The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CLAYTON CANGELOSI CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 20-1991
GOVERNOR JOHN BEL EDWARDS SECTION: "A" (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
The following motion is before the Court: Motion to Dismiss Under Rule
12(b)(1) for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Under Rule 12(b)(6) for Failure
to State a Claim (Rec. Doc. 17) filed by the defendant, John Bel Edwards, Governor of
the State of Louisiana. The plaintiff, Clayton Cangelosi, opposes the motion. The
motion, submitted for consideration on October 14, 2020, is before the Court on the
briefs without oral argument.1 For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
I. Background
This case involves a constitutional challenge to Emergency Proclamation 89
JBE2020, issued by the defendant, John Bel Edwards, Governor of the State of
Louisiana, on July 11, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Governor
issued the Proclamation to implement additional mitigation measures in an effort to slow
the spread of infection in Louisiana. Section 4 of the Proclamation is a Face Covering
Order, referred to colloquially as a “mask mandate” (at times hereinafter “the Mask EP”).
The Mask EP requires every individual in Louisiana to wear a “face covering over the
1 The Court notes that oral argument has been requested but in light of the issues
presented the Court is not persuaded that oral argument would be helpful.
nose and mouth when inside a commercial establishment or any other building or space
open to the public, whether indoor or outdoor.” (Rec. Doc. 17-2, Exhibit 1 at 3 § 4(A)).
The Mask EP is subject to several exceptions or exemptions. The Mask EP obligates
businesses and organizations to require all persons who enter their premises to wear a
face covering unless one of the enumerated exemptions applies to the individual. Under
the Mask EP’s enforcement provision, businesses and organizations that fail to enforce
the mask requirement are subject to written citations. Id. § 4(D). The state-wide mask
mandate, however, does not allow for governmental enforcement against individuals
who fail to comply with the mask mandate.
On July 13, 2020, the plaintiff, Clayton Cangelosi, proceeding pro se, filed this
action against the Governor in his official capacity. Cangelosi contends that the state-
wide mask mandate 1) constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on his liberty and
privacy rights in violation of the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution (Count I), 2) violates his rights to freedom of speech and assembly
and to petition his government under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution (Count II), 3) constitutes an unconstitutional infringement
of his fundamental right to travel in violation of the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution (Count III), 4) constitutes an
unconstitutional infringement of his right to control his own body and to make his own
health decisions by restricting his access to fresh air in public in violation of the Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (Count IV), and 5)
violates state law (La. R.S. § 29:736(D)) (Count VI).2
2 The Court has not skipped over Count V in the enumeration above. Count V of the original
complaint was simply an invocation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source
Plaintiff seeks relief for the foregoing alleged violations of federal law pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count V). Plaintiff also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, asking
the Court to declare the Mask EP to be unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its
enforcement. Plaintiff also seeks damages in the amount of $1,500,000.00 for the
emotional distress and humiliation of being asked to leave the premises of certain
businesses and harassed in public places due to the mask mandate.
Defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety arguing that the
claims do not satisfy the requirements for Article III standing and that the claims are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Should any of Plaintiff’s claims survive those
obstacles, Defendant argues that the facts alleged fail to state a claim for a violation of
any right guaranteed by the Constitution.
II. Discussion
Article III of the United States Constitution extends the judicial power of the
United States to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. It is now well-
settled that Article III constitutes a constitutional limitation of federal court jurisdiction to
actual cases or controversies. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)
(citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in
the traditional understanding of a case or controversy. Id. The doctrine ensures that
federal courts do not exceed their jurisdictional authority, and it does this by limiting the
category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for
of substantive rights,” but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Therefore, Count V is the means for vindicating the federal rights
referenced in Counts I-IV; it does not constitute a separate basis for challenging the Mask
EP.
a legal wrong. Id. (citing Raines, 521 U.S. at 820; Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Americans United for Separ. of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)).
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has established that standing consists
of three elements: the plaintiff must have 1) suffered an injury in fact, 2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant (causation), and 3) that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environ. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). The plaintiff who files a complaint in federal court, as
the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements.
