.
a. Harm suffered by plaintiff
Defendants argue both that the plaintiff did not experience substantial harm,1 and that
because she has not submitted expert testimony, plaintiff cannot establish medical causation.
Specifically, defendants argue that there is no expert testimony that their acts or omissions
caused plaintiff to go into premature labor, or the precipitous delivery.
This argument rests on a mischaracterization of plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff does not
allege that defendants caused her premature labor, or that premature labor constitutes the harm
she suffered. The substantial harm alleged by plaintiff is: the additional, unnecessary pain and
suffering she experienced because once in labor; the fact that she was not transferred to a
hospital or other facility better equipped for childbirth and capable of administering pain
1Initially, defendants argued that plaintiff's claims were barred by 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e) of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), because that statute requires a physical injury,
which defendants argue Woodward has not alleged. Defendants abandoned that position in their
Reply because the PLRA applies only to plaintiffs who are prisoners at the time of filing suit, a
class to which plaintiff does not belong.
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medication; and that as a result, she suffered an unnecessarily painful labor and delivery, a delay
in the delivery of the placenta, and a seizure. She also alleges that she suffered severe emotional
distress, triggered by giving birth to her child in a toilet and believing for an unspecified period
that he was dead. It is plaintiff's contention that the foregoing harms were caused by defendants'
failure to adequately respond to her repeated, urgent requests for medical help. Suffering of
additional pain may constitute substantial harm. See Petzold, 946 F.3d at 249.
As to causation, plaintiff has submitted the testimony of expert labor and delivery nurse
Nurse Alysse Reams, who testified that the symptoms plaintiff related to prison staff are
symptoms of labor that would warrant contacting a physician for further information, direction,
and eventual diagnosis. Further, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals observed in a similar case
that a layperson can recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention when a pregnant prisoner
reports bleeding, that she hurt “down there”, and that she was having contractions six minutes
apart, even though the nurse she reported to noted that she was unable to feel any contractions.
Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 785 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has put forth sufficient competent evidence to
establish that material fact issues are present as to whether she suffered harm caused by
defendants' actions, which preclude the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's § 1983 claim
brought in her individual capacity.
b. Harm suffered by plaintiff's minor son, LW
Plaintiff also seeks damages on behalf of her minor son, LW. In moving for summary
judgment on this issue, defendants contend that it is undisputed that LW did not suffer any
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injuries. Plaintiff responded to defendants' statement of uncontested facts, stating that her son
suffered physical pain when he dropped into the toilet of his mother’s cell. Unfortunate though
that event may be, the record reflects that no substantial harm resulted from it, as required to
recover under § 1983. Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 249. To the contrary, the record
reflects that LW did very well in the NICU considering his premature birth, and was discharged
to his father's care on day 14 of life. In addition, plaintiff testified as follows:
Q: So, one of the things I need to ask you is you sued on behalf of your son,
[LW].
Can you tell us today what [LW]'s damages were?
....
THE WITNESS: I mean, physical damages, as of right now, we're not aware of
anything. However, -- yeah, we're not aware of anything right now.
Q: Are you aware of any type of damages [LW] has?
A: No.
Depo. of Tiffini Woodward, Rec. Doc. 144-3, p. 201:2-16. On this record, the court finds that
plaintiff cannot prevail on a § 1983 claim on behalf of her son.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's state law intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, arguing that she cannot prove the requisite intent, or that
she suffered severe enough distress to establish the claim.
To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Louisiana, a plaintiff must
establish: (1) that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and, (3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe
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emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be substantially certain to result
from his conduct. White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991). Under Louisiana
law, “extreme and outrageous conduct” is conduct that is “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” Rice v. Reliaster Life Ins. Co., 770
F.3d 1122, 1137 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting White v. Monsanto, 585 So. 2d at 1209 (La. 1991)).
The distress suffered must also “be such that no reasonable person could be expected to endure
it. Liability arises only where the mental suffering or anguish is extreme.” White, 585 So. 2d at
1210 (citing Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So.2d 559, 570 (La.1990). In Lejeune v.
