The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MANUEL CHAPA CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER: 19-13761
STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL SECTION: “B”(1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the court are:
(1) Defendant State of Louisiana’s motion to dismiss (Rec.
Doc. 21);
(2) Defendant Thomas Noto’s motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc.
30);
(3) Plaintiff Manuel Chapa’s motion for appointment of
counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(1), motion to vacate
July 13 Order of Dismissal, motion for extension of time
to respond, motion for reconsideration until 30 days,
and motion to strike Noto’s motion to dismiss (Rec. Docs.
37, 42); and
(4) Plaintiff’s motion for “abatement until appearance of
counsel” (Rec. Docs. 38, 42).
For the reasons discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant State of Louisiana’s motion to
dismiss (Rec. Doc. 21) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Thomas Noto’s motion to
dismiss (Rec. Doc. 30) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for appointment
of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(1), motion to vacate July 13
Order of Dismissal, motion for extension of time to respond, motion
for reconsideration until 30 days, and motion to strike Thomas
Noto’s motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 37) are DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for abatement
until appearance of counsel (Rec. Doc. 38) is DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Manuel Chapa brings a civil rights action for
monetary and other relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988,
alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the time of
filing the complaint (Rec. Doc. 3), Chapa was a fifty-three-year-
old resident of Seguin, Texas. (See Rec. Doc. 3-1 at 1). As basis
for the claims, he alleges being wrongfully arrested and convicted
for possession of marijuana. Id. at 2.
Chapa states the arrest occurred in St. Tammany Parish,
Louisiana on March 24, 2002 while he was driving a tractor trailer
rig. Also in the truck at that time was passenger David Salinas.
Id. Chapa denies knowledge of the presence of marijuana in the
vehicle. He further states David Salinas took responsibility for
the marijuana at the arrest scene and during a severance hearing
on September 5, 2002. After trial on October 27, 2004 in the 22nd
Judicial District Court of St. Tammany Parish, Chapa was
subsequently found guilty and sentenced to twenty-five years in
prison. Id. He was released from prison on November 21, 2018. Id.
Chapa alleges a “conspiracy to maliciously prosecute” him,
which was a “direct result of the well documented public corruption
and malicious prosecution” by Walter R. Reed, the District Attorney
for St. Tammany Parish. Id. As part of the conspiracy, Chapa
alleges (1) the officers at the scene of his arrest, Thomas Noto
and Gary Nunez, “conspired to fabricate the offense report by not
including Salinas’s exculpatory statement”; (2) the Assistant
District Attorney, Scott Gardner, conspired to coerce Salinas’s
lawyer, David Dixon, to “force Salinas to change his story”; (3)
Noto and Nunez did not testify to Salinas’s exculpatory statement
at trial; and (4) Judge William J. Knight did not allow Chapa to
question Salinas’ lawyer David Dixon about coercing Salinas to
“lie about Plaintiff’s (Chapa’s) involvement.” Id.
Judge Knight and St. Tammany Parish Government’s motions to
dismiss were granted on July 13, 2020. (Rec. Doc. 28). Chapa failed
to submit any memoranda in opposition to either motion; the court
deemed both motions unopposed and having merit. Id. at 1. Claims
against Judge William J. Knight and St. Tammany Parish Government
were dismissed and no motion for reconsideration was filed within
the requisite thirty days for doing so. Id. at 2.
On August 4, 2020, plaintiff was directed to obtain responsive
pleadings or preliminary defaults on or before August 28, 2020 as
to certain defendants. (Rec. Doc. 31). He was warned that failure
to do so would result in the defendants’ dismissal. Id.
Chapa then filed the aforementioned motion for appointment of
counsel, to vacate this Court’s July 13, 2020 order, for extension
of time to respond, and to strike defendant Noto’s motion to
dismiss, (Rec. Doc. 37), and motion to stay proceedings on August
26, 2020. (Rec. Doc. 38).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Request for Counsel and Stay of Proceedings
A district court may grant a request for an attorney to
represent any person unable to afford counsel. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(1). The Fifth Circuit has explained that courts may
exercise this discretion “if doing so would advance the proper
administration of justice.” Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213
(5th Cir. 1982). The trial court is not obligated to grant the
motion unless there are “exceptional circumstances.” Jackson v.