Id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). In order to satisfy this
burden at the pleading stage the plaintiff must clearly allege facts to satisfy each
element of Article III standing. Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 518). Moreover, the
plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief that he seeks.
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 185 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109
(1983)).
Even where the requirements of Article III standing are met, the sovereign
immunity conferred on the states by the Eleventh Amendment further limits the grant of
judicial authority found in Article III of the Constitution. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 98. The
Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against a state, state agency, or a state official
in his official capacity unless that state has waived its sovereign immunity. Corn v. Miss.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 954 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Bryan v. Tex. Dep’t of
Aging & Disability Servs., 781 F.3d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 2015); Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par.
Council, 279 F.3d 273, 280-81 (5th Cir. 2002)). A suit against a state official in his official
capacity is not a suit against the official personally but rather is a suit against the
official’s office. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 1985)). As such an official capacity suit is no
different than a suit against the state itself. Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165-66 (1985); Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment “generally precludes actions against state officers
in their official capacities.” Cantu Servs., Inc. v. Roberie, 535 Fed. Appx. 342, 344 (5th
Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir.
2004)).
An action against a state official in his official capacity may not be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment if the doctrine recognized by the Supreme Court in Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), applies. The Ex parte Young doctrine ensures that state
officials do not “employ the Eleventh Amendment as a means of avoiding compliance
with federal law.” Cantu Servs., 535 Fed. Appx. at 344 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 684, 688 (1993)). For Ex parte Young to
apply, the claim must be brought against a state official in his official capacity and the
relief sought must be “declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect.” Id.
(quoting Saltz v. Tenn. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 976 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1992)); Corn,
954 F.3d at 274. Furthermore, the state official must be committing an ongoing federal
violation. Id. Finally, the state official who has been sued must have some connection
with the enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional law. Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, ---
F.3d --- , No. 20-50793, 2020 WL 6058290, at *4 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2020) (citing In re
Abbott, 956 F.3d 696, 708 (5th Cir. 2020)).
Although standing is a jurisdictional issue and therefore should be resolved
before considering more substantive issues, see Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 616 (1973), this case involves claims against a state official—the Governor of
Louisiana—in his official capacity. As such, the Eleventh Amendment presents an
obstacle to all aspects of Plaintiff’s claims against the Governor. First, the claim against
the Governor for monetary relief ($1,500,000.00) and any claims premised on violations
of state law, whether statutory or constitutional, are dead on arrival without even
considering the enforcement provisions of the Mask EP. Neither the claim for monetary
relief,3 which constitutes non-injunctive retrospective relief, Corn, 954 F.3d at 274, nor
the claims premised on state law4 fall within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh
3 In addition to the insurmountable obstacle presented by the Eleventh Amendment, § 1983
does not allow for an award of damages against a state official in his official capacity to
redress past conduct because the state is not a “person” in the context of such a claim. Will,
491 U.S. at 64. Consistent with the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment a
state, and hence a state official in his official capacity, is a “person” under § 1983 when
sued for prospective injunctive relief. Id. at 71 n.10 (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14; Ex
parte Young, supra). Thus, even if the claim for damages was not absolutely barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, and even if it were justiciable vis à vis the Governor as an Article III
case or controversy, it would be subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim for such an exorbitant amount of damages appears to be
linked to the manner in which employees of private businesses have dealt with his attempts
to enter their premises without a face covering. As Judge Vance recently pointed out when
dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Jefferson Parish President Cynthia Lee Sheng, the
allegedly abusive private conduct that the plaintiff is complaining about is not fairly traceable
to Sheng, and it is certainly not traceable to Governor Edwards. Cangelosi v. Sheng, No.
20-1989, 2020 WL 5960682, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2020). And like the Jefferson Parish
mask mandate, abuse and harassment are neither required by the Mask EP or a natural
consequence of it.
4 In addition to the insurmountable obstacle presented by the Eleventh Amendment, § 1983
is only a remedial vehicle for violations of federal statutory and federal constitutional rights.
Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 353 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367
Amendment immunity, Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106 (1984) (recognizing that Ex parte
Young only applies to claims premised on federal law); Corn, 954 F.3d at 275. As to the
damages claims and state law claims the Eleventh Amendment bar is absolute and
insurmountable. Thus, for those claims any discussion of standing or whether the
plaintiff has pleaded a plausible claim for relief would be mere didactic exercises.
Second, as to the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims, i.e., those premised on federal
law for which the relief sought is injunctive and prospective in nature, the Eleventh
Amendment also presents an obstacle for the following reasons. For the Ex parte
Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment to apply, the state official that the plaintiff
is seeking to prospectively enjoin must be responsible for or at least have some
connection to the enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional law. Referring to the
specific provisions of the Mask EP, it becomes obvious that the Governor does not
enforce the Mask EP—rather enforcement is carried out by the State Fire Marshal and
the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. (Rec. Doc.
17-2, Exhibit 1 at 4 § 5). Thus, even if the Mask EP were violative of some federal right,
an injunction issued against the Governor would not alleviate the violation of any right
guaranteed under federal law because the Governor does not enforce the mandate
against anyone including the plaintiff herein. Therefore, the essence of the injunction
that Plaintiff seeks is one in which a federal court coerces the state’s executive into
F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2004)). Violations of state law are not cognizable under § 1983 unless
those violations also implicate a right guaranteed by federal law. See id. Thus, even if the
state law claims were not absolutely barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and even if they
were justiciable vis à vis the Governor as an Article III case or controversy, the § 1983
claims premised on state law would be subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
countermanding an executive order issued under state law. Ex parte Young does not
permit a federal court to take such action against the Governor and the exception does
not save the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims from the reach of the Eleventh Amendment.5
Given however that the Mask EP is enforced by state officials who are within the
executive branch of state government, and may very well be answerable to the
Governor at some level, one may argue that even without a direct enforcement role the
Governor has a “sufficient connection” with enforcement to open the door to the Ex
parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, at least insofar as the claims
premised on federal law for which the relief sought is injunctive and prospective in
nature are concerned. See Mia Familia Vota, 2020 WL 6058290, at *4 (citing In re
Abbott, 956 F.3d at 708). But for those claims even if they escape Eleventh Amendment
immunity, they fail based on Article III standing and the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
As to standing, because the Court must liberally construe a pro se litigant’s
pleadings, Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the Court will assume that the “injury” at issue for
purposes of standing is not the monetary damages for distress and humiliation that
crept into this case via the plaintiff’s amended prayer for relief (Rec. Doc. 9)—injury
5 As discussed below, aside from Ex parte Young, the lack of efficacy of an injunction
against the Governor in his official capacity also has ramifications for Article III standing.
So that Plaintiff will not second guess the wisdom of suing the Governor in his official
capacity only, the Court points out that because the Governor does not personally enforce
the Mask EP and has had no personal involvement in any of the alleged deprivations that
the plaintiff has sued upon, no claim against him would lie in his individual capacity. See
Henley v. Simpson, 527 Fed. Appx. 303, 307-08 (5th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (explaining
the folly of trying to evade the Eleventh Amendment by suing a state official in his individual
capacity for claims that are actually official capacity claims).
allegedly committed by third parties that have no connection to the sole defendant in
this case—but rather the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights when
business owners refuse to allow him to enter without wearing a face covering. In order
to move past the injury in fact element of standing, the Court will ignore two not
insignificant facts: the Mask EP itself cannot be and has never been enforced against
the plaintiff by the only governmental actors authorized to enforce it; and the private
business owners whose conduct the plaintiff is complaining about are not governmental
actors whose conduct is limited by the Constitution. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
Assuming solely for the sake of argument that the plaintiff has pleaded an injury
in fact chargeable to the sole defendant in this case, the standing requirements of
causation and redressability remain problematic. The private businesses that have and
will continue to enforce the Mask EP against the plaintiff are independent actors not
before the Court and they are the parties that are directly regulated by the Mask EP.
