“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”
How later courts described this case
- “On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RAUL-ALEJANDRO RAMOS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS CASE NO. 19-9802
STATE OF LOUISIANA, et al. SECTION: “G” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Pending before this Court is a second “Motion to Dismiss” filed by Defendants Agent
Supervisor Tommy Anderson (“Anderson”), Agent Officer Jose Torres (“Torres”), and Agent
Officer Unk Rogers, Jr.’s (“Rogers”) (collectively, “Defendants”).1 In this litigation, Plaintiff
Raul-Alejandro Ramos (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendants are liable for damages Plaintiff
suffered due to his removal from the Supreme Court of Louisiana Law Library (the “Law Library”)
and from the Louisiana Supreme Court building.2 Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 In the instant motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s action
should be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity.4 Plaintiff opposes the
motion.5 Having considered the motion, the memoranda in support and opposition, the record, and
the applicable law, the Court grants the motion.
1 Rec. Doc. 24.
2 Rec. Doc. 1; Rec. Doc. 21.
3 Rec. Doc. 1.
4 Rec. Doc. 24.
5 Rec. Doc. 29.
1
I. Background
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges that on January 16, 2019, he went to the Louisiana Supreme Court Law
Library to work on a separate case.6 Plaintiff asserts that he was entering the building in order to
file a brief against Liberty Bank & Trust.7 Plaintiff alleges that he was stopped by Anderson and
Torres who told Plaintiff that he could not enter certain sections of the Supreme Court building.8
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were carrying out a “pre planned, pre determined, and deliberate
act” when they stopped Plaintiff, in order to restrain Plaintiff from filing his brief with the
Louisiana Supreme Court.9 Plaintiff claims that he objected to Anderson’s demands.10 Plaintiff
alleges that Anderson threatened Plaintiff with expulsion and arrest.11 Plaintiff claims that, out of
fear of arrest, he left the building.12 Plaintiff alleges that after he was escorted out of the building
by Torres and Rogers, he was informed that he was thereafter barred from the Supreme Court
building and that, if he returned, he would be arrested.13 Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of being
6 Rec. Doc. 1 at 4–5.
7 Rec. Doc. 21 at 2.
8 Rec. Doc 1 at 6–7; Rec. Doc. 21 at 1.
9 Rec. Doc. 21 at 2.
10 Rec. Doc. 1 at 7–8.
11 Id. at 8–9.
12 Id. at 9–13.
13 Id. at 13.
2
barred from the Supreme Court building and the Law Library, he was unable to properly research
his other cases.14
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on April 25, 2019, originally bringing claims
against the State of Louisiana, the Louisiana Supreme Court, Anderson, Torres, and Rogers
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.15 On July 1, 2019, all of the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss.16
The State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Supreme Court argued that they were immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment.17 Anderson, Torres, and Rogers argued that they were entitled to
qualified immunity.18
On March 30, 2020, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss in part and denied it in part.19
The Court dismissed without prejudice claims against the State of Louisiana and the Louisiana
Supreme Court under the Eleventh Amendment.20 The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
against Anderson, Torres, and Rogers in their official capacities for monetary damages under the
Eleventh Amendment.21
14 Id. at 14.
15 Id. at 1.
16 Rec. Doc. 7-1 at 2–3.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Rec. Doc. 16.
20 Id. at 35.
21 Id.
3
The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint and to file a Rule 7(a)(7) reply
responding to Anderson, Torres, and Rogers’s defense of qualified immunity.22 Specifically, the
Court found that Plaintiff did not have a clearly established right to access a public library nor did
Plaintiff have a clearly established right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before being
removed or banned from a library.23 Accordingly, Plaintiff had not carried his burden of alleging
facts that would overcome the qualified immunity defense as to those claims.24 Further, the Court
found that Plaintiff had not alleged facts to show that Anderson, Torres, and Rogers’ conduct
violated his constitutional right to access the courts.25 While recognizing the existence of a general
right of access to courts, the Court held that Plaintiff had not shown actual injury as a result of
being denied access to the Louisiana Supreme Court.26 Because Plaintiff’s claim was a backward-
looking claim, Plaintiff was required to provide facts identifying a nonfrivolous underlying claim
that Plaintiff lost as a result of being denied access to the Louisiana Supreme Court.27 The Court
found that Plaintiff had failed to provide information on any underlying claims.28
