Brown v. SCF Waxler Marine, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

STACIA BROWN CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 19-12398

SCF WAXLER MARINE, LLC SECTION “F”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the defendant’s motion for summary judgment

and accompanying dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint. For the

reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.

Background

On February 3, 2017, the plaintiff Stacia Brown was terminated

from employment with the defendant SCF Waxler Marine, LLC. At

primary issue in this case is the reason for that termination.

The company chalks Brown’s firing up to a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason: insubordination. Brown views matters

differently and sues the company for FMLA retaliation and ADA

discrimination.1 The company seeks summary judgment dismissal of

both claims.

1 After completing discovery, Brown dismisses her own claims

for FMLA interference and Title VII race discrimination. See Opp’n

at 15 n.17.

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I.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary

judgment is appropriate where the record reveals no genuine dispute

as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. No genuine dispute of fact exists

where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A

genuine dispute of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the mere assertion of

a factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported

motion. See id. Therefore, where contradictory “evidence is

merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,” summary

judgment remains appropriate. Id. at 249–50 (citation omitted).

Likewise, summary judgment is appropriate where the party opposing

the motion fails to establish an essential element of his case.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). In

this regard, the nonmoving party must do more than simply deny the

allegations raised by the moving party. See Donaghey v. Ocean

Drilling & Expl. Co., 974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992). Instead,

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it must come forward with competent evidence, such as affidavits

or depositions, to buttress its competing claim. Id. Hearsay

evidence and unsworn documents that cannot be presented in a form

that would be admissible at trial do not qualify as competent

opposing evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2); Martin v. John W.

Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987) (per

curiam).

Finally, in evaluating a summary judgment motion, the Court

must read the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

II.

A.

Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after

adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who

fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322. Urged at this later stage in the proceedings, the company’s

motion for summary judgment reads and functions like a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. In essence, the company asserts that the

undisputed facts in the record, even when read in the light most

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favorable to Brown, do not establish that Brown has a plausible

claim for relief against the company. If the company is correct,

then the Court must indeed grant summary judgment in the company’s

favor and dismiss Brown’s claims as legally baseless. See id.

The Court thus proceeds to evaluate Brown’s ability to state

a viable claim on the developed factual record at hand.

B.

Both of Brown’s claims must be evaluated under the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Wheat v. Fla. Par. Juv.

Just. Comm’n, 811 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Retaliation

claims under . . . the FMLA . . . are analyzed under the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework.”); McInnis v. Alamo Cmty. Coll.

Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (“This being a case

brought under the Americans With Disabilities Act where only

circumstantial evidence is offered to show the alleged unlawful

discrimination, we apply the McDonnell Douglas, Title VII burden-

shifting analysis.”).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “once the employee

establishes a prima facie case of retaliation [or discrimination],

the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”

Richardson v. Monitronics Int’l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir.

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2005). “If the employer succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts

back to the employee to show by a preponderance of the evidence

that the employer’s articulated reason is a pretext for

discrimination.” Id. at 332–33.

Accordingly, as it pertains to both of Brown’s outstanding

claims, the Court must first determine whether Brown “establishes

a prima facie case” of FMLA retaliation and/or ADA discrimination.

See id. at 332. To prove FMLA retaliation, Brown must show

(1) that she “was protected under the FMLA,” (2) that she “suffered

an adverse employment action,” and (3) that she “was treated less

favorably than an employee who had not requested leave under the

FMLA” or that “the adverse decision was made because [she] sought

protection under the FMLA.” Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth., 446

F.3d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 2006). Similarly, to “establish a prima

facie discrimination claim under the ADA, [Brown] must prove: (1)

that [she] has a disability; (2) that [she] was qualified for the

job; [and] (3) that [she] was subject to an adverse employment

decision on account of [her] disability.” EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc.,

773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014) (fourth alteration in original)

(quoting Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 853

(5th Cir. 1999)).