See Inclusive Communities Proj., Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 646 F.3d 649, 655-56 (5th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). As the defendant has pointed out, a private
business may refuse service to any person for any non-discriminatory reason, e.g., “No
Shirt, No Shoes, No Service.” (Rec. Doc. 17-1, Memorandum in Support at 10). Thus,
while Plaintiff may question the efficacy of face coverings in preventing the spread of
COVID-19, the owners of private businesses may not feel the same way. With or
without the Mask EP being in effect, those business owners might very well require a
face covering before entering their premises both for the protection of their employees
and for the protection of their other patrons who might otherwise be disinclined to enter
the premises if a face covering is not required. And even if this Court had some basis to
legitimately enjoin enforcement of the mask mandate, which it does not, those business
owners could very well continue to require the plaintiff to don a face covering before
entering their premises. The proposition that an injunction against the Governor would
relieve the plaintiff of having to wear a face covering in order to enter certain businesses
is highly speculative. Inclusive Communities Project, 946 F.3d at 655 (explaining that
redressability requires a showing that it is likely not just merely speculative that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision). Thus, the causation and redressability
elements of standing are not met here.6
But even if Plaintiff could escape the obstacles presented by the Eleventh
Amendment and problems with Article III standing, at the end of the day he fails to state
a claim for relief under any legal theory because even if the business owners could be
considered state actors for the purpose of requiring the plaintiff to wear a face covering,
a specious proposition at best, the face covering requirement does not violate any right
guaranteed by federal law. Simply, the claims grounded on violations of the Constitution
and federal law are legally frivolous for the reasons explained by Judge Vance in her
6 Plaintiff’s case for causation is further weakened by the fact that the facts pleaded
demonstrate that the businesses that the plaintiff is complaining about are taking an even
tougher stance on face coverings than what the Mask EP requires. The mask mandate is
subject to several exceptions or exemptions including “[a]ny individual with a medical
condition that prevents the wearing of a face covering.” (Rec. Doc. 17-2, Exhibit 1 at 3 §
4(B)(3). Plaintiff complains that some business do not accept his assertion that a medical
condition of his should exempt him from the face covering requirement, (Rec. Doc. 23,
Opposition at 2), but the Mask EP provides that “[o]perators of businesses and
organizations are entitled to rely on the representations of their customers, patrons, or
employees regarding whether or not they qualify for an exception from the face covering
requirements.” (Rec. Doc. 17-2, Exhibit 1 at 3 § 4(D)). Thus, if business owners have
offended the plaintiff’s sensibilities by questioning his claim to a medical exemption they
have not done so because of any coercion from the Governor or the Mask EP itself. Nothing
prevents them from taking more onerous steps than what the Mask EP would require.
Order and Reasons addressing the same constitutional claims against Jefferson Parish
President Sheng in conjunction with the parish’s mask mandate. Cangelosi v. Sheng,
No. 20-1989, 2020 WL 5960682, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2020).
Aside from the fatal flaws in his case that have already been discussed, Plaintiff
simply ignores that when faced with a society-threatening epidemic, a state may
implement emergency measures that curtail constitutional rights so long as the
measures have at least some “real or substantial relation” to the public health crisis and
are not “beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by fundamental
law.” In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 784 (quoting Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197
U.S. 11, 31 (1905)). The Supreme Court’s Jacobson decision instructs that all
constitutional rights may be reasonably restricted to combat a public health emergency.
Id. at 786. Thus, even if the facts pleaded had raised a plausible inference that a right
guaranteed under federal law might be implicated by the Mask EP, Plaintiff cannot
overcome the Jacobson hurdle, notwithstanding his own questioning of the efficacy of
face coverings vis à vis COVID-19.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Under Rule 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim
(Rec. Doc. 17) filed by the defendant, John Bel Edwards, Governor of the State of
Louisiana is GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety as follows: All
claims premised on federal law are dismissed with prejudice; all claims premised on
state law are dismissed without prejudice.’
November 3, 2020
C) <6 2
(fmey’s ATES CT JUDGE
7 The Court creates a distinction for purposes of the nature of the dismissal because the
Court is clearly without jurisdiction to adjudicate a state law claim against the Governor in
his official capacity, whereas the federal law claims fail for reasons beyond jurisdiction.
12