22 Id.
23 Id. at 34.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 30.
27 Id. at 31–32.
28 Id. at 32.
4
On July 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint.29 Plaintiff restates the facts
alleged in his original complaint.30 Plaintiff adds a new allegation that he was targeted by
Anderson and Torres under a “pre planned, pre determined, and deliberate act” to bar Plaintiff
from “getting into the Louisiana Supreme Court with [Plaintiff’s] Application Brief against
LIBERTY BANK & TRUST.”31 Plaintiff alleges that he was stopped by Anderson and Torres not
due to a complaint against him, but rather because of actions “going on behind the scenes relative
to [Plaintiff] and [Plaintiff’s] case against LIBERTY BANK N& [sic] TRUST.”32
On July 29, 2020, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.33 On September 8, 2020,
Plaintiff filed an opposition.34 On September 15, 2020, with leave of Court, Defendants filed a
reply.35
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. Defendants’ Arguments in Support of the Motion to Dismiss
In the instant motion, Defendants maintain that they are entitled to qualified immunity.36
Defendants assert that the Amended Complaint added “few facts” to the “general allegations”
29 Rec. Doc. 21.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 2.
32 Id. at 1.
33 Rec. Doc. 24.
34 Rec. Doc. 29.
35 Rec. Doc. 33.
36 Rec. Doc. 24.
5
contained in the original complaint.37 Defendants argue that the Court “previously determined that
Plaintiff’s original complaint failed to overcome the qualified immunity” defense of Defendants
and that the Amended Complaint “fails to cure the deficiencies noticed in the original
complaint.”38
B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
In response, Plaintiff argues that “the Court has a procedure and process that requires that
a trial on the merits move forward so as to allow a jury to bring judgment, settlement and peace to
all claims made by Plaintiff claimant and Defendants parties in this matter.”39 Plaintiff further
alleges that the case should proceed to trial because “the Court has denied Defendants previous
Motion to Dismiss” and should now “deny Defense any attempt to delay the Court’s Procedure
and Process to meet that end.”40 Finally, Plaintiff asserts that “the Court requires a jury to settle
all Plaintiff’s Claims made in it’s Court.”41
C. Defendants’ Arguments in Further Support of the Motion to Dismiss
In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “fails to respond to the [Motion to Dismiss] in any
meaningful way” and that Plaintiff’s opposition “contains only conclusory statements that this
matter should proceed to trial.”42 Defendants assert that “Plaintiff has the burden of overcoming
37 Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 2.
38 Id. at 4.
39 Rec. Doc. 29.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Rec. Doc. 33.
6
the defendants qualified immunity defense” and that Plaintiff has “failed to show that Defendants
committed any constitutional violations and that their actions were objectively unreasonable in
light of the law that was established at the time.”43 In conclusion, Defendants argue that “[s]imply
put, Plaintiff has failed to tailor his reply to the assertion of qualified immunity, as required by the
Court.”44
III. Legal Standard on a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed “for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”45 A motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”46 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”47 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”48 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow
the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”49
On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
46 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
47 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
48 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
49 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
7
and all facts pleaded are taken as true.50 Although required to accept all “well-pleaded facts” as
true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true.51 “[L]egal conclusions can provide
the framework of a complaint, [but] they must be supported by factual allegations.”52 Similarly,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements” will not suffice.53 The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it
must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action.54 That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned, the defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”55 From the face of the complaint, there must be enough
factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each
element of the asserted claims.56 If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an
“insuperable” bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.57
50 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see
also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
51 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78.