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Here, there is relatively little question as to the first two

elements of each claim. Instead, as is often the case, the third

element – causation – is the analytical focal point of both claims.

On that issue, the company asserts that Brown lacks any substantive

evidence that her termination was motivated by her disability or

her decision to take FMLA leave, but Brown begs to differ.

Assume for sake of analysis, however, that Brown can establish

the third element of each claim – and by extension, valid prima

facie cases for unlawful FMLA retaliation and ADA discrimination.

Even still, the undisputed facts in the record reveal that the

company possessed “a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for

firing an at-will employee like Brown: namely, an honest belief

that Brown had engaged in insubordination.2

2 The essential and incontrovertible facts on Brown’s

insubordination are as follows: While Brown was away on medical

leave from November 29, 2016 through January 9, 2017, the company

implemented a new payroll review system. When Brown returned from

leave, she was resistant to – or, at the very least, not readily

receptive of - certain aspects of the new system. See, e.g., Pl.’s

Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ¶ 7

(“Plaintiff testified that she was not being resistant; rather,

she simply requested that she be permitted to continue correcting

any errors that were uncovered.”). In conversations regarding the

new process, Brown’s supervisor, Bryan Christy, found Brown to be

argumentative and disrespectful. See, e.g., Mot., Ex. F at 30–

33. In one such conversation, Christy gave Brown direct

instructions with regard to her future administration of payroll;

in particular, Christy directed Brown to allow Adam Morris to

review Brown’s work before its submission to Koretha Todd. See,

e.g., id. Christy warned Brown that her failure to follow such

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Because the company had a valid reason for terminating Brown,

“the burden shifts back to [Brown] to show by a preponderance of

the evidence that [the company’s] articulated reason is a pretext

for discrimination.” Richardson, 434 F.3d at 332–33. Brown fails

to do so. Simply put, there is very little reason to doubt the

genuineness of Christy’s belief that Brown contravened his

instructions when she had already been warned not to do so. See

supra note 2. As such, a preponderance of the evidence does not

instructions could result in her termination. See, e.g., id. A

short time later, Christy reasonably perceived actions taken by

Brown as a failure to follow such instructions, memorialized his

understanding of all relevant events in a thorough email, and

agreed with a human resources manager that termination was in

order. See, e.g., id. at 77–78.

Contravening a superior’s directions – as Brown reasonably

appeared to do - is textbook insubordination. And rudeness,

argumentativeness, and “attitude” likewise provide classic grounds

for terminating an at-will employee. To be sure, workplace

relationships can be – and often are – complicated, but few

employees aggrieved by disagreements with their boss make a federal

case out of their termination. Where an employee chooses to do so

without any concrete evidence of unlawful animus, a court’s primary

inquiry lies in assessing the “honest belief” at the heart of the

employer’s stated rationale for the decision at issue – with all

the subjectivity inherent in such a belief. See, e.g., Shackelford

v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 408–09 (5th Cir. 1999)

(“The issue is whether [the employer’s] perception of [the

employee’s] performance, accurate or not, was the real reason for

her termination.”). Against this backdrop, Brown’s attempt to

tease out supposed disputes of material fact on the exact manner

in which the salient events unfolded is unavailing.

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suggest that any factual mistakes3 Brown’s superiors made in

assessing the situation amounted to the willful blindness of an

employer in search of a valid reason for terminating a disabled

employee who chose to avail herself of federal labor protections.

Had Brown experienced no prior incidents or brush-ups,4 or had she

warmly accepted the newly enacted payroll system,5 then a finding

of retaliatory animus or pretense would not be such a tall order.

As it stands, however, any evidence that Christy’s sworn (and

contemporaneously memorialized) understanding of events was

pretextual is undeniably scant.

