Traweek v. Gusman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOHNNY TRAWEEK CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 19-1384

MARLIN GUSMAN, ET AL. SECTION "F"

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on each of the plaintiff’s outstanding claims. For the

following reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART.

Background

In this civil rights action, the plaintiff Johnny Traweek

claims that bureaucratic incompetence caused him to be unlawfully

detained in Orleans Parish Prison for twenty days beyond his court-

ordered release date. See Traweek v. Gusman, 414 F. Supp. 3d 847,

853–55 (E.D. La. 2019).1

In the time since Traweek filed his original complaint on

February 14, 2019, he has amended his pleadings three times and

the Court has dismissed certain claims against certain defendants.

1 For a thorough description of the circumstances giving rise

to this case, see Traweek, 414 F. Supp. 3d 847. For sake of

efficiency, the Court assumes familiarity with the background

provided there.

1

See id. at 869. Remaining now are a total of thirteen claims

against three defendants in their individual capacities: James

LeBlanc (the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety

& Corrections), and Tracy DiBenedetto and Ashley Jones, employees

of LeBlanc’s Department who allegedly acted unlawfully in slow-

rolling the processing of Traweek’s release after being

“personally put on notice” of Traweek’s ongoing overdetention.

See Opp’n at 1.

Contending that the undisputed material facts surrounding

Traweek’s unfortunate overdetention entitle them to judgment as a

matter of law, the defendants collectively move for summary

judgment on - and dismissal of - each of Traweek’s remaining

claims.

I.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary

judgment is appropriate where the record reveals no genuine dispute

as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. No genuine dispute of fact exists

where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A

genuine dispute of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that

2

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the mere assertion of

a factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported

motion. See id. Therefore, where contradictory “evidence is

merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,” summary

judgment remains appropriate. Id. at 249–50 (citation omitted).

Likewise, summary judgment is appropriate where the party opposing

the motion fails to establish an essential element of his case.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). In

this regard, the nonmoving party must do more than simply deny the

allegations raised by the moving party. See Donaghey v. Ocean

Drilling & Expl. Co., 974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992). Instead,

it must come forward with competent evidence, such as affidavits

or depositions, to buttress its competing claim. Id. Hearsay

evidence and unsworn documents that cannot be presented in a form

that would be admissible at trial do not qualify as competent

opposing evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2); Martin v. John W.

Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987) (per

curiam).

Finally, in evaluating a summary judgment motion, the Court

must read the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

3

II.

Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after

adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who

fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322. Urged at this phase in the proceedings, the defendants’

motion for summary judgment reads and functions like a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. In essence, the defendants assert that the

undisputed facts in the record, even when read in the light most

favorable to Traweek, do not establish that Traweek has a viable

legal claim against the defendants. If the defendants are correct,

then the Court must indeed grant summary judgment in their favor

and dismiss Traweek’s claims as legally baseless. See id.

The Court accordingly proceeds to evaluate Traweek’s ability

to state a viable claim on the developed factual record at hand.

Traweek’s claims fall into two categories: first, constitutional

claims for asserted violations of Traweek’s due process rights

under the Federal and Louisiana Constitutions, and second, garden-

variety tort claims under Louisiana law – specifically, for false

imprisonment, negligence, and (against LeBlanc only) respondeat

4

superior. The Court assesses each defendant’s possible liability

with regard to both sets of claims in turn.

A. Traweek’s Constitutional Claims

Traweek sues each defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process and Article I,

Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution, which “provides the same

due process protections as . . . the United States Constitution.”

See Cripps v. La. Dep’t of Agric. & Forestry, 819 F.3d 221, 232

(5th Cir. 2016). Because the Louisiana Constitution’s due process

guarantee is coextensive with that of the Federal Constitution,

the qualified immunity defense available to state officials sued

under § 1983 applies with equal force to Traweek’s federal and

state constitutional claims. See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany,

187 F.3d 452, 482 (5th Cir. 1999); Moresi v. State ex rel. Dep’t

of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1093 (La. 1990).