Rayne Branch Hospital, the court noted that serious emotional distress “goes well beyond simple
mental pain and anguish.” 556 So. 2d at 570, “A non-exhaustive list of examples of serious
emotional distress includes neuroses, psychoses, chronic depression, phobia and shock.” Id.
Defendants argue that because plaintiff cannot prove deliberate indifference, she cannot
prove an intentional act as required by the third prong above. With respect to Nurses Gabriel and
Armant, the evidence establishes that they did not act with deliberate indifference; thus, they are
entitled to the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against them.
However, with respect to the other defendants, the court has found that fact issues exist on the
question of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Becnel and CorrectHealth are not entitled to
summary judgment based on this argument.
Defendants further argue that plaintiff has not suffered severe enough distress to prevail
on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants contend that this is borne
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out by the fact that plaintiff has never sought mental health treatment in connection with the
incident.
Plaintiff has alleged that she experienced severe emotional distress by being forced to
deliver her baby alone in a prison cell toilet after requesting and being denied medical assistance
while in labor. After delivery, her son remained in the toilet for some period of time, during
which plaintiff assumed he was dead. She has testified that she has persistent nightmares and
remains afraid for her son to go in the water or take a shower. While she has not sought formal
medical or mental health treatment for her trauma, she has addressed it in group therapy
sessions. The court finds that plaintiff has established that an issue of fact exists as to whether
she experienced severe emotional distress. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary
judgment for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails against plaintiff in her individual
capacity except with respect to Nurses Gabriel and Armant.
Plaintiff has made no argument nor pointed to any evidence to support an intentional
infliction of emotion distress claim on behalf of her son. Thus, defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on any claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress brought on
behalf of her minor son.
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D. Punitive Damages Claims
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages from defendants. Defendants seek summary judgment
dismissing the punitive damages claims, arguing that punitive damages are not recoverable
against any of the defendants in this case. With respect to the state law claims, defendants argue
punitive damages are not authorized by statute. With respect to the 1983 claims, the individual
defendants argue that Woodward has not shown any evidence of malicious intent, which is
required for a punitive damages award. CorrectHealth argues that the prohibition against
assessing punitive damages against a municipality exempts it from punitive damages because it
is essentially acting as a municipality.
1. State Law claims
“Under Louisiana law, punitive or other ‘penalty’ damages are not allowable unless
expressly authorized by statute.” Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041
(La. 1988). Plaintiff does not identify a statute that authorizes punitive damages for her state law
claims. Thus, plaintiff is barred from recovering punitive damages on her state law claims.
2. Individual defendants
“[A] jury may . . . assess punitive damages . . . under § 1983 when the defendant's
conduct is . . . motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
“Reckless indifference . . . [is] ‘subjective consciousness’ of a risk of injury or illegality and a
‘criminal indifference to civil obligations.’” Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 803 (5th Cir.
2017) (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999)).
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The court has dismissed Nurses Gabriel and Armant, therefore, any claims for punitive
damages are solely directed to Nurse Becnel. The court has previously found that a jury could
conclude that Becnel responded with deliberate indifference to Woodward's serious medical
needs. Likewise, a jury could conclude that Becnel responded with the reckless or callous
indifference required to recover punitive damages. Accordingly, the motion for summary
judgment dismissing the punitive damages claim as to Nurse Becnel is denied. 3.
CorrectHealth
“[A] municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). However, “the Fifth Circuit has not
directly addressed whether punitive damages can be awarded against a private company working
under contract with a local political subdivision to provide correction services.” Moore v.
LaSalle Corr., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 3d 285, 287 (W.D. La. 2019) (holding punitive damages not
allowed against private prison contractor) appeal docketed Moore v. LaSalle Corrections, Inc.,
No. 20-30739 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2020). In Moore, the court analyzed the Supreme Court’s
decision in City of Newport and applied the reasoning to a private prison contractor. Id. at 289.
The Moore court found, as a matter of first impression in this circuit, that a prison contractor was
exempt from punitive damages because such an award would necessarily “harm the public fisc”
by increasing the cost of maintaining the contract with the contractor. Id. The court further
reasoned that a company cannot have the state of mind for the required scienter. Id. The court
also found that “[a]llowing punitive damages against [the contractor] would be to hold it liable
for the actions of its employees (i.e. under a vicarious liability theory), despite the clear
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jurisprudence against the application of vicarious liability against a private prison management
company.” Id.