52 Id. at 679.
53 Id. at 678.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).
57 Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Metro. Human Serv. Dep’t, No. 09-
6470, 2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
8
IV. Analysis
A. Whether Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity
To plead a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff is required to allege facts demonstrating that: (1)
the defendant violated the Constitution or federal law; and (2) the defendant was acting under the
color of state law while doing so.58
Government officials can defend against a Section 1983 claim by asserting qualified
immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials sued in their
individual capacities “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”59 Qualified immunity is an “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.”60
In this manner, “[o]ne of the most salient benefits of qualified immunity is protection from pretrial
discovery, which is costly, time-consuming, and intrusive.”61
Once a defendant has invoked the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff carries the
burden of demonstrating its inapplicability.62 In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court set forth a
two-part framework to determine if a plaintiff has overcome a qualified immunity defense.63 First,
58 See Wilson v. Dallas Cty. Hosp. Dist., 715 F. App’x 319, 323 (5th Cir. 2017).
59 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
60 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009).
61 Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012).
62 Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009).
63 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
9
the Court asks “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts
alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”64 Second, the Court considers
whether the allegedly violated right is “clearly established” in that “it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”65 The Court does
not have to address these two questions sequentially; it can proceed with either inquiry first.66
Commencing with the second prong of the Saucier framework, the Court must determine
whether a plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. When
deciding whether the right allegedly violated was “clearly established,” the Court asks whether the
law so clearly and unambiguously prohibited the conduct such that a reasonable official would
understand that what he was doing violated the law.67 “Answering in the affirmative requires the
court to be able to point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority—
that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity. This
requirement establishes a high bar.”68 When there is no controlling authority specifically
prohibiting a defendant’s conduct, the law is not clearly established for the purposes of defeating
qualified immunity.69
64 Id. at 201.
65 Id. at 202.
66 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that,
while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”); see also
Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2014).
67 May v. Strain, 55 F.Supp.3d 885, 897 (E.D. La. 2014) (Brown, J.) (citing Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d
496, 503 (5th Cir. 2013)).
68 Id.
69 Id.
10
Even if “the defendant’s actions violated a clearly established constitutional right,”
however, the inquiry under the Saucier test is incomplete.70 The court will then ask whether
qualified immunity is still appropriate because the defendant’s actions were ‘objectively
reasonable’ in light of ‘law which was clearly established at the time of the disputed action.’”71
Officials “who reasonably but mistakenly commit a constitutional violation are entitled to
immunity.”72
In the context of a motion to dismiss, “a district court must first find ‘that the plaintiff’s
pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity.’”73
“Thus, a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged
and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.”74 After the district court
determines that plaintiff’s pleadings meet this requirement, “if the court remains ‘unable to rule
on the immunity defense without further clarification of the fact,’ it may issue a discovery order
‘narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim.’”75
70 Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 537
(5th Cir. 2004)).
71 Id.
72 Collins, 382 F.3d at 537 (quoting Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir.
2001)).
73 Backe, 691 F.3d at 648 (quoting Wicks v. Miss. State Emp’t Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1995)).
74 Id. at 648.
75 Id. (quoting Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1987)).
11
Here, Defendants’ asserted a defense of qualified immunity to Plaintiff’s allegations.76
Plaintiff then had the burden of alleging facts to overcome this defense by showing a constitutional
violation of a clearly established right. In ruling on the Defendants’ initial Motion to Dismiss, the
Court held that Plaintiff had not “carried his burden of alleging facts that would overcome the
qualified immunity defense” raised by Defendants.77 The Court held that Plaintiff had not alleged
a violation of a clearly established right as required under the Saucier analysis.78 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court held that: (1) there is not a clearly established constitutional right to access
the Law Library;79 (2) Plaintiff did not have a due process right to be heard prior to his removal
from the Law Library or, in the alternative, that due process was provided before Plaintiff was
removed from the Law Library;80 (3) Plaintiff had not adequately asserted a right to access the
Louisiana Supreme Court because he failed to identify a “nonfrivolous underlying claim”;81 and
(4) Plaintiff failed to allege an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.82 The
Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint and to file a Rule 7(a)(7) reply to address
Defendants’ affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on
76 Rec. Docs. 7, 24. The Court notes that Defendants’ qualified immunity defense would not bar a claim by
Plaintiff against Defendants for injunctive relief. See Williams v. Ballard, 466 F.3d 330, 334 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006)).
However, Plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief against Defendants. See Rec. Docs. 1, 21.
77 Rec. Doc. 16.
78 Id. at 19–34.
79 Id. at 19–21.
80 Id. at 21–27.
81 Id. at 27–33; United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 830–31 (5th Cir. 2012).
82 Rec. Doc. 16 at 33.
12
July 15, 2020.83 Accordingly, the Court considers whether the Amended Complaint alleges
sufficient facts to overcome Defendants’ qualified immunity defense.
B. Whether the Amended Complaint Overcomes Defendants’ Qualified Immunity Defense
A defense of qualified immunity by itself does not “subject the complaint to a heightened
pleading standard.”84 However, a Court may, in its discretion, “insist that a plaintiff file a reply
tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity” under Rule 7(a)(7) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.85 A Rule 7(a)(7) reply must provide more than “mere conclusions” and
“cannot be allowed to rest on general characterizations.”86 Instead, a Rule 7(a)(7) reply must
comport with the principle of “heightened pleading” by including “allegations of fact focusing
specifically on the conduct of the individual who caused the plaintiffs’ injury.”87 A Rule 7(a)(7)
reply “must be tailored to the assertion of qualified immunity and fairly engage its allegations.”88
As discussed above, Plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to overcome the qualified
immunity defense. Nevertheless, the Court denied Defendants’ initial Motion to Dismiss to the
extent it sought to dismiss the individual capacity claims under the doctrine of qualified
immunity.89 Instead of dismissing Plaintiff’s claims at that time, the Court ordered Plaintiff to
83 Rec. Doc. 21.
84 Arnold v. Williams, 2020 WL 5668461, at *3 (5th Cir. 2020).
85 Id.; see also Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995).
86 Floyd v. City of Kenner, La., 351 Fed. Appx. 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Schultea, 47 F.3d at
1432).
87 Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
88 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.
89 Rec. Doc. 16.
13
amend the Complaint and file a Rule 7(a)(7) reply addressing Defendants’ defense of qualified
immunity.90 The Court ordered Plaintiff to amend the original complaint and file a Rule 7(a)(7)
reply alleging facts “tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity.”91
The Amended Complaint, however, fails to fulfill this directive. The Amended Complaint
does not allege specific facts relating to either prong of the Saucier test to overcome a qualified
immunity defense. As discussed in this Court’s prior order, there is not a clearly established right
to access the Law Library92 and Plaintiff did not have a due process right to be heard prior to his
removal from the Law Library.93 Alternatively, even assuming that a due process right existed,
the Court found that due process was provided before Plaintiff was removed from the Law
Library.94 Plaintiff did not address these issues in the Amended Complaint and he has not
presented any authority to show a clearly established right to access the Law Library.
As discussed in the prior order, there is a general right of access to courts but, to succeed
on such a claim, Plaintiff must assert facts identifying a nonfrivolous underlying claim that
Plaintiff lost as a result of being denied access to the Louisiana Supreme Court.95 However, in the
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff merely reiterates that he was allegedly removed from the Louisiana
Supreme Court while on his way to file a brief against Liberty Bank & Trust.96 Plaintiff provides
90 Id.
91 Id. at 34.
92 Id. at 19–21.
93 Id. at 21–27.
94 Id. at 26–27.
95 Id. at 31–32.
96 Rec. Doc. 21 at 2.
14
no further information on any claims that he allegedly lost as a result of his removal from the
Louisiana Supreme Court building.”’ Beyond this claim, the Amended Complaint provides no
new allegations of other constitutional violations that could form the basis for overcoming
Defendants’ qualified immunity defense.
Because Plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation of a clearly established right,
Plaintiff falls short in overcoming Defendants’ defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly,
Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of alleging facts that would overcome Defendants’
qualified immunity defense. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show
that Defendants’ violated a clearly established constitutional right.
Accordingly,
IT IS HERBY ORDERED that Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss”®* is GRANTED.
Plaintiff's individual capacity claims against Defendants under Section 1983 are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 9th day of December, 2020.
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 Td.
8 Rec. Doc. 24.
15