In the simplest of terms, qualified immunity “protects

officers from liability for damages unless they violate clearly

established law.” See Samuel L. Bray, Foreword: The Future of

Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1793 (2018); see also

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine of

qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

5

reasonable person would have known.’” (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))). Qualified immunity thus

“operates ‘to ensure that before they are subjected to suit,

officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful.’” Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).

The Supreme Court has “mandated a two-step sequence for

resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims.” Id.

at 232.

First, a court must decide whether the facts that a

plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of

a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff has

satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether

the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time

of [the] defendant’s alleged misconduct.

Id. (citations omitted). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at

202, overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at

236.

Here, each defendant claims entitlement to qualified

immunity. Because the defendants do so “in good faith, the burden

shifts to [Traweek] to rebut” each particular defendant’s

qualified immunity. See Disraeli v. Rotunda, 489 F.3d 628, 631

6

(5th Cir. 2007). Where Traweek has failed to do so with sufficient

particularity,2 his constitutional claims must be dismissed; but

where the facts in the record do afford Traweek a provable

2 As detailed below, the greatest weakness in Traweek’s case is

not factual, but legal. In the papers he has submitted throughout

this litigation, Traweek paints a startling picture of a department

of corrections in calamitous disarray. See Opp’n at 5–11. Indeed,

as Traweek persuasively illustrates, incompetence in the

Department seems to run rampant – and worse yet, the Department

seems to be well aware of that reality. See id. Unfortunately

for Traweek, that fact has little bearing on the Court’s

constitutionally limited task in presiding over Traweek’s

particular case. Thus, the (near-)fatal flaw in Traweek’s papers

is an overarching failure to bring to the Court’s attention

“clearly established law” on the unlawfulness of the particular

actions of these defendants in this case.

With a dearth of on-point cases to support his cause, Traweek

concentrates on demonstrating the unreasonableness of the

defendants’ actions in light of the clearly established

constitutional rule “that a jailer has a duty to ensure that

inmates are timely released from prison.” See Porter v. Epps, 659

F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011). The second prong of the qualified

immunity analysis seldom permits such generality, however. This

is because the Court is required to determine whether “all

reasonable officials in the defendant’s circumstances would have

then known that the defendant’s conduct” violated the plaintiff’s

clearly established rights. See, e.g., Thompson v. Upshur County,

245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (some emphasis added). In other

words, the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that

a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987) (emphasis added). So here, the fact that reasonable

officials in the defendants’ positions would have known of

Traweek’s general entitlement to timely release does not make their

acts and omissions – no matter how frustrating in hindsight –

“objectively unreasonable” under the standards that govern this

Court’s analysis.

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constitutional claim, such claims must be preserved for trial.3

Cf. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

The Court expounds on its findings with respect to each

individual defendant below. See Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417,

421 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has

“consistently examined the actions of defendants individually in

the qualified immunity context”).

1. Tracy DiBenedetto

The Court begins with Traweek’s constitutional claims against

Tracy DiBenedetto.

3 Before proceeding further, two additional notes on themes

that pervade much of Traweek’s opposition to the defendants’

motion:

First, while Traweek makes much of the fact that the Court

previously denied qualified immunity to LeBlanc and Jones at the

motion to dismiss stage, he fails to account for inherent

procedural nuances that make an important difference. At the

motion to dismiss stage, the Court was required to accept Traweek’s

allegations as true and determine whether those allegations

afforded Traweek a “plausible” shot at relief such that discovery

could continue. Now, armed with a fuller record, the Court must

determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law in light of the undisputed facts the plaintiff has

unearthed.