Dallas Police Dep't, 811 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1986)(quoting Branch
v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In Ulmer, the Fifth Circuit laid out four factors
to be considered when evaluating motions to appoint counsel:
(1) the type and complexity of the case; (2) whether the
indigent is capable of adequately presenting his case;
(3) whether the indigent is in a position to investigate
adequately the case; and (4) whether the evidence will
consist in large part of conflicting testimony so as to
require skill in the presentation of evidence and in
cross examination.
Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213 (internal citations omitted).
Additionally, in Jackson, the Fifth Circuit held that “[t]he
court should also consider whether appointed counsel would
aid in the efficient and equitable disposition of the case.”
Plaintiff’s arguments that this case meets the factors
of Ulmer and Jackson are weakened by his own motions.
Plaintiff points to the complexities of the motion practice
at hand, the fact that he relies on others “not committed” to
him to write his motions and has written none himself, and
implies that he cannot afford counsel. (Rec. Docs. 37, 38).
However, despite the ostensible complexities of this dispute,
plaintiff has competently filed two well-drafted motions1 and
supporting memoranda. See Id. Plaintiff also states that he
has not written anything filed in this dispute except for a
“change of address,” and that prior counsel has abandoned his
case. (Rec. Doc. 37-1 at 2). However, the instant motions
were filed under plaintiff’s own name and allegedly bear his
signature. Id. Plaintiff has also filed other motions bearing
his alleged signature, none of which—the instant motions
included—indicate that others assisted in their drafting.
See, e.g., (Rec. Doc. 14 at 2) (requesting an extension of
1 It is worth noting that plaintiff’s motions contain legal citations in
substantial, if not complete, compliance with the relevant Blue Book rules.
See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 37-1 at 6-7.
time to effect service of process). Either plaintiff’s
assertions are disingenuous and indeed plaintiff has drafted
several court filings, or plaintiff is filing motions and
memos drafted with assistance from undisclosed and unsigned
persons.
Plaintiff also fails to assert any facts or offer any
evidence to substantiate his indigency or inability to afford
counsel. See generally (Rec. Docs. 37, 38). Plaintiff does
not address factor four, whether evidence will consist of
conflicting testimony requiring skills in presenting evidence
and cross-examination, except to state that defendant Nunez
has filed a jury demand. (Rec. Doc. 37-1 at 7). Moreover, for
reasons explained below, plaintiff’s argument that
appointment of counsel would aid in the disposition of this
case because the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v.
Louisiana requires his conviction to be overturned and
therefore defeats defendant Noto’s Heck v. Humphrey defense
lacks merit, and therefore does not bear on the complexity of
this case. Id. at 7. Therefore, plaintiff has not shown that
he is entitled to appointment of counsel under the factors
set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Ulmer and Jackson, and
discretion to do so is rejected. Because plaintiff’s request
for appointment of counsel lacks merit and nothing more is
necessary to resolve instant motions, the motion for a stay
of proceedings and “plea for abatement” are denied. (Rec.
Docs. 37, 38).
Defendants Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and cannot
adjudicate claims unless the authority to do so is conferred by
statute. Jones v. Gee, No. CV 18-5977, 2020 WL 564956, at 4 (E.D.
La. Feb. 5, 2020). “Therefore, federal courts must dismiss lawsuits
whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.”
Id. District courts considering whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists may evaluate: “(1) the complaint alone; (2)
the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the
record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus
the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming v. United
States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Barrera-
Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)).
The plaintiff “constantly bears the burden of proof” that subject
matter jurisdiction exists. Id. (citing Menchaca v. Chrysler
Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)). When considered
in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, 12(b)(1) attacks on
subject matter jurisdiction should be considered before addressing
attacks on the merits. Id. (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561
F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)). “Ultimately, a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be
granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove
any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle
plaintiff to relief.” Id. (citing Home Builders Ass’n of Miss.,
Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.
1998)).