In contrast, multiple courts around the country have held that private prison contractors
are not immune from punitive damages. See e.g., Beard v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 900
F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 2018); Sanders v. Glanz, 138 F. Supp.3d 1248 (N.D. Okla. 2015); Lawes v.
Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 2013 WL 3433150 (D. Nev. 2013). See also, Campbell v.
Pennsylvania Sch. Boards Ass'n, 2018 WL 3092292 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (holding that punitive
damages could be claimed against the Pennsylvania School Board Association as a “private
entity held to be a state actor for purposes of a claim under §1983.”). Similarly, commentators
have concluded that
municipal immunity from punitive damages does not extend to private organizations
that contract with the municipality to perform a function previously performed by the
municipality. The policy reasons behind prohibiting recovery of punitive damages
against municipalities are not applicable to private parties merely because of their
contract relationship with the municipality.
JOHN KIRCHER & CHRISTINE WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRAC. § 15:23 (2d ed.
2020).
Moore presents the precise question the court is confronted with in this motion, which is
unresolved in this circuit, and currently before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. It has been
docketed and briefing is underway. The trial of the instant matter is set for August 2, 2021.
Accordingly, the court pretermits consideration of this issue until after the appellate court has
issued its decision.
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E. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Claims
Defendants also seek summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief. The sole allegation in the revised first amended complaint concerning
injunctive and declaratory relief states: "Plaintiffs pray that . . . this Court . . . [a]ward Injunctive
and Declaratory Relief against the Defendants’ in their official capacities." In addition to the fact
that plaintiff acknowledges that injunctive relief is inappropriate because she is no longer
incarcerated, the only defendants sued in their official capacities are Sheriff Lopinto and Sheriff
Normand. No injunctive or declaratory relief claims have been brought against movants herein;
accordingly, this portion of the motion is moot.
III. CONCLUSION
The summary judgment evidence before the court establishes that neither Nurse Armant
nor Nurse Gabriel acted with deliberate indifference. The summary judgment evidence
establishes that there are fact issues as to whether Nurse Becnel acted with deliberate
indifference and callous indifference to the fact that Woodward was in labor, and whether
Becnel's actions were the result of a CorrectHealth policy or practice of not training employees
on the detection of labor, after it adopted a policy of transferring out pregnant patients upon
onset of labor. The summary judgment evidence establishes that plaintiff's minor son, LW, did
not suffer the substantial harm required to establish a § 1983 claim. The summary judgment
evidence establishes that plaintiff cannot prove a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress on behalf of her minor son, LW. The summary judgment evidence put forth in this case
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establishes that plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages for her state law claims.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 144)
filed by defendants, CorrectHealth Jefferson, LLC, Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company,
Michelle Becnel, Vonzelle Gabriel, and Margaret Armant, is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff's
claims brought on behalf of her minor child, LW, are DISMISSED, and plaintiff's claims for
injunctive relief and declaratory relief are DISMISSED as CorrectHealth, Ironshore Specialty
Insurance Company, Michelle Becnel, Vonzelle Gabriel, and Margaret Armant. In all other
respects, the motion is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding
Deliberate Indifference (Rec. Doc. 147) filed by defendants is GRANTED in part, and the
claims against Vonzelle Gabriel and Margaret Armant are DISMISSED. In all other respects,
the motion is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding
Punitive Damages (Rec. Doc. 145) filed by defendants is GRANTED in part, and plaintiff's
claim for punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress is DISMISSED. The
motion is DENIED as to Nurse Becnel. With respect to CorrectHealth, the motion is
PRETERMITTED pending the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Moore v.
LaSalle Corr., Inc., No. 20-30739 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2020);
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Liability (Rec. Doc. 148) filed by plaintiff is DENIED.
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New Orleans, Louisiana, this 17th day of May, 2021.
MARY ANN VIAL Faxon
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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