Second, while Traweek argues that material disputes of fact

preclude summary judgment, the defendants are correct that Traweek

“does not genuinely dispute the actions of the Defendants,” but

instead disputes the reasonableness of those actions. See Reply

at 1. The pertinent question is not what actions the defendants

took, but whether those actions were objectively unreasonable such

that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

8

DiBenedetto heads the Department’s “Administrative Remedy

Procedure” program. Traweek claims that DiBenedetto “did nothing

more” than providing cursory responses and conducting a half-

hearted investigation after receiving emails from Traweek’s

attorney that put her “on notice of Mr. Traweek’s overdetention”

- in addition to a litany of allegations concerning DiBenedetto’s

slow response and apparent unwillingness to see to it that Traweek

was promptly released. See Opp’n at 11–17. In a similar vein,

Traweek asserts that DiBenedetto is liable as a “bystander” for

failing to intervene in defense of Traweek’s constitutional

rights.

Whatever the strength of his factual allegations, Traweek

cites no law that clearly establishes that DiBenedetto’s chosen

course of action was objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances. While Traweek cites a Fifth Circuit case for the

abstract principle that “unlike his prisoner, the jailer has the

means, the freedom, and the duty to make necessary inquiries” on

the prisoner’s behalf, glaringly absent from Traweek’s argument is

any detail whatsoever on the parameters of the “jailer’s . . .

duty to make necessary inquiries” – even assuming that a mid-

ranking bureaucrat like DiBenedetto qualifies as a “jailer” to

9

begin with. See Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 1968).4

To be sure, DiBenedetto did make some inquiries: indeed, she

checked the “CAJUN” database, responded to Traweek’s attorney, and

performed some investigation into the matter.

As such, any failure by DiBenedetto to move heaven and earth

to secure Traweek’s release the moment she supposedly learned of

his overdetention is not cognizable for purposes of negating

DiBenedetto’s entitlement to the broad qualified immunity afforded

to officials in her position.

2. Ashley Jones

In arguing that the conduct of Ashley Jones was objectively

unreasonable, Traweek cites even fewer cases to establish what

“all reasonable officials” would have supposedly known while in

Jones’s shoes: none in fact, aside from snippets from this Court’s

opinion denying Jones qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss

stage. Cf. Thompson, 245 F.3d at 457; Traweek, 414 F. Supp. 3d

847.

In the time since the Court’s decision then, it has now been

discovered that Jones received paperwork indicating Traweek’s

entitlement to release three days earlier than previously known.

In light of this development, Traweek bases the bulk of his present

4 Traweek’s cases on bystander liability provide hardly any

more guidance to officials in DiBenedetto’s position.

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argument on the notion that if the Court held that a one-day delay

in processing Traweek’s paperwork “was sufficient to deny

qualified immunity” at the motion to dismiss stage, “then a

fortiori, a four-day delay must require denial of qualified

immunity.” See Opp’n at 18.

The defendants are correct, however, that the Court did not

deny Jones qualified immunity because of the length of her delay

in processing Traweek’s release per se,5 but instead “because, in

the absence of evidence explaining why there was a delay, the Court

had to accept [Traweek’s] allegations as true and, based on those

allegations, it was ‘plausible’ that the delay was due to

incompetence or knowing violation of the law.” See Reply at 5;

see also Traweek, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 868–69. Importantly, other

new evidence has come to light as well: namely, Jones’s

uncontroverted explanation for why she took four days to process

Traweek’s release (described in depth at Mot. 8–14).

Here again, Traweek’s utter failure to cite any caselaw

clarifying the precise “contours” of Traweek’s abstract

entitlement to a timely release from prison compels the Court to

5 Indeed, this Court explicitly held that the length of Jones’s

delay was not dispositive on the objective reasonableness of her

conduct. See Traweek, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 868–69.

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grant Jones qualified immunity.6 Cf. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640.

And while Traweek cites no law in support of his contention, the

defendants do cite somewhat persuasive law in support of theirs.

See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (holding that

officers had no constitutional obligation to work over the weekend

because Supreme Court was “quite certain that a detention of three

days over a New Year’s weekend does not and could not amount” to

a deprivation of the plaintiff’s speedy trial right).

At bottom, Jones contends that she received Traweek’s papers

on a Friday and began processing them the following Monday; this

is hardly shocking bureaucratic behavior, and Traweek provides no

precedent whatsoever in support of the notion that all officials

in Jones’s position would have known that taking Jones’s course of

action was objectively unreasonable and unconstitutional.