Defendants State of Louisiana and Noto, in his official
capacity, assert sovereign immunity conferred by the Eleventh
Amendment. (Rec. Docs. 21-1 at 4, 31-1 at 7). The Eleventh
Amendment grants the states sovereign immunity, thereby depriving
federal courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against a
state. Warnock v. Pecos Cty., Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir.
1996). In Quern v. Jordan, the Supreme Court explained that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment. 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). Similarly, where
a state has not waived sovereign immunity, “state-law claims are
also subject to the Eleventh Amendment bar.” Richardson v. S.
Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1997). This immunity extends
not only to the state, but also “a state agency, or a state official
in his official capacity,” unless waived or abrogated by Congress.
Corn v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Safety, 954 F.3d 268 (5th Cir.)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 672, 208 L. Ed. 2d 277 (2020).
With the exception of plaintiff’s request that defendant
Noto’s motion to dismiss be stricken, defendants’ motions to
dismiss are unopposed. Plaintiff’s motion to strike is of no
consequence, however, because it does not challenge the veracity
of defendants Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and is, for reasons discussed above, otherwise
fatally flawed. (See Rec. Doc. 37 at ). Plaintiff asserts § 1983
claims against the State of Louisiana and defendant Noto, in his
official capacity. (See Rec. Doc. 1 at 1-2). Defendants are
presumptively entitled to sovereign immunity from plaintiff’s
claim, and plaintiff perpetually carries the burden of showing
subject matter jurisdiction. The complaint does not allege that
defendants have waived their sovereign immunity. (See Rec. Doc.
1). Moreover, as explained by the Supreme Court in Quern, Congress
did not by enactment of § 1983 abrogate the states’ sovereign
immunity. Therefore, plaintiff has not carried his burden and
subject matter jurisdiction over defendants State of Louisiana and
Noto, in his official capacity, is found lacking.
B. Defendant Noto’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5)-(6)
As an initial matter, plaintiff’s motion to strike
defendant’s motion to dismiss lacks merit and needs not be
addressed at length.2 (Rec. Doc. 37). A motion to dismiss for
2 A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) applies only to “pleadings,” which the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define in an exhaustive list without includion
of motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a); see also Burnett v. ARCCA Inc., No. CV
15-1214, 2016 WL 828151, at 4 (W.D. La. Feb. 25, 2016) (denying motion to strike
a motion to dismiss because “[m]otions to strike under Rule 12(f) are not
authorized to be filed against other motions, only pleadings”). But even if
this Court were to overlook this fatal flaw, plaintiff’s motion to strike would
still lack merit because plaintiff’s arguments in favor thereof are moot.
failure to properly serve a defendant “turns on the legal
sufficiency of the service of process.” Quinn v. Miller, 470 F.
App'x 321, 323 (5th Cir. 2012). “The party making service has the
burden of demonstrating its validity when an objection to service
is made.” Id. (citing Carimi v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc.,
959 F.2d 1344, 1346 (5th Cir. 1992)). If a defendant is not served
within 90 days after the complaint is filed, “the court--on motion
or on its own after notice to the plaintiff--must dismiss the
action without prejudice against that defendant or order that
service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
However, upon a showing of good cause for failure to do so, courts
are required to extend the time allowed for service of process.
Id.
Under the federal rules, service of process can be made by
“following state law for serving a summons” in the state where the
district court sits, or by one of the following three methods:
(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to the individual personally;
(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling
or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and
discretion who resides there; or
Plaintiff contends the motion to dismiss should be stricken because “he raises
an insufficient defense and scandalous matter by falsely asserting that
[plaintiff] was convicted of second-degree murder.” (Rec. Doc. 37-1 at 8).
However, plaintiff’s contention that defendant’s Heck v. Humphrey argument is
misguided, as the mere possibility that his conviction could be invalidated is
not sufficient to defeat the Supreme Court’s edict in Heck that “the complaint
[which implies the invalidity of his conviction] must be dismissed unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.” 512 U.S. 477, 487 (emphasis added). Additionally, this Court has
already granted plaintiff’s motion to amend or correct the erroneous reference
to a conviction of second-degree murder. (Rec. Doc. 36)
(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). This Court has explained that, “[i]n
Louisiana, service of citation or other process is made by personal
or domiciliary service.” Able Sec. & Patrol, LLC v. State of
Louisiana, No. CIV.A. 07-1931, 2009 WL 1870851, at 2 (E.D. La.