Brown counters that several disputes of material fact

preclude summary judgment at this stage. In addition to

maintaining that she did not engage in any insubordination

3 In response to the company’s motion, Brown accuses the company

of making too much of the appearance that Brown had “locked Morris

out” of the company’s payroll program. According to Brown, such

“lock outs” occurred frequently with no ill intent, and Morris was

well aware of that fact. Maybe so. But this fact alone is

insufficient in meeting Brown’s burden of proving animus or

discrimination with purely circumstantial evidence – particularly

when the company has provided significant evidence and deposition

testimony supporting a good-faith belief that Brown had engaged in

insubordination and other unacceptable behavior.

4 She had. According to Christy, he had “written Brown up” for

bad behavior on two prior occasions. See Mot., Ex. F at 6–9.

5 She had not. According to Christy, Brown bristled at many of

the changes to this aspect of her role at the company. See, e.g.,

Mot., Ex. F at 4.

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whatsoever,6 Brown draws supposed evidence of pretext from the

company’s failure

to maintain a formal disciplinary policy, the vast

discretion left to those who knew of [Brown’s] medical

issues and medical leave, the failure of the

decisionmakers to equally ‘consider the context’

surrounding [Brown’s] actions as compared to other SCF

employees, the suspiciously close timing between

[Brown’s] return from leave and her termination, and the

utter failure to investigate the purported offense.

See Opp’n at 1.

Each of these arguments requires the Court - with no direct

evidence of animus or discriminatory intent to speak of – to second

guess the company’s business decision and practices. The Court is

not free to do so. Indeed, the Court “does not sit as a super-

personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business

decisions.” Dale v. Chi. Trib. Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir.

1986). “No matter how medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how

6 Brown is certainly entitled to her own opinion and version of

events. However, her subjective views are of far less salience

than the subjective views of the company, which she has sued for

retaliation and discrimination. Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit has

repeatedly held, “[m]anagement does not need to make proper

decisions, only non-discriminatory ones.” Bryant v. Compass Grp.

USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2005). As such, in the mine

run of cases where the truth lies somewhere in the middle, what

actually occurred is less legally important than what the

defendant-employer reasonably perceived. Such is the case here as

well – indeed, even if Christy was sorely mistaken as to the true

nature of Brown’s apparent insubordination, his good-faith belief

that Brown had repeatedly been insubordinate provides a lawful

basis for his decision to recommend that Brown be terminated.

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high-handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the

firm’s managers,” the Court’s inquiry is strictly “whether the

employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.” Pollard v.

Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1987)

(Easterbrook, J.).

As a result, even when viewed in the light most favorable to

Brown, the tangled web of circumstantial evidence Brown offers in

her 41-page opposition fails to show by a preponderance of the

summary judgment evidence that the company’s reasonable perception

of Brown’s insubordination is a mere pretext for FMLA retaliation

or ADA discrimination. Cf. Richardson, 434 F.3d at 332–33; Moore

v. Eli Lilly & Co., 990 F.2d 812, 815–16 (5th Cir. 1993) (“To

demonstrate pretext, the plaintiff must do more than ‘cast doubt

on whether [the employer] had just cause for its decision’; he or

she must ‘show that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that

[the employer’s] reason[] [is] unworthy of credence.’”

(alterations in original) (quoting Hanchey v. Energas Co., 925

F.2d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam))). Because a reasonable

factfinder could not do so here, summary judgment is warranted.

* * *

Aggrieved by her former employer’s facially valid decision to

terminate her for insubordination, the plaintiff cobbles together

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unimpressive circumstantial evidence in a kitchen-sink damages

suit. In the same breath, her complaint accuses her former

employer of not only terminating her in retaliation for her

decision to take FMLA leave, but also discriminating against her

on the basis of her disability, and even her race. The Court sees

no way on this record in which the plaintiff could successfully

“bear the burden of proof at trial” on the developed factual record

at hand. Cf. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: that the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED. The plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, January 20, 2021

Mes hie ( dua

bu Wh . Cy BRLDMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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