3. James LeBlanc

Secretary LeBlanc’s entitlement to qualified immunity is a

closer call. As the Court summarized at the motion to dismiss

stage,

6 The doctrine of qualified immunity “is shown a special

solicitude by the Supreme Court” for good reason: because it

“balances two important interests – the need to hold public

officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and

the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson,

555 U.S. at 231; Bray, supra, at 1793.

12

LeBlanc’s § 1983 individual capacity liability is

predicated solely on his supervisory role as Secretary

of DOC; there are no allegations that he affirmatively

participated in the acts that caused Mr. Traweek’s

constitutional deprivation. Thus, LeBlanc is only

liable under § 1983 if Mr. Traweek [can show] that

[LeBlanc] implemented unconstitutional . . . policies

that causally resulted in [Traweek’s] overdetention.

Traweek, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 867.

Again, Traweek offers little legal support in his argument on

LeBlanc’s entitlement to qualified immunity, instead mounting a

staggering volume of factual evidence of incompetence and

indifference in the Department headed by LeBlanc. See Opp’n at 5–

11. The disturbing nature and sheer weight of this “pattern

evidence” is compelling and has led several courts to deny LeBlanc

qualified immunity in similar cases. See Crittindon v. Gusman,

2020 WL 1862467, at *15 (M.D. La. Apr. 13, 2020) (“The state of

affairs at the DOC, where DOC’s staff were passive and essentially

flying blind unless contacted by a concerned family member, evinces

a reckless disregard for the likelihood of overdetention in the

DOC system.”); Grant v. Gusman, 2018 WL 3869494, at *11 (E.D. La.

Aug. 14, 2018) (denying LeBlanc qualified immunity where

plaintiff’s alleged facts made it “plausible that Secretary

LeBlanc engaged in a policy of unconstitutionally over-detaining

persons and that policy was the driving force behind” the

plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injury).

13

More importantly though, the Fifth Circuit recently followed

suit in another overdetention case against LeBlanc, albeit in an

unpublished decision that cannot be cited or construed as precedent

in this circumstance. There, the court of appeals identified this

particular case as one containing a factual scenario in which

LeBlanc could be held liable for his Department’s pattern of

overdetention. See Hicks v. LeBlanc, 2020 WL 6164338, at *4 (5th

Cir. Oct. 21, 2020) (per curiam) (observing that “LeBlanc could be

held liable for incompetent over-detention, such as the failure to

process a prisoner’s release or immediately compute an inmate’s

sentence after being sentenced to time served,” where, as here,

the plaintiff “alleged that LeBlanc knew of the DPSC’s long history

of over-detaining inmates” and “alleged facts . . . which included

processing delays, data errors, inconsistent calculation

methodologies, and [other] unspecified deficiencies . . .

speak[ing] to the incompetence of DPSC employees and the lack of

adequate training and supervision” (emphasis omitted)).

As with DiBenedetto and Jones, Traweek’s constitutional

claims against LeBlanc raise issues that are primarily legal in

nature – indeed, the question is less what happened to Traweek and

similarly situated inmates as whether LeBlanc’s complicity in

establishing (and/or failing to correct) policies leading to such

extensive violations of inmates’ clearly established rights to

14

timely release was objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances. That question is best left for trial.

Accordingly, in light of the foregoing – and particularly in

light of the Fifth Circuit’s signal in Hicks – the Court cannot

grant qualified immunity to LeBlanc on the record before the Court.

As a result, Traweek has triable constitutional claims against

LeBlanc, and the defendants’ motion for summary-judgment dismissal

of such claims must be denied.

B. Traweek’s Tort Claims

That leaves Traweek’s ordinary tort claims. Specifically,

Traweek sues all three defendants for negligent overdetention and

false imprisonment, and seeks damages from LeBlanc in particular

for the torts of Department employees for whom LeBlanc is

supposedly vicariously liable under Louisiana law.