June 29, 2009) (citing La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 1231). Louisiana
does, however, allow a public officer to be served “at his office
either personally, or in his absence, by service upon any of his
employee” or, in the absence of an established office, “at any
place where the chief executive officer of the political entity or
the public officer to be served may be found.” La. Code Civ. Proc.
art. 1265. Additionally, “[i]n cases wherein an individual is named
in pleadings in more than one capacity, personal service on that
individual is sufficient to constitute service of process on that
individual in all capacities.” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 1237.
However, “[n]either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nor
Louisiana law, provide for service of process on individuals within
the State of Louisiana by certified mail.” Jones v. Becnel, No.
CIV.A. 15-713, 2015 WL 4677543, at 4 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2015).
Plaintiff filed suit on November 11, 2019. (Rec. Doc. 1).
Plaintiff, therefore, was required to effectuate service of
process by February 19, 2020. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). On March
12, 2020, after the time to serve defendants had expired, this
Court issued an order requiring plaintiff to file into the record
returns of service of process on all defendants by April 10, 2020.
(Rec. Doc. 5). Moreover, this Court warned that “[f]ailure to do
so will result in DISMISSAL of the unserved defendants without
further notice.” Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiff failed to
comply, but filed a motion for extension of time three days after
this Court’s deadline expired. (Rec. Doc. 7).3 This Court granted
plaintiff’s untimely request, and ordered plaintiff to serve the
outstanding defendants no later than June 12, 2020.
Defendant Noto moves to dismiss claims against him for failure
to adequately affect service of process. (Rec. Doc. 31-1 at 5-6).
Defendant contends that, as of July 31, 2020, he still had not
been properly served. Id. In a sworn declaration accompanying his
motion, defendant states that he found an envelope addressed to
him on his work desk containing a copy of the complaint. (Rec.
Doc. 30-2). Defendant further states that he has received no other
copy of the complaint, that he has not been personally served, and
that no copy was left at his residence. Id. Defendant’s motion was
also accompanied by a scanned photograph of the envelop allegedly
mailed to his office.4 Id. at 2. Plaintiff only briefly addresses
3 Plaintiff’s motion was deemed deficient, (Rec. Doc. 8), and this Court ordered
plaintiff to remedy the deficient motion on April 14, 2020. (Rec. Doc. 9).
Plaintiff subsequently filed a cured motion on May 4, 2020. (Rec. Doc. 14).
4 The photograph displays an envelope with postal markings from the United
States Postal Service and is addressed to defendant Noto, although the return
address is obscured only to reveal an address and zip code from Slidell,
Louisiana. (Rec. Doc. 30-2 at 2). Therefore, it is impossible to tell from
defendant’s exhibit by whom the package was sent, what it contained, or the
his failure to properly serve defendants, stating only: “I do not
know how to correct the defect in service.”5 (Rec. Doc. 37-1 at
3). Because plaintiff, who bears the burden of disproving
deficiency of service, has neither demonstrated its sufficiency
nor demonstrated good cause for his failure to properly serve
defendant, defendant’s motion to dismiss has merit. (Rec. Doc.
30). Because defendant’s motion to dismiss has merit in both his
official capacity, pursuant Rule 12(b)(1), and his individual
capacity, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5).
Assuming arguendo the inapplicability of dismissal under FRCP
12 (b)(1) and 12 (b)(5), the instant §1983 complaint against all
defendants is barred pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and the United
States Supreme Court decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). The Heck decision requires federal courts
to dismiss a complaint that collaterally brings into question the
constitutional validity of a conviction or sentence if the
conviction or sentence has not already been invalidated. False
arrest claims and claims regarding evidentiary matters, as
similarly asserted here, have been rejected under Heck. See Queen
v. Purser, 109 F.App’x 659, 660 (5th Cir. 2004) and Penley v. Collin
date it was received, though the postal stamp does appear to be dated May 28,
2020. See id. However, as noted, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
effective service when its sufficiency is challenged. See Quinn v. Miller, 470
F. App'x 321, 323 (5th Cir. 2012)
5 Plaintiff cites this Court’s August 4, 2020 order requiring correction service
of process. (Rec. Doc. 37-1 at 3). However, that appears to be an erroneous
reference, as this Court’s August 4, 2020 order pertained to time to file
responsive pleadings for other plaintiffs who had been served. (Rec. Doc. 31).