The defendants move for summary judgment on all such claims,

and the Court considers their motion with regard to each claim in

turn.

1. Negligence (Against All Defendants)

The following “four inquiries must be affirmatively answered”

“[f]or a plaintiff to recover on a negligence theory” under

Louisiana law:

I. Was the conduct in question a substantial factor in

bringing about the harm to the plaintiff, i.e., was it

a cause-in-fact of the harm which occurred?

15

II. Did the defendant owe a duty to the plaintiff?

III. Was the duty breached?

IV. Was the risk, and harm caused, within the scope of

protection afforded by the duty breached?

Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1041–42 (La. 1991).

Considering the foregoing standard, the Court proceeds to

evaluate Traweek’s ability to state a viable negligence claim

against each defendant on the developed factual record at hand.

Cf. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

a. Tracy DiBenedetto

The summary judgment record reveals that DiBenedetto’s

actions in relation to Traweek were not negligent under Louisiana

law. For starters, DiBenedetto reasonably responded to inquiries

from Traweek’s counsel and inquired as to the status of Traweek’s

release. But more importantly, with no indication that DiBenedetto

had any ability to singlehandedly assure Traweek’s timely release

while operating in a tangled bureaucratic web that required action

by a bevy of other individuals, there is no evidence that

DiBenedetto’s actions – or failures to act – were a “substantial

factor” in Traweek’s overdetention. See id.

b. Ashley Jones

Likewise, undisputed facts in the record show that Jones’s

actions with regard to Traweek were similarly non-negligent. Like

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DiBenedetto, Jones is merely a single actor in a large and

multifaceted bureaucracy. As a result, she can only do what she

has the power to do, and there is no evidence that her actions

were beyond the pale or made a substantial difference in Traweek’s

particular case.

c. James LeBlanc

In seeking dismissal of Traweek’s negligence claim against

Secretary LeBlanc, the defendants argue that “LeBlanc owed no legal

duty” to Traweek because Louisiana law committed Traweek to the

custody of the Orleans Parish Sheriff. This argument is overly

technical and unavailing, as there is certainly a chance that a

reasonable factfinder could deem LeBlanc’s acts and omissions - as

the head of a department that had significant (if not dispositive)

say in when Traweek was released from Orleans Parish Prison – to

have been “substantial factor[s]” in Traweek’s overdetention. See

id.; see also Opp’n at 22–23 (“Defendants argue they cannot be

responsible for Mr. Traweek’s false imprisonment because he was in

the ‘physical’ and ‘legal’ custody of the sheriff’s office. But

that argument completely fails to engage with the fact that all

parties understood the DOC to be the entity determining when Mr.

Traweek should be released. The sheriff’s office said they had

‘no authority’ to release Mr. Traweek without approval from the

DOC. And the DOC put Mr. Traweek through their ‘normal process’

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for processing and release. Indeed, the DOC concedes that they

‘approved [Mr. Traweek’s] final release’ and that Ms. Jones

personally ‘transmitted the release certificate.’ Considering

that the DOC took upon itself to decide Mr. Traweek’s release date,

it can hardly escape responsibility for when he was released.”

(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).

As a result, the undisputed facts in the record reveal that

Traweek has a viable negligence claim against LeBlanc that cannot

be short-circuited at the summary judgment stage.

2. False Imprisonment (Against All Defendants)

Traweek also sues each defendant for false imprisonment under

Louisiana law. However, as Traweek acknowledges in the operative

complaint, in Louisiana, false imprisonment “is restraint without

color of legal authority.” See Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353

So. 2d 969, 971 (La. 1977); Third Am. Compl., ¶ 103.

Because there is no question that Traweek was overdetained

under “color of legal authority,” Traweek’s false imprisonment

claims must be dismissed as a matter of law. See Kyle, 353 So. 2d

at 971; see also color of authority, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.

2014) (“The appearance or presumption of authority sanctioning a

public officer’s actions”.); color of law, id. (“The appearance or

semblance, without the substance, of a legal right. . . . The term

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usu. implies a misuse of power made possible because the wrongdoer

is clothed with the authority of the state.”).7

3. Respondeat Superior (Against James LeBlanc)

In a final claim, Traweek alleges that Secretary LeBlanc is

vicariously liable for torts of individuals acting within the scope

of his Department’s employment and “obligated by Louisiana statute

to pay any judgment entered against [such] employees.” See Third

Am. Compl., ¶¶ 121–28.

With seemingly little legal guidance on this issue, the

parties haggle over the degree to which LeBlanc can be held

vicariously liable for the actions of DiBenedetto and Jones. For

their part, the defendants argue that LeBlanc is neither an

“employer” nor a “public entity” under Louisiana law; instead,

they claim, the State itself is the employer of all three

defendants. See Mot. at 21–22. Traweek counters that it is

conceivable that LeBlanc qualifies as a “Master [or] employer”

under Article 2320 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides

that “Masters and employers are answerable for the damage

occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the

functions in which they are employed.”

7 A state prisoner is surely detained under color of legal

authority. Indeed, Traweek’s is not the paradigmatic case of false

imprisonment, in which a shopkeeper or other private citizen

wrongfully restricts a plaintiff’s movement against his will.

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With no on-point authority provided by either side, the Court

is satisfied that, at least at this stage, Traweek has a viable

claim that LeBlanc could be held liable for any “damage”

proximately caused by the work-related acts of those conceivably

under his command.8

* * *

In striking a delicate balance “between the interests in

vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public

officials’ effective performance of their duties,” the doctrine of

qualified immunity “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.

Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (first quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S.

183, 195 (1984); then quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986)). “To determine whether a given officer falls into either

of those two categories, a court must ask whether it would have

8 Traweek is correct that even if the defendants are right “that

the State is obligated by State law to indemnify Secretary LeBlanc

or the other DOC employees, [] that does not determine whether

LeBlanc is the ‘master’ or ‘employer’ of those under his command.”

Article 2320 of the Louisiana Civil Code appears to leave open the

possibility that LeBlanc could very well be a “Master” or

“employer[]” who is “answerable for the damage occasioned by [his]

servants and overseers.” See Opp’n at 22. In light of the

defendants’ failure to directly counter Traweek’s legal assertion

on this point – and in light of the somewhat analogous and

supportive Fifth Circuit decisions cited by Traweek, see Opp’n at

22 n.129 – Traweek’s respondeat superior claim against LeBlanc

presents a triable legal issue that cannot be dismissed at the

summary judgment stage.

20

been clear to a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct ‘was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id. (emphasis added)

(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).

Where Traweek largely (or completely) fails to identify any

“pre-existing law” confirming that the unlawfulness of the conduct

he complains of would be readily “apparent” to any reasonable

officer in the defendants’ positions, his claims fail to overcome

the qualified immunity enjoyed by the defendants on the developed

factual record at hand. Cf. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640. For this

reason, Traweek’s constitutional claims against Tracy DiBenedetto

and Ashley Jones must be dismissed.9 Cf. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

However, as it pertains to Secretary LeBlanc – and as the

Fifth Circuit recently confirmed,10 albeit in an unpublished

decision – Traweek’s claims do raise triable questions regarding

the reasonableness of LeBlanc’s management of a department which

manifests deliberate indifference, systemic error, and rife

incompetence – and which contributed to Traweek’s injury in this

case.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: that the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The

9 And, for the other reasons provided above, Traweek’s tort

claims against DiBenedetto and Jones are likewise nonviable.

10 See Hicks, 2020 WL 6164338, at *4.

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plaintiff’s remaining claims against Tracy DiBenedetto and Ashley

Jones, and the plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against James

LeBlanc, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The plaintiff’s

constitutional claims, negligence claim, and respondeat superior

claim against James LeBlanc shall remain for trial.

New Orleans, Louisiana, January 20, 2021

MARTIN\IL. C. ELDMAN

UNITED STAKES DISTRICT JUDGE

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