County, Texas, 446 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2006). Moreover, the AEDPA
allows federal courts the discretion to dismiss any unexhausted
challenge to the constitutionality of a state court conviction on
its merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of
habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the
failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the
courts of the State.”). Rodriguez v. Stephens, No. 2:12-CV-187,
2014 WL 3058297, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2014). Chapa fails to
show that his conviction has been invalidated by any court. To the
extent he seeks invalidation of the conviction, he has not shown
timely exhaustion of state court remedies, or reasons to abrogate
the exhaustion rule, under 28 U.S.C. §2254. Therefore, the claims
based under the latter statute and §1983 are dismissed.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate this Court July 13, 2020 Order
Although defendants oppose plaintiff’s motion to vacate under
both Rules 59(e) and 60(b), only the latter is applicable because
plaintiff’s motion was filed more than 28 days after the order it
challenges. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend
a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of
the judgment.”); see also Priester v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
927 F.3d 912, 913 (5th Cir. 2019). Under Rule 60(b), a party may
seek relief from an order for:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively
is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Plaintiff’s motion could only qualify as a
motion to vacate under Rule 60(b)(1), “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect,” or 60(b)(6), “any other reason
that justifies relief.” See id.
Plaintiff does not suggest that his failure to oppose the
motions to dismiss which precipitated the July 13, 2020 order was
the result of any mistake, inadvertence, or surprise. However,
plaintiff’s contention that he does not know how to oppose the
motions without counsel could be characterized as “neglect.” (Rec.
Doc. 37-1 at 1). However, plaintiff has not established that this
neglect was excusable, instead conceding only that he is
“absolutely unable to represent [him]self.” Id. However,
plaintiff’s failure to secure counsel, or to seek appointment of
counsel by this Court until the final hour, do not constitute
excusable neglect.
Rule 60(b) also permits a court to relieve a party from a
judgment “for any reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6). “It is a catch-all provision, meant to encompass
circumstances not covered by Rule 60(b)’s other enumerated
provisions.” Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002).
A motion to vacate pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) “will be granted only
if extraordinary circumstances are present.” See id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff’s motion does not
suggest, nor justify an inference of, such “extraordinary
circumstances” to warrant an order vacating this Court’s July 13,
2020 order.
Plaintiff’s arguments essentially turn on the request for
appointment of counsel, dispensed with above, and the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Ramos v. Louisiana.6 (Rec. Doc. 37-1).
He contends that, in light of the Supreme Court’s April 2020
decision in Ramos, his conviction must be invalidated, thereby
necessitating reconsideration of his claims against all
defendants. Id. at 5. However, “[a] change in decisional law after
entry of judgment does not constitute exceptional circumstances
and is not alone grounds for relief from a final judgment.” Bailey
v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 894 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1990), holding
modified by Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2002).
Moreover, as explained earlier, Chapa fails to show compliance
with applicable laws to authorize him to proceed with a challenge
6 140 S. Ct. 1390, 206 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2020).
to the conviction. See Heck and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), cited and
explained supra.
Additionally, plaintiff did not comply with the explicit
instruction in this Court’s July 13, 2020 order that any motion
for reconsideration must be filed within thirty days of the order.
(Rec. Doc. 28 at 2). Per this Court’s instruction, plaintiff was
required to challenge this Court’s order by August 12, 2020. See
id. Plaintiff did not file the instant motions until August 26,
2020. (Rec. Docs. 37, 38). Additionally, this Court mandated that
any such motion “be accompanied by opposition memoranda to the
original motions.” (Rec. Doc. 28 at 2). Plaintiff has neglected to
oppose motions underlying that judgment. Therefore, plaintiff’s
motion to vacate is not timely, does not comply with this Court’s
order, and fails to rectify the deficiencies in his complaint that
this Court found meritorious.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 29th day of March, 